# LOCAL AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS AND FARMER STRATEGIES: THE CASE OF ÇİĞDEMLİ

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

AYKUT OZAN ALAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

SEPTEMBER 2024

Approval of the thesis:

**LOCAL AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS AND FARMER STRATEGIES: THE CASE OF ÇİĞDEMLİ**

submitted by **AYKUT OZAN ALAN** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Administration, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KİRAZCI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences _____

Prof. Dr. Kürşad ERTUĞRUL
Head of Department
Department of Political Science and Public Administration _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Münis Seven AĞIR
Supervisor
Department of Economics _____

**Examining Committee Members:**

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Tarık ŞENGÜL (Head of the Examining Committee)
Middle East Technical University
Department of Political Science and Public Administration _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Münis Seven AĞIR (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of Economics _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aylin TOPAL
Middle East Technical University
Department of Political Science and Public Administration _____

Prof. Dr. Bülent GÜLÇUBUK
Ankara University
Department of Agricultural Economics _____

Prof. Dr. Alp Yücel KAYA
Ege University
Department of Economics _____

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

**Name, Last Name: Aykut Ozan ALAN**

**Signature:**

## ABSTRACT

LOCAL AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS AND FARMER STRATEGIES:
THE CASE OF ÇİĞDEMLİ

ALAN, AYKUT OZAN

Ph.D., The Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Münis Seven AĞIR

September 2024, 512 pages

The decline of the village and peasantry as objects of research, the blurring of boundaries between rural and urban areas, and the reduction of agriculture to a subordinate element of agri-food chains, environment and food security have led to the neglect of local agricultural relations as a distinct field of study. Correspondingly, particularly in Central Anatolia, towns and villages that are disadvantaged in terms of agricultural conditions, with aging and declining populations, appear to be on their deathbeds, with a future envisioned where small farmers, and indeed all farmers, have exited the scene. However, these towns and villages are at the heart of a significant social, cultural, demographic, and economic transformation, where social classes are being transformed, dissolved, and new classes are emerging. To understand this transformation, there is a need for a holistic and bottom-up approach that can illustrate the multidimensional structure of agricultural relations, and their interactions with environmental and non-agricultural factors. This dissertation aims to analyze the social and class structures, economic and non-economic relationships, and power dynamics in the agricultural field of Çiğdemli, an Anatolian town exhibiting above-mentioned characteristics, using Bourdieu's theoretical framework and concepts of agricultural

field, agricultural habitus, and agricultural capital. It considers the differentiation among social classes under changing external conditions, examining the strategies of farming families to either exit or remain within the agricultural field, the new entrants into the agricultural field, the informal structures within agricultural relations, and the role of non-economic values and political relationships from an intergenerational perspective.

**Keywords**: Bourdieu, agricultural field, agricultural capital, agricultural relations, Çiğdemli

# ÖZ

YEREL TARIMSAL İLİŞKİLER VE ÇİFTÇİ STRATEJİLERİ:
ÇİĞDEMLİ ÖRNEĞİ

ALAN, Aykut Ozan
Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Münis Seven AĞIR

Eylül 2024, 512 sayfa

Köyün ve köylülüğün bir araştırma nesnesi olarak işlevini kaybetmesi, kırsal ve kentsel alanlar arasındaki sınırların bulanıklaşması ve tarımın tarım-gıda zincirleri, çevre ve gıda güvenliği konularının birer alt unsuruna indirgenmesi, yerel tarımsal ilişkilerin özgün bir inceleme alanı olarak ihmal edilmesine yol açmıştır. Buna paralel olarak özellikle İç Anadolu'nun tarımsal şartlar açısından dezavantajlı, nüfusu yaşlanan ve azalan kasaba ve köyleri adeta ölüm döşeğinde görülmekte, bu bölgelerde küçük çiftçilerin, hatta tüm çiftçilerin sahneyi terk ettiği bir gelecek tasavvur edilmektedir. Ancak, gerçekte, bu kasaba ve köyler, sosyal sınıfların dönüştüğü, tasfiye edildiği ve yeni sınıfların ortaya çıktığı büyük bir sosyal, kültürel, demografik ve ekonomik dönüşümün merkezindedir. Bu dönüşümü anlamak için, tarımsal ilişkilerin çok boyutlu yapısını ve çevresel ve tarım dışı etkenlerle olan etkileşimlerini gösterebilecek bütüncül ve aşağıdan yukarı bir yaklaşıma ihtiyaç vardır. Bu tez, belirtilen özellikleri sergileyen bir Anadolu kasabası olan Çiğdemli'deki tarımsal alandaki sosyal ve sınıfsal yapıları, ekonomik ve ekonomi dışı ilişkileri ve güç dinamiklerini Bourdieu'nun teorik çerçevesi ve tarımsal alan, tarımsal habitus ve

tarımsal sermaye kavramlarını kullanarak analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, değişen dış koşullar altında sosyal sınıflar arasındaki farklılaşmayı dikkate alarak, çiftçi ailelerinin tarımsal sektörden çıkma veya tarımsal sektörde kalma stratejilerini, tarımsal alana yeni girenleri, tarımsal ilişkilerdeki enformel yapıları ve nesiller arası bir perspektiften ekonomik olmayan değerlerin ve siyasal ilişkilerin rolünü incelemektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler**: Bourdieu, tarımsal alan, tarımsal sermaye, tarımsal ilişkiler, Çiğdemli

*To my mother*

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation was written during a challenging process, with the support and contributions of many individuals and institutions. Though I may never fully repay their efforts, I would like to acknowledge at least some of those who have contributed here.

I would like to start by acknowledging the invaluable contributions of esteemed academics. First and foremost, this dissertation was completed thanks to the tremendous support and guidance of my thesis advisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. M. Seven Ağır. I owe her a great debt of gratitude for her patience, solidarity, time, and attention. I also extend my sincere thanks to the esteemed jury members Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Tarık Şengül, Prof. Dr. Bülent Gülçubuk, Prof. Dr. Alp Yücel Kaya, and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aylin Topal for being part of the thesis committee and for their valuable contributions throughout the process.

I owe a great deal to Hakkı Doğan, the teacher who made significant contributions to the education of Çiğdemli, who introduced me to Çiğdemli during the fieldwork, acted as a guide, and a gatekeeper. Without him, I could not gain such an insider's perspective on Çiğdemli. I am deeply grateful to him for his support and hospitality.

I feel immense gratitude towards the wonderful people of Çiğdemli, which became like a second home to me. I am indebted to all of them for opening their homes to me and their hospitality.

The support provided by public institutions and officials during the process was also of critical importance. In this regard, I would like to thank the family of the Turkish Grain Board, where I worked as a public servant for 13 years, the Çiğdemli Municipality and its former mayors, the Sorgun District Directorate of Agriculture, the General Directorate of Agricultural Reform, and the General Directorate of Meteorology for their interest, contributions, and facilitative assistance.

I am also deeply grateful to my dear friends Dr. Mustafa Arıkan and Dr. Turgay Gülpınar, who supported me throughout the entire process.

Lastly, I must mention that the greatest credit for completing this thesis goes to my dear wife, Duygu Alan, and my beloved family, who bore the entire emotional burden of this process with great patience and never withheld their love and support. In addition to her boundless emotional support, Duygu's critical contributions played a significant role in this journey. I am eternally grateful to her and my family for their unwavering support.

.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM ..... iii

ABSTRACT ..... iv

ÖZ ..... vi

DEDICATION ..... viii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..... ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..... xi

LIST OF TABLES ..... xvii

LIST OF FIGURES ..... xviii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..... xxi

CHAPTERS

1. AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS REVISITED ..... 1

1.1. Introduction ..... 1

1.2. Rise and Fall of Peasantry as Central Focus ..... 8

1.2.1. Origins of Dualist Interpretation of Peasantry ..... 10

1.2.2. Peasant Mindset: Moral Economy vs. Market Rationality ..... 12

1.2.3. Contributions of Rural Sociology and Anthropology ..... 14

1.2.4. Agrarian Question, Marxism and Revolutionary Role of Peasantry ..... 17

1.2.5. Alexander Chayanov and Peasant Economy ..... 20

1.2.6. Developmentalism and Dual Economy Models ..... 23
1.2.7. Global Shocks and Policy Shifts (1970s Onwards) ..... 27
1.2.8. Contemporary Topics, Concepts and Debates ..... 31
1.2.9. Need for Rethinking Local Agricultural Relations ..... 41
1.3. Turkish Case: Relevant Literature and History of Agricultural Policies ..... 46
1.3.1. Relevant Literature on Peasantry and Agriculture ..... 46
1.3.2. A Brief History of Agricultural and Rural Policies in Turkey ..... 51
1.3.3. Choosing Çiğdemli: Justifications for Research Site ..... 67
1.4. Theoretical Background: Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu ..... 69
1.4.1. Theory of Practice ..... 71
1.4.2. Habitus ..... 73
1.4.3. Theory of Capital ..... 75
1.4.4. Field ..... 83
1.4.5. Theory of Class ..... 86
1.4.6. Theory of State ..... 100
1.4.7. Application of Bourdieusian Concepts to Agricultural Relations ..... 102
1.5. Ontology, Epistemology, Methodology and Field Research ..... 123
1.5.1. Ontology and Epistemology ..... 123
1.5.2. Field Research, Methodology, and Research Sample ..... 126
2. CASE STUDY: ÇİĞDEMLİ ..... 135
2.1. Stage Where Agricultural Game is Played ..... 138

2.1.1. Agricultural Game ..... 138
2.1.2. Town and Villages: Physical Boundaries of Field ..... 140
2.1.3. Concept of Agricultural Field in Çiğdemli ..... 142
2.1.4. Basic Climatic and Geographic Features of Region ..... 143
2.1.5. Past and Present of Çiğdemli ..... 145
2.2. Changing Technology ..... 146
2.2.1. Technological Change in Figures ..... 148
2.2.2. Technological Change in Collective Memory ..... 154
2.2.3. Harvesters' Impact on Crop Choice ..... 157
2.2.4. Harvesters' Impact on Seasonal Agricultural Laborers ..... 159
2.2.5. Technology's Impact on Social Transformation ..... 164
2.3. Depletion of Water Resources ..... 169
2.3.1. Drought, Past and Present ..... 170
2.3.2. Decrease in Average Precipitation ..... 173
2.3.3. Groundwater Overuse ..... 177
2.3.4. Consequences of Water Scarcity ..... 179
2.3.5. Water Policy/ Politics of Water ..... 185
2.4. Demographic Transition ..... 189
2.4.1. Migration to Urban Areas ..... 190
2.4.2. Ageing ..... 197
2.4.3. Return Migration ..... 204

2.4.4. Changing Face of Seasonal Agricultural Labor: Refugees ..... 207
2.4.5. Effects of Demographic Trends on Agricultural Field..... 208
2.4.6. Population Policy/ Politics of Population..... 211
2.5. Collapse of Local Industry, Commercial Life, and Public Institutions..... 214
2.6. Municipality and Politics ..... 222
2.6.1. History of Municipality..... 223
2.6.2. Investments and Debt Crisis..... 226
2.6.3. Political Rivalry, Favoritism and Corruption..... 227
2.6.4. Municipality's Impact on Agricultural Field ..... 233
2.7. Change in Agricultural Policies ..... 234
2.7.1. Public and Private Organizations in Çiğdemli ..... 235
2.7.2. Recent Agricultural Policies..... 251
3. FARMERS AND STRATEGIES..... 261
3.1. Social Classes in Çiğdemli..... 262
3.1.1. Principles of Classification..... 263
3.1.2. Social Classes and (Survival) Strategies ..... 268
3.1.3. Elderly Small Farmers: Farming out of Necessity ..... 273
3.1.4. Part-Time Farmers..... 282
3.1.5. Big Farmers..... 296
3.2. Land, Farmer Strategies and Policy Implementations ..... 311
3.2.1. Land Fragmentation, Acquisition and Registration Policies..... 313

3.2.2. Informal Property Relations and Agricultural Support Policies ..... 325
3.3. Local Agricultural Market: Formal and Informal Rules of the Game ..... 331
3.3.1. Informal Financial Structures and Agricultural Policies..... 331
3.3.2. Gas Stations and Public Procurement Policies..... 342
3.3.3. Turkish Grain Board and Public Procurement Policies ..... 343
3.3.4. Gas Stations as Dominant Merchants of Çiğdemli ..... 349
3.3.5. Class Struggle Embedded in Social Relations: Gas Stations..... 361
3.4. Non-Market Cost Reduction Strategies ..... 372
3.4.1. Sugar Beet Production and Return to Domestic Labor..... 373
3.4.2. Cutting Fertilizer and Certified Seed Costs ..... 376
3.4.3. Consequences of Input Cuts..... 379
3.5. Informal Trade Activities and Formal Economic Structures ..... 381
3.5.1 Merchants and Turkish Grain Board Procurements..... 382
3.5.2. Sugar Beet Policies and Sugar Factory Procurements ..... 385
3.5.3. Sugar Beet Pulp Trade ..... 391
3.6. Transformation of Cultural Capital..... 393
3.6.1. Tractor Purchases: Symbols of Class Distinction ..... 395
3.6.2. Mayors and Cultural Capital: Intersecting Perspectives ..... 400
3.6.3. Laziness, and Conscious Farming as Markers of Class Distinction ..... 404
3.6.4. Part-Time Farmers and Two Sides of Cultural Capital..... 410
4. FUTURE OF ÇİĞDEMLİ: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .. 414

REFERENCES ..... 422

A. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE. 479

B. SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONAIRRE ..... 480

C. TABLE OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS ..... 484

D. CURRICULUM VITAE ..... 487

E. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET ..... 489

F. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU ..... 512

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Division of Capital ..... 118
Table 2: Drought Classification by SPI Value ..... 176
Table 3: Migration to Yozgat from Abroad, 2016-2021 ..... 207
Table 4: Municipal Council Elections, 1977-2019 ..... 224
Table 5: Distribution of Loans Provided to Partners by Group (Thousand TL) ..... 239
Table 6: Collection Rates, Agricultural Credit Cooperatives, 2011 – 2021 ..... 240
Table 7: Sugar Beet Quota Distribution, 2010 - 2022 ..... 243
Table 8: Türkşeker Sugar Beet Procurement Prices, 2015-2020 ..... 245
Table 9: Turkish Grain Board Procurements in Sorgun, 2005-2021 ..... 249
Table 10: Supports Paid to Producers Storing Products in Licensed Warehouse ..... 253
Table 11: Young Farmer Support Payments, 2016-2018 ..... 254
Table 12: Supports under Rural Development Investments Support Program ..... 259
Table 13: Farmers, Land Size, and Rental Contracts, 2019 ..... 314
Table 14: Distribution of Farm Size Per Farmer ..... 316
Table 15: Land Ownership of Big Farmers, Çiğdemli ..... 317
Table 16: Distribution of Agricultural Holdings and Land by Holding Size ..... 319

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Total Number of Tractors in Sorgun, 2004-2020 ..... 149

Figure 2: Tractor Numbers by Hp Ranges, Sorgun, 2004-2020 ..... 149

Figure 3: Number of Combine Harvesters in Sorgun, 2014-2020 ..... 150

Figure 4: Amount of Equipment in Selected Items, 2004-2020 ..... 151

Figure 5: Total Chemical Fertilizer Consumption by Plant Nutrient ..... 151

Figure 6: Plant Protection Products Usage by Year, Turkey, 2006-2020 ..... 152

Figure 7: Use of Plant Protection Products, Yozgat, 2016-2020 ..... 153

Figure 8: Ankara-Sivas High-Speed Train Line, Çiğdemli, 08/30/2019 ..... 154

Figure 9: Cultivated Area of Cereals, Legumes and Fallow Land ..... 158

Figure 10: Stream Bed, Büyük Öz, 08/31/2019 ..... 171

Figure 11: Map of Çiğdemli and Ortaçayır ..... 172

Figure 12: Ortaçayır, 08/31/2019 ..... 173

Figure 13: Annual Precipitation, Sorgun, 1985-2020 ..... 175

Figure 14: 12-Month SPI for Sorgun Station ..... 176

Figure 15: April-May SPI for Sorgun Station ..... 177

Figure 16: Groundwater Well, Ortaçayır, 08/31/2019 ..... 178

Figure 17: Number of Livestock, Sorgun, 2004-2020 ..... 181

Figure 18: Number of Water Buffalos, Sorgun, 2004-2020 ..... 182

Figure 19: Population of Turkey, 1965-2019 ..... 192

Figure 20: Population of Yozgat, 2000-2018 ..... 192

Figure 21: Rural and Urban Population of Yozgat, 1965-2019 ..... 193

Figure 22: Migration to and from Yozgat, and Net Migration, 1975-2018 ..... 194

Figure 23: Population of Çiğdemli 1965-2000 ..... 195
Figure 24: Population of Çiğdemli 2007-2018 ..... 196
Figure 25: Turkey's Population by Age Groups 1935-2019 ..... 198
Figure 26: Dependency Ratios of Turkey, 1935-2019 ..... 199
Figure 27: Population Pyramids for Çiğdemli, 1985 ..... 200
Figure 28: Population Pyramids for Çiğdemli, 2000 ..... 200
Figure 29: Population Pyramid for Urban Sorgun, 2019 ..... 201
Figure 30: Population Pyramid for Villages of Sorgun, 2019 ..... 202
Figure 31: Dependency Ratios of Sorgun District Center, 1985-2019 ..... 203
Figure 32: Dependency Ratios of Sorgun Villages and Towns, 1985-2019 ..... 203
Figure 33: Old Factory, Çiğdemli, 09/08/2019. ..... 206
Figure 34: Abandoned Flour Mills, 08/30/2019 ..... 214
Figure 35: Screenshots of National Day Ceremonies, Çiğdemli, 04/23/1986 ..... 215
Figure 36: Çiğdemli Yogurt Container, 09/29/2019 ..... 218
Figure 37: Abandoned Building of Çiğdemli ACC, 08/30/2019 ..... 220
Figure 38: Sectoral Distribution of Loans, Yozgat, Q3 2019 ..... 238
Figure 39: Gas Station A, 08/04/2019 ..... 251
Figure 40: Gas Station B, 08/30/2019 ..... 251
Figure 41: Average Farm Size Per Farmer, Çiğdemli, 2014 - 2020 ..... 315
Figure 42: Distribution of Farm Size Per Farmer, Çiğdemli ..... 315
Figure 43: Price Movements and Market Interventions, Çiğdemli ..... 343
Figure 44: Turkish Grain Board Purchases, Turkey, 2005-2021 ..... 344
Figure 45: Turkish Grain Board Purchases, Sorgun, 2005-2021 ..... 345
Figure 46: Ratio of TGB Purchases in Sorgun to Total ..... 346
Figure 47: Number of Villages with Sugar Beet Production, Yozgat, 2002-2020 ..... 388
Figure 48: Number of Sugar Beet Producers, 2002-2020 ..... 388

Figure 49: Size of Quota-A Production Area, 2002-2020 .....389

Figure 50: Quota-A per Farmer, 2002-2020 .....390

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACCs ..... Agricultural Credit Cooperatives

ARIP..... Agriculture Reform Implementation Project

CAP .....Common Agricultural Policies

DIS ..... Direct Income Support

EEC ..... European Economic Community

ELÜS .....Electronic Product Receipt

EU .....European Union

IMF .....International Monetary Fund

PANKOBİRLİK .....Union of Sugar Beet Growers' Cooperatives

TEK ..... Turkish Electricity Authority

TGB .....Turkish Grain Board

TÜSİAD .....Turkish Industry & Business Association

WB ..... The World Bank

WTO .....World Trade Organization

# CHAPTER 1

# LOCAL AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS REVISITED

## 1.1. Introduction

This dissertation pursues a simple yet crucial question that emerges when observing agricultural relations in rural Anatolia. In a small, semi-arid, and agriculturally limited town in Central Anatolia—where the population has been aging and declining for a long time, the traditional economic patterns have been absorbed by capitalist relations, and what remains of local traditions and culture is ambiguous—do unique social relations and class struggles clustered around agricultural relations still exist? If they do, are these relations significant enough to be examined by social sciences concerned with the future of rural agricultural life, particularly in terms of their potential to influence or even reverse this trajectory? If so, with what conceptual tools can we understand these relations, and on what theoretical plane can we analyze them?

To address these questions, the dissertation aims to (1) present a systematic approach derived from Bourdieu's social theory that demonstrates the interaction of long-term external factors, local informal structures, and agricultural policies to provide a comprehensive analysis of local agricultural relations in the agriculturally disadvantaged town of Çiğdemli, and (2) illustrate the class dynamics among farmers and their differentiated survival strategies within the agricultural field, thereby drawing inferences about the present and future of agricultural relations in a Central Anatolian town such as Çiğdemli.

The primary assertion of the dissertation is to propose an approach that reconsiders agricultural relations as an integrated system of social, political, and economic interactions. This endeavor seeks to counteract the gradual fragmentation of a subject of study that has existed since ancient times, from Hesiod (Millett, 1984), and its disintegration into parts within current political and academic agendas. For centuries,

agriculture has not only been referred to as an economic activity but also considered a universal condition of human existence, associated with a specific type of social organization and common characteristics. Agriculture and the rural life, with their physical boundaries, economic foundations, and its folklore, pointed to a relatively undisputed social reality. In this context, the peasant, as the main object/subject of the agricultural society, has constituted one of the primary social categories even in the modern era. The peasant has been a central category in sociology's discussions on modernization (e.g., Tönnies, 2001; Durkheim, 1960), political science's analyses of democracy and revolution (e.g., Polanyi, 2001), and economics' explorations of industrialization (e.g., Boeke, 1954; Higgins, 1954; Lewis, 1956).

In recent decades, a notable transformation has occurred whereby the traditional notions surrounding agriculture are undergoing dissolution. The death of peasantry (Hobsbawn, 2013), as a social class, has already been declared, while villages have lost their traditional characteristics or simply absorbed by urban landscapes. Once well-known dichotomies such as rural versus urban, subsistence economy versus capitalism, city dweller versus villager, and organic versus industrial have lost their delineations, reaching a point where categorizing agriculture as a distinct realm of social reality becomes increasingly challenging. The spatial and cultural specificities that once defined agriculture and village life have disappeared. The evaporation of the peasantry has reduced agriculture to an occupation stripped of all social and cultural ties. Without the social and cultural components, agriculture is no longer a standalone category but rather an adjective for various policy areas, such as commodity chain, food security, environmental sustainability, food justice, etc. (McMichael & Buttel, 1990).

This fragmentation the agricultural phenomenon has had its impact both in theory and in agricultural policy. In this new context where agricultural and non-agricultural areas are more intertwined than ever, the agriculture-related literature has shifted its focus to new trends. New peasant studies (e.g., Ploeg, 2008; Monllor, 2012) aim to substitute a new political subject for the vanishing traditional peasantry. In the absence of the peasantry as a political mass, the political existence of these new rural actors has been redefined in relation to urban struggles and within the context of global food chains. Macro theories addressing the global capitalist organization of food such as the food

regime analysis (McMichael, 2009; 2013) have reconceptualized agricultural relations as part of the agri-food chain. As food has become politicized around concepts such as food sovereignty (Declaration of Nyéléni, 2007), and fair trade (Fair Trade International, n.d.), the farmer, linked to the urban consumer through the agri-food chain, has gained a new political subjectivity (Petrini, 2001), in a fight against urban consumerism and global capitalist control over food (Andrew G. , 2008).

This profound transformation has resulted in the diminishing significance of local agricultural relations as a domain of political, sociological, and economic inquiry. Local agricultural relations have been integrated within the broader analysis of global structures, and reduced to a spatial and sectoral extension of urban-centered issues. Furthermore, throughout the 20$^{th}$ century, the multifaceted and rich perspective to village and rural life in the fields of anthropology, sociology, and ethnography began to be increasingly overlooked. As the non-monetary economy, unwritten rules, and traditional institutions of the village have been supplanted by capitalist market relations, modern institutions, and formal regulations, the application of holistic approaches -rooted in the analysis of the inseparable integration of economic, political, and social spheres within traditional village societies- has become constrained. Consequently, monetary economic relations have come to the forefront in addressing rural areas as a link in the capitalist production and consumption chain. The domain of mainstream economics has isolated farming families from the non-economic aspects of their lives by treating them as agricultural enterprises governed solely by the laws of pure economics, measurable only in monetary terms, while ignoring the informal, non-monetary, and statistically invisible forms of social relations and structures. Due to the simplification of local agricultural relations to purely economic terms, rural sociology has more concerned with identifying the obstacles that prevent agricultural actors from complying with laws of economics and with regulations posed by national or transnational authorities.

In contrast to the abovementioned perspective, this dissertation argues that there exists a *unique* domain of social and class relations within rural areas, characterized by distinctive qualities, social structures, patterns of relationships, and rules centered around agricultural relations. The dissertation posits that analyzing these local agricultural relations within the context of their inherent structure and their interaction

with external factors is crucial for understanding and analyzing the present and future of agriculture.

A comprehensive analysis of local agricultural relations is vital for understanding contemporary rural developments, requiring a theoretical approach that integrates the inherent uncertainties of agriculture with long-term technological, demographic, and climatic trends, as well as the historical and social context of the local community. Such an approach must recognize the dual role of local agricultural actors as both agents of social change and subjects constrained by structural forces. To effectively analyze the survival strategies, struggles, and competition among farmers, the analysis must be localized, incorporating external factors such as national and global structures, and recognizing the interplay between economic, social, and political aspects of rural life. Given the complexity of rural life, it is crucial to consider the influence of social rules, cultural codes, and local customs alongside formal laws and regulations when analyzing agricultural policies and their impacts on rural communities. These elements, together with the interactions between public authorities and local agricultural institutions, shape the distribution of resources and the dynamics within local agricultural relations.

The dissertation aims to achieve the above outlined objectives by drawing on Pierre Bourdieu's social theory. By doing this, the dissertation attempts (1) to define the *agricultural field* as a distinct domain of relations and a differentiated game, composed of distinct rules, economics of values, actors; to describe its internal structure, and its relations to the political and other fields (2) to examine external factors such as climate and demographics, and the complex and multilayer political, economic etc. trends, affecting the agricultural field, (3) to introduce economic, social, cultural and symbolic forms of agricultural capital to emphasize the non-economic forms of accumulated value that plays a vital role in the agricultural field, (4) to identify and describe the social classes based on their distinctive capital structure and habitus, (5) to describe the local, unwritten rules and informal structures as well as formal rules and policies that social classes and farmers interact with and struggle over; and (6) to demonstrate how different social classes pursue different class habitus, short and long term strategies to survive in agricultural field.

There are three main reasons for applying Bourdieu's social theory to this dissertation. First, we aim to move beyond the traditional discourse that views peasantry as a passive and anachronistic group, by emphasizing the agency of modern farmers within structural constraints. Second, we intend to address the growing integration of rural society with urban, national, and transnational structures while maintaining a clear focus on the distinct structure of the agricultural field. Finally, Bourdieu's framework provides essential tools for analyzing the agricultural field's complex power relations and social transformations.

The dissertation suggests a systematic approach based on Bourdieu's social theory that demonstrates the complex and multifaceted interaction between local relations and top-down trends, articulation of formal regulations and structures to informal ones, as well as interconnectedness of economic, social and political aspects of rural life. This theoretical framework also allows us to analyze the local relations of power, class dynamics, and struggle over distribution of resources. In this context, social classes' distinct structural dispositions (habitus) and survival strategies within the agricultural field will be discussed to draw inferences about the present and future of agricultural relations. The notion of habitus helps us understand how the dynamic struggle between agents results in a profound change in set of values, class formation, agricultural structures, in short, the rules of the game over time; although the agents themselves are born into pre-prescribed rules and structures.

For this purpose, the dissertation includes a field study conducted in Çiğdemli, a Central Anatolian town in Yozgat province. The town with its semi-arid climate, aging and declining population, and disintegrating traditional fabric, is representative of many similar settlements in the Central Anatolia region. The selection of this town is based on the general neglect toward such settlements in contemporary social science. Contrary to the belief that these increasingly desolate areas, due to their disadvantageous conditions, are inevitably headed for dissolution and extinction—thus lacking any local actors worth studying unless significant macro-level changes occur—this thesis will demonstrate the existence of important social structures and dynamics, as well as deeply rooted social movements and class struggles that are essential for understanding contemporary agricultural relations. The dynamic nature of these local relations holds the potential to shed light on the different transformations

that such settlements in Central Anatolia may experience in the future. It is also worth understanding how small farmers survive even under such unfavorable conditions since we might see elsewhere in the future, with increasing aridification.

Although the thesis objectives encompass a wide range of issues, certain topics have been excluded due to the dissertation's limitations. While the theoretical approach presented in the dissertation is applicable to all local agricultural relations, the generalizability of our conclusions regarding the local agricultural relations in Çiğdemli is constrained. In this context, it can be argued that Çiğdemli primarily represents settlements with similar economic, demographic, climatic, and agricultural characteristics, and that the explanatory power of the dissertation diminishes in settlements where these attributes differ.

The COVID-19 pandemic, a significant global development in recent years, has profoundly impacted agriculture and rural-urban relations. Since it emerged after the field research was completed and constitutes a research topic on its own, the pandemic has been excluded from the dissertation's scope.

Another limitation concerns the literature the dissertation draws upon. Due to its multifaceted perspective, the dissertation incorporates sources from various disciplines, mainly political science, rural sociology, and economics. However, given its scope, many topics that could justify standalone research are only addressed as needed to support the dissertation's objectives. The dissertation also avoids technical discussions related to agricultural engineering, as these fall outside its scope.

The following section of this chapter presents the relevant literature(s) on peasant studies, agricultural economy, agricultural politics, and rural sociology to summarize the rise and fall of peasantry and agriculture as an academic and political subject. The next section will provide an inventory of specific studies produced under different disciplines related to rural and agricultural fields, alongside a brief history of agricultural policies in Turkey. The section 1.4. is devoted to the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. It touches upon his theory of practice, theory of capital, the theory of class, notions of field, and habitus. After drawing a general picture of his social theory, the chapter follows with some key concepts, such as cultural capital and field, and

discusses their application to the case study. The last section lays out the ontological and epistemological foundations of the dissertation.

Chapter 2 is about the field research conducted in Çiğdemli. It consists of seven sections that describes the major trends affecting the agricultural field in the town. These trends define the boundaries of the agricultural field and set the rules of the agricultural game in Çiğdemli: Technology, climate and droughts, demographic transition, institutional and commercial structure, municipality and political history.

This chapter of the study explores the enduring trends shaping the agricultural landscape in Çiğdemli, beyond the influence of individual players. These long-term dynamics include technological advancements, water scarcity, demographic shifts, the decline of public and private institutions, and transformations in political and administrative structures. Technological changes, particularly mechanization, have reduced physical demands, altered crop choices, and impacted labor dynamics, leading to a shift in age composition and the decline of traditional social networks. Water scarcity has transformed arable crop choices, impacted fruit and vegetable cultivation, and prompted the commodification of water resources. Demographic transitions, marked by emigration and aging, are influenced by both natural processes and political maneuvers, including population manipulation for municipal gains. The disappearance of official institutions and light industries, coupled with a loss of non-farm jobs, has contributed to population decline and social fabric depletion. The municipality becomes a crucial economic redistributor, with proximity to the mayor influencing economic opportunities, leading to informal practices and corruption. Lastly, changes in agricultural policy frameworks and institutions, influenced by deregulation and EU harmonization, reflect contemporary concepts such as sustainability, environment, and food safety.

The third chapter of the dissertation explores the dynamics of the agricultural field in Çiğdemli, focusing on key agents—small farmers, part-time farmers, and big farmers—and their economic, social, and cultural capital. The study focuses on the vulnerability of small farmers, mainly elderly farmers engaged in small-scale agriculture, who face financial challenges and generational shifts leading to a decline in younger farmers. Part-time farmers, including wage laborers and civil servants,

benefit from additional income but possess distinct social and cultural capital. Large-scale farmers with extensive land holdings form the third group, enjoying financial stability. The chapter explores challenges related to land fragmentation and ownership issues, revealing the impact on agricultural practices and the failure of official policies to address local dynamics. The seasonal cycle of agricultural production is examined, emphasizing the debt cycle faced by small farmers, with gas stations emerging as significant players offering financial alternatives. The economic and social influence of gas stations is explored, showcasing their role in shaping market structures and social networks. The chapter concludes by examining how farmers cope with external challenges, particularly drought and economic conditions, and analyzes the impact on the implementation and effectiveness of agricultural policies. The transformation in cultural capital within the agricultural community is also discussed, reflecting a divergence between traditional small farmers and larger, urban-experienced farmers in their perspectives on farming issues. This comprehensive exploration sheds light on the multifaceted nature of the agricultural landscape in Çiğdemli.

In the third section, the class structure in Çiğdemli will be analyzed from a Bourdieusian perspective, focusing on the capital structures and agricultural habitus of small farmers, part-time farmers, and big farmers. The analysis will illustrate how different social classes develop survival strategies in response to the challenges they face in the agricultural field. The dissertation pays much attention to how these social classes allocate their capital between the agricultural field and other non-agricultural fields, as well as to their intergenerational exit strategies.

In the final section, the findings will be reviewed to determine whether the thesis has achieved its objectives. The suitability of Bourdieu's social theory as a theoretical framework for analyzing agricultural relations will be evaluated, and the potential future of Çiğdemli will be discussed.

### 1.2. Rise and Fall of Peasantry as Central Focus

The peasant community, as a well-documented social organization, can be traced back to Hesiod's *Works & Days* (Millett, 1984) and Aristotle (Marshall, 1947). From ancient times to the emergence of modern states, agriculture has attracted significant intellectual attention. The processes of capitalism, industrialization, and

modernization have brought interest in agriculture and farming communities to a new level, particularly in relation to these developments. In this context, agriculture first drew the attention of early economists, such as the physiocrats in the 17th and 18th centuries, who studied the relationship between agriculture and other productive activities to understand the source of national wealth. Their main concern was to advocate for specific economic policies, particularly the freedom of grain trade, which reflected "special needs of a new landowning class under a bankrupt monarchy and a fiscal system inherited from the past" (Ware, 1931, p. 618). Consequently, agriculture became a cornerstone of political economy at the very beginning of capitalism.

Agrarian societies have long attracted the attention of early sociologists, not only because they represent a mode of production that has evolved over thousands of years (Flannery, 1973) and shaped humanity's social, cultural, and political existence, but also because they help define the modern, industrialized, and urbanized world through contrast. The understanding of human existence often relies on a dichotomy between urban and rural, modern and premodern, and industry and agriculture. However, the boundaries between these concepts are not always clear, and they are often idealized rather than reflective of reality. Despite this, the duality has remained a central theme in social studies and policy throughout the 20th century.

In recent decades, the social, cultural, and economic structures related to agriculture have lost their definitive characteristics due to rapid changes. The traditional peasantry has disappeared, replaced by a new farmer community lacking traditional features, and joined by city dwellers, part-time farmers, and multinational corporations. There is spatial ambiguity as villages loses their distinct characteristics, while agricultural activities are done at the edges or even within urban areas (Tekeli, 2016). Agricultural policy has shifted from a focus on development and industrialization to issues such as agri-food, demographic changes, sustainable growth, global warming, and the environment.

This first chapter of the dissertation will explore the transformation of agricultural relations and the corresponding shift in how they are approached within the social sciences. It will trace the abandonment of approaches that once analyzed agriculture and peasantry as central concepts, showing how the loss of agriculture's definitive

characteristics and the blurring of rural-urban distinctions led to its marginalization in social sciences. The section will also examine the comprehensive contributions of peasant-centered literature and the conceptual erosion that followed its neglect, emphasizing the importance and potential of re-centering local agricultural relations in scholarly analysis. From anthropology and rural sociology, to agricultural economy, agricultural history and public administration there are numerous disciplines and sub-disciplines concerning the topics covered in the dissertation. As Halpern and Brode points out, these literatures evolved separately without enough interdisciplinary cooperation (Halpern & Brode, 1967, pp. 86-87). Although it is not always possible to cover all of them here, the following sections will briefly go over the common patterns and intersection points as long as the purpose of the dissertation is concerned.

### 1.2.1. Origins of Dualist Interpretation of Peasantry

The discipline of sociology has been born to understand the phenomenon of modernity. The founders of the field focused on the peculiarities of the industrialized, urbanized, and civilized Western world. Defining characteristics of this very recent type of human existence is often described in opposition to the previous type, the ancient society. Tonnies' community (Gemeinschaft) and society (Gesellschaft) (Tönnies, 2001), Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1960), and many others built their social theories upon this dualism. In this context, modernization refers to the transition of traditional societies into advanced Western societies. This process, marked by the Industrial Revolution, the formation of Western society, and capitalism, required significant changes in value systems, institutions, economic organizations, and social structures. In other words, breaking away from the ancient social order was a prerequisite for this progress. (Moore W., 1963, pp. 89-112).

This line of thought, the modernization approach, is shared by the pioneers of the social sciences, such as Spencer, Tylor, Morgan, Durkheim, and Marx (Long, 1982, p. 9). Some of them, such as the British sociologists and anthropologists Spencer (1867) and Morgan (2007), put their theories more on an evolutionary basis. Others, such as Marx (1993), have grounded their theory of historical progress on contradictions and power struggles. No matter what was accepted as the engine of history, dualism and the main pillars of modernist thought remained roughly the same.

European historians, specifically medievalists, were also interested in the peasantry to understand the economic, social, and political structure that transformed European feudalism into modern capitalism. The monumental studies by Bloch (1966) and Duby (1968) gave remarkable insights into medieval Europe's social, economic, and political order by focusing on the peasantry and the juridical order, technology, irrigation system, social structures, and relations of power around it.

Another reason the peasantry became a subject of intellectual interest is the Westernization process in Central and Eastern Europe. For the intellectual and governing elites who are dedicated to modernizing and/or westernizing their countries, the peasantry, "(…) the poorest, the most backward and numerically the largest section of their nations," was the primary problem to be dealt with (Shanin T., 1971, p. 289).

In many ways, the peasantry seemed to contradict what was considered modern: its social formation, culture, customs, and economy appeared anachronistic. All the characteristics attributed to the peasantry and the peasant economy reflected the contradictions of the modernization process. Thus, throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, Western scholars used the peasantry of the Western past to measure the progress of Western societies and the peasantry of non-Western countries to assess their perceived backwardness.

The peasantry also emerged as a unique phenomenon that coexists with modern society. It has been widely studied not only because this form of economy prevailed long before the Industrial Revolution and capitalism, but also because understanding the dynamics behind its persistence could help explain why much of the Third World still lags in modernization and industrialization. The reasons for economic backwardness and the barriers to change may lie in the peasantry's organization, customs, behavior, and socio-economic structure (Long, 1982, p. 41).

Studies on the peasantry have focused on these underlying motivations. Every attempt to define the peasant also implied an attempt to define the non-peasant; every value or human trait attributed to the peasantry influenced judgments of modern values and traits. This motivation, as we will see in the next section, led to an increased curiosity about the peasant's mental world, way of thinking, and worldview.

### 1.2.2. Peasant Mindset: Moral Economy vs. Market Rationality

Another aspect of the foundational role of peasantry in the core of modernism is the contrast between the thought patterns of peasants and urban dwellers. According to this approach, the unique mindset, worldview, and daily interactions within peasant societies contrast with modern urban dwellers (see Redfield, 1956; Wolf, 1966; Shanin, 1973). Those differences also act as obstacles to the development, progress, and, in short, peasants' modernization. In this context, the behavioral traits that coexist with the subsistence economy seem to contradict modern capitalism. The peasantry is often associated with risk aversion. They are considered to be unentrepreneurial, inert, and afraid of change. These are also the traits that stand before any progressive change. As Bloch says:

> It is trite but true to observe that peasant farming is still a great economic and social force today. The smallholding is still landlocked in its antiquated layout fields, still stubbornly resistant to change; there is little inclination toward sudden innovation (…), and ancestral habits are abandoned only with difficulty; technical improvements have made little headway. (…) Nevertheless, it can be said that peasant farming has not succumbed to the pressure of agricultural change. France is still a country where the land is in many different hands. (Bloch, 1966, pp. 246-247)

While there was broad consensus that the peasantry possesses a distinct, static/cyclical mindset resistant to development and change, the idea that this mindset is the cause of their circumstances was not without controversy. For instance, in attempting to understand the peasant rationale and morale, Foster believes that the state of subsistence, poverty, and deprivation equipped them with specific behaviors and worldviews (Foster, 1965). The source of the peasants' common worldview is the material conditions in which they live, not the other way around.

The distinct set of values and customs of the peasantry were also in confrontation with the single famous moral touchstone of liberal thought, *laissez-faire*. Since the 17$^{th}$ century, from the birth of the liberal school of thought, peasants' resistance to commercial liberalization and the development of capitalism drew attention. Polanyi (2001) argued that peasantry movements were a reaction to establishing a completely free market, a venture that is both impossible to achieve and equally dangerous. For him, it was a spontaneous but inescapable moment for people to mobilize against the

attempt to establish a free market that would endanger the very existence of society. By referring to a moral basis that peasantry took their strength from, Polanyi and others were revealing the true nature of the laissez-faire and the notion of the free market: It is nothing but a political construction, an ideology rather than a fundamental ethical premise that derives its source from reason and reason alone.

Peasant studies have embraced the exploration of ethics of economy outside of the capitalist rationale. The notion of "moral economy" proposed by Edward P. Thomson (1971) proposed the term "moral economy of the poor," which refers to the traditional social norms and obligations regarding the economic roles in a community as a moral stance, in contrast to the liberal principles of a self-regulating market. James Scott (1985b) then successfully adopted this concept to explain the intrinsic values behind peasant uprisings and how the peasantry conceives of exploitation. Scott looked deeper into peasants' perceptions of social justice and moral values. He developed an epistemologically different perspective based on the peasantry's perception of justice. This way, Scott would be able to explain the peasant revolts in England and Burmese not as "primary reactions" but as protests against "the rupture of the social contract with merchants and landowners" (Fassin, 2019, pp. 19-20).

Some others, such as Popkin (1979), described a peasant as a rational decision-maker who makes decisions in his best interest in every transaction he is involved. So, according to Popkin, under the various uncertainties, it is the rational move for peasants to secure their long-term interests and be averse to any risk that endangers them. So, Popkin's stance is against a notion of romanticized peasant morality and refuses to create a moral dichotomy between market institutions and the peasants. Although Scott and Popkin represent opposite views on this matter, they are both part of a "debate on the peasantry's encounter with modernity" (Yew-Foong, 2009, p. 25).

The debates over peasant rationale and morality have been based on a moral realm *against* or *despite* capitalism. These debates, in part, aimed to understand the mindset of the modern individual within the context of their relationship with capitalism, using the peasantry as a lens. In doing so, they also produced rich studies that demonstrated how the mental framework of peasant societies, their relationships with their environment and with each other, and their productive activities influenced

one another. However, as we will see later, as the historical fusion of peasant economy and peasant morality is invaded, and shattered by the capitalist market rationale, the axis of debate shifted from peasant to farmer. Replacing the peasantry with farmers led to the decline of the peasant mindset as a subject of study. The assumption that capitalist modes of relationship had fully absorbed rural and agricultural relations facilitated the rise of economically reductionist approaches, overshadowing this rich body of literature. Unlike peasants, farmers' economic relations were considered separable from other aspects of social life, leading to significant gaps in contemporary approaches to rural studies.

### 1.2.3. Contributions of Rural Sociology and Anthropology

So far, we have followed the historical cornerstones of studies on peasantry. Similar to the peasantry, the village, with its distinctive characteristics and its opposition to urban areas, has been a focus of sociological inquiry. In this context, rural sociology emerged as a specialized field of study within sociology in the United States between 1870 and World War I and later spread to Europe and other countries. The reasons behind the United States' pioneering role in rural sociology include its establishment as a new country through European immigration, the stark wealth disparity between industrial cities and the rural West and South, the scattered land structure, and questions of settlement and organization (Nelson, 1980, pp. 1-13).

The main purpose of rural sociology, as Sorokin and Zimmerman state, "(…) to describe the relatively constant and universal traits or relations of the rural social world as distinct from the non-rural social or urban social universe" (Sorokin & Zimmerman, 1929, p. 8). This rural world possesses characteristics that often stand in sharp contrast to the urban world, differing in occupations, environment, population size and density, social mobility, and stratification (Sorokin, Zimmerman, & Galpin, 1930, pp. 147-239). Rural sociology, with its focus on the spatial characteristics that distinguish rural populations from urban ones and the unique attributes of these areas, has significantly influenced the goals, implementation, and content of rural policies.

Although the agricultural economy plays a vital role in rural sociology, the rural sociology cannot be reduced to economic relations. In this respect, rural sociology has

made a major contribution to understanding the multifaceted nature of agricultural relations by bringing together many different sub-disciplines. As Taylor puts it, rural sociology "(…) cover the field rural government, rural ethics, rural religion rural education and rural social psychology" (Taylor, 1923, p. 592). This discipline recognizes that the non-economic aspects of rural life are integral components of the overall rural experience and, consequently, of the targeted level of development.

For a long time, anthropologists have been interested in primitive or savage life rather than peasantry. The distinction between a cultivator and a peasant is blurred in many studies (Dalton, et al., 1972). Peasantry became a significant concern for anthropologists only after World War II when the nations with significant populations of the peasantry became independent states (Geertz, 1961, p. 1). By 1956, in his famous book, Redfield would state that, unlike the first-generation anthropologists who were seeking to study isolated tribes, it became "[…] usual for an anthropologist to study a community connected with or forming part of a civilization or national state" (Redfield, 1956, p. 10). Consequently, rather than focusing on particular peasant communities, some anthropologists had attempted to work out a general definition of a universal 'peasant society'.

Kroeber gives one of the most famous definitions of peasant society: "Peasants are definitely rural-yet live in relation to market towns; they form a class segment of a larger population which usually contains urban centers, sometimes metropolitan capitals. They constitute part-societies with part-cultures" (Kroeber, 1948, p. 248). Here, peasantry is defined as being rural, in relation to market towns, and as a class segment. It gives us the definitive characteristics based on spatial, economic, and class relations. Being part-society with part-culture puts peasant societies somewhere in between nature communities (tribes) and industrial societies.

On the other hand, Firth (1963) describes peasant society in economic terms:

> The term peasant has primarily an economic referent. By a peasant economy, one means a system of small-scale producers with simple technology and equipment, often relying primarily for their subsistence on what they themselves produce. The primary means of livelihood of the peasant is the cultivation of the soil. This is not merely a physical attachment; the peasant is

> not a landless laborer but someone who has an individual or collective right or claim to the land. (Firth, 1963, p. 87)

Firth's definition covers a broader range of communities since, in this definition, the peasantry is not defined in relation to cities or political power. Therefore, isolated tribes cultivating their soil are also included in this category.

Redfield (1956) is among the first who attempts to define a 'peasant society' apart from tribal communities. He follows Kroeber by thinking of peasantry with its ties to the outer world, specifically the city. Being in relation to the city is the necessary condition for defining a *tribal community* as a peasant one. Redfield mainly considers peasantry to be a cultural category. For him, peasant culture can only be understood in its relation to the civilization it is a part of, which is the greater culture. He demonstrates that in a world where it is becoming harder to find an isolated community, it is more important to focus on how particular social entities interact with and are connected. The ties connecting different communities, the grey areas between here and there, the semi-parts and subgroups of a community give us the key to understand the common features that allow us to put a society under a certain category (Redfield, 1956).

Another important aspect to consider when defining the peasantry is power relations. According to E. R. Wolf, unlike the modern farmer, a peasant is neither an individual laborer nor a business but a part of an autonomous, self-sufficient household. Peasantry's definitive character comes from its subordination to a superior power, the state (Wolf, 1966, pp. 9-11). The relationship with the superior authority forms the basis of the peasant economy. Peasantry has its unique social formation (peasant family) based on the economic conditions (p. 61). Moreover, it has its ideological formation, an order of symbolic understanding (p. 96).

For a long time, anthropologists have seemed to be interested in a static or cycling world of savage life isolated from Western societies. As Firth puts it, “[…] the antithesis between the apparently unprogressive primitive and the self-consciously developing civilized man was so strong that the anthropologist tended to assume too easily that he was dealing with static conditions” (Firth, 1963, p. 80). Although the dichotomy between unchanging premodern communities and changing modern societies has been tempting to many social scientists, it is also a fact that traditional

societies have undergone a great change across the globe with the introduction of capitalism. Specifically in cases where outsiders, such as colonial governments and overseas companies, have introduced capitalism and modernism, the new power relations have altered the ancient structures. Modernization of the premodern, or westernization of the East, is never a merely economic transition but a social, cultural, and political one. Marx, for instance, insisted that in India, the British, as the "unconscious tool of history," had destroyed the ancient social structures of *Oriental despotism* and brought about a great social change (Marx, 1853).

Anthropology has become increasingly interested in the dynamics of change in premodern communities since the third world's rapid transformation with capitalism and modernization. Many, such as Firth (1963) and Geertz (1963), study gradual change through external forces. Even if little has changed on the surface level, due to the cultural and symbolic continuity in the community, modern relations slowly take over through *agricultural involution* (Geertz, 1963).

### 1.2.4. Agrarian Question, Marxism and Revolutionary Role of Peasantry

Scholars widely debated how capitalism would affect the destiny of the peasantry. The various debates addressing the potential economic and political outcomes for rural areas, agriculture, and the peasantry during the transition to capitalism (or socialism) have been referred to as the *agrarian question* (Byres, 1986). Although the agrarian question encompasses a broad field of discussion, its content has varied across different periods, in both developed and developing countries, and within Marxist and other schools (see Kautsky, 1988; Lenin, 2008; Shanin, 1972). Following Shanin (1972), we can identify two major camps regarding this question in the broadest sense of the term. While Marxists and some liberals thought that the traditional peasantry would be polarized and the majority of them would dissolve into a migrating labor force, Chayanov (1966) and others have pointed out the cyclical and repetitive nature of the family farm and accepted the mobility and polarization as a part of this cycle.

The Marxist line of thought is one of the most remarkable schools that has widely debated predictions about the peasantry. There were two forms of peasantry shown in the Marxist tradition. The peasantry has generally been seen as a suppressed and

exploited class left from ancient society. It is also accepted that the peasantry, as a "leftover from an early social formation," was dying under capitalist relations (Shanin T. , 1971, p. 292). Scholars have studied peasant uprisings and revolutions through the lens of power relations, often portraying rising masses of suppressed peasantry in a populist manner. Additionally, Marxist studies have examined class dynamics within the peasantry, focusing on power relations, commodification, and polarization in rural communities from the very beginning (Bernstein, 2018).

According to Marx, as capitalism developed, the land would inevitably become commodified; the relationship between landowner and peasant would be stripped of all feudal aspects and transformed into pure exploitation. Capitalist competition would lead to the disappearance of small land ownership, which cannot hold against large land ownership. On the other hand, the rise of the large landownership would increase the migration of peasants to the cities and lead to the strengthening of industrial capital, which in turn would lead industrial capital to end the privileges of large landowners and throw them into global competition (Marx, 1959a, pp. 20-27). Small-scale farming and *"the free ownership of the self-managing peasant,"* as Marx calls it (1959b, p. 585), would sooner or later be replaced by large-scale capitalist farming.

Parallel to Marx's views, Lenin demonstrated that the peasantry in Russia, in its old form, begins to dissolve by integrating into the commodity economy. This de-peasantation process remarks the emergence of the rural proletariat and the rural bourgeoisie (well-to-do peasantry). The poor peasantry was being transformed into the rural proletariat, whereas the well-to-do peasantry was being transformed into the rural bourgeoisie, and the middle peasantry shrunk down on behalf of those extreme poles. With the development of commercial farming and new technologies, the capital occupies the most profitable fields of production, whereas the rest of the land is left to small producers (Lenin V. , 2008).

Lenin's thesis that the small peasantry will dissolve and disappear in favor of capitalist agribusinesses and agricultural workers is one of the main predictions of classical Marxism, but it is not the only one. Kautsky, one of the most important theorists of orthodox Marxism, has an exceptional place in the literature with his approach to the agrarian problem and the future of the small commodity-producing peasants. Kautsky

had similar views to Lenin on the destructive effect of the capitalist system on small land ownership. However, Kautsky, who analyzes the specific articulation of the small peasantry to capitalism and the specific characteristics of the petty commodity it produces, differs from Lenin on the permanence of the small peasantry (Alavi & Shanin, 1988).

According to Kautsky, peasant family farms have an advantage over large farms because they provide the labor force needed by industry and the army. Moreover, Kautsky argued that small farmers have the capacity to resist and survive against big business, unlike small commodity-producing industrial enterprises, because they can consume their produce without putting it on the market and produce their own inputs. He pointed out that peasants could survive against mechanized and efficient agricultural enterprises through underconsumption and excessive labor (Kautsky, 1988). Kautsky's predictions and observations on the small peasantry are very similar to those of Chayanov, as we shall see in the next section.

Apart from the relation of the peasantry to capitalism, the revolutionary potential of the peasantry as a potential ally of the working class has also been a subject of debate within Marxism. Peasants comprised a large part of the population not only in the East and the colonial world but also in many parts of Europe. For Marx, Engels, and those who came after them, the peasantry's role in a possible revolution was to be discussed at strategic and tactical levels (Hammen, 1972). In this sense, the agrarian question is about how to approach the peasantry and what to offer them to have them in the forefront. It inevitably takes us to land reform through redistribution, purchase on easy terms, or confiscation depending on communist, socialist, or reformist agenda (Stalin, 1954). Peasants' active participation in the Russian Revolution of 1905-1907 led to significant economic and political gains (Shanin T. , 1986). It is also worth noting Trotsky's view in 1917 that the proletariat could not have come to power in Russia without the peasant war (Trotsky, 1967). This line of thought kept feeding on the significant role of peasant movements throughout the 20$^{th}$ century. The discussion was heated again around the 1960s and 1970s due to a new wave of peasant wars and revolutions around the world, more specifically in the third world, such as those in Cuba and China (Edelman, 2013). While many scholars of the modernization approach

associated the peasantry with conservatism, many others see the peasantry as "the locus of all revolutionary aspirations" (Vilar, 1998, p. 152).

The waves of peasant uprisings in the 19th and 20th centuries had fed the idea of a monolithic, sui-generis class of peasantry in the Marxist left as well as other schools. However, as the rural communities further integrated into capitalist relations and subjected to commodification, the differentiation in the peasantry itself became significant. So, a holistic approach to the agricultural communities, or "populist constructions of the peasant," as Bernstein puts it, does not represent the social reality of today's rural society (Bernstein, 2018, p. 1144). Peasant studies, Bernstein and Terence argue, fall into "*peasant essentialism"* by taking peasant as a generic social type that applies anytime and anywhere (Bernstein & Terence, 2001, p. 6). Moreover, it is questionable that peasant as such a transhistorical construct has and could ever be conceptually helpful.

Scholars have also studied the peasantry as a class in relation to the political system. Wittfogel suggested that "the oriental despotism is rooted in the agrarian way of life whereas the modern totalitarian apparatus state is rooted in a machine-based industrial economy" (Wittfogel, 1953, p. 97). The despotic regimes, such as those in Egypt and Mesopotamia, stem from the organization of agriculture. Such states function as large hydraulic enterprises, organizing irrigation and paving the way for despotism (Wittfogel, 1953). In his remarkable work, "The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Barrington Moore showed that relative power and the position of the peasantry have a deep impact on the modernization process and the political system in a country (Moore B. , 1966). Interclass relations, precisely the way the peasantry problem was *handled* in the past, are considered crucial in understanding the basis of the authoritarian and democratic regimes of today. Again, just as in the literature we have already seen, the most important examples of political sociology have placed the peasantry at the center of their analyses.

### 1.2.5. Alexander Chayanov and Peasant Economy

Just as Kautsky was skeptical of the prediction that small farmers would inevitably become landless, others also questioned or directly opposed this view. For instance,

Sorokin and Zimmerman argued that no empirical evidence supported the notion that peasants would soon be dispossessed of their lands (Sorokin & Zimmerman, 1929, pp. 68-71). A key figure in this debate is Chayanov, whose arguments we will explore in detail.

Research conducted in Russia from the emancipation of serfdom in 1861 until the establishment of gulags led to two major schools of thought focusing on Russian peasantry as simple commodity producers: the Organization and Production School of Russian Agricultural Economists and Chayanov's school. These scholars shed light on the resilience of the *family farm*—comprising over 90% of Russian society—as a unique social and economic unit capable of coexisting with capitalism (Thorner, 1966, p. xiii).

Chayanov is often regarded as the father of the peasant economy school. He argued that classical economic concepts were insufficient to comprehend the distinct economics of the family farm (Thorner, 1966, pp. xiv-xv). He drew a clear distinction between capitalist and peasant economies, noting that obtaining detailed quantitative data from farmers was nearly impossible during surveys, as their accounting practices differed fundamentally from those of capitalist firms. Unlike modern entrepreneurs, farmers did not estimate value and expenses in the same manner (Kerblay, 1966, pp. xxxii-xxxiii).

In a family farm, where no wages are paid, the balance between satisfying family needs and the drudgery of labor (self-exploitation) determines the optimal production level. Each family would "(…) seek an annual output adequate for its basic needs (…)" but since it involves drudgery, "(…) the family does not push its work beyond the point where the possible increase in output is outweighed by the irksomeness of the extra work" (Thorner, 1966, p. xvi). In essence, optimal production is achieved by balancing needs with the drudgery of effort required (Kerblay, 1966, pp. xxix-xxxiii). Consequently, concepts like rent and surplus value do not apply to peasant farms, and the principle of diminishing returns on labor is irrelevant.

This unique economic model makes family farms more resilient to economic downturns than capitalist firms (p. xvi). Unlike a capitalist entrepreneur who may face

bankruptcy, a family farm can survive by reducing surplus, decreasing consumption, or adjusting its practices. This flexibility led Chayanov and his followers to believe that small family farms could endure within a capitalist system, a view that Marxists generally disputed (Thorner, 1966, pp. xx-xxi). Daniel Thorner later argued that Marxist theoretical tools needed revision to understand peasant-dominated economies better, like those in China, India, and Tsarist Russia. He suggested that Chayanov's peasant economy model should replace the "outdated" Marxist mode of production to capture the distinct characteristics of these economies (Vilar, 1998, p. 152).

A key distinction between Chayanov and other theorists lies in their views on the primary dynamics driving change in agrarian peasantry. While Marxists emphasized class formation and antagonism, Chayanov prioritized demographic changes and the household life cycle (Thorner, 1966, pp. xx-xxi). As the number of family members and available labor fluctuates throughout the family life cycle, the amount of cultivated land also varies. This perspective emphasizes the dynamic nature of family farming and allows us to situate family history, local agricultural history, and broader historical processes from the specific to the general.

The balance between unpaid and paid economic activities includes not only agricultural work but also other types of economic activities and incomes. These activities "cannot be reviewed independently of one another" (Chayanov A. , 1925, p. 102). Chayanov's inter-generational and family-oriented approach transcends individualism. He recognized the impact of intra-family relations on self-exploitation, labor intensity, and overall economic activity, integrating family dynamics and the life cycle into his economic analysis. He also acknowledged the role of social networks, or social capital, which evolves throughout the family life cycle and goes beyond mere economic interaction (Letenyei, 2000).

Chayanov's primary goal was to demonstrate the unique nature of the family farm, emphasizing that classical economic theory is insufficient to capture its complexities. This perspective remains relevant today, as it implies that the multifaceted relations of agriculture cannot be fully understood through economic individualism, and must be considered within the broader context of non-agricultural economy and family relations.

### 1.2.6. Developmentalism and Dual Economy Models

Rural development was a central theme in agricultural policy throughout the second half of the 20th century. It stemmed from economic development, which focuses on "the material well-being of as large a percentage of the population as possible" (Pieris, 1969, p. 1), instead of economic growth, which prioritizes cumulative indicators and per capita averages. As Yücer and colleagues note, rural development is "a political choice that aims to develop the rural population on the ground in order to achieve an optimum balance in the socio-economic differences between rural and urban areas" (Yücer, et al., 2009, p. 15).

The end of colonialism marked the beginning of developmentalism, particularly in the global South. Policies involving trade tariffs, import substitution, social spending, and subsidies successfully led to economic progress and poverty reduction. This was the heyday of developmentalism; from the 1950s onward, the gap between rich and poor countries began to narrow, particularly in Latin America's Southern Cone and East Asia (Jason, 2015).

In the post-World War II era, the rural sector in Third World countries was widely viewed as "(…) a unique, distinctive phenomenon that displayed similar structural features across the underdeveloped world" (Long, 1982, p. 1). While in the Marxist tradition peasant question was a question of socialist revolution, the post-war era reframed it as a developmentalist concern (Araghi, 2009, pp. 117-118). The belief was that traditional societies needed to overcome social, economic, and political obstacles by taking certain steps, in order to achieve steady growth, and industrialize. It is best crystallized in the work of Rostow, where he defines the stages of economic growth that a traditional society needs to follow after it takes off from its initial state (Rostow, 1960).

Economists of this period focused on the contrast between the industrial and rural sectors, and more broadly, between the industrialized West and the rest of the world. The goal was to explain the dynamics of industrialization, providing other countries with a blueprint for development. In this context, economic dualism, similar to dualist approaches in sociology, came into play.

Boeke's (1954) dual economy, Higgins' (1956) dualistic theory, and Lewis' capitalist growth model (Enke, 1962), all refer to economic models featuring two coexisting sectors—agriculture and industry—each with different levels of technology, social structures, and labor markets. A common premise of all these models is that the primary force of growth is the endless flow of labor from the underdeveloped rural sector to the industrialized urban areas, which would keep wages at the subsistence level. Economists discussed major indicators such as wages, profits, growth, and inflation within the context of this dual characteristic of the developing world by referring to a closed, agriculture-industry model (Jha, 2010).

Differences among these models led to varied policy prescriptions for developing countries. The Lewis model is based on subsistence agriculture, with an unlimited labor surplus at a subsistence wage, and the capitalist sector (Lewis, 1954, p. 29). The labor flow from the overpopulated agricultural sector to the industrial sector would fuel industrialization and raise the share of profits in the national income but not in raising wages (Lewis, 1954). Kalecki on the other hand, emphasized increased productivity and reduced prices, concluding that it would lead to an increase in real wages (FitzGerald, 1990, p. 185). Kaldor, challenging general equilibrium theory, argued that "the income of the agricultural sector" determines "the level and the rate of growth of the industrial production" (Kaldor, 1975, pp. 353-354). For him, the labor supply of the agricultural economy was so crucial to economic development that he suggested the low growth rate of the British economy was due to a labor shortage in the agricultural sector (Pressman & Holt, 2008, p. 368).

Early policy agendas of the 1950s and 1960s clearly instrumentalized the rural sector to boost industrialization, not only by utilizing surplus labor but also by increasing the food supply. For this purpose, large-scale agricultural enterprises were favored over small farms due to economies of scale. The ultimate goal was industrialization, leading to what was often called an 'industry-first' approach. In these early stages of developmentalism, small farming was not the focus of agricultural economic policy (Griffin, 1979).

Those years witnessed the start of a global wave of public investment and policy support for agriculture which is known as the Green Revolution. Led by the

Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, an international research program focused on technological improvements to increase the staple food production, specifically wheat and rice in developing countries. Agricultural reform policies prioritized technological investments such as mechanization, irrigation, improved seeds, use of fertilizers and plant breeding (Hazell, 2009). In this context, the Green Revolution has been a success in increasing cereal production. In 40 years between 1961 and 2001, global cereal production climbed from 900 million up to 2,100 million ton (FAO, 2023).

Despite the emphasis on the Green Revolution's positive impact on cumulative food production, its role in poverty reduction and its effects on inequality have been met with skepticism. Das (2002), for instance, points out the weak statistical basis of claims that the Green Revolution alleviated poverty. Griffin (1979) argues that the Green Revolution made little contribution to reducing poverty in the Third World and did not diminish social inequalities; instead, it primarily benefited better-resourced farmers. He suggests that issues of poverty and inequality, often framed as solvable through technical and technological means, fundamentally require political solutions (Griffin, 1979).

By the 1960s, the dual-economy approach had been replaced by agriculture-led economic development policies. “Small-farm agriculture” was increasingly seen as “the very engine of growth and development” (Ellis & Biggs, 2001, p. 440). Perceptions of small farms shifted, with studies suggesting policies that targeted small farmers through education, improved seeds, and enhanced technological capabilities (Schultz, 1964). Pro-small-farmer policies proved highly effective in reducing poverty, especially in developing countries with a majority of small farms and labor-intensive production (International Development Committee, 2004).

Both dualist models and subsequent agricultural developmentalism were economic approaches tailored to the specific circumstances of developing countries in the post-World War II world, many of which had just gained independence and whose populations were predominantly peasant. It is no coincidence that this period also saw anthropological approaches turn their attention to peasant societies in these countries, leading to increased empirical studies and historical examinations of the peasantry's relationship with democracy and other political systems. However, this period of

intense political and scientific focus on the peasantry ended with a series of demographic, economic, and political events that significantly altered the status of the peasantry as it had been understood.

The golden age of developmentalism, roughly from 1950 to 1980, witnessed a remarkable surge in growth for many developing nations. Protectionist policies, state-led industrialization, and robust public investment fueled rapid expansion. However, as the global landscape shifted, the golden age left a complex legacy - demonstrating the potential and pitfalls of state-led growth, and shaping ongoing debates about development strategies and equitable prosperity.

As the developmental era has ended with a series of crisis, the dual economy models and their underlying assumptions has been subject to great criticism. The idea that an unlimited supply of labor - or in other words, dispossession of agricultural population from the rural areas is key to capitalist development is falsified by many scholars. Notably Arrighi as early as 1970, showed that the historical data from Rhodesia does not support any relationship between the dual economy and economic development (Arrighi, 1970). Arrighi and others demonstrated that the accumulation by dispossession in South Africa has undermined the conditions for development (Arrighi, Aschoff, & Scully, 2010). It is also shown that in many cases developmental policies caused more damage than the market failures they aim to fix. Contrary to the assumption that governments and bureaucracies act with selflessness, benevolence without any cost, the historical evidence shows that conflict of interests, political interests, corruption and other factors may and did have a great impact in outcome of developmental policies (Krueger, 1990).

Following 1980s a different, more fundamental critique of developmentalism has emerged as post developmentalism. The post-developmentalist studies argued that the developmentalist project was from the very beginning western-centric and non-universal. Developmentalism detached issues such as hunger and food security from their political context and presented them as matter of pure rational/technical policy application. On the contrary, developmentalism itself was ideological in a sense that while it was promoting an illusion of development, it served as a cover up for the uneven and exploitative nature of international economic relations. In this context, it

was argued that there was a "discursive continuity" between the 19th century colonialism and the developmentalist discourse (Ziai, 2016). The criticism of developmentalism was relying on and fed by the criticism of modernism. So just as modernism, they advocated to leave developmentalism behind and to look for "alternatives to development" (Escobar, 1992, pp. 21-22). Post developmentalist theorists were not only critical of developmentalism, but also rejecting the paradigm itself; suggesting that the term should be completely abandoned rather than being reinterpreted (Matthews, 2004).

### 1.2.7. Global Shocks and Policy Shifts (1970s Onwards)

During the 1970s and 1980s, the global economy was hit by a series of shocks, including the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971-72 and the oil crises of 1973 and 1979. These events were followed by the period of high interest rates in the U.S., known as the *Volcker Shock*, between 1979 and 1987. As a result, the West experienced significant recessions and rising unemployment, while many developing countries, particularly in Africa and Latin America, saw dramatic declines in growth rates. The post-Soviet era then witnessed an increase in conflicts and wars across the globe, including in countries such as Uganda, Liberia, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Frank, 1984; Arrighi, 1994; Hobsbawm, 2013).

In response, drastic measures were implemented in the 1980s and 1990s. Expansionary fiscal policies were abandoned, and structural adjustment programs (SAPs) were introduced by the IMF, World Bank, and U.S. Treasury to address debt crises and macroeconomic challenges in developing countries. These policies, collectively known as the Washington Consensus, included reducing budget deficits, liberalizing financial sectors, removing trade restrictions, promoting privatization, and deregulating markets (Williamson, 2004). Over-indebted governments in underdeveloped countries adopted the *structural adjustment programs* (SAPs) mandated by the IMF as a condition for debt relief (Vreeland, 2003). Many of these countries implemented extensive privatization and deregulation programs, alongside government layoffs and contractionary fiscal policies. Additionally, the liberalization of capital accounts became a widespread strategy among developing nations to attract foreign investment.

The late 1990s witnessed a series of financial crises in Mexico (1994), Asia (1997), and Russia (1998), resulting in currency devaluations, capital outflows, and significant damage to banking systems (Kim, 1998). Despite the reduction in inflation resulting from the neoliberal economic prescriptions applied in Latin America during the debt crisis, there were dramatic increases in unemployment and poverty. Crises in developing countries triggered widespread global social unrest, symbolized by the anti-WTO protests in Seattle in 1999. These developments led to a critical reassessment of the Washington Consensus, particularly its one-size-fits-all approach, its unconditional deregulation policies, and its disregard for the positive role of the state and institutions in economic development (Krogstad, 2007). This critique gave rise to the Post-Washington Consensus, first proposed by World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz in 1998. Although this approach does not depart from the foundations of neoclassical economics, it emphasizes the importance of considering the unique characteristics of developing countries, recognizing the roles of the state and institutions in economic development, and drawing attention to the risks of extensive deregulation (Lesay, 2012).

Since the 1950s, advanced economies have experienced a decline in manufacturing's share of total employment, a phenomenon known as deindustrialization. This trend became particularly evident in the West after 1980 (see Mishel, 1989; Lever, 1991). However, a similar pattern emerged also in low- and middle-income countries, where economies transitioned into service sectors without fully industrializing like their Western counterparts (Rodrik, 2015, p. 2).

The years after 1980s witnessed another structural change called *deagrarianization*, where agrarian and land-based livelihoods have become deprived of survival conditions. Since the agricultural sector falls short in providing sufficient income, rural populations have been increasingly pushed into off-farm work, urban migration, or clinging to a marginal existence in subsistence agriculture. The process ultimately resulted in a sharp decline in agricultural occupations and the population of family farms (Hebinck, 2018, p. 227).

This process was neither spontaneous nor natural. Factors such as the rising costs of post-Green Revolution farming, integration into global markets, elimination of tariffs

and subsidies, and new competitive approaches accelerated deagrarianization and mass urban migration (Oks & Williams, 2022). The driving force behind this change was not the invisible hand of capitalism but political power—manifested in deregulation, the dismantling of welfare states, and other policies (Araghi, 2009, pp. 112-113).

This process was neither spontaneous nor natural. Factors such as the rising costs of post-Green Revolution farming, integration into global markets, elimination of tariffs and subsidies, and new competitive approaches accelerated deagrarianization and mass urban migration (Oks & Williams, 2022). The driving force behind this change was not the famous *invisible hand* of capitalism but the "visible foot," i.e. the political power—manifested in deregulation, dismantling of welfare states, and other policies (Araghi, 2009, pp. 112-113).

Accompanying deagrarianization was depeasantation, where agricultural activities shifted to non-peasant actors, such as multinational corporations, small and medium-sized businesses, outgrowers, and contract farmers (Hebinck, 2018). These actors are often spatially disconnected, financially fluid, and urban in mentality, lacking the cultural and social ties traditionally associated with the peasantry.

Liberal trade policies had devastating effects on many developing countries, making them dependent on global markets for basic food staples. By the 2000s, formerly net-food-exporting countries in the Global South faced food deficits (Bello, 2009). Under the neoliberal principles of the WTO, mechanized and high-tech agricultural giants in the North threatened to displace nearly 3 billion peasants practicing traditional agriculture. Amin argues that this situation has led to the number of marginalized and unstable classes of people lacking skills, forming the majority of the world's population for the first time in history in the second half of the 20th century, feeding the trend of impoverishment and creating a *new labor problem* (Amin, 2009).

Between 2005 and 2008, food prices increased by an average of 5.6% in real terms, and this alone increased the population in extreme poverty by 1.5% globally (de Hoyos & Medvedev, 2011, p. 399). The extreme risks to global food security are followed by

calls from international organizations such as the World Bank and FAO to put the agricultural sector back on the development agenda.

In 2008, the World Bank acknowledged that market liberalization had failed to deliver the desired outcomes for the poor (World Bank 2007). The neoliberal development model, known as the "charity and aid-centric model," began unraveling (Hickel, 2014). Instead, a new agricultural approach emerged, emphasizing sociological and ecological sustainability and regional differences (McMichael & Schneider, 2011). International institutions subsequently called for investment in agriculture, support for smallholders, and the creation of rural safety nets.

However, to address smallholder poverty, the World Bank focused on market intensification and integration with agribusiness. In its 2008 report, the World Bank promoted a new agriculture model led by private businesses, supported by governments, to integrate smallholders into global value chains through intensified market integration (McMichael, 2009). However, as McMichael argues, a global development agenda driven by neoliberal states through 'public-private partnerships' does not constitute a paradigm shift. Instead, this approach risks further marginalizing small farmers, increasing agriculture's dependence on reductionist technologies, and failing to eliminate poverty and hunger (McMichael, p. 239).

Although quantifying the relationship is complex, the sharp rise in global inequality and the depeasantation process have gone hand in hand since the latter half of the 20th century. Societies without small family farms became more vulnerable to famines and economic crises (Vanhaute, 2008). From 1973 to 2015, the wealth ratio between the poorest and wealthiest countries grew from 44:1 to 80:1, signaling a "crisis of development" (Jason, 2015). Global crises, such as the war in Ukraine, the COVID-19 pandemic, supply chain disruptions, and energy shocks, have further hindered efforts to eliminate extreme poverty (Oks & Williams, 2022).

Financialization has become another critical trend in agriculture. Defined as "the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors, and financial institutions in the operation of domestic and international economies" (Epstein, 2005, p. 3), financialization not only refers to the growing size of financial services globally

but also to “the growing importance of financial income” (Chadwick, 2019, p. 51). After the 2008 housing bubble, investors turned to farmlands as a safe alternative, fueling their use as financial assets. Expecting farmlands to outperform other assets due to scarcity and to generate steady rental income, investors have increased their demand for farmlands. Additionally, the securitization of farmlands has transformed them into liquid assets (Fairbairn, 2014).

Recently, the state's role in agricultural finance has diminished, favoring private financial entities at the expense of small-scale farmers. Reforms, such as the privatizing government-run marketing boards in countries like Canada and Australia, have shifted marketing and credit provision to the private sector, often disadvantaging small farmers. In the U.S., regulations on agricultural commodity futures have been relaxed. Developing countries have also been encouraged by the World Bank to employ derivatives to manage financial issues in commodity markets. As a result of structural adjustment policies, the role of public agricultural credit institutions has been reduced, with private banks stepping in to fill the financial gap left by the state's diminished role in financial support. The rise of private financial investments and deregulation has increased market volatility (Martin & Clapp, 2015).

### 1.2.8. Contemporary Topics, Concepts and Debates

The rapid globalization and neoliberal policies in the agricultural sector have spurred the formation of global farmer organizations and networks, such as Via Campesina and APM-Mondial (Reseau Mondial Agricultures Paysannes, Alimentation et Mondialisation). These developments have significantly increased the transnational character of peasant movements, enhancing communication, information exchange, and coordination across countries. Transnational peasant movements have adopted various concepts and values, including human rights, food sovereignty, and small-farmer-centric policies. Notably, many of these movements have focused on reclaiming power from agribusinesses and transnational institutions (Edelman, 2005, pp. 338-340). Primarily rooted in the Global South, these movements are considered radical, aiming for fundamental social transformation (Giménez & Shattuck, 2011). Socialist policies, with varying levels of intervention in private property, are also proposed solutions for the agrarian challenges in the global south (Amin, 2022).

As the influence of agri-food chains on urban consumers grew, urban-based movements emerged as significant players in agricultural politics. Unlike the radical movements of the Global South, these urban movements are often progressive, appealing mainly to the middle class and youth in the Global North. These new social movements at local, national, and international levels advocate for land reform, sustainable agriculture, fair trade, and community food security. However, organizations within this progressive trend lack a common ideological foundation, viewing agrarian issues as one axis among many concerns of new social movements. As a result, they may lean towards either reformism within the neoliberal paradigm or a more radical, class-based approach (Giménez & Shattuck, 2011).

#### 1.2.8.1. Shifting Paradigms in Food and Agricultural Policy Themes

Recent decades have seen the emergence of interconnected policy themes. The dissertation will focus on some of the most significant.

Recurrent food crises drew attention to the concept of food security, which emphasizes the "(…) adequacy of supplies and nutritional content, with the food itself produced and delivered under any conditions, including far-off, chemical-intensive industrial agriculture" (Edelman, et al., 2014, p. 914). Concerns about supply chain disruptions in food-deficient regions revoked debates on how to increase self-sufficiency in such countries.

Food sovereignty, introduced by La Via Campesina at the 1996 Rome World Food Summit, offers an alternative food system. Defined by the Declaration of Nyéléni as "(…) the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems" (Declaration of Nyéléni, 2007), it is both a political project and a social movement opposing institutionalized corporate power and the WTO (Alonso-Fradejas et. al., 2015).

Localization and reducing the distance between food producers and consumers is a major theme in food sovereignty. Localized and fair-trade networks are favored over long-distance routes controlled by agri-food giants. Urban and peri-urban farming is gaining popularity for reducing costs, minimizing pollution from transportation,

ensuring food labeling, and fostering solidarity between city dwellers and farmers through direct interaction (Edelman, et al., 2014, p. 918).

Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) is a model where consumers support a farm operation, turning the farm into a community asset, with growers and consumers sharing the risks and benefits of food production (USDA, n.d.). Although it dates back to the 1960s in Europe, CSA became widespread in the US, Canada, and Australia after the 1980s. It aims to connect urban dwellers with the land, promote cooperation, ensure social justice, and provide food security for disadvantaged groups (Adam, 2006). Farmers benefit from upfront payments and a steady client base, while consumers gain control over the food they receive, often prioritizing healthy, organic, and environmentally friendly options (Prial, 2019).

As part of food sovereignty, some have suggested focusing on feasible projects that enable consumers and farmers to compete with, and survive against global agri-food chains (Petrini, 2001). The Slow Food Movement, founded in Italy in 1986, is a notable example, promoting access to "good, clean, and fair food" and creating a global network of local farmers advocating for fair trade, traditional food, and biodiversity (Slow Food Foundation, n.d.). This movement opposes consumerism, which reduces food consumption to a mere economic act. It redefines the production and consumption of food within an ethical and cultural framework, positioning the food consumer as a gastronome and a political subject at its core (Andrew G. , 2008). As Friedmann and McNair (2008, p. 427) argue, this "Builder" approach to social change contrasts with the more confrontational "Warrior" approach of movements like Via Campesina.

Fair trade is another alternative organization to the neoliberal commodification of agriculture. It requires its members to meet certain economic, social, and environmental criteria to ensure fair compensation for producers, social development, and environmentally friendly production (Fair Trade International, n.d.). Certified products carry a fair-trade label, allowing consumers to support the system by paying a premium price. A similar trend is observed in certification initiatives.

Local food alternatives, such as community-supported agriculture (CSA) and fair trade address issues like alienation and commodity fetishism by shedding light on the production chain. These movements offer local communities practical alternatives to global agro-industrial food chains, transforming social relations, raising awareness, promoting transparency in production, and ensuring fair pricing (Pinkerton & Hopkins, 2009). However, as Zebre (2014) notes, they fall short of challenging capitalist and neoliberal principles. They may represent the commodification of social justice and soften market conditions without offering a genuine alternative to the conventional food system (Zebre, 2014, pp. 97-104). Similarly, McMahon (2014) is skeptical of local food's ability to challenge neoliberalism, arguing that the motivations behind these movements remain rooted in neoliberal trade mentality. They do not fundamentally challenge neoliberal agri-food practices as long as they share the same terminology and ideological framework (McMahon, 2014, pp. 118-126). Nonetheless, the search for alternatives beyond individualistic, consumer-driven, and niche initiatives within the existing neoliberal system continues (Wright S. , 2014).

With climate change policies entering the global agenda, the concept of development is now being reconsidered. Climate change has long been known to affect natural resources like water and soil, disrupting agricultural production and livestock (Adams, et. al., 1998). However, agriculture is now being scrutinized not only for its vulnerability to climate change but also for its role in emitting greenhouse gases (United States Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.).

Ecological approaches challenge the foundation of rural studies, which often rely on the modernist dualism of nature and society. Goodman draws attention to the ontological and moral opposition between green social movements and contemporary agri-food studies, suggesting that merely "greening" social theory is insufficient to overcome this divide (Goodman D. , 1999, p. 33). Adopting an ecological approach requires reassessing agricultural activity's previously unquestioned goals and merits. Some argue that the Earth cannot sustain the development of underdeveloped countries in terms of resource consumption and that we should focus on "de-developing" overdeveloped countries by reducing their consumption and addressing inequalities (Jason, 2015).

As traditional peasantry fades, studies increasingly focus on the political stance of modern, urban-minded farmers. Andree (2014) examines the potential of city farmers, consumer-sensitive and ideologically conscious agricultural producers, to challenge neoliberal practices. While acknowledging that individual efforts like city farming alone cannot dismantle the neoliberal market, he views them as stepping stones toward broader collective resistance and change. However, Andree cautions against over-romanticizing these initiatives, noting that their motivations, largely consumer-driven and market-embedded, risk becoming niche marketing rather than sparking systemic change. He argues that the long-term success of alternative food networks depends on collective action that transcends individualistic and market-oriented perspectives, ultimately recognizing and confronting the overarching neoliberal structure (Andrée, 2014).

#### 1.2.8.2. New Peasantries in the Search for Agency

Peasantry, as an analytical and academic concept, has always been problematic. When used as "peasantry-in-general" (Dalton, et al., 1972, p. 399), a trans-temporal and trans-spatial term, it becomes vague, a "mixed-bag," as Kaplan calls it (Dalton, et al., 1972, p. 409), which seeks to define everything but thereby loses specificity.

While its analytical utility is debated, there has always been an acknowledgment of a social phenomenon that could be identified under the labels of peasantry or rurality. As Shanin (1971) notes, striking similarities exist among billions of people from distinct geographies and cultures. Interestingly, the academic interest in peasantry surged when the peasant population dramatically declined in industrialized countries. Mendras, addressing the unprecedented academic focus on peasantry in 1960s France, humorously notes: "It was necessary to describe and analyze [the vanishing peasant] quickly, to theorize him, while there were still a sufficient number of representative peasants who were real peasants; that is, persons who had developed in a real peasant civilization" (Mendras, 2002, p. 158).

However, in recent decades, this phenomenon has increasingly dissolved. The concept of peasantry and rurality, along with the politics and policy frameworks surrounding them, has faded. The traditional notions of rural development, peasant policies, and

rural revolutions have disappeared, marking the loss of agency. While there have been significant efforts in the past to reclaim the agency of the peasantry, it has become increasingly challenging to maintain the label ‘peasantry’ as an agent. The boundaries between urban and rural, worker and farmer, are becoming increasingly blurred. The issue of agency is not solely a product of structuralist theory but also stems from the disappearance of the traditional agricultural subject. To address this challenge, contemporary studies focus on newly emerging agents theoretically capable of challenging the current structure. In this context, attention is increasingly given to consumers, particularly new fractions of the middle-class urban population who are sensitive to what and how they consume.

As discussed earlier in the context of Marxist approaches, there was a strong belief in the inevitable demise of the peasantry. Hobsbawm referred to this as “this massive and silent exodus from the land (Hobsbawm, 2013, p. 292). In developed industrial nations, the farming population has shrunk to a small percentage, and peasantry has also seen a sharp decline in the non-industrialized countries of the Third World (Hobsbawm, 2013, pp. 289-293). The restructuring of agriculture under capitalist relations has reached a point where agriculture is “losing its distinctive sectoral identity" (McMichael & Buttel, 1990, p. 90).

Yet, it remains true that peasants continue to form a significant portion of the population in many Global South countries, such as Bangladesh (Misra, 2017). As of 2016, a total of 83 countries harbor over 380 million households with farms averaging less than five hectares. These farms collectively command roughly 30% of the agricultural land and are responsible for producing more than half of the global food calories (Samberg, et. al, 2016).

The globalized economy has also changed small farmers’ role and status. Smallholders have increasingly become integrated into global agrifood chains through contract farming. With farmers' growing dependence on capital, debt relations have become an instrument of pressure and control. Small farmers’ property often serves as collateral for their debt, deepening their dependence (McMichael, 2013). Additionally, identity movements have overshadowed peasantry as a distinct identity. Following the end of the Cold War, emancipatory movements lost momentum, giving rise to new social

movements. Identity-based social movements have replaced the radical Marxist peasant movements in the Third World. The class identity of the peasant has been supplanted by a multitude of identities with diverse ideas, values, and ideological orientations, including gender and ethnicity (SinghaRoy, 2005).

Traditional peasants, as we once knew them, have become a shrinking social category, relegated to marginalized corners of the globe and ultimately facing the same destiny as the Western peasantry. Moreover, the commodification and urbanization of rural areas make it difficult to argue for the existence of a traditional peasant society. Despite claims of the death of the peasantry, there have been significant efforts to argue otherwise. Those unwilling to relinquish the term 'peasantry' have redefined it, leading to studies on what is now called the *new peasantry*.

Ploeg (2008) argues that the peasantry is unlikely to disappear, as modernist theories have predicted. He rejects treating the 1.2 billion peasants on Earth as "a remnant from the past," referring to such a perception as "manufactured invisibility." Contrary to those who explain peasantry by referencing the past, Ploeg insists that today's peasantry is "rooted in the realities of today" and must be understood within the context of contemporary relations and contradictions (Ploeg, 2008, pp. xv-xvi).

To define today's peasantry, Ploeg introduces the concept of the "peasant condition": It is "(...) the ongoing struggle for autonomy and progress in a context characterized by multiple patterns of dependency and associated processes of exploitation and marginalization" (Ploeg, 2008, p. xiv). Following Hardt and Negri (2000), Holloway (2002), Negri (2003), Friedmann (2004), and Weis (2007), Ploeg suggests that the Empire, representing the dominant mode of global ordering, marginalizes and destroys the peasantry. Ploeg does not view peasantry as a false category but as a challenger capable of resisting the Empire and reversing the destruction it brings. The new peasantry possesses the agency to fight back against the Empire through cooperation, defense of natural inheritances, endogenous technological improvements, new networks, and city markets.

Similarly, McMichael argues that the peasantry is far from being a nostalgic relic of the past. Today's peasant mobility is not the reactionary movement of an outdated

social category but represents a contemporary political actor. Through the concept of food sovereignty, the peasant movement has broken away from the existing capitalist and developmentalist discourse and advocates for a new political ontology (McMichael, 2008).

With the decline of traditional peasantry, giving agricultural policies new targets and direction has become increasingly challenging. Monllor (2012) differentiates between two groups in defining the new peasants: newcomers, who have not farmed before, and continuers, who have taken over family farms. While continuers tend to follow the strategies of their predecessors, newcomers seem to adopt new values such as locality, diversity, environmental friendliness, cooperation, innovation, autonomy, social commitment, and slowing down. In this context, newcomers are the catalysts for change, willing to take risks and work toward new farming practices.

The introduction of new agents has significant consequences. Since the 1990s, the concept of rural development has shifted away from agricultural development toward a broader perspective that encompasses the entire rural society, including the non-farm economy. Creating a *diverse rural economy* offering multiple income options has become a policy goal, with environmental concerns also gaining prominence. Policies increasingly focus on local capacity, preferences, and knowledge (Maddock, 2020).

The growing interest in the rural non-farm economy stems from its increasing significance as a source of income and employment in developing countries. Surveys show that non-farm income constitutes roughly 35% of rural income in Africa and around 50% in Asia and Latin America, encompassing trading, agro-processing, manufacturing, and services. Given the multitude of new agents and non-farm activities, some argue that rural development policies should target not only farmers but all economic actors in the countryside. As Ploeg et al. (Ploeg, et al., 2000, p. 393) concisely put it, “The ‘rural’ is no longer the monopoly of farmers.”

#### 1.2.8.3. Food Regimes and Contemporary Perspectives in Agri-Food Studies

The term "food regime," proposed by Friedmann and McMichael, describes the global food production and consumption process and its key components. It is defined as “(…) stable periods of capital accumulation associated with particular configurations

of geopolitical power, conditioned by forms of agricultural production and consumption relations within and across national spaces" (McMichael, 2009, p. 139). Food regime analysis addresses fundamental questions such as (a) where and how food is produced, (b) where and how food is consumed, and (c) the social and ecological effects of international food production and consumption relations within different food regimes (Bernstein, 2015, p. 1).

The first food regime (1870-1930) is identified with the colonial activities of European industrial countries, particularly Britain. During this period, colonies appropriated the lands belonging to locals to produce and export goods needed by core countries. After World War II, the second food regime emerged under the hegemony of the United States, characterized by the increasing industrialization of agriculture and its role in capital accumulation (McMichael, 2009). While the first food regime centered on colonial trade in bulk commodities, the second was defined by the integration of industrial agriculture and manufactured foods. The third food regime is marked by the dominance of global corporations, which control and profit from reorganized agri-food chains. In this era, the finance capital controls the agri-food supply chain from production to consumption as a whole. Unlike previous regimes, the retail sector now wields more influence over agri-food chains than the manufacturing sector (Burch & Lawrence, 2009, pp. 267-269).

The term *commodity chain* also plays a significant role in contemporary agri-food studies. Introduced by Hopkins and Wallerstein, it "(…) refers to a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity" (Hopkins & Wallerstein, 1986, p. 159). This concept has been widely used to analyze the spatial organization of production in the neoliberal era. Gereffi and Korzeniewicz define Global Commodity Chains (GCCs) as "(…) sets of inter-organizational networks clustered around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world-economy" (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994, p. 2). GCCs reveal the social embeddedness of economic structures, emphasizing the monopolistic and unequal dynamics that drive their historical development. Core and peripheral nodes within each chain reflect disparities in added value. Notably, the GCCs approach reveals the inadequacy of conventional frameworks in explaining new societal and economic structures, dispels the simplistic assumption of a positive link

between development and industrialization, and provides an understanding of global capitalism's complexity and its role in sustaining global inequality.

A related approach is Friedland's *commodity systems analysis*, which views the social reality around a specific commodity system as a domain of sociological study. Unlike agricultural economists, Friedland emphasizes commodities' social, political, and cultural aspects (Friedland, 2021). This analysis also recognizes the interconnectedness of agricultural commodity systems with other commodity systems (Friedland, 2021, p. 223).

Another framework for understanding the global agri-food regime is the food systems approach, which views food systems as interconnected stages from production and processing to distribution and consumption. McCullough et al. (2008) identify three types of food systems based on the share of the food market flowing through organized chains: traditional, structured, and industrialized (p.4). Traditional food systems, common in less developed countries, feature unorganized supply chains and minimal market infrastructure, with small-scale retailers like wet markets dominating the landscape. Vertical relationships within the chain are largely informal and unregulated. Industrialized food systems, on the other hand, are defined by high consumption of processed and high-value food. Supermarkets dominate the retail sector, while the processing industry relies on pre-arranged contracts with managed chains. Food safety standards and accountability are crucial in this highly organized system. Structured food systems bridge these two extremes, combining elements of both organized and informal structures (McCullough et. al., 2008, pp. 9-13).

The concept of *network* has also been applied to rural studies as a new paradigm. Murdoch (2000) distinguishes between “vertical” networks, which connect rural spaces to the agri-food sector, and “horizontal” networks, which link rural spaces to non-agricultural economic areas. He advocates for rural development strategies that take these networks into account.

There is also a struggle for food sovereignty and food safety at the international level as well as the local level. A colossal and complex challenge exists in establishing a comprehensive set of international institutions and regulations that can simultaneously

ensure global food security and resolve inter-state tensions and disputes while not impeding free trade (Rosling, Roberts, & Orden, 2004). Smyte (2014) emphasizes how international negotiations on agriculture have shaped consumer rights, such as the ‘right to know’ and ‘provenance of food’. Parties have met in WTO committees to discuss and clarify the content of some consumer rights such as ‘right to know’ and ‘the provenance of food’. She argues that while consumer demands have influenced food regulations, international trade rules undermine sustainable peasant-based agriculture and limit domestic policy space. She argues that international trade rules “destroy sustainable peasant-based agriculture” and “limit domestic policy space regulations and policies that support more domestically oriented food systems” (Smyte, 2014, p. 312). She concludes that the struggle for food sovereignty and safety must occur at both the international and domestic levels (312).

### 1.2.9. Need for Rethinking Local Agricultural Relations

Contemporary literature on agricultural politics primarily addresses three key areas: (a) the impact of globalization and neoliberal policies on agriculture and food, (b) the emergence of new agents and capitalist relations replacing traditional rural structures, and (c) issues related to sustainably feeding an increasingly urbanized world. Most studies adopt a macroeconomic and urban-centric perspective to tackle these challenges.

Two factors contribute to the heightened public and academic interest in these topics. First, there is a pervasive belief that agriculture, alongside the 'disappearance' of the traditional peasantry, has lost its distinctiveness as a research subject. Whether one believes that agriculture will ultimately fall under the control of transnational capital or that small farmers will adapt and survive, the prevailing capitalist market relations and urban-centered worldview are expected to fully permeate the rural landscape, leaving little of scholarly interest. This perception has diminished interest in studying rural formations deemed obsolete, alongside a neglect of the rich literature developed for peasant studies, under the assumption that the peasantry no longer exists.

Despite debates over the boundaries and relevance of peasant studies, this literature has effectively demonstrated the intricate interconnections between agricultural life's

social, cultural, and economic aspects. Any meaningful analysis must consider the multifaceted nature of rural life. For example, Henri Mendras emphasizes the complex decision-making processes of peasants. By examining their reluctance to adopt technological innovations, he shows that social constraints, economic considerations, risk assessments, concerns about social status, traditional beliefs, and power struggles all play significant roles in these decisions (Mendras, 1970, pp. 23-46).

However, in recent decades, analyses of rural relations have increasingly abandoned this multifaceted perspective. With the rise of new peasantries, former city dwellers, entrepreneurs, and business owners, the unique mindset of rural populations is often deemed irrelevant, as it is perceived to be indistinguishable from that of urban populations. The once-dominant concept of peasantry, which shaped political, economic, and academic discourse, has been replaced by a multiplicity of fluid, diverse subjects who follow the same capitalist rules. Consequently, the study of everyday structures, social fabric, and culture has declined as regular market relations have overshadowed any unique rural structures that resist capitalist logic. This shift has led to the neglect of particular places and local relations, with local studies gaining relevance only when they shed light on global trends.

This shift also reflects the increasing application of the 'homo economicus' model to rural studies. The non-monetary, labor-intensive economy of the small peasantry in previous centuries required a comprehensive approach that considered social and cultural aspects. However, as commodification and market relations have taken over the rural landscape, it has become the implicit assumption that farmers are economically driven individuals akin to their urban counterparts. The monetization of agriculture has led to the naive belief that all relevant economic activities occur in monetary terms and can be captured by statistics. It represents a step backward from the enriched analytical tools of ethnography, anthropology, and sociology central to peasant studies in the 20$^{th}$ century.

The second reason for the shift in focus is the rapid growth of the urban population, contrasted with the decline of traditional rural life. This demographic shift has redirected attention to urban concerns. Current debates on agricultural policies are driven by a deep concern for feeding an increasingly urbanized world. Topics such as

‘sustainability,’ ‘food safety,’ ‘food sovereignty,’ ‘environmentalism,’ and ‘rural development’ are framed in modifying the current capitalist consumption model to mitigate its negative effects. As a result, rural issues attract academic attention only insofar as they relate to these urban and global concerns. Agriculture and rural problems have become secondary and indirectly relevant.

As rural concerns have shaped our perspective on agriculture, agriculture itself has become subordinate to the food chain, and the agri-food chain has become subordinate to global structures or the world system. This approach has compelled scholars to adopt a top-down analysis, starting with global trends to understand local phenomena. While macro-level analysis is essential for understanding global tendencies, it can also obscure important issues. Overemphasis on macro-level analysis can lead to an agency problem, where political, economic, and agricultural developments at the local level are seen merely as derivatives of global trends. Local relations' unique characteristics and creative capacities are often overlooked or sacrificed in favor of macro-theory. Emphasizing structures such as the neoliberal market or global agri-food chains makes it difficult to explain the role of individual agents in social and political change.

With the peasantry no longer seen as a political subject, political studies seeking resistance have focused on international farmer organizations and consumer activism. Structural change is expected either due to growing urban demands or through the struggles of globally organized farmers—no longer as peasants but as a fraction of the working class. Consequently, a large portion of the rural population that does not appear as a visible political subject has been left out of academic discourse.

In terms of manifesting agency, contemporary studies often portray two types of farmers: those who overcome the challenges of a changing world through entrepreneurial spirit, as depicted in farmer magazines published by international agricultural companies or FAO, and those who resist neoliberal agendas, as portrayed in academic studies. Farmers are thus divided into three categories: those who adapt to change, those who resist it, and those who do neither and are destined to be marginalized. Anti-establishment studies seek indicators of farmers reclaiming their political agency through reorganization and resistance, while mainstream approaches that accept the general direction of change offer agricultural policy prescriptions, such

as funding, rural development projects, and rehabilitation programs. These policies aim to prepare farmers for the inevitable transformation of agriculture. In either case, little attention is paid to those who are disorganized, equipped with outdated technology, and struggling to make a living yet *still* manage to stay in the game. The everyday lives and struggles of these farmers, who remain invisible, are largely ignored.

Top-down approaches, which prioritize urban-centric policy agendas and often neglect the agency of everyday farmers, inevitably fail to capture the importance of local relations in understanding how macro trends and policies impact the local level. Whether examining neoliberalism, deindustrialization, structural adjustment policies, or national development policies, macro-level analysis does not directly and seamlessly translate into local contexts. Instead, policies and global changes interact with local agents, relations, and structures, often resulting in unintended and unforeseen consequences. The social, economic, and cultural dimensions of local relations create a fabric through which external influences must pass.

This counter-effect of local relations stems from unwritten rules, social regularities, unofficial titles, and non-monetary forms of power. These characteristics, once well-documented and studied by sociologists, anthropologists, and ethnographers as integral features of the peasantry, have vanished from contemporary analyses. However, rural areas, consisting of farmers and newcomers, still possess these everyday structures, ultimately dictating the outcome of change. Although individualism has been introduced into local life, farmers still belong to families, and even if family businesses are separated from the family unit, the family continues to have a profound impact on economic decisions. Similarly, while modern local communities may not organize themselves by age as traditional communities did, farmers do age, and long-term economic decisions are deeply influenced by the family life cycle.

This dissertation represents an effort to fill the gap from the developments discussed. It aims to provide a theoretical framework for examining local agricultural relations' unique social and power dynamics and the social, economic, and political structures that are organized around them. The dissertation seeks to draw attention to how these

dynamics can guide our predictions and insights regarding the future of agriculture. Focusing on local agricultural relations demonstrates the dynamics between broader trends, structures, and actors, revealing, much like in traditional village societies, the inseparable intertwining of social, political, cultural, and economic domains in practice.

Such an approach offers multiple benefits. First, this holistic perspective can show that, despite the extent of marketization in rural areas today, farmers' behaviors, approaches, and long-term tendencies, which narrow monetary economic interests cannot fully explain, become comprehensible when non-economic factors are considered. It is particularly crucial now to include in the analysis the broader cultural, social, and symbolic interests, as well as the strategies that gain meaning within family dynamics. For this purpose, the dissertation centers on local structures and relations without neglecting the importance of national and global scales. Local relations encompass social, economic, and political interactions, non-monetary economic activities, informal institutions and norms, and cultural, social, and symbolic phenomena that have economic impacts. The dissertation aims to demonstrate (a) the intersections and interactions between social, political, cultural, and economic spheres; (b) the relations between agricultural and non-agricultural fields; (c) how farming families' perceptions of their past, present, and future influence their strategies; (d) how long-term trends impact local agricultural relations; (e) how the formation of social classes affects local agricultural relations and power dynamics; and (f) how agricultural policies, agricultural relations, and political relations interact with each other.

Particularly in examining the local implementation of agricultural policies, it becomes evident that local agricultural relations significantly influence the execution and outcomes of these policies. It is well-known that the effectiveness of agricultural or developmental policies is affected by the non-economic structures and cultural and social values of a particular society (Pieris, 1969). The dissertation will illustrate, with examples, how struggles between social classes, informal economic relationships, social structures, and unwritten rules substantially affect the implementation and results of these policies. Adopting a local perspective delivers the opportunity to observe how current policies work or, rather, *fail* to work in remote rural areas where

the struggle among social classes, local politics, and informal economic and social structures is at play.

In order to overcome these problems, the dissertation applies the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu's concepts, specifically the field, habitus, and the theory of capital allow us to grasp the complex, multidimensional, and multilayered nature of local life and relations of power among social classes and demonstrate how rural relations interact with non-rural ones. It also allows us to conceptualize non-monetary forms of value, as well as informal structures.

Before exploring Bourdieu's social theory, reviewing the Turkish literature on agriculture is beneficial, considering that the dissertation's field research was conducted in a town in Central Anatolia. Similar to the general trends discussed in the agricultural literature in this chapter, Turkey also has a rich body of literature on villages and peasantry. To compare the findings from our field research in Çiğdemli with relevant literature and to later draw on its insights, we will now provide an overview of the critical themes in Turkish literature. Subsequently, to contextualize the local relations we will examine in our field research, we will provide an overview of the agricultural sector's history and policies in Turkey.

## 1.3. Turkish Case: Relevant Literature and History of Agricultural Policies

### 1.3.1. Relevant Literature on Peasantry and Agriculture

In the Turkish sociological literature, Ziya Gökalp and Prince Sabahattin are recognized as early thinkers who, although not exclusively focused on it, addressed the issue of villages and peasantry from a scientific perspective (Sağlam, 2016). Ziya Gökalp's approach was aligned with the A. Comte-E. Durkheim school of thought within continental European sociology, while Prince Sabahattin based his understanding on the F. Le Play-E. Demolins framework, also known as *Science Sociale* (Sucu, 2016).

The Science Sociale school, known for its decentralized, individualistic, and empirical approach, emphasized sociological research, particularly monographs and statistical data. This school advocated analyzing society using sociological methods and promoting individualistic education to cultivate active and sociable individuals.

Mehmet Ali Şevki is considered the most significant representative of this school in the early Republican era. His field research, “The Village of Kurna,” conducted in Pendik in 1936 and published in the Political Sciences Journal, is regarded as a pioneering work in sociological field studies on villages (Sucu, 2016). These studies focused on the rural population’s social and economic development, which comprised most of Turkey’s population. However, many of the monographs from this period were conducted by amateurs and lacked sufficient classification or oversight (Soyşekerci, 2021).

Rural sociology studies gained momentum in the early 1940s, particularly those influenced by the American rural sociology school. Niyazi Berkes was among the prominent figures of this period. His “Research on Some Ankara Villages,” based on fieldwork conducted in 13 villages around Ankara starting in 1940, is considered one of the most important monographs of the era (Berkes, 1942). The “Village Monographs of Western Anatolia,” prepared by Berkes and his student Nedim Göknil, following their monograph travels in 1942, are notable works from this period (Göknil, 1943).

Another key figure was Behice Boran, who viewed the village issue as one of backwardness and attributed the problem to the existing structure of Turkish villages. She advocated for improving production techniques, cultural life, and the mental framework of villages—essentially urbanizing them (Boran, 1940a, 1940b). Her “Social Structure Research,” comparing eight villages in the Manisa plain with five villages in the foothills based on fieldwork conducted in 1941-42, is another pioneering work in village monographs (Boran, 1992). Although Boran's and Berkes's studies employed similar methods to those of Prince Sabahattin’s school, they differed in purpose, focusing not just on the study of villages but on understanding broader societal changes from a village perspective (Sucu, 2016, p. 1966).

An essential economic study from this period is “Turkey's Village Economy” by Tökin, a member of the Kadro Movement, published in 1934. Tökin examines the transformation of Turkey's agricultural structure from a dialectical materialist perspective. Tokin examines the differences between market-oriented commodity production in regions with developed transportation technology and subsistence

production in areas lacking transportation infrastructure. By analyzing the development of agricultural commodity production for the market, Tokin details how capitalist production characteristics such as specialization and product differentiation emerge, how capitalist relations transform property relations in villages, and how the processes of dispossession and proletarianization shape the economic structure, culture, and mentality. Additionally, the study explores the characteristics of the feudal system in the Ottoman era, how it transformed into capitalism and modern republic, and examines the current agha system (Tökin, 1990).

As evident, village studies, considered a continuation of the social science school, gained momentum from the early 1940s, through 50s and 60s. Particularly after 1946, when Turkey aligned with the Western bloc, American-centered scientific perspectives became more influential (Şahin M. , 2017). The *science sociale* continued to influence by merging with American sociology, leading to a focus on village studies in the 1950s and 60s.

In the 1950s, the village institutes not only played a crucial role in creating village literature but also led to numerous village studies conducted by Turkish experts. Cahit Tanyol, who conducted his first monographic study in 1948 in Karataş Village with Hilmi Ziya Ülken and Nurettin Şazi Kösemihal, produced several significant works during that period (Ülken, Kösemihal, & Tanyol, 1950). His monographs on Elifoğlu Village in 1951 (Tanyol, 2014a), Peşke Binamlısı Village in 1956 (Tanyol, 2014b), and Eylen Village in 1965 (Tanyol, 2014c) are considered some of the notable studies of that era. Another influential researcher in the 1950s and 60s was Mümtaz Turhan (1957; 2015; 2019), who emphasized the structure of mentality in society. In his research on the villages of Erzurum, Turhan argues that the basis of social change is the cultural changes taking place at the level of mentality. According to him, technical changes alone were insufficient, and the Western, scientific mode of thought and value system behind these changes had not sufficiently penetrated the villages. There are key monographic studies in this period conducted by İbrahim Yasa, Cavit Orhan Tütengil, Tahsin Demiray, Turhan Yörükan, Turgut Cebe, and Yusuf Kurhan (see Taşçıoğlu, 1955a, 1955b; Tütengil, 1954, 1955; Yörükan & Cebe, 1955; Kurhan, 1955a, 1955b; and for general information, Kaçmazoğlu, 2012; Soyşekerci, 2021, p. 3127).

The tradition of *village novels,* which began in the 1950s, constitutes an essential source of information on rural Turkey. Since writers and thinkers of village origin, as well as graduates of the village institutes played a significant role in this tradition, their works reflect village life from an insider's perspective, making these literary works sociological documents (Çankaya, 2013). Ahmet Makal's "*Bizim Köy*" (Our Village), which presents a detailed portrait of daily life in rural Turkey, is considered the pioneering work of this movement (Makal, 2019). Other notable examples include Orhan Hançerlioğlu's "*Karanlık Dünya*" and "*Ekilemiş Topraklar*" (1999), Orhan Kemal's "*Bereketli Topraklar Üzerinde*" (2010), Yaşar Kemal's "*İnce Memed*" (2012) and "*Teneke*" (2018), Kemal Tahir's "*Körduman*" (2007) and "*Rahmet Yolları Kesti*" (1997), and Fakir Baykurt's "*Yılanların Öcü*" (2017).

Ethnographic studies of Turkish rural life also provide valuable insights. Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of the Traditional Society* (1958) presents a detailed examination of Turkish modernization during the Republican era, including a case study in Balgat. Joe E. Pierce's *Life in a Turkish Village* examines the village of Demirciler, a Central Anatolian village of 60 households. The book describes in detail a series of events, such as circumcision, marriage, and death, through the eyes of a boy named Mahmud while at the same time providing a detailed analysis of the village (Pierce, 2003). Nermin Erdentuğ's monographic studies, "Ethnological Study of Hal Village" (1956) and "Ethnological Study of Sün Village" (1959), are important anthropological folklore studies using ethnographic methods (Kaçmazoğlu, 2012). Additionally, Paul Stirling's "The Turkish Village," conducted in Sakaltutan and Elbaşı in Kayseri, is another key anthropological study (Stirling, 1965).

The 1960s saw the rise of planned development in Turkey. During this period, it was essential to understand the lifestyle, expectations, values, and overall culture of the villagers, as well as how these aspects were changing, to determine effective development policies. This effort led to a collaboration between the State Planning Organization and social scientists to study rural life (Erdentuğ, 1978).

Marxist debates came to the forefront with the influence of the Cold War, while the influence of the social science school and American sociology diminished. The peasantry debates of this time centered around class differentiation within the

peasantry, peasant-state relations, feudalism, the Asiatic mode of production, and underdevelopment. In examining Turkey's underdevelopment and its integration into the capitalist world system, scholars frequently focused on land ownership structures in Turkey.

The roots of Turkey's anti-democratic tendencies, economic backwardness, and dependency were often traced to the relationship between capitalism and the remnants of the Ottoman social order inherited by the young republic. In this context, the historical reasons for Turkey's underdevelopment became the subject of intense debate among historians, particularly from the second half of the 1960s, within the framework of the *Asiatic mode of production*, as proposed by Marx (1973, pp. 471-514). The discussions began in 1965 with Selahattin Hilav's article classifying Turkey as *Asiatic* (Hilav, 1966). Some thinkers, such as Doğan Avcıoğlu (Avcıoğlu, 1969) and Muzaffer İlhan Erdost (Erdost, 2005), argued that the Ottoman land system differed significantly from the Asiatic mode of production and had feudal characteristics. Niyazi Berkes contended that the Ottoman Empire's land system could not be categorized as feudal, stating that the early Ottoman regime had more despotic features (Berkes, 2013). Similarly, Sencer Divitçioğlu argued that the Ottoman Empire, particularly in its early period, operated under an Asiatic mode of production (Divitçioğlu, 2003, p. 124). Other thinkers such as Ömer Lütfi Barkan (Barkan, 1980) and Halil İnalcık (2021) pointed out the unique characteristics of Ottoman society distinguishing it from the typical feudal and Asiatic mode of production.

Between the 1960s and 1980s, significant studies in village sociology were produced, including outstanding works by Cavit Orhan Tütengil (1969; 1983) and Orhan Türkdoğan (1969). The 2000s were years in which capitalism, neoliberalism, and peasant relations were frequently discussed. For example, Köymen (2009) argues that it is a misconception to claim that Turkey has no landowner class due to the abundance of land, widespread small land ownership, and state support for peasants. She asserts that this narrative, which gained strength alongside the rise of neoliberalism, conceals the exploitative relationships experienced by peasants.

More recently, anthropological studies have focused on rural and agricultural areas. For instance, Alexander (2002), examining the Turkish Sugar Corporation as a case

study, argues that the Turkish bureaucracy is deeply connected to society through personal networks and informal practices. In her detailed exploration of local relations with bureaucratic structures, she challenges traditional social theories that separate the state from society, advocating for a more integrated approach that considers dynamic and reciprocal relationships between individuals and bureaucratic institutions. Additionally, notable studies include Carol Delaney's research on male-female relations in a Sunni village near Ankara (Delaney, 2012) and Ildiko Beller and Chris Hann's work on socio-cultural transformation in the Eastern Black Sea region, particularly around tea production (Hann & Hann, 2017). There are other significant recent studies as well; however, they will not be addressed here to avoid redundancy, as they will be referenced as relevant throughout the study.

### 1.3.2. A Brief History of Agricultural and Rural Policies in Turkey

At this point, it is necessary to review the recent history of agricultural policies in Turkey briefly. When analyzing these policies, it's crucial to recognize that the peasantry is not a homogeneous class. In this regard, examining how different social classes within the peasantry were affected by agricultural policies and exploring the various alliances and competitions between the state and these classes becomes essential (Birtek & Keyder, 1976). Such an analysis will not only contribute to our understanding of class dynamics but also shed light on the impact of state policies on local agricultural relations.

#### 1.3.2.1. Transformation of Ottoman Land System and Agricultural Reforms

In the traditional Ottoman land system, state-owned lands, known as *miri* lands, were categorized into fiefs based on their productivity and assigned to a bureaucratic/military class called *sipahi*. The *sipahi* were responsible for collecting taxes and raising soldiers (Ecevit, 1999, pp. 5-7). The *reaya* (peasants) were required to pay a tithe, known as *aşar* or *öşür*, amounting to one-tenth of their produce, to the ruler. Non-Muslim *reaya* were additionally subject to a head tax called *jizya*. Besides the *aşar*, the *reaya* had other labor obligations, such as transporting and storing the *sipahi's* share of the produce, plowing his fields, and performing other duties. In return,

the *sipahi* was tasked with maintaining order in the village, providing seeds, and addressing some of the *reaya's* basic needs (Geray, 2011, pp. 21-22).

With the weakening of state power from the second half of the 16th century, the traditional land system was replaced by the *iltizam* system, where the right to collect taxes from the land was sold to specific individuals (Ecevit, 1999, pp. 5-7). The *iltizam* system and rising inflation, contributed to an increase in corrupt land seizures and thefts, eventually leading to peasant uprisings known as the Celali Rebellions (Geray, 2011, p. 21).

The 1839 Tanzimat Edict (Edict of Gülhane) aimed to implement reforms such as the abolition of the *iltizam* system and the adjustment of the *aşar* tax, but these measures remained inadequate. In 1858, a regulation legalized private land ownership, and in 1864, a provincial charter (*Vilayet Nizamnamesi*) recognized the village as the lowest administrative unit, assigning tax collection and municipal duties to village administrations. During this period, the Homeland Funds (*Menafi-i Umumiye Funds*), which later formed the basis of the Agricultural Bank, aimed to provide farmers with accessible credit to counter high interest rates and usury. Infrastructure investments, such as village roads and bridges, were made in the Tuna province, and Agricultural Councils were established. However, these reforms were not implemented nationwide and primarily benefited medium and large-scale farmers in the Tuna province (Geray, 2011, pp. 23-24).

Throughout the 19$^{th}$ century, agriculture became increasingly commoditized and integrated into the global market. The construction of railroads and ports facilitated access to international markets, boosting the production of certain industrial crops (Ecevit, 1999, pp. 5-7).

#### 1.3.2.2. Agricultural Policies and Land Reforms in Early Republic

The Economic Congress convened in Izmir in 1923 laid the foundation for the early agricultural policies of the republican era. One of the key outcomes of the congress was the abolition of the *aşar* tax in 1925, a move strongly advocated by large landowners. As a result, the tax burden on peasants, previously around 84-87% during the late Ottoman and early republican periods, dropped to approximately 31% (Önder,

2019). The abolition of the *aşar* primarily benefited large farmers and to some extent, middle farmers. This decision was driven both by the government's desire to boost exports through increased producer incentives and by the tacit alliance between the government and large landowners. The removal of the *aşar* can also be seen as a concession by the government to secure the support of large farmers for its broader superstructural reforms (Birtek & Keyder, 1976).

Another significant development during the early years of the Republic was the transfer of land, vacated following the displacement of the non-Muslim population, to large Muslim landowners in regions such as Çukurova, Maraş, the Kurdish areas in the east, as well as western Anatolia and the Black Sea region. These landowners supported the new regime by becoming part of the ruling bloc and serving as members of parliament (Avcıoğlu, 1969).

On March 18, 1924, the Village Law was enacted, transforming villages into local government units with legal personality. The law regulated village revenues, expenditures, and duties and required the village population to cooperate on various public works, such as building roads and schools. Over time, this obligation came to be seen as a form of drudgery, provoking strong reactions from villagers, mainly because the work did not account for the agricultural season (Geray, 2011, p. 28). Similarly, the road tax, first implemented in the 19th century, continued into the republican era, with male taxpayers who could not pay in cash being conscripted for roadwork (Özdemir, 2013). The practice of forced labor during harvest time led to widespread discontent among farmers and is believed to have contributed to the end of single-party rule (Yücer, et al., 2009, p. 24).

The 1930s, influenced by the 1929 economic depression, marked a period of intensified state intervention in Turkey, with numerous regulations and investments to boost agricultural production. A wheat law was introduced to mitigate the effects of falling wheat prices on farmers, and Ziraat Bank was tasked with wheat procurement and sales. In 1933, the Higher Agricultural Institute was established. The 1$^{st}$ Five-Year Development Plan in 1934 is followed by various agriculture-based industrial investments, such as sugar and weaving factories. The state also implemented education, transportation, and banking reforms and established model farms to

promote agricultural development. The first industrial plan was also introduced to foster interaction between agriculture and industry, leading to significant increases in agricultural production under statist policies (Bacaksız & Uysal, 2019).

In the 1930s, the government sought to cultivate a class of commodity-producing farmers, particularly from the middle peasantry, who would supply the market. For this purpose, the government implemented policies protecting middle farmers from falling wheat prices, increasing their dependence on the state. The alliance with large landowners, formed at the beginning of the Republic, began to break down during this period as the foreign market became unstable and the state shifted towards a more autarkic economic stance. Instead of supporting a few large farmers with significant bargaining power who produced export-oriented crops like cotton, the government prioritized increasing wheat production by integrating the products of many small, dispersed farmers into the market. This approach aimed to prevent resources needed for industrial growth from being diverted towards food imports (Birtek & Keyder, 1976).

Another aspect of these developments was the government's search for new alliances and strategies to carry out superstructural and socio-economic transformations. During this period, the CHP government focused on two main issues: land reform and rural education. Driven by the intellectual and petty-bourgeois wing's desire for radical change—such as eliminating feudal remnants and liberating the peasantry from religious fundamentalism—a significant educational mobilization took place in the 1930s. Village instructor training courses were established to bring education to villages without schools (Erdem, 2008). The most important part of this mobilization was the “Village Institutes Movement” launched in 1940 (Tanilli, 2010). Aimed at training village teachers and professionals, the Village Institutes featured a democratic structure where teachers, students, and workers collaborated (Burkay, 2000, s. 18-19). Utilizing a unique, practice-based educational method, the Village Institutes dedicated 58 weeks of the 5-year program to agricultural education and practical training (Tanilli, p. 16). As we will see, intellectuals educated in these institutes pioneered the "village literature" movement, producing observer-realist and social-realist works that highlighted village issues (Bayrak, 2000, pp. 53-59).

Policies to land the peasants started in the 1920s with more regional implementations and gained momentum in the 1930s with nationwide implementation. The 1925 Budget Law and the 1934 Land Registry Law included provisions for land ownership for landless peasants. The Settlement Law of 1934 included provisions on the resettlement of Muhajirs, as well as provisions on the landing of landless and landless peasants, the abolition of institutions such as tribal leaders, local landlords (agha), and sheikhdoms, and the confiscation of the real estates that had been allocated to them (İskan Kanunu, 1934).

However, one of the most impactful land reform initiatives in modern political history was the 1945 law aimed at distributing land for farming (*Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu*). The law sought not only to redistribute publicly owned lands but also to politically neutralize large landowners, which provoked strong opposition from political groups representing this segment in parliament (Geray, 2011, p. 34). Although the law intends to bolster the CHP's credibility among peasants, it failed to achieve the desired effect. Article 17, which proposed the redistribution of large landowners' properties to landless peasants, was not enforced, leading to a rift within the party (Gürel, 2014, pp. 321-322). Nevertheless, the "land distribution commissions" established under the law did help facilitate the transfer of state lands to landless and smallholder peasants (Taraklı, 1976).

Between 1939 and 1945, during World War II, the government implemented policies that disadvantaged the middle farmers—a class it had previously supported and helped to create—thereby dismantling its alliance with them. Large-scale conscription during the war reduced agricultural production, with middle and small farmers suffering the most. Additionally, the rising prices of industrial products compared to agricultural goods, combined with the government's 1943 law requiring the purchase of farmers' products at low prices, led to the emergence of black-market practices. Large farmers had an advantage, as they could store their products and sell them on the black market, whereas middle farmers were forced to sell their produce to the government at low prices. These policies alienated middle farmers, pushing them to seek new political alliances against the government. The large farmers, along with the middle farmers who had distanced themselves from the government due to the land reform efforts formed a new political alliance, laying the groundwork for the political developments

that would lead to the rise of the Democratic Party in 1950. (Geray, 2011; Birtek & Keyder, 1976).

According to Savran (2011), the absence of an agricultural revolution in Turkey resulted in a limited bourgeois revolution. Due to the lack of such a revolution, productivity growth in agriculture lagged behind that in industry, and the agricultural surplus did not expand sufficiently. Furthermore, large landowners remained intact and were not adequately taxed, which prevented the agricultural surplus from being transferred to the industrial sector. As a result, the bourgeoisie had to ally with these landowners to maintain political dominance (Savran, 2011, p. 90).

#### 1.3.2.3. Mechanization, Developmental Policies and Political Consequences: 1950-1979

"Modernization of agriculture" was the key goal shaping agricultural policies in Turkey between 1950 and 1980. Following World War II, the European Recovery Program (ERP), also known as the Marshall Plan, was established by the United States in 1948 to support the Western and Southern European economies. In this context, Turkey received foreign aid to modernize its agricultural sector.

During the Democrat Party era, agriculture-focused policies were implemented. Specifically, loans and incentives were provided to large landowners engaged in capitalist production, while treasury lands were distributed to landless peasants. Highway investments accelerated, making a large portion of agricultural production market-oriented, effectively ending traditional subsistence farming (Gürel, 2014, p. 324). These policies rapidly resulted in significant progress. According to Toprak (1988), the agricultural transformation of the 1950s cannot be explained solely by the era's circumstances. The rapid development after 1950 was also resulted from the structural, institutional, and legal progress accumulated from pre-1950 reforms (Toprak, 1988, p. 20).

However, due to industrialization during the same period, the relative importance of agricultural value-added gradually declined. The share of agricultural value-added in total value-added decreased from 44.1% in 1950-59 to 26.6% in 1970-79 and further to 15.3% in 1990-97. The modernization of agriculture and urbanization accelerated

migration, with the share of agricultural employment dropping from 78.0% in 1950-59 to 45.6% in 1990-97 (Oyan, 2015, pp. 58-59).

Following the end of Democrat Party rule by the military government on May 27, the mechanization of agriculture continued until 1980, despite a shift in investment focus from agriculture to industry. In this context, the number of tractors increased from 1,750 in 1948 to 436,369 in 1980, while the number of harvesters rose from 994 to 13,667 (Gürel, 2014, p. 325).

Like other developing countries, Turkey adopted agricultural development policies aligned with the import substitution industrialization (ISI) model. During this period, the state played an active role in the economy and implemented protectionist policies. Investments in agricultural infrastructure were essential for integrating rural areas into the national market. These investments primarily focused on mechanization, extensive use of chemicals, opening new agricultural lands, introducing modern farming technologies, and new crop varieties. This system required an institutional organization to achieve its objectives. The Agricultural Bank and cooperatives became key instruments for regulating funding, production, marketing, and distribution. Cooperation with international financial institutions (IFIs) also began during this time, as Turkey required financial support to implement these policies (Aydın, 2010, p. 150).

Agricultural sales cooperatives have been key organizations protecting the interests of farmers. Established under Law No. 2834 in 1935, they assist members "by facilitating the marketing of their crops, ensuring fair prices, processing and marketing their produce, ensuring crop standardization to increase exports, provision of cheap agricultural tools, machinery and inputs" (Aydın, 2010, p. 162).

Since 1963, Turkey has implemented five-year development plans. These plans provide a framework for tracking shifts in the agricultural sector's general approaches and identifying key policies and concepts over time. During the early years, village development and consolidation took center stage. The dominant theme of the First Five-Year Development Plan was "community development," emphasizing the importance of state and societal cooperation to promote social, economic, and cultural progress. The plan aimed to improve irrigation, health, transportation, communication,

and handicrafts in villages, with cooperatives and inter-village unions playing a vital role. Notably, in this first plan, “community development” and “village development” were treated synonymously (Koç & Gül, 2006, pp. 43-44).

During this period, the village-town project significantly influenced rural development policies. It was designed to create development centers with the necessary infrastructure to provide public services among neighboring villages that could cooperate administratively and economically (Günaydın, 2001). The 4th Five-Year Development Plan introduced the project with goals that included improving income distribution, fostering rural development, increasing villagers' income, and raising living standards (Koç & Gül, 2006).

The radical agricultural transformation between 1950-1980 sparked political struggles in rural areas. As mechanization displaced large numbers of rural populations by forcing them into urban areas, land occupations became widespread (Gürel, Küçük, & Taş, 2022). In regions like Çukurova, mechanization allowed large landowners to accumulate wealth, which was later transferred to industry while dispossessing many peasants. These developments led to peasant land occupations and prolonged legal disputes with landowners. Between 1968 and 1971, these occupations merged with the broader labor movement, becoming a mass movement. During the same period, leftist groups such as FKF (Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu) and Dev-Genç organized large rallies to protest government-announced base prices (Gürel, 2014, pp. 332-333).

#### 1.3.2.4. Neoliberal Agricultural Transformation: 1980-1999

The Turkish economy has transformed based on neoliberal principles for over four decades. An export-oriented approach replaced the previous economic development strategy, reshaping the socio-economic structure and institutions. While agriculture and rural areas were affected as much as industry and urban sectors, neoliberal agricultural reforms were not implemented as consistently or uninterruptedly as in other sectors. Although successive governments adopted a long-term neoliberal agenda, contradictory policies, and populist deviations often clashed with the new economic objectives.

The oil crisis of the 1970s triggered a global crisis, leading to debt traps in developing countries. Problems with the balance of payments were followed by radical changes in economic policies, leading to liberalization programs. The general exit strategy for developing countries involved securing loans from the IMF and World Bank and implementing Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Following the coup d'état in 1980 in Turkey, the economic measures taken on January 24, 1980 marked the beginning of this perspective. The economic package included standard stabilization measures and structural adjustment programs, which the IMF and World Bank imposed on developing countries throughout the 1970s. Key elements of this package included foreign exchange policies accompanied by real devaluations, liberalization of the import regime, prioritization of exports, elimination of commodity subsidies, and restrictions on domestic demand (Boratav, 2012, pp. 148-149). These policies also aimed to minimize state intervention and reduce the state's share in the economy. In this context, while the number of supported products was 26 in 1980, it dropped to 10 within ten years (Sayın, 1997, p. 36). The share of support purchases in total value-added fell from 12.2% in 1977-79 to 5.5% in 1988. Consequently, the agriculture-industry terms of trade declined by 38.9% during this period (Boratav, 2012, p. 165; Keyder and Yenal, p. 196).

The 1990s were critical years for the liberalization of Turkish agriculture, and Turkey has fully adopted a neoliberal reform perspective under the directives of IFIs such as IMF and WB. There were two additional international incentives to push Turkey to liberalize agriculture. First, the Customs Union between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Turkey was established in January 1996, accelerating Turkey's EEC accession process. The process necessitated adjustment policies to harmonize with EEC Common Agricultural Policies (CAP). While the customs union does not cover agricultural trade, it was governed by preferential trade rules. By 2001, more than 60% of Turkey’s agricultural exports to the EU faced no import restrictions, and another 36% benefited from reduced tariffs (Grethe, 2004, p. 25). Secondly, the Uruguay Round of 1986-1994 brought agriculture under GATT/WTO rules. The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AOA), to which Turkey is a party, aimed to liberalize agricultural trade by improving market access and reducing domestic support, export subsidies, and tariffs. The Turkish Grand National Assembly ratified

the Agreement, and it came into effect on December 31, 1994. While developing countries, including Turkey, had a prolonged timeline for implementing these changes, Least Developed Countries (LDCs) were exempt (Clapp, 2006, p. 564).

These two processes deeply influenced development plans in Turkey. The Sixth Five-Year National Development Plan (1990-1994) included agricultural support purchases as a form of intervention. It stated that the prices of these purchases would be determined to stabilize farm incomes and boost productivity while also considering the overall economic balance and foreign market prices. Although the plan referenced legal harmonization and structural adjustments in the context of the EEC accession process, it lacked specific details beyond general modernization policies already on the agenda (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1989, p. 48). In contrast, the Seventh Five-Year National Development Plan (1996-2000) adopted a more radical neoliberal perspective due to the aforementioned international developments. It directly referenced CAP and the WTO Agreement, proposing a reconfiguration of agricultural support policies to align with free competition, market signals, and efficient use of public funds. The plan called for reduced state intervention in agricultural pricing, gradual removal of input subsidies, and the introduction of a direct income support system. Additionally, it aimed to decrease surplus production by limiting certain crop cultivation areas, establishing producer associations, privatizing production units, and making the Union of Agricultural Sales Cooperatives autonomous (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, pp. 60-61).

The macroeconomic adjustment program announced on April 5, 1994, included several decisions regarding the agricultural sector. The program limited agricultural supports to cereals, tobacco, and sugar and revoked privileges for agricultural sales cooperatives. However, the impact of these decisions was short-lived, due to populist concerns (Bulut E. , 2023) and “the inability of the state to liberalize the economy on all fronts at once” (Aydın, 2010, pp. 159-160). In the following year, input subsidies increased. The tobacco quota was abolished in 1997 (Bulut E. , 2023, p. 623).

The newly liberalized foreign trade regime led to a substantial rise in Turkey's agricultural imports and exports. Supported by export promotion policies, Turkey's agricultural export revenues grew from $1.2 billion in 1980 to $3.4 billion in 1995

(Keyder and Yenal, 2013, p. 116). However, during the same period, as Turkey's economy shifted from being agriculture-based to becoming more industry-focused, the share of agriculture in total exports dropped from 57.46% to 9.86%, while its share in imports increased from 0.64% to 6.84% (Ay & Yapar, 2005, p. 71). By 1988, the agricultural sector's share of the gross national product had fallen below 17%, and as the century neared its end, it lost its role as the primary surplus provider for industrialization and its driving force in Turkey's economic growth (Boratav, 2015, p. 88).

Transnational agribusiness companies had already entered the Turkish market before 1980. After 1980, the role of foreign capital in agricultural production and the food industry (Food TNCs) grew significantly. Multinational corporations partnered with local investment groups (Keyder and Yenal, 2013, pp. 117-118). Yenal argues that export-oriented market policies, along with the liberalization of foreign trade and investment in the agri-food sector, eroded the protection of agricultural production. As a result, the restructuring of agri-food production and markets accompanied the deregulation of the agri-food sector (Yenal, 1999, pp. 26-27).

Atasoy (2017) argues that the neoliberal restructuring of agriculture does not necessarily result in the dispossession of small farmers. Neoliberalism can take multiple forms depending on historical, socio-cultural, and political contexts. In the case of Turkey, despite the neoliberal policies implemented after the 1980s and particularly under AKP rule, the country did not experience large-scale deagrarianization and displacement, mainly due to the complex nature of local relations (Atasoy, 2017, pp. 17-18).

As a result of these transformations, small family farms, increasingly dependent on commodities and deeply integrated with multinational corporations, have moved away from the traditional peasant characteristics understood in the context of the nation-state, becoming part of the global food chain. However, as Aydın notes, these farmers, in response to their challenges, have not formed a “new peasantry” that challenges the existing order, as Ploeg (2008) suggests. Instead, they have turned to continual sacrifice and self-exploitation, in the Chayanovian sense to survive (Aydın, 2016).

### 1.3.2.5. Radical Restructuring in Agricultural Policies and Its Consequences: 2000s

The agricultural restructuring program, first proposed in 1994 but never fully implemented throughout the 1990s, resurfaced in 1999 through the IMF. Turkey submitted several Letters of Intent to the IMF between September 29, 1999, and December 18, 2000, detailing plans to eliminate existing agricultural support policies, introduce a direct income support system (DIS), and privatize or dismantle agricultural support institutions. These objectives were incorporated into the 2001 Economic Reform Program (ERP) (Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler, 2007, pp. 113-115; Aydın, 2010; Ziraat Mühendisleri Odası, 2004a). Concurrently, the Long-Term Strategy and Eighth Five-Year Development Plan (2001-2005) outlined plans to transform the agricultural sector into a highly competitive market (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 2001-2005, p. 136).

In 2000, the World Bank supported Turkey's reforms by signing the Economic Reform Loan (ERL) agreement, providing $760 million for the implementation of the commitments made in the 1999 standby agreement. In 2001, the World Bank granted an additional $600 million alongside the Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP) to monitor the progress of these reforms (Aydın, 2010, p. 160). ARIP was carried out from 2002 to 2007. The project had four main objectives. The first one was to “phase out the unsustainable and distortionary system of subsidies for fertilizer, credit and price supports--which disproportionately benefit large farmers, regressively tax consumers, and together cost over US$6 billion a year--and to link prices to world market prices” (World Bank, 2002, p. 2). Other objectives were to offer financial incentives to farmers to switch from overproduced crops to alternative activities, to restructure and privatize sales cooperative unions, and to assist the government in effectively communicating the program to the public (World Bank, 2002, pp. 1-3). According to the World Bank and IMF, all policy measures except DIS were to be eliminated, based on the belief that a self-regulating market required removing any intervention affecting individual choices.

The project faced criticism for prioritizing the elimination of subsidies despite input subsidies making up only 0.34% of GDP in 1998. For instance, Oyan (2000, 2015)

argued that there was argued that no concrete evidence proved subsidies were a significant burden and high consumer prices were due to trade and transportation margins. Moreover, the claim that subsidies mainly benefited large farmers was unsupported by data (Oyan, 2000; 2015, pp.116-125).

The direct income support system was implemented between 2001 and 2007. Initially, the system covered 2 million farmers and 118 million decares of land. The payment was set at 10,000,000 TL per decare in 2001, increased to 13,500,000 TL in 2002, and finally raised to 16,000,000 TL in 2003 and the following years. The government also provided additional payments for selected products. For example, the government paid 3 YTL of fertilizer subsidy per decare for oilseed and industrial plants. The payments were lower than the OECD average, and there was no link between the payments and actual production; landowners benefited from the system whether they cultivated their land. This policy resulted in reduced production and a decline in the number of farmers. Additionally, small farmers struggled with the transaction costs, while larger landowners benefited more easily and effectively from the system (Çetin, 2010, pp. 70-84).

Despite an average annual growth rate of 7% between 2003 and 2007, the new neoliberal program that began in 1998 negatively impacted the peasantry and farming classes. Agricultural employment dropped by around 2.7 – 3 million between 1998 and 2007 (Boratav, 2012, p. 219). From 2000 to 2008, Turkey experienced a reduction of approximately 1.7 million hectares in land available for cultivation and about 1.9 million hectares in actively cultivated land. This significant decline in agricultural capacity, driven by policies implemented since 2000, raises concerns about the country's ability to meet the growing food needs of its population (Çelik Ateş, et al., 2017). According to Gülçubuk, the globalist agricultural policies have led to Turkey losing its self-sufficiency in agriculture, becoming an importer, with rural incomes falling and agricultural markets increasingly controlled by international monopolies (Gülçubuk, 2002, p. 111).

In this era, the state shifted from providing broad social security to offering discriminatory charity through institutions aligned with the party. Agriculture saw significant disintegration, with a sharp decline in subsistence farming households,

contributing to the proletarianization of society. The highest poverty rates were among rural laborers and subsistence peasants, although transfers to rural areas helped alleviate some of the poverty (Köse & Bahçe, 2017).

The European Union accession process has led to efforts to harmonize Turkey's agricultural policies with those of the European Union. From 2005 when the negotiations for full membership were started until the suspension of negotiations in 2016, 16 out of the 35 chapters necessary to complete the accession process have opened, one of which is *Food Safety, Veterinary and Phytosanitary Policy*. 14 chapters including Agriculture and Rural Development are blocked due to decision of the EU Council with regard to Cyprus (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2022). Turkey, throughout the negotiation process, made *progress* under certain headlines. She established an IPARD Agency (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance in Rural Development) to modernize the agricultural sector and to ensure sustainable development. Turkey has pledged to replace direct support payments and price support measures in the agriculture with decoupled direct supports which also requires to redesign the support policies of state economic enterprises. The land identification system and the National Farmer Registration System has also introduced. She also lifts restrictions on trade in beef meat, live bovine animals and derivate product to align with CAP requirements (Directorate for EU Affairs, 2022). The EU has allocated to the Rural Development Program for the Republic of Turkey a total of € 654 million. In January 2006, Turkey adopted its first rural development strategy which sets a framework for rural development policies. The strategy aimed at setting sustainable conditions for a rural community, which includes creating jobs and opportunities, utilizing local resources, protecting environment, cultural assets and landscape (Akkaraca Köse, 2012).

The 2008-09 recession and the 2008 global food crisis, driven by rising demand, falling grain production, and speculation, affected Turkey significantly. Between 2003 and 2007, food prices escalated at least 10% annually, reaching 18% in 2008. In 2008, wheat and maize prices surged twofold, and rice threefold (Watson II, 2017, p. 497). The inflation in unprocessed food increased significantly in 2009 and 2010, combining with the declining domestic meat supply (Rawdanowicz, 2010, p. 14). According to TÜSİAD, the rise in agricultural product prices was driven by factors such as increased demand from rapidly growing economies like China and India, the use of oilseeds and

cereals for biofuel, rising oil prices, and climate instability (TÜSİAD, 2008, pp.29-35).

In parallel with the rising trend in food prices, which reached its peak during the 2008 food crisis, a shift occurred in government policies. The supports that were largely eliminated and viewed as market-distorting following the transition to the Direct Income Support system were reintroduced with the enactment of the Agriculture Law in 2006. In the years following the law's adoption, policies such as input subsidies and product-based support, along with price supports like deficiency payments and premiums, were reinstated. In terms of resource transfers from consumers to producers via customs policies and direct subsidies, which accounted for 4-5% of the Gross National Product in the 1990s, fell to 3% during the period of the Direct Income Support system, but began to rise again after 2007, returning to 1990s levels (Keyder & Yenal, 2013, pp. 202-203). Indeed, capital groups were also reacting to this policy shift. TÜSİAD argues that despite outward appearances of liberal policies, Turkey's main agricultural strategy remains focused on self-sufficiency, which conflicts with WTO guidelines and the harmonization of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (TUSİAD 2008, pp. 29-35).

#### 1.3.2.6. Insights from Turkish Agricultural History and Relevant Literature

Turkey's agriculture is partly the history of transitioning from a self-sufficient peasantry with limited market access to small and medium farms producing commodities for the market. The young Republic, striving for industrialization, supported agricultural production to create a surplus for industrial development. However, in doing so, it frequently shifted between alliances and confrontations with different classes within the peasantry. Since the 1980s, Turkey, in line with global trends, faced growing pressure to integrate its agricultural sector into global markets, abandoning protectionist policies. This pressure, especially during times of economic crisis, pushed the state toward adopting neoliberal and structural adjustment policies—sometimes reluctantly, sometimes more thoroughly.

What can we learn from Turkey's agricultural history? Firstly, the literature reveals the importance of class struggles in analyzing the recent history of Turkish agriculture.

We have seen that the peasantry is not a monolithic entity, and the class differentiation within the peasantry—particularly the sharp differences in interests between large and small farmers—is as important as their relationships with the bourgeoisie and merchants. Class divisions within rural areas have played a significant role in the formation and implementation of populist policies by governments, and in managing the demands and pressures from capital groups. It demonstrates that it is impossible to analyze local agricultural relations accurately without considering class relations.

Today, speaking of the peasantry as a traditional economic structure or exotic folklore is no longer accurate. The state's agricultural policies still impact various rural class groups differently, shaping the political views, socioeconomic conditions, and daily practices of farmers from different classes. This perspective is essential when examining the strategies of small farmers—on which this dissertation focuses—and how these strategies interact with agricultural policies.

Secondly, with the abandonment of the growth model based on agricultural surplus, the decline in the rural population, and the decrease in agriculture's share of GDP due to industrialization, the peasantry has lost its macroeconomic functions. As a result, it has also lost its relative political importance and influence. As we noted at the beginning of the dissertation, it explains to some extent the loss of focus on agricultural relations, the marginalization of the peasantry as a subject matter, and the transition from peasantry to farmers, leading to a loss of subjectivity in the agricultural sector. Recent analyses take agriculture as part of broader global issues, such as the global agri-food chain and environmentalism. It stems from transforming from being the locomotive of national development to a sector fully integrated into international capital and trade.

However, the vast literature on Turkish peasantry, especially within the field of sociology, continues to provide a rich perspective on the impact of market integration and modernization on the transformation of the peasantry. As we attempt to bring local agricultural relations back to the center of analysis in a way that avoids economic reductionism, this literature, with its multifaceted perspectives, will offer significant contributions.

### 1.3.3. Choosing Çiğdemli: Justifications for Research Site

This dissertation emphasizes local relations through a case study in Çiğdemli, a small, often overlooked rural town, and three nearby villages that have recently joined the municipality. Like much of the region, the town suffers from a semi-arid climate, limited irrigation, and a declining, aging population. Before discussing the application of Bourdieu's social theory to local agricultural relations, it is essential to address the choice of location for the field research.

Section 1.2 shows that a rich body of literature on agricultural relations, notably regarding villages and peasantry, has been produced for Turkey, reflecting broader global trends, especially in the 20$^{th}$ century. This literature, especially in rural sociology and village monographs, thoroughly examines villages' traditional characteristics and unique features and their ambivalent transformation within a modernizing Turkey. However, more recently, the focus has shifted towards issues like the capitalist transformation of agriculture, environmental concerns, and migration, paralleling global trends.

Nevertheless, the prevailing belief in the demise of the village and the peasantry and the notion that small farmers are doomed to disappear under neoliberal policies seems to hinder detailed local-level studies. On the one hand, attention has concentrated heavily on regions with strong agricultural capitalism, such as areas producing high-value crops like cotton and sunflower, where capital investment is significant. On the other hand, in Central Anatolia, which is characterized by a semi-arid climate and aging, shrinking populations, interest in villages and small towns has primarily been limited to pointing out the decline of small farmers. It may be partly due to the demographic structure of these populations, where distinct social classes and power dynamics are less apparent. Indeed, at first glance, the general income level, lack of non-agricultural employment opportunities, the prevalence of retirees, and relatively low wealth and income inequality compared to metropolitan areas may make class dynamics less visible, especially to those accustomed to urban settings. I experienced this firsthand during the fieldwork.

As we pose the fundamental question prompted by these factors, we also clarify the rationale for conducting this dissertation's fieldwork in a small town in Central Anatolia: What is happening in the rest of Anatolia, where capital inflows are limited, and an aging population of smallholder farmers struggles in semi-arid conditions? How do local dynamics operate in these lesser-studied areas? Why do some farmers remain despite harsh conditions while others leave? Is it worthwhile to study the local agricultural and social relations in slowly dying where small farmers increasingly abandon agricultural production? For this dissertation, the answer to this question is affirmative.

In the dissertation, we aim to demonstrate, as illustrated by the case of Çiğdemli, that beneath a seemingly stagnant and disintegrating social structure lie dynamic social and class relations, as well as social mobilities that could potentially alter the existing class formation and demographic structure in the future. In this context, the internal dynamics of local agricultural relations and the dynamic interactions between social classes carry significant potential to influence the future of such settlements. Therefore, examining the strategies employed by small farmers to survive and their relationships with other social classes in Çiğdemli will enable us to analyze the multifaceted relationships underlying farmer behavior in rural areas. This analysis, in turn, will help us predict how new factors that may emerge in the rural landscape could alter the current trajectory.

Secondly, what we might learn from today's rural Anatolia is vital for gaining new insights into the future of rural life in other regions of Turkey. Understanding the communities that persist despite harsh social, economic, and environmental conditions is key to making meaningful predictions for the near future, especially given that climate change studies predict the expansion of arid climates. The harsh conditions and scarce water resources we see today in specific regions may become more widespread in the future.

Lastly, there is a vast, underexplored area where small businesses and smallholder farmers are unlikely to be replaced by large agribusinesses shortly due to hostile environmental and economic conditions. Such a research subject is academically significant and increasingly relevant as it may become a common phenomenon in the

future. It is essential to closely observe the transformations taking place in remote towns of Anatolia, just as much as in the fertile, prominent regions of agricultural capitalism. Therefore, conducting a case study in Çiğdemli will expand our understanding of agricultural relations in areas with more marginal conditions.

In the following section, we will examine Pierre Bourdieu's social theory, which provides the most suitable theoretical framework for the approach we aim to establish. Bourdieu offers the conceptual tools and theoretical approach necessary for conducting the multifaceted, in-depth, and holistic social and political analysis outlined thus far. We will begin by broadly reviewing his approach and then exploring how we can apply this theoretical framework to the analysis of agricultural relations.

### 1.4. Theoretical Background: Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu

In the preceding sections, we have explored the multifaceted debates on peasantry and agriculture within the social disciplines. Concurrently, we have traced the evolution of the agricultural sector and peasants' economic, social, and political positioning throughout history, parallel with the development of capitalism and industrial cities. Analyzing the complex social and political relationships in today's highly commercialized, financialized, and urbanized rural areas poses significant challenges when employing concepts specifically developed for the rural/agricultural domain. Agricultural economics and rural relations, inherently complex due to the dependence of agricultural production on environmental factors, require a multidimensional perspective from the outset.

Moreover, additional complexities arise from the urbanization of villages and towns, technological advancements, increased mobility leading to the erosion of the closed nature of rural communities, the deepening of rural-urban relationships, the blurring of distinctive rural cultural traits due to marketization, the growth of non-agricultural elements within rural economic relations, and the integration of agricultural economics with non-agricultural economies through financialization and the connection of local economies with national and transnational production and distribution chains.

Under these conditions, examining contemporary farmers' economic, social, and political relationships within the rural structure necessitates considering the factors

influencing rural society across different time scales. Any analysis must start with factors such as soil and climate conditions, demographic structure, technological developments, contemporary forms of capitalist production and distribution relations, and state policies, which shape the ground on which actors operate over various periods. Furthermore, they must comprehensively evaluate these social relations, recognizing the inseparable nature of the economic, cultural, and political aspects and demonstrating the interactions between rural structures, social relations, and actors.

While undertaking this, we must establish a framework that points to the grey areas created by the above developments. This framework can also delimit the specific research object. Within such a framework, I believe it will be possible to illustrate the existence of struggles, distribution and redistribution relationships, competitions, and transformations of actors in the agricultural domain, especially farmers.

Although Bourdieu's magnum opus, “Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste,” (1996a) demonstrates the theory's most prominent application within the context of urban classes, this does not mean that the theory is inapplicable to rural settings. Bourdieu's early structural anthropologic research forms the foundation of his “theory of practice,” notably in his work “The Algerians,” (1962) which devotes a significant portion to the analysis of rural tribes and villages in Algeria. “The Bachelors’ Ball” (2008), a collection of four essays he wrote about the French peasantry, is also significant for its focus on peasantry and rural sociology as a central theme.

Pierre Bourdieu's theory provides a solid theoretical framework that allows us to comprehend the multi-layer depth of social reality with irreducible complexities. First and foremost, the starting point of Bourdieu's social theory makes it particularly suitable for this topic. One of the distinguishing features of Bourdieu's theory is the emphasis on power relations within society. The main problem Bourdieu deals with is the persistence of hierarchy and domination in the society without significant resistance. At this point, Bourdieu does not take 'the political' isolated from 'the social.' From Bourdieu's perspective, culture is a domain of power struggle. Power relations are not external to social relations; rather, it is embedded in all dimensions of life.

Hierarchies are conveyed through social distinctions and reproduced by cultural symbols and practices (Swartz, pp. 6-7).

The chapter will encapsulate Bourdieusian theory's general approach, theory of practice, and critical concepts, field, capital, and habitus, respectively, to clarify why and how the study benefits from Bourdieusian theory. Following this, we will review studies in the rural/agricultural field employing Bourdieu's approaches. Finally, we will adapt his critical concepts to the context.

### 1.4.1. Theory of Practice

The relationship between structure and individual is one of the primary subjects that social sciences focus on to comprehend social change (see, Giddens, 1984; Habermas, 1989). In this context, Bourdieu's social theory is considered as a successful attempt to understand the relationship between social structures and everyday practices (Webb, Schirato, & Danaher, 2002, p. 1). One of the significant questions that Bourdieu attempts to address is the question of agency in social theory. The agency problem deals with how social norms and rules affect human action and vice versa. Bourdieu defines his theoretical stance towards this problem as opposed to what he calls 'the subjective/objective dichotomy'. He takes subjectivism and objectivism as two modes of knowledge and two poles, which dominate the social sciences regarding the structure-agency dichotomy.

'Subjectivism' refers to an epistemological approach that sees the social world through the insider lens. It prioritizes the experience and comprehension of the individual who is the subject of the study. Subjectivist approaches generally adopt voluntarist, methodological-individualist premises. This category includes studies of ethnomethodology, phenomenology, and rational actor theory (Swartz, 1997, pp. 54-55). According to Bourdieu, subjectivists fail to consider the relationship between objective structures and individual behaviors (Webb, Schirato, & Danaher, 2002, p. 33). Individuals cannot grasp the structures they are exposed to because they have a limited understanding of the social reality. Thus, social scientists cannot rely merely on individuals' fragmental and insufficient world comprehension. Social sciences'

primary objective is to go beyond the commonsense and disclose the underlying structures (Swartz, 1997, pp. 57-58).

Objectivism, on the other hand, is an approach that focuses on social structures derived from theoretical abstractions. (Thompson J. , 1991, p. 11). It also emphasizes statistically displayable tendencies. Structuralism, theoreticism, and functionalism fall into this category (Swartz, 1997, pp. 54-55). The objective relations constructed by the observer do not necessarily correspond to the subjective comprehension of the subject (Thompson J. , 1991, p. 11). Just as with subjectivism, Bourdieu criticizes objectivism for its shortcomings. According to Bourdieu, objectivism tends to reject or ignore insiders' explanations of a social phenomenon because this explanation is a way of rationalization (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 38-39). By doing so, objectivists believe that their own knowledge and construction of society actually represent, or even determine, society: "(…) objectivist discourse tends to constitute the model constructed to account for practices as a power really capable of determining them" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 37). In other words, objectivists confuse the product of their thought with the social reality as if theoretical models were effective in society. However, no matter how elegant a theoretical construction might be, it is most likely to fail simply because society does not act by a constructed set of rules, which is a product of the observer's imagination.

For Bourdieu, both subjectivism and objectivism offer "partial and fractured views of social reality" (Swartz, 1997, p. 53) He thinks that most schools in the social sciences belong to either the objectivist or subjectivist camps and regard only one dimension of social reality.

To develop a satisfactory understanding of social reality, Bourdieu proposes a theory of practice. He argues that agents act with *a practical sense of* the social world, experiencing the world through "practical mode of knowledge" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 25). Agents understand the world as it is experienced, or in other words, as taken for granted. This provides what Bourdieu refers to as "phenomenological knowledge" of the social world (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 25-26). They comprehend the world as it is, as experienced, or in other words, as taken for granted. It gives us the "phenomenological knowledge" of the social world (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 25-26). Human actions are neither solely the result of external factors nor entirely driven by internal factors.

Instead, Bourdieu suggests a structural theory of practice, with *habitus* playing a central role (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 8-9).

### 1.4.2. Habitus

The term *habitus* has occasionally been used in sociology and philosophy to describe "an acquired and stable disposition" (Sapiro, 2015, p. 484). Phenomenologists like Husserl focused on the role of experience and "pre-reflective aspect of habits and agency" (Crossley, 2001, p. 112). In contrast, sociologists such as Max Weber (1965) and Norbert Elias (Elias, 2001) examined how collective attitudes and behaviors within social groups—religious for Weber and national for Elias—are shaped and reflected. The term was systematically applied in sociology by Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss to indicate the internalization of ideas, practices, et cetera, of a specific group by new generations through socialization and education. Although the term has a broad range of applications across various social sciences, this dissertation will focus on Bourdieu's interpretation without a detailed discussion of others.

*Habitus* is Bourdieu's most cited concept, utilized across various disciplines. He formulated and employed the term in his Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) and The Logic of Practice (1991) as an alternative to the objectivist and subjectivist approaches he opposed. It is a concept Bourdieu uses to understand how individuals and society, or agents and structures, interact while avoiding reductionist explanations. As he puts it, "Notions such as habitus (or system of dispositions), practical sense, and strategy are tied to the effort to get away from objectivism without falling into subjectivism" (Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 111-112).

*Habitus* refers to "the systems of dispositions" (Bourdieu, 1996a, p. 6). In more detail, it corresponds to:

> (…) systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor. (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 72)

Bourdieu distances himself from rational choice theories. Often, decisions made by individuals are not the result of isolated calculations or data processing in their minds. In other words, we do not always make 'choices' as rational choice theories suggest. Instead, humans understand how things work from early childhood (Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986, p. 112).

*Habitus* is the missing element that paves the way for an alternative interpretation of agent-structure relations. It is neither a mere reflection of social structures nor a determining force on human behavior. Instead, "the regulated tendency to generate regulated behaviors" (Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986, p. 114). It is both structured and structuring, and therefore, it straightforwardly embodies *the sense of the game*. *Habitus* is neither a calculated, mentally processed product of a rational mind nor a prescription for action imposed by structures. Rather, it is a practical form of knowledge acquired through participation in social life and engagement with the field. Instead of placing the agent and structure in opposition, Bourdieu reinterprets the individual as a socialized body and views *the practical sense* or *sense of the game* as an intermediary where both the individual and structure meet (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 66-79). Since *habitus* is a subjective take on the social world, it is not perfect; it reflects the world through the perspective of a particular individual in a specific position.

Patterns of dispositions are structured by both the past and present and, in turn, shape agents' practices, feelings, beliefs, and more (Maton, 2010, p. 51). Using the analogy of a "game" (Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 66-67), *habitus* can be seen as the 'sense of the game' (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 81) —the internalization or embodiment of the rules (everyday regularities) of the game (i.e., the field). In this way, *habitus* is deeply intertwined with the field, emerging and evolving within the conditions imposed by it. Since *habitus* is always a product of history, any change in current conditions can cause a mismatch between past experiences and the present situation, reducing the ability of certain *habitus* to solve problems or produce outcomes as effectively as before (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 62). This ongoing mismatch and adaptation cycle drives changes in *habitus* over time.

Furthermore, just as we can speak of *habitus* at the individual level, we can also speak of the *habitus* of social classes. Social classes tend to produce *habitus* due to the

conditions in which they exist and their class history. Consequently, members of a particular social class tend to possess relatively homogeneous *habitus* compared to other social classes. The *habitus* specific to a social class is enacted by its members in varying forms, each reflecting the personal history of the individual (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 60). In this dynamic context of semi-structured regularities, agents constantly and critically engage with their *habitus*—either as participants and practitioners or as observers, influenced by their social class or past experiences. This engagement explains both intergenerational and inter-class differences.

The regularities inherent in *habitus* differ from explicitly formalized and declared rules, written or unwritten, such as laws, legal formulas, customs, and proverbs. Although these rules are constitutive parts of social reality and the field, their existence does not necessitate any particular *habitus*. As Bourdieu explains regarding "the reality of practices" (Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986, p. 115), individuals may choose to follow, manipulate, or entirely undermine these rules.

The formation of *habitus* is significantly influenced by education and official institutions, leading to the internalization of the dominant class's perspective by the lower classes. In the ongoing dynamic where lower classes strive to imitate the lifestyles of the upper classes, and the upper classes seek to distinguish themselves from the lower classes, the traces of upper-class hegemony manifest in *habitus*. In this context, while hegemony is established and maintained at the level of consciousness among the lower classes in Gramsci's framework, it operates at the level of *habitus* in Bourdieu's framework, manifesting itself within *habitus* (Schaffer, 1995).

### 1.4.3. Theory of Capital

Bourdieu's theory of capital introduces history into sociology. "The social world is accumulated history" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241). The past manifests itself through the notion of capital, which is nothing more than "accumulated labor," found in materialized or embodied forms. Regardless of the form it takes, the distribution of total capital in a society at a given moment reveals the social structure of that society (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 242).

Bourdieu defines capital as follows:

> Capital is accumulated labor (in its materialized form or its "incorporated," embodied form) which, when appropriated on a privet, i.e., exclusive, basis by agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form of reified or living labor (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 241).

Although Bourdieu seems to share a lot with Marxist labor theory of value at first glance, his take on the concept of capital does not back this idea. The term 'capital' in Bourdieu's studies, does not appear only in the material sense of the term. For him, capital refers to all kinds of assets and covers all of the exchanges across different fields. Not only economic, but also cultural, social, scientific etc. assets could be regarded as the forms of capital.

Anything could be considered as a capital, whether material or not, as long as it is accepted as a valued resource in a social relation at a given moment. In this sense, there is no fundamental difference between economic capital and other forms of capital as they serve the same purpose. The main difference is that, where economic capital is visibly and transparently instrumental and self-interest oriented, and it is objectively accepted that its value is not intrinsic but comes from being a means to an end such as profit or wage. However, non-economic or symbolic types of capital deny, or even suppress the fact that they are also instrumental and self-interested. They appear as if they have an intrinsic value (Moore R. , 2010, p. 103).

All forms of relationships and values (religious, educational, aesthetic, etc.) that belong to the superstructure in classical Marxism become constitutive elements, serving as building blocks of society and history, much like forms of capital (Swartz, 1997, pp. 73-74). In general, while economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital are commonly referenced in Bourdieu's work and the broader literature, it is also acknowledged that different fields have specific forms of capital. In this context, numerous studies focus on various types of capital. For instance, Reay (2000) and later Gillies (2006), introduced the concept of "emotional capital" in their studies on mothers' involvement in children's education. Shilling (2004), interpreted Bourdieu's understanding of the body through the concept of "physical capital." Additionally, Abrar-ul-Hassan's study (2021), which views the dominance of the English language in the academic world as a form of "linguistic capital," is another good example of studies exploring different types of capital.

Bourdieu criticizes economic theory for reducing exchange to mercantile terms and interest to purely economic interest, while ignoring other forms of exchange and interest. Instead, he proposes three fundamental forms of capital: economic, cultural, and social capital (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 243). In addition, he identifies symbolic capital, in which language plays a crucial role. By extending the concept of capital into cultural and social realms, Bourdieu's theory departs from Marxist theory, though it still shares some foundational principles.

Bourdieu views action as a strategy, essentially aimed at maximizing both material and symbolic profit. This can be understood as "the application of the language of economic interest and strategy to all areas of cultural and social life" (Schwartz, 1997, p. 67).

Bourdieu has been criticized for a different kind of economic reductionism. However, his interpretation of interest-oriented behavior differs from the classical view of homo-economicus. He speaks of 'interests' rather than the universal, natural, and transhistorical 'Interest.' He suggests that one must conduct a historical analysis to reveal how interests are constructed in a particular time and society. He argues that every institution or practice has a form of interest or function, which simply asserts the principle of sufficient reason. In this way, Bourdieu uses economic terms to articulate the basic fact that all human behavior has underlying reasons—a rhetorical choice to critique Marxist objectivism and economism (Schwartz, 1997, pp. 71-73).

The following sections will explore cultural and social capital in more detail to assess their applicability to agricultural relations.

#### 1.4.3.1. Cultural Capital

Cultural capital refers to cultural resources that hold value and are accumulated from an early age (Bourdieu, 1996c). As Lamont and Lareau (1988) note, the term is polysemic, containing numerous but overlapping meanings.

First, cultural capital represents class-based, inherited language skills and behavioral traits, which the educational system uses as criteria for evaluation. Students from the dominant class benefit from the cultural capital acquired in the family from a young

age, allowing them easier access to reputable and well-established schools. In contrast, lower-class students struggle due to their lack of these essential traits and skills. Ironically, the modern education system, which is expected to foster equal opportunities through the democratization of knowledge, instead reproduces social hierarchies and restricts class mobility. Moreover, the educational system "disguises" and "legitimizes" the "arbitrariness of the distribution of powers and privileges" (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p. x).

From another perspective, cultural capital includes preferences and behaviors that manifest as tastes, indicating an individual's class position, which is closely tied to economic capital. Individuals from the same class tend to share similar tastes (Bourdieu, 1996a).

As Lamont and Lareau point out, cultural capital in Bourdieu's writings also refers to "power resources," such as technical, scientific, economic, and political expertise, which grant access to positions within organizations (Lamont & Lareau, 1988, p. 155).

Cultural capital often appears to represent the higher-class culture, functioning as an obstacle for lower classes to ascend. The dominant class culture is considered the legitimate culture, while the culture of the dominated class is not. This interpretation frames dominant class culture as part of a hegemony, where the power of this culture derives from the recognition and legitimacy granted by lower classes (Bourdieu, 1996a, 1996c).

Cultural capital exists in (i) *embodied*, (ii) *objectified*, and (iii) *institutionalized* forms. Cultural capital can be internalized and carried in an individual's body and mind, known as the *embodied state*. It can also be manifested in objects, like books, paintings, or instruments, referred to as the *objectified form*. Lastly, it can be seen in its *institutionalized form*, which refers to credentials and qualifications (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 243-246; Schwartz, 1997, 76). As Schwartz explains, cultural capital encompasses a wide range of resources, from verbal facility to educational credentials and from general cultural awareness to aesthetic preferences (Schwartz, 1997, p. 75). It includes official qualifications and certifications, which "confer on its holder a

conventional, constant, legally guaranteed value with respect to culture" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 248).

Different forms of capital are convertible into one another. Although Bourdieu clearly states that cultural capital can be converted into economic capital, in many cases, cultural capital is not easily translatable into monetary value. Therefore, cultural capital should not be confused with 'human capital' as used in economic theory. Human capital refers to abilities or skills workers use to earn wages, while cultural capital includes forms that have no immediate or direct market value (Schwartz, 1997, p. 78).

One of the most important findings in studies on cultural capital is that the cultural capital invested by the family plays a crucial role in an individual's access to better education. The democratization of the education system does not lead to a redistribution of accumulated cultural capital. Thus, the uneven distribution of cultural capital, based on class differences, restricts access to credential systems (Bourdieu, 1996c; Bourdieu, 1986, p. 245). Moreover, the dominant ideology of ruling classes is imposed through education. In this sense, pedagogical actions contain *symbolic violence* that legitimizes the cultural dominance of the ruling classes (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977).

It is also important to note that objectified cultural capital retains its value as long as it is recognized as such by those who accumulate it to succeed in a particular field (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 247). As we will further elaborate in our thesis, this characteristic of cultural capital is the underlying reason why the value of cultural capital is constantly a subject of contention and struggle, and why its value fluctuates in parallel with the changing rules of the game.

The concept of cultural capital has been criticized from various angles. For example, despite Bourdieu's emphasis on the importance of high-brow culture, Thornton has pointed out the existence of distinctive subcultural capitals among social groups in lower positions in society, particularly among youth subcultures (Thorton, 2005). Lamont and Lareau (1988) criticize the term for its lack of clarity and for encompassing incompatible meanings (p. 156). Some critiques have focused on the

difficulty of distinguishing between cultural capital and ability, while others have pointed out that the influence of high-brow culture in education has diminished over time (Andersen & Hansen, 2012, p. 608). Despite all these criticisms, Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital continues to serve as a starting point for contemporary studies in this field.

#### 1.4.3.2. Social Capital

'Social capital' is a widely used concept in sociological and economic studies to explain the rationale behind non-economic human behaviors, rules, relations, and organizations, particularly in the context of their positive socio-economic outcomes. The term is composed of two elements: 'social,' which refers to its collective and solidaristic nature, and 'capital,' which implies individualism. This dual dynamic has led to two distinct applications. In mainstream economics and among some sociologists, including Bourdieu, the concept is approached from a methodological individualist perspective. In contrast, other theorists see social capital as a public asset that is collectively acquired and used (Tisenkopfs, Lace, & Mierina, 2008).

Coleman defines social capital as a form of capital arising from social structures, which enables individuals to achieve specific economic or non-economic goals (Coleman, 1988, pp. 98-100). Although less tangible than ‘human capital,’ social capital includes social relationships that “facilitate productive activity” (p. 101). Similarly, Putnam describes social capital as “features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam, 1993, p. 167). An example is a rotating credit association, where trust among participants is key to the system's success. Here, trustworthiness as a social capital, becomes a value that increases community’s funding capability (Putnam, 1993, pp. 167-169). Fukuyama defines social capital as “(…) an instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals” (Fukuyama, 2000, p. 3). Social capital plays a positive role in liberal market economy as an asset, since trust, civil society, and networks et cetera are all byproducts of social capital (Fukuyama, 2000).

What basically makes Bourdieu's take on social capital unique is that he examines social capital in relation to other forms of capital within the context of struggle over positions and power in particular fields. Social capital, is not just an additional or alternative way to develop economies, enhance societies, produce value or ensure collective achievements, but it appears as a capital to accumulate to wield power, compete with others, rank up in hierarchies, and ultimately dominate a field. In contrast to the concept of social capital as a means of social solidarity which is widely seen in the literature, social capital as a means of struggle is therefore one of the distinguishing marks of Bourdieusian thought.

What distinguishes Bourdieu's view of social capital is his examination of it within the broader context of power struggles and positions in particular fields. Social capital, in Bourdieu's framework, is not simply an additional or alternative means for developing economies, achieving collective goals or producing value. Instead, it serves as a form of capital that individuals or groups can accumulate to gain power, compete, and rise in hierarchies, ultimately dominating a field. In contrast to the more common notion of social capital as a means of social solidarity found in the literature, Bourdieu's concept focuses on social capital as a means of struggle, which is one of the distinguishing features of his thought. "Social capital," according to Bourdieu, is

> the aggregate of the actual and potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a 'credential' which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 248-249)

These networks can be formal or informal, ranging from consciously organized ones, like prestigious groups and elite clubs, to unintentional ones, such as neighborhoods and kinship ties. What makes them durable and long-lasting is the profit (in the form of cultural or economic capital) that their members derive from them, which is maintained through social exchanges of value.

According to Bourdieu, economic capital can be converted into social or cultural capital with time and effort. Ultimately, "economic capital is at the root of all other types of capital," and other forms of capital are "transformed, disguised forms of

economic capital" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 252). It can be said that cultural capital is subordinate to economic capital, partly because economic capital can be easily converted into other forms, whereas the opposite is not true (Schwarz, 1997, p. 79).

Although different forms of capital are transferable, this transfer is not without cost. "In accordance with a principle which is the equivalent of the conversation of energy, profits in one area are necessarily paid for by costs in another (…)" (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 254).

However, this does not mean that cultural and social capital can be reduced to economic capital. For Bourdieu, each form of capital has its own use in granting power, position, and privileges to its owner in a given field. In this context, he criticizes economism for ignoring the autonomous character of other types of capital and semiologism for treating social exchanges as mere practices of communication (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 253).

#### 1.4.3.3. Symbolic Capital and Symbolic Violence

Bourdieu's theory on language is crucial for understanding the concept of symbolic capital. According to Bourdieu, language should not be seen merely as a tool for communication or an exchange of ideas. He criticizes the conventional semiology, which tends to analyze language by separating it from the social conditions and historical contexts in which it is embedded. Bourdieu argues that when language is viewed within its societal and historical context, its role in exercising power, establishing hierarchies, and implementing authority becomes apparent. He believes that mainstream linguistic theories, notably those by Chomsky and Habermas, fail to adequately address language's role in power dynamics within social systems (Thompson, in Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 7-9).

Bourdieu emphasizes that language functions as a mechanism to establish and reinforce class distinctions. Different forms of speech, for example, help crystallize class differences; formal speech, which denotes fluency, often serves to distinguish the petit bourgeoisie from the working class. Conversely, slang is utilized by individuals with lower cultural and economic capital to differentiate themselves from those perceived as weak or effeminate (Thompson, in Bourdieu, 1991, pp. 21-22).

The realm of language and symbols is a battleground where power relations are constantly negotiated and enforced through everyday assumptions and practices. Bourdieu refers to this as "symbolic power," which is the way power relations are veiled in symbolic forms and thereby legitimized (Thompson, in Bourdieu, 1991:23). Symbolic violence is then the ability to mask economic and political power using symbolic means, defined by Bourdieu as follows:

> Symbolic violence is the coercion which is set up only through the consent that the dominated cannot fail to give to the dominator (and therefore to the domination) when their understanding of the situation and relation can only use instruments of knowledge that they have in common with the dominator, which, being merely the incorporated form of the structure of the relation of domination, make this relation appear as natural; or, in other words, when the schemes they implement in order to perceive and evaluate themselves or to perceive and evaluate the dominators (high/low, male/female, white/black, etc.) are the product of the incorporation of the (thus neutralized) classifications of which their social being is the product. (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 170)

Terms such as 'disguised' and 'misrecognition' employed by Bourdieu suggest that symbolic violence and symbolic capital are affiliated with 'ideology' in the classical Marxist sense of the term (Schwartz, 1997, p. 89). Both Marx's notion of ideology and Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence describe how the ruling class's ideas dominate. However, Bourdieu contends that unlike in Marxism, where the dominated can escape ideological control through developing class consciousness, the lower classes are deeply influenced by the worldview of the dominant classes—a view embedded in their habitus and manifested in their daily practices. Thus, he argues that effective counter-interventions against the ideological dominance of the ruling classes must also engage at the level of habitus (Burawoy, 2018, pp. 15-16). This manifestation of symbolic violence often results in the imposition of the dominant group's norms on subordinate groups across various social dimensions, including nationality, gender, sexual orientation, and ethnic identity.

### 1.4.4. Field

The concept of the 'field' is a fundamental metaphor and a key component of Bourdieu's social theory. In Bourdieu's words:

> In analytic terms, a field may be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.). (Bourdieu and Wacquant:97)

In simpler terms, a field refers to "(…) a series of institutions, rules, rituals, conventions, categories, designations and appointments which constitutes an objective hierarchy, and which produce and authorise certain discourses and activities" (Webb et. al, 2002, pp. 21-22). Swartz (1997) defines it as "(…) arenas of production, circulation, and appropriation of goods, services, knowledge, or status, and the competitive positions held by actors in their struggle to accumulate and monopolize these different kinds of capital" (p. 117).

To explain the concept of the field, Bourdieu uses analogies like the football field, force fields in science fiction, and fields of force in physics. (Thompson P. , 2010). However, the analogy of the 'game' (e.g. a card game) is particularly helpful for understanding the field. Players, by playing the game, show that the game is worth playing and accept its rules. The existence and validity of the game come from this implicit consensus and practice. Players invest resources such as cards, time, and energy, and adopt strategies to win. There are different types of cards, each with a different value. Although everyone agrees to the rules, it is possible to question, challenge, and change them over time (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, pp. 98-99).

Like a game, a field is a self-fulfilling prophecy—it exists as long as participants (individuals, groups, and organizations) continue to believe in its validity, recognize it as worth engaging in, and keep playing. However, unlike a game, fields don't have designers or inventors who create the rules. Instead of strict codes, fields function through regularities (Lamaison and Bourdieu, 1986, p. 113). Also, unlike an ideal game, fields are not fair: players' capitals and starting positions are unevenly distributed, with some players in dominant positions and others not (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, pp. 98-99). Each field continuously produces, circulates, and consumes various forms of capital, such as cultural or material resources (Swartz,

1997, p. 9). Furthermore, a field is endless, and 'winning' is part of the ongoing struggle for power and position in the hierarchy.

Fields are deeply connected to the notion of capital, and each field has its own forms of capital, which hold varying degrees of value. "(…) [T]he hierarchy of the different species of capital (economic, social, cultural, symbolic) varies across the various fields" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 98). The position and power an agent hold in a field depend on the amount and distribution of specific capital they possess. The value of a particular type of capital depends on the presence of a field where it can be effectively used. In this context, capital serves as both a tool and an objective in the competition for power and influence (p. 98). Thus, a field can also be understood as a battleground, where agents and institutions struggle to secure or improve their positions. Given the limited and uneven distribution of capital, these struggles require strategic action (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 101).

Bourdieu adds historicism and dynamism to his theory of the field by including the concept of strategy. Strategy implies both the possibility of success and failure, imperfect execution, and unexpected events. While dominating agents have an advantage due to their positions, alliances and strategies open up opportunities for those in dominated positions to resist or advance. Ultimately, fields produce and reproduce hierarchies, but these hierarchies do not dictate or determine the outcome of the struggle (Bourdieu, 2000; Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986). The potential for resistance and change marks the political content of the theory, allowing us to detect the political within fields beyond the political field itself.

According to Bourdieu, modern society consists of relatively autonomous fields, each dominated by specific interests and requiring investment to succeed. Multiple fields exist simultaneously, and these fields can overlap or intersect with one another (Bourdieu, 1993).

The "field of power" is a key term in Bourdieu's work. It refers to "a field of forces structurally determined by the state of the relations of power among forms of power, or different forms of capital" (Bourdieu, 1996a, p. 264). It can be described "as a meta-field, or a macro-concept, to describe the ways in which individuals and institutions

within dominant fields relate to one another and to the whole social field" (Webb et al., 2002, p. 86). Although the field of power does not directly determine other fields, there is "a mutual process of influence and ongoing co-construction" (Thomson, 2010, p. 71). Field of power helps us to conceptualize that all power relations within different fields are connected to one another on a meta-level.

There are no fixed boundaries or limits to fields. Just as the rules of a game can be challenged and changed by players, the structure of a field including rules, norms, and regularities can evolve over time. Players may adopt strategies to alter the rules in their favor. However, not all changes come from within—external factors like climate change can also drive changes in a field (Thomson, 2010, pp. 70-71).

The complexity of fields makes them challenging to define and study. Bourdieu outlines three key steps for analyzing a field. First, the field's position in relation to the overarching field of power must be examined. Second, it is essential to map the objective structure of relationships between the agents or institutions competing for authority within the field. Finally, an analysis of the agents' habitus is required, focusing on how their dispositions, shaped by specific social and economic conditions, are activated within the field's trajectory (Bourdieu and Wacquant. 1992, pp. 104-105).

### 1.4.5. Theory of Class

Social class is a key concept in regards to the objectives of this dissertation. The task of examination of the power relations in agricultural field obliges us to take into account the relations of production and a potential existence of a class formation. As mentioned before, different schools of social sciences – notably the ones from Marxist tradition - have occupied themselves with the question that whether or not peasantry could be considered as a class. As we have seen in the previous chapter, despite there has been a long-running, multifaceted and many-sided debate since the dawn of the industrial revolution, it is still far from being over.

Given that the dissertation focuses on a small-scaled social unit seemingly with a narrower income gap and social diversity comparing to urban areas we need a theoretical framework which is sensitive to interlayers, grey areas and ambiguousness without melting different class positions in the same pot of 'peasantry'. Today, trends

such as globalization, urbanization and other related forms of transformation taken place in rural areas have made it even more difficult to lay out a theoretical framework and conceptual toolbox in order to deal with the complexity of the contemporary social reality of rural life. In this respect, Bourdieu's understanding of social classes suggests a viable solution to address these problems.

Before going into detail with Bourdieu's understanding of class relations, it is necessary to provide brief information about the major theories of class and their implications in regard to peasantry.

#### 1.4.5.1. A Brief Examination of Literature on Class

In Latin, the word "classis," which also refers to a ship or fleet among other meanings, was used in Rome to categorize people based on age and property ownership. Following the Industrial Revolution, the term was employed in a threefold manner to distinguish between upper, middle, and working classes or in a binary manner to differentiate between the privileged and working classes (Dworkin, 2014, pp. 12-14).

Some scholars have distinguished between social classes by examining individuals' relationships with production processes. This approach to class analysis can be traced back to the Physiocrats, predating Marx. For instance, François Quesnay divided society into "proprietors" (i.e. the class of landowners), "productive class" (agricultural producers and laborers), and "sterile class," those providing services other than agriculture (Dworkin, 2014, p. 20).

In Marx's works, there are various sections addressing the classes present in modern society. Apart from a five-paragraph, unfinished section titled "Classes" in the third volume of Capital (Marx, 1999a), his writings do not contain a systematic examination centered on the concept of class and the different classes. (p. 633). This gap in Marx's writings has opened the door to significantly different Marxist class analyses and ongoing debates in Marxist literature. The discussions on the Marxist understanding of class have primarily focused on the philosophical, methodological, and epistemological principles on which class analysis should be based (Wright E. , 2016, p. 29). While a deep examination of these debates is beyond our scope, we will address some of the significant topics and key distinctions in this matter.

The factors influencing class formation and their relative importance have been a significant topic of debate. While it is generally accepted that the foundation of class structure lies in economic relations and, more fundamentally, in exploitation relations, some Marxists such as Lukacs (1967) argue that exploitation is the core element of class formation. This perspective paves the way for distinguishing between a class that has not yet achieved class consciousness, referred to by Marx as an "incoherent mass," (1993) and a class that possesses class consciousness, both theoretically and historically. However, emphasizing this viewpoint and prioritizing it over other constitutive elements led to critiques of economism. Theorists such as Poulantzas (1976a, 1976b) and Ollman (1968) put emphasis on the constitutive role of antagonism and the political struggle arising from this opposition in class formation. Additionally, another perspective, often associated with neo-Marxists, emphasizes the primary role of domination and power relations in class formation. From this viewpoint, dominant classes are distinguished from subordinate classes. A dichotomy therefore, can be established between exploiters and exploited on the economic basis; and between the oppressors and oppressed on the political basis (Hodges, 1961, p. 25).

In Marxist class literature, the distinction between a class for itself and a class in itself holds significant importance. A class "in itself" refers to the existence of objective conditions necessary for the formation of a class, specifically the occupation of a particular position within the production process. On the other hand, a class "for itself" denotes the transformation of this class, under these objective conditions, into a political subject that emerges in opposition to other classes, organizes itself, and acquires a capacity for struggle. In Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx addressed this issue by examining whether the peasantry constituted a class in Napoleonic France. He describes the small-holding peasants as a vast, isolated mass with limited interaction among themselves due to their mode of production and poor means of communication. Each peasant family is largely self-sufficient, engaging more with nature than with society, which prevents any division of labor or diverse development. Although their living conditions, mode of production and common interests distinguish them from other classes and make them a class (*in itself*), this very conditions deprive them of any collective organization, prevent them from "asserting their class interest in their own name," or in other words, *being a class for itself* (Marx, 1999b, p. chapter VII).

As Öngen (2002, p. 11) points out, this issue is a praxis problem concerning how a class, which is an economic entity (class “in itself”), transforms into a social entity (class “"for itself”), and the relationship between class and revolutionary practice. Although deterministic interpretations suggest that a class (particularly the working class) will necessarily transition from a class "in itself" to a class “for itself” according to the laws of history, it can be argued that Marx did not establish a necessary relationship between a class's objective position within the production relations and its attainment of class consciousness (Öngen, 2002, p. 11).

Separating the objective conditions for class formation from its subjective conditions implies that these are independent stages that follow one another. Moreover, it suggests that class conflict exists outside and beyond the objective existence of class, and thus, beyond economic relations (Öğütle & Çeğin, 2010). The subjective condition in which a class acquires the will for political struggle is also addressed in Marxist literature as the problem of “class consciousness.”

A class transcending its status as a “class in itself,” based on objective conditions, and emerging as a subject can occur at a historical moment through agency that will manifest in various forms. This, brings us to historicist interpretation of the Marxist class analysis. One of the most important representers of this tradition is Lukacs. According to Lukács, class consciousness is not merely a sum or average of single individuals’ consciousnesses, but rather a collective awareness; “(…) the appropriate and rational reactions ‘imputed’ (zugerechnet) to a particular typical position in the process of production” (Lukacs, 1967, n.p., sec. 1) that emerges from the shared conditions and experiences of a class within the production process. This consciousness develops through the recognition of common interests and antagonisms with other classes, leading to organized collective action. Lukacs emphasizes the historical and dialectical development of class consciousness, arguing that it is shaped by and evolves through historical processes and struggles. His focus on the dynamic and transformative potential of class consciousness within the context of historical materialism aligns with a historicist perspective (Lukacs, 1967).

Another figure who occupies a pivotal position in the class literature is Antonio Gramsci. The struggle for hegemony between classes is a central concern in Gramsci’s

work. Contrary to the economic deterministic interpretations of Marxism, he focused on the political analysis of how ruling classes assert intellectual and moral superiority through the concept of hegemony. In this regard, he paid great attention to the critical role of intellectuals in establishing and challenging hegemony. Gramsci distinguishes between organic and traditional intellectuals. Whether, from a dominating or a subordinate class, organic intellectuals are deeply rooted in the everyday life of a class, serving as an organizing force, that bridges the influences of ruling class hegemony and consciousness of the subaltern class. They facilitate the expansion and consolidation of their respective classes and seek hegemony. Traditional intellectuals such as ecclesiastics, on the other hand, are considered to be remnants of a former historical epochs. Intellectuals of the rural type are mostly traditional intellectuals such as priests. They mediate the establishment of connections between the state administration and peasants; thus, they possess a socio-political function. Here, Gramsci draws a line between the ideological consciousness of organic intellectual and the broader mass-level consciousness, and sees organic intellectual as a key to understand the development of class consciousness (Gramsci, 1992, pp. 3-23).

Gramsci's analysis of historical situations entails examining relations of forces at three distinct levels. The first level, relation of social forces looks at the development of material production and class relations, forming the basis for class consciousness. The second level is the relation of political forces, it assesses the political awareness and organization of social classes. This includes the evolution from individual economic interests, to a broader class identity, ultimately leading to the establishment of social hegemony that challenges the ruling class. Lastly, relation of military forces examines how political actions can lead to the military consequences. Gramsci puts emphasis on that the resolution of class conflicts and competing hegemonies often involves armed struggle. Such an analysis of historical situations corresponds to the development of class-in-itself and class-for-itself proposed by Marx (Saldanha, 1988, pp. PE-17).

Against the historicist school which asserts that class consciousness evolves progressively through the course of struggles emphasizes structural relationships and processes. One of the leading theorists of Structuralist Marxism, L. Althusser opposes the very notion of subjectivity itself in Marxism. He does not consider Marx's early works, which emphasize subjectivity, to be scientific. According to Althusser, after

what he terms an "epistemological break," Marx established the "science of the history of 'social formations'," uncovering the subjectless laws governing class struggle (Althusser, 1969, p. 7). For Althusser, subjects are merely bearers of structures.

Poulantzas argues that *the class in itself* and *class for itself* are "Hegelian reminiscences" and do not fit into Marx' overall understanding of class. Thus, he opposes the interpretation of class that *first* emerges in the realm of economic relations and *subsequently* gains political consciousness through struggles, gradually. He argues that the notion of class cannot be taken separately than the class struggle. There is no pure economic class that exists *outside of* or *prior to* class struggle (Poulantzas 1976a, p. 76). He implied the importance of politics and ideology in making of classes.

Neo-Marxist sociologist, Erik Olin Wright, attempted to develop a Marxist typology of classes that can be employed in empirical research. He introduced the concept of 'contradictory class locations' to address the complexities of the new middle class in advanced capitalist societies. He expanded the dichotomous class model to include contradictory locations such as managers and technocrats -positioned between bourgeoisie and the proletariat-, semi-autonomous workers -positioned between the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie-, etc. (Wright E. , 2016).

In Marxist class literature, the class typology has been another significant area of discussion relevant to our dissertation. Marx mentions different numbers of classes at various levels of abstraction and different contexts. In Capital, he recognizes the wage-laborers, capitalists and land owners as "three big classes of modern society" (Marx, 1999, n.p., sec. 52). However, he analyzes capitalism at the highest level of abstraction based on a bipolar class structure acknowledging that the fundamental contradiction lies between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (Marx & Engels, 1993). At this point, the presence of the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry within the capitalist mode of production has been a notable subject of discussion. Marx and Engels define these two classes as "intermediate classes" (Marx & Engels, 1993, p. 29), predicting that they would be eliminated in the advanced stages of capitalism. The term "middle class" is also employed in order to refer to the intermediate classes including peasants, traders and small urban producers. While Marx and Engels did not include the small peasantry

in their use of petty bourgeoisie, Lenin and Bukharin took the small peasantry as a part of petty bourgeoisie (Hodges, 1961, pp. 35-36).

The semi-proletariat, as an intermediate class, represents a significant category within the context of our dissertation. Semi-proletarian status, particularly prevalent in countries with a dual economy structure and a substantial agricultural sector like China, refers to the condition of earning both wage income and agricultural income, working partly in agriculture and partly as wage laborers. In other words, semi-proletarian status is used to describe those who occupy both worker and farmer positions, or households that receive both types of income (Qi, 2019).

It would be reductive to claim that Marx's understanding of class is based solely on the relationship to the means of production. According to Poulantzas, class contradictions and class struggle are constitutive characteristics of the classes from their very birth. Social classes exist through class struggle, in other terms, classes are "(…) only defined in their mutual opposition" (Poulantzas, 1976a, p. 14). According to Wright, the Marxist concept of class has four main structural characteristics: classes are *relational*, this relationality is based on *antagonism*, the root of this antagonism lies in the phenomenon of *exploitation*, and this exploitation stems from *social production relations*. (Wright E. , 2016, p. 46). According to Ollman, the antagonistic relationship with one another is among the essential characteristics that define a class in Marx's thought (Ollman, 1968). This antagonism, or knowing the *common enemy* to struggle against, fosters unity, organization, solidarity, and ultimately, consciousness.

Another great thinker in the history of social sciences, Max Weber (1978), bases his concept of class not on production relations but on market relations. Weber's concept of "class situation" refers to the likelihood of individuals to procure goods, achieve a status, and find personal satisfaction, based on their control over goods and skills within an economic system. "Class" includes all individuals sharing the same class situation. Those who occupy the same class, have common life chances. He identifies three types of classes: property class (based on property differences), commercial class (based on marketability of goods and services), and social class (characterized by the totality of class situations within which mobility is possible). Social classes are the

"working class," "the petty bourgeoisie," "the propertyless intelligentsia and specialists" and "the classes privileged property and education" (p. 305). Weber, similar to Marx, considered the existence of classes to be rooted in economic relations. However, as we see, alongside property relations, he also places other types of assets that affects individual's position in the market -such as skills- at the foundation of his class analysis. Another difference is that inter-generational mobility has also included as a factor in his social class analysis.

It is also evident that, in his works, the notion of class is not taken as a source of inevitable conflict. Nor does he believe a class-centered and class-antagonism-based notion of history. He did not perceive classes as entities possessing class interests or class consciousness beyond the interests of the individuals composing them. He posited that class organization only emerges under specific conditions and argued that there is no predetermined collective will beyond these circumstances. In this context, classes do not necessarily form organizations. Conscious organization of a social class depends on many variables such as organizational capabilities, economic opposition, number of persons, et cetera (Weber, pp. 302-307).

Although Weber pays great attention to the phenomenon of class, he views class distinctions as only one of the factors affecting power relations within society. He emphasizes the existence of social status groups in addition to class distinctions, emphasizing that intra-class stratifications derive from social prestige, honor, the nature of professions, and lifestyles. These factors hold significant importance in the analysis of society. Through this approach, Weber incorporates the competitive and imitative relationships among groups into his analysis, emphasizing the hierarchical steps that soften and gradate the transitions between classes (Bottomore, 2018, p. 26).

Neo-Weberian studies based on Weber's class analysis occupy a significant place in the class literature. Among them, studies of Erikson, Goldthrope and Portocarero (1979) and later, Erikson and Golthrope (1992) stand out. The class schema developed by Goldthrope, distinguishes occupations based on market and work situations. Market situation includes income sources, employment conditions, and economic advancement opportunities. Work situation involves authority and control within production processes. In this schema, occupations with similar market and work

situations are classified together, which, in turn, affects the different life chances of individuals occupying different classes. In his subsequent works, he also differentiated positions within labor markets and production units based on the nature of employment relations (Erikson and Goldthrope, 1992, p.37). The class schema has eleven, seven and four-class versions with subdivisions, and in most aggregated versions, includes service, intermediate, petty-bourgeois and labor contract classes which reflect the complexities and variations in employment relations and market situation (Breen, 2005, p. 41).

Some approaches to social classes are more eclectic, combining multiple parameters to identify similarities. For instance, Sorokin and Zimmerman define social class as "(…) the totality of individuals whose occupational, economic, and socio-political status (rights, and privileges, duties, and disfranchisements) are closely similar (Sorokin & Zimmerman, 1929, p. 61). Sorokin and Zimmerman, defines a distinct "farmer-peasant class" based on their relatively low economic-status (level of income, income sources, standard of living etc.), socio-political status. They insist that, excluding the big land owners, farmer-peasant class is less differentiated than other classes (pp. 59-97).

#### 1.4.5.2. Bourdieu's Theory of Class

Bourdieu's approach to class can be encapsulated by his words in the introduction of *Distinction* (1996a):

> The model of the relationships between the universe of economic and social conditions and the universe of life-styles which is put forward here, based on an endeavour to rethink Max Weber's opposition between class and Stand, seems to me to be valid beyond the particular French case and, no doubt, for every stratified society, even if the system of distinctive features which express or reveal economic and social differences ( themselves variable in scale and structure) varies considerably from one period, and one society, to another. (Bourdieu, 1996a, xi-xii)

While examining Weber's exploration of status differences, Bourdieu emphasizes the inclusion of what he terms "lifestyles" into class analysis as a symbolic manifestation of class differentiation. However, to make this endeavor successful, it was necessary to address the classical distinction between the material conditions of class and its

cognitive and epistemological aspects, engaging in a fundamental discussion on the ontological and epistemological foundations of class.

For Bourdieu, the question of class is essentially an epistemological matter. Before defining social class, one must ask whether social classes are scientific constructs or if they truly exist (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 7). He identifies two major approaches, rooted in the objectivist/subjectivist antinomy, as the source of this problem. Objectivists (notably Marx and Durkheim) propose making objective classifications by applying objective properties of society. For objectivists, subjective assessments and classifications made by individuals about themselves are irrelevant to an objective/scientific classification. Subjectivists, on the other hand, see social reality as constructed by the members of society. For them, categories defined subjectively by agents are considered real. This distinction becomes crucial when recognizing social classes. Subjectivists would acknowledge the reality of a social class only if there is a group that subjectively identifies itself as a class. Conversely, from an objectivist perspective, a class exists as long as there is a social group whose characteristics fit into the objectively constructed definition of the class (Bourdieu, 1987).

Bourdieu suggests a third way to conceptualize social classes, which would help us transcending this antimony. He thinks that class is defined both by objective indicators (such as capital) and by perceptions of agents. These two categories are interrelated or more precisely, two sides of the same coin. Bourdieu links these two poles by using the concept of habitus: "(…) social class is not defined solely by a position in the relations of production, but by class habitus which is 'normally' associated with that position" (Swartz, 1997, p. 146). In order to understand how habitus mediates making of class, we need to elaborate what kind of an impact positions in a social place have on agents who occupy them.

Agents' relative positions in a social space can be empirically identified by considering three factors: (i) the total volume of capital an agent possesses, (ii) the composition of capital (i.e., the relative proportion of different forms of capital in the total), and (iii) the agent's trajectory in social space, referring to changes in the volume and composition of their capital over time (Bourdieu, 1987, p. 4). Neighboring positions in social space tend to share similar conditions, leading to the development of similar

dispositions and interests, which, in turn, result in similar practices and representations. These shared conditions foster a "class habitus," whereby habitus homogenizes those who share it, creating a distinct social group while simultaneously reinforcing social distance from other groups (Bourdieu, 1987, pp. 4-5). In essence, similar conditions create similar dispositions, which lead to similar practices (Swartz, 1997, p. 162).

Through this process, an "objective class" emerges, which Bourdieu defines as

> (…) the set of agents who are placed in homogeneous conditions of existence imposing homogeneous conditionings and producing homogeneous systems of dispositions capable of generating similar practices; and who possess a set of common properties, objectified properties, sometimes legally guaranteed (as possession of goods and power) or properties embodied as class habitus (and, in particular, systems of classificatory schemes. (Bourdieu, 1996a, p. 101)

To identify social classes, Bourdieu proposes mapping social space by identifying similar positions, which requires examining the volume and composition of capital they possess, as well as their trajectory within that space. Differences in the total volume of capital create interclass divisions, while variations in the composition of capital, particularly cultural and economic capital, lead to intraclass fractions (Swartz, 1997, p. 159). For instance, within the dominant class, there are two poles defined by distinct balances of cultural and economic capital. Different fractions of this class, such as teachers, engineers, and private sector executives, exhibit significantly different levels of economic capital and cultural practices. At one end of the spectrum, occupations like writers and artists hold a great deal of cultural capital but little economic capital; at the other end, business owners and financiers possess substantial economic wealth but relatively less cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1996a, pp. 114-125).

Bourdieu also draws on Weber's notions of class and status to some extent, acknowledging that class and status are not entirely separate groups and that the boundaries between them are often unclear (Swartz, 1997, p. 151). This overlap illustrates the complexity of social divisions and the need to consider both economic and cultural resources when analyzing class structures.

According to Bourdieu, a class cannot be defined by a single determinant such as relation of production. He calls this kind of interpretations as "linear thinking". As we

have seen before, Bourdieu applies his relational method to class structures. In this view, social class is "(…) the structure of relations between all the pertinent properties which gives its specific value to each of them and to the effects they exert on practices" (Bourdieu, 1996a, p. 106). Instead of looking for the determinant factor among all of the factors relevant to a class formation, we should construct a model of "networks of interrelated relationships" which are observable in each factor (p. 107). This approach allows him to explain the role of properties such as age, sex, religion etc. in the construction of classes.

In his work Distinction – *A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (1996a), Bourdieu calls characteristics such as age, sex, ethnic origin as "subsidiary characteristics" or "secondary properties". According to Bourdieu, a class or class fraction is not defined by relations of production, but may also be defined by those characteristics.

> This means that a class or class fraction is defined not only by its position in the relations of production, as identified through indices such as occupation, income or even educational level, but also by a certain sex-ratio, a certain distribution in geographical space (which is never socially neutral) and by a whole set of subsidiary characteristics which may function, in the form of tacit requirements, as real principles of selection or exclusion without ever being formally stated (this is the case with ethnic origin and sex). (1996a, p. 102)

However, they are not always visible as constitutive components of classes. These characteristics may be disguised under the veil of occupation. Thus, a class analysis should consider these parameters as well (1996a, pp. 101-103). To sum up, Bourdieu insists that a class is not defined by a single property or a series of properties, but by all the structure of relations between relevant properties; whether primary properties such as position in the relations of production but also secondary properties such as age, sex, religion etc. (Bourdieu, 1996a, p. 106).

Moving from this point, implies that although we may construct the class divisions in a society by applying to primary properties, in a well-founded way, classes derived from such a meticulous theoretical effort do not necessarily or automatically become 'real'. According to Bourdieu, other factors such as nationality, ethnicity, race, or even occupational and local divisions could operate as the principle behind social practices.

Class, as another candidate for being an effective principle of social reality, needs to compete with others (Bourdieu, 1987:7).

According to Bourdieu, competition among classes shows up in two main forms: Competition "(1) over valued forms of capital, and (2) over definitions of what is legitimate capital" (Swartz, p. 180). Individuals and families adopt different "reproduction strategies" by investing in different kinds of capital to "maintain or improve their position in the class structure" (Bourdieu, 1996a, p. 125).

#### 1.4.5.3. Class Analysis in Turkish Literature

Having reviewed the literature on class in broad terms, it is essential to examine how class relations in Turkey are addressed in the literature before proceeding with the application of Bourdieu's approach to the research topic. This step is crucial for understanding the class dynamics in Turkey and evaluating how Bourdieu's theoretical framework can be employed in this context. Examining the literature on class relations in Turkey will provide a comprehensive perspective on existing approaches and analytical methods, forming the foundation for this study.

Keyder argues that the ruling class of the Republic is a continuation of the Ottoman elite. The class composition that emerged in the final years of the Empire consisted of independent peasant producers, bureaucrats, and the comprador class, which acted as intermediaries between the peasants and foreign capital. According to him, the bourgeoisie in Turkey derives its power from the state and is weak in comparison to it. The major political dualism and struggle in Turkish history takes place between bourgeoise and this state/bureaucracy as the ruling class (Keyder, 2017). Similarly, the widespread small land ownership in the country means there is no strong landowning class capable of balancing against the state or demanding rights and justice. Consequently, democracy does not develop, and capitalism can only progress under an anti-democratic regime protected by state elites, who are a continuation of the old regime (Keyder, 1993, pp. 166-169).

Boratav (2005) makes a distinction between direct and indirect distributional relations and argues that classes in the objective sense derive only from direct distributional relations, while indirect or secondary distributional relations can be used to explain

intra-class differentiation and intermediate strata. In this context, the petty bourgeoisie and the modern bureaucracy in Turkey are social strata that feed on secondary distributional relations. He suggests that in the Ottoman era, the state directly appropriating the surplus from villagers, could be considered as a class since its existence was relying on this direct distribution relations. However, since the "öşür" was lifted in 1925, and the modern Turkish bureaucracy has no longer relied on the öşür, its existence become a social stratum. It is misleading to see the modern state as a continuation of the Ottomans (Boratav, 2005, pp. 9-16).

According to Boratav, in an agricultural structure dominated by small commodity production such as Turkey, if land rental and agricultural labor are excluded, the net income of the small commodity-producing peasant is divided between commercial profit, interest paid to moneylenders and banks, and productive income. The basic class antagonism is therefore between the small commodity producers and the classes that exploit them, that is, between the merchant class and the moneylenders / finance capital (Boratav, 2005, pp. 47-60; Boratav, 2004).

According to Akşit, the nature of merchant-peasant relations in a village is determined by land ownership and the availability of means of transportation. If the village is dominated by small ownership and horticulture, and if transportation facilities are available, the peasant will establish relations with the town merchant. On the other hand, if the village is far from the town and there are no means of transportation, the town grocer establishes the relationship between the merchant and the peasant, and this grocer grows his capital over time and brings about the end of small land ownership. Akşit argues that technological developments that entered Turkey from abroad led to a class transformation in villages by changing property relations. According to him, in areas where land ownership was dominated by landlords, mechanization transformed sharecroppers into workers and landlords into capitalists, and the traditional law between them disappeared (Akşit, 1966, pp. 59-60).

There are studies that analyze in detail the class differentiation within the peasants based on property relations. For example, Kızıldere (1983) lists the social classes in agriculture in 1960s Turkey as follows: 1) *agricultural workers* who sell their labor in capitalist farms, 2) *landless peasants* who live by renting land as sharecroppers,

sharecroppers and the like, 3) *poor peasants* who work as sharecroppers in addition to cultivating their own land because they do not have enough land, 4) *small peasants* who cultivate their own land with their own means of production, 5) *middle peasants* who own a sufficient amount of land and who also cultivate the land of poor peasants and become capitalist farmers, 6) *capitalist farmers* who buy labor and produce for the market, 7) *semi-feudal landlords* who own large areas of land and employ peasants as sharecroppers and sharecroppers on their land but do not participate in production themselves (Kızıldere, 1983, pp. 154-155).

In a more recent study, Köse and Bahçe (2011) classified property-owning classes in the agricultural sector into three strata—large farmers (who use seasonal or regular wage labor), peasants, and subsistence farmers—based on land size, labor usage, and agricultural income. In their work, Köse and Bahçe define subsistence farmers as "agricultural households that work on their own land with their own labor but can only reproduce themselves at a survival level." (Köse & Bahçe, 2011, p. 402) They categorized the laboring masses in the agricultural sector as wage laborers, landless (propertyless) peasants, and the unemployed in the agricultural sector (Köse & Bahçe, 2011, p. 402).

As can be seen, although Weberian perspectives on Turkish class structure hold a significant place, Marxist analyses based on property relations often take precedence in class analyses related to the agricultural sector.

### 1.4.6. Theory of State

Since the agricultural relations at the center of this thesis are characterized by both the state's various levels of intervention and the intertwining of political relationships, it is appropriate to briefly address Bourdieu's approach to the state. Although Bourdieu did not deliver his thoughts on state in a systematic manner (Loyal & Quilley, 2017), the core of his arguments will briefly be presented here.

Bourdieu, conceives state of a field or a space. According to him, the state is "[t]he administrative field, as a particular sector of the field of power (…) that is, a space structured according to oppositions linked to specific forms of capital with differing interests (Bourdieu, 2014, p. 20). State, as a social reality and an entity, therefore, is

nothing but an “illusion,” existence of which depends on people’s belief, and social recognition (p. 10). Behind this subjectively internalized and objectively manifested belief of autonomous state, there is nothing but a “space of agents, a very complicated space” (p. 110). With this perspective, Bourdieu primarily opposes approaches that reify the state, overlooking the fact that it is an image formed in the minds or a theoretical construct. Furthermore, he opposes the state theories that utilizes the very concepts produced through bureaucratic field, such as universality and neutrality to cover up the true nature of the state (Bourdieu, 1994).

At this point, Bourdieu, drawing from Weber's definition of the state, asserts that the distinguishing characteristic of the state is its claim to the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a specific territorial area and its population. Of course, what makes something a state is the subjective internalization of this claim in people's minds and its acceptance as an objective social reality (Bourdieu, 1994, pp. 3-4).

An autonomous image of the state goes hand in hand with the perception of autonomous law. Bourdieu opposes the “formalist” approach, most notably seen in Kelsen's “pure theory of law,” (Kelsen, 2005) which conceptualizes law as a professional domain or a pure doctrine field, free from the influences of the social and political spheres. On the other hand, Bourdieu also criticizes the structural-functionalist Marxist approach, most notably exemplified by Althusser (1971), which views law as a superstructure that is ultimately based on production relations but relatively autonomous. He argues that this approach fails to explain the origins of this relative autonomy. Against these two opposing approaches, Bourdieu proposes to consider law as a field (juridical field) with its own unique logic and operation, where legal authority is produced and exercised (Bourdieu, 1987). The juridical field derives its effectiveness from the political and scientific fields. With its small relative autonomy, this field is significantly influenced by social power struggles. Interests and power struggles in the political sphere manifest their effects in the juridical field.

The notion of state is closely related to the concept of the field of power. According to Bourdieu, the state is the “culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital” (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 4); types of capital such as the capital of

physical force, economic capital, informational capital, symbolic capital, and juridical capital concentrate within the state field. The state, as a kind of “meta-capital” (p. 4), does not only give power to those holding different kinds of power, but it also gives power to other kinds of capital.

Because state is conceived of a space, or field, it can benefit subordinate classes, depending on the outcomes of the struggle over it. Although Bourdieu, accepts that the state is not completely neutral due to the disproportionate power of the ruling class, he does not believe in the idea of a state which is instrumentalized by the ruling class. Instead, the state is a “battleground” where social movements can be effective in the direction of the transformation of the state (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 34).

### 1.4.7. Application of Bourdieusian Concepts to Agricultural Relations

There are three principal reasons for our intention to apply Bourdieu's social theory to the dissertation. First, we seek to depart from the tendencies observed in the discourse on peasantry, which often interpret peasantry as an anachronistic social group passively subjected to the structural processes of history. By leveraging Bourdieu's framework, we aim to accurately conceptualize the relationship between structure and agency, emphasizing the agency of contemporary farmers while also indicating the constraints of this agency.

Secondly, we aim to address to the increasing fusion of contemporary rural society with urban areas, as well as national, and transnational structures without losing our way due to eroded antagonisms and gray areas. By demonstrating the unique structure and distinctive rules of the agricultural field, we also seek to illustrate that the agricultural domain maintains its existence as a subject of research.

Lastly, as we have previously emphasized, Bourdieu's social theory offers significant potential for providing the conceptual tools necessary to analyze the complex structure of the agricultural field, multilayered power relations as well as the multifaceted social structures and transformations.

In this section, we will discuss how Bourdieu's theory can be applied to contemporary rural/agricultural domains, and how its key concepts can be *calibrated* to suit the

research topic. Undoubtedly, Bourdieu himself was the first to undertake this application, as he has conducted significant sociological and ethnographic studies related to villages and peasantry.

However, as we will see below, in the current literature, the Bourdieusian approach is applied partially for limited purposes, rather than embarking on a more holistic examination of the agricultural field. It is often used to investigate the underlying causes of inefficiencies in the rural economy and the implementation of particular policies. In such studies, specifically the concepts of field and habitus are -successfully- used to explain the resistance to a certain value or regulation, such as sustainability or a land policy. However, the utilization of Bourdieusian theory for these purposes results in the relegation of class antagonisms and power struggles to the background if not totally neglect. Moreover, partial applications do not offer a comprehensive framework necessary for making long-term inferences about the trajectory and future of the agricultural field. This section aims to rectify these limitations by demonstrating a comprehensive application of Bourdieu's theoretical framework to the contemporary agricultural field, thereby providing a clear pathway for its effective implementation, while prioritizing the relations of power at the basis of class relations. For this purpose, we will first explore relevant literature and then present our own interpretations.

#### 1.4.7.1. Bourdieusian Approaches in Rural Sociology and Agricultural Studies

Before discussing how to adapt Bourdieu’s approach to the dissertation, in this section, we will review studies that apply Bourdieu’s approach to rural/agricultural studies.

Undoubtedly, Bourdieu himself was the first to undertake this application, as he has conducted significant sociological and ethnographic studies related to villages and peasantry. His first book, The Algerians, as previously mentioned, is the very ethnographic and structural anthropologic study about the Kabylia groups and Algerian society (Bourdieu, The Algerians, 1962). Additionally, “The Bachelor's Ball,” a collection of Bourdieu's studies on gender and peasant-town dweller relations in Béarn, a rural region in southern France where he grew up, is a significant work that demonstrates how Bourdieu addresses rural social dynamics (Bourdieu, 2008). In this

work, Bourdieu examines the cultural difference and alienation based on the distinction between the 'sophisticated town culture' and the "primitive peasant" starting from the linguistic difference between French-speaking town-dwellers and Béarnese-speaking farmers (Savage, 2011, p. 513).

In "The peasant and his body," Bourdieu (2004) examines the cultural dissonance that arises when peasant men encounter townswomen, analyzing how the cultural mismatch manifests in the body language, gestures, and expressions of the peasant men—referred to in Greek as "*hexis*" (p. 582). He argues that internalizing the perceptions that urban dwellers have of him, and becoming aware of his "em-peasanted" body, peasants become aware of their peasant condition (p. 585). Bourdieu's examination of the peasant condition and habitus through the lens of family structure, gender relations, and gender roles, and their contrasts with urban life, signifies the importance of rural culture and the social dynamics generated by the rural-urban divide in his thought.

Bourdieu objected to the way the peasant class identity and the peasant condition were constructed through external stigmatization. He used the term "object class" to define the peasantry, referring to that the peasant class is objectified and defined in opposition to other classes:

> Of all dominated groups, the peasant class, probably because it has never given itself or has never been given the counter-discourse capable of making it the subject of its own truth, is the prime example of the object class, forced to form its own subjectivity from its objectivation (and very close in that to the victims of racism). Of these members of a class dispossessed of the power to define its own identity, one cannot even say they are what they are because the most usual word to refer to them [peasant] can operate, even to their ears, like an insult. (Bourdieu 2002 [1977], pp. 255-256, as cited in Laferté & Renahy, 2006, p. 13)

Bourdieu specifically criticizes the Radfieldian tradition for collaborating with modernization-focused public policies. Additionally, he accuses the ethnographic tradition of turning peasants into folkloric objects, thereby commodifying them for economic and symbolic gain by their very existence. His critics opposed the very foundation of the rural studies, and its underlying power dynamics putting peasantry

in a dependent and dominated position in relation to the urban (Laferté & Renahy, 2006).

In current studies looking at rural areas from a Bourdieusian perspective, it is not often possible to come across studies that aim to develop a radical objection to the existing paradigm. Leaving this point aside, there are numerous studies in which Bourdieusian theoretical perspective and the key concepts he developed have been successfully applied in rural and agricultural fields. When we examine these studies, we see that a significant portion of them is clustered in areas such as agricultural economics, rural sociology and rural policy. As will be demonstrated below, rather than a comprehensive application, much of the existing literature employ specific concepts that facilitate addressing the particular research problem, or certain aspects of the theory for limited purposes.

Although it is not feasible to exhaustively review all studies that apply Bourdieu's approach on rural and agricultural relations, for the purposes of the dissertation, we will analyze specific studies to illustrate how particular concepts such as field, capital, habitus and strategy have been applied.

A significant number of the studies in this field focuses on the decision-making processes of farmers, by inquiring why there is insufficient or inadequate adaptation to innovations such as good agricultural practices and sustainability policies. These studies often concentrate on the underlying reasons for farmers' adherence to traditional agricultural practices, while also attempting to identify conditions that foster qualities such as entrepreneurship and openness to innovation among farmers. In essence, these inquiries extend the discussions on the rationality of peasantry presented in section 1.2., on a more micro-level within the context of contemporary farmers.

While dealing with various problems of rural sociology, researchers applied to the term 'field' to imply the autonomous character of the rural and agricultural relations. In this context, *field of agriculture*, or *agricultural field* is founded useful to describe the specific subsystem of social relations. However, among those who attempt to interpret Bourdieu's approach, there is a dispute over the number of agricultural fields.

While some argues that there is a single agricultural field in a given moment, others speak of multiple and competing agricultural fields. The fundamental issue here arises from the differing interpretations of the conflict of values that emerges in response to the changing rules of the game within a particular field over time. While some consider the conflicting values within the same field, others interpret it as an emerging new field (and game) out of the old one, and take the same rural population as two distinct groups of people who participate in different games.

Studying how farmers perceive of, alter and evaluating their landscapes, Glenna (1996) takes agriculture as a single field. He defines "the field of agriculture" as following:

> An agricultural field is comprised of the objective social relationships in agriculture, such as the farmer-commodity buyer, the farmer-lender, tenant-landlord, farmer-government agent, etc. These are relationships that transcend generations of farmers, so that those who enter into these relationships do not need to construct consciously the logics and materials that govern the relationships. (Glenna, 1996, p. 38)

Glenna takes agricultural field as single construct, even though it contains competing and conflicting mentalities. He demonstrates that there is a transition towards a new kind of instrumental rationality taking over the farmers' social relationships. While some farmers adopt instrumental rationality, others resist and keep relying on a substantial rationality (1996, p. 34).

Raedeke and his associates (2003), applied Glenna's "the field of agriculture" to their study concerning the potential role of agroforestry as an alternative to conventional farming practices. They defined a field of agriculture composed of economic relations, family relations and rental relations. They put stress on the constraining impact of economic actors such as bankers and lenders on farmers. Family relations establish connections with both previous and future generations, where the previous generation influences farmers' decision-making. In terms of rental relations, Raedeke and his associates emphasize the competition among farmers to secure rental agreements. It is also important to note that, examining how farmers view the field of forestry, they treated the forestry as a separate field (field of forestry), although it significantly

overlaps with the agricultural field (Raedeke, Green, Hodge, & Valdivia, 2003, pp. 70-75).

On the other side, Carolan (2005) examines the rental relationships among landlords, tenants and agricultural agency professionals, by basing his arguments on Bourdieu's theory of practice and the terms cultural capital, habitus and field. While applying the field theory on farming in his article, he introduces the term "field of farming". He criticizes the concept of a singular 'the' field of farming because "Such arguments conceptually oversimplify the diverse array of attitudinal proclivities, cultural rules and resources, and objective network constraints that exist within the production realm of agriculture" (p. 387). He argues that there is no single logic of game of farming. Instead, there are "competing logics" referring to distinct networks, structures of interpretations and meanings et cetera, although they might overlap (p. 395). Carolan also argues that there is not a universal definition of what is valuable and what is not across the social body in which farming is being practiced. Instead, there are overlapping multiple fields within the realm of agricultural production and correspondingly, multiple habitus (p. 394). Based on this argument, he defines multiple fields within agriculture, namely "conventional" and "sustainable agriculture fields" which coexist, overlaps and interpenetrates each other to some extent (pp. 404-405).

There are advantages to both positions mentioned above in the interpretation of the agricultural field. The approach advocating for multiple and overlapping fields provides us with a powerful conceptual tool to understand the social and cultural features caused by major social and economic changes within the existing social structure, especially in conditions where traditional and new value sets, which have sharp contrasts between them, coexist. However, it would be appropriate here in this dissertation to accept that, the agricultural field where long-term, gradual changes affect social classes simultaneously but to varying degrees, is a singular field where new value sets engage in close and prolonged interaction and struggle with the existing set of values, and where players attempting to introduce new rules engage in a long-term struggle with those adhering to traditional rules. In this regard, the dissertation will take the struggle over the rules of the game as a part of the game itself.

The Bourdieusian concept of “cultural capital” have multiple forms of use in social sciences. Although it is often used in its strict sense of the term, referring to academic, artistic, and aesthetic pursuits with reference to “Distinction” (see, for instance, Mazzanti, 2002), it has also been applied to the agricultural field with rich connotations (Burton & Paragahawewa, 2011). Examining the reasons for the failure of certain policies aimed at changing farmer behavior in the UK, Burton (2004) and Burton and others (2008), suggest that the root of this failure lies in the perception of agricultural productivity as a form of cultural and symbolic capital that serves as an indicator of good farming. In contrast, activities aimed at environmental protection lack such value, leading to their lack of appeal (Burton, 2004; Burton, et. al., 2008). Similarly, Thomas and her colleagues (2020) explore how UK farmers evaluate, share, and adapt their farming knowledge in response to public authority advice, and examine conflicting knowledge bases of both sides with reference to the concept of “cultural capital” in agriculture. The study, focusing on the Catchment Sensitive Farming (CSF) initiative, emphasizes the significance of specific contexts and personal relationships in the transfer and acceptance of new knowledge while emphasizing that changing regulations and environmental conditions are reshaping the knowledge farmers draw on and trust (Thomas, Riley, & Spees, 2020). Lastly, Riley and others, approaches the topic from a similar theoretical standpoint by focusing on the ineffectiveness of Agri-environment Schemes (AESs), which entails policies focusing on limiting the negative impact of agricultural activities on inhabitant species, by integrating Bourdieusian concepts of 'good farming' and reconceptualizations of 'trust,' (Riley, Sangster, Smith, Chiverrell, & Boyle, 2018).

The studies discussed above share two common features. First, they successfully utilize the concepts of cultural capital, symbolic capital, and habitus to elucidate the significance of traditional attitudes and behaviors within local agricultural contexts, which contribute to the construction of the “good farmer” image. These concepts, especially cultural capital and habitus, are seen as successful applications in explaining specific agricultural dilemmas. Second, these studies are part of a fundamental paradigm outlined at the beginning of our dissertation, focusing on the mismatch between farmers and top-down, transnational agricultural policies like ‘good farming practices’ and ‘sustainable agriculture’. They view this mismatch itself as problematic,

often suggesting ways to *align* farmers with these overarching paradigms, leaning towards a Weberian or even Durkheimian perspective that emphasizes social harmony and cooperation over conflict. In contrast, our thesis aims to construct a theoretical framework that reads the agricultural field primarily as a realm of power struggles, differentiation, and conflict. Despite the significant contributions of these studies to the literature, they do not address the theoretical gap we have identified.

The study that aligns most closely with the perspective we aim to develop, based on the foundational point of our dissertation in the agricultural field in Turkey, is undoubtedly the article by Şenol and Altuntek (2017). This article examines the strategies developed by actors in response to the effects of external transformative factors in three villages of Gönen district. They employ Bourdieu's theory of practice, viewing individuals as active agents to understand their forms of adaptation, resistance, or counter-strategies to change. Their study examines how agents' adaptation strategies vary in response to exogeneous transformative factors across three rural settlements based on the type and volume of capital they possess. In their study, Şenol and Altuntek suggest to employ the term "social space" to differentiate between different actors with different kinds and volume of capital (Şenol & Altuntek, 2017, pp. 205-206).

In this study, Şenol and Altuntek emphasize the significance of class differentiation in rural areas, even if not to the same extent as in urban contexts, and analyze rural community class differentiation through qualitative and quantitative variations in cultural capital, independent of spatial dimensions. This approach aligns with the one advocated and implemented in this dissertation. While Bourdieu's work (2004) puts emphasis on spatial and linguistic differentiation in the dynamics between rural and urban areas, the diverse actor structure of contemporary rural areas, along with the urbanization of the countryside in both sociological terms and the diminishing significance of physical distances due to communication and transportation advances, necessitates that modern agricultural relations be examined through the interactions of classes with different capital structures and habitus, similar to the distinctions among urban classes.

Apart from his early work Algerians, Bourdieu's major works deal mainly with urban issues. Applying Bourdieusian theory to rural societies therefore requires evaluation of peculiarities of rural life and a detailed consideration of each concept one by one.

### 1.4.7.2. Agricultural Field

According to Bourdieu's definition (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97), an agricultural field can be defined as a matrix of institutions, rules, and regularities in which agents compete for agricultural capital.

At this point we need to pose an important question: Is the agricultural field equal to the agricultural market, in a narrow sense? Glover, for instance, limits the scope of the term to the dairy industry (Glover, 2008, p. 76). Such an interpretation has its advantages, as it allows us to conceptualize a field with clearer boundaries and more measurable relationships.

However, this approach would not be appropriate to our goals in this dissertation for two reasons. Firstly, defining a field on a micro-scale is not the best way to analyze agricultural relations in a particular rural settlement. Undoubtedly, it is always possible to imagine sub-fields within more substance, consistent, and major fields. In this regard, it may be convenient to presuppose a division within the agricultural field and speak of, say, grain production, dairy, or agricultural trade fields. These fields would inevitably intersect with and be integrated into one another. Although this would allow us to examine a specific set of relations within the agricultural field, it would not be helpful to comprehend the complexity and integrity of the relations of agriculture in Çiğdemli.

Secondly, reducing the field to a specific industry may bring about an overemphasis on market relations. It, in turn, may result in a form of economic reductionist reading of the power relations. Although it is clear that agents in any field are interest seekers in the broadest sense of the term, it does not mean that economic interest can explain all motives in social life. In this regard, the term field, embraces different aspects of the social life even if they are not directly related to agricultural markets or economics. Agricultural capital is more than agricultural materials, which have immediate exchange value in agricultural markets; so do agricultural field.

Even if agricultural field contains more than market relations or a specific agricultural industry, we still need to clarify limitations to the term. Firstly, it is necessary to draw a line to separate agricultural economic relations from the rest of the economy. Today, this is more difficult than ever; since many factors including agri-food industry, production chains and rural-urban integration blur the boundaries between agriculture, chemistry, food processing et cetera.

From an economic perspective, we put agricultural production at the center and count all groups of people and institutions directly related to production and/or means of production as agents in the agricultural field. Farmers, agricultural laborers, shepherds, agribusinesses, land owners, combine harvester lenders, merchants, businesses who sell agricultural inputs such as fertilizers and seeds, and warehousing businesses could be mentioned. Although all producers and those who have rights to means of production are included in the agricultural field, not all agents on the demand side are included. The agricultural field intersects and, at some points, overlaps with the food industry. Complex national or global production chains use agricultural products in many phases and forms. Yet, there is no point in covering all of them regarding the case of Çiğdemli. Therefore, it would be convenient to include industries that use agricultural products as unprocessed raw materials and exclude industries that use derivative, processed products. In this respect, industries such as flour plants and sugar factories, which use raw materials and directly impact prices, would be considered agents inside the field. Besides, *consumers* of agricultural products apparently needed to be excluded from the agricultural field, even if they consume some agricultural products in their raw forms. Otherwise, a theoretically infinite number of consumers would expand the boundaries of the agricultural field to the extent that there would be no distinct field to speak of. At this point, we should remember that, in most cases, there is no direct communication between farmers and consumers, with some exceptions. The concept of field presupposes and recognizes a minimum level of social integrity among the agents in a field, those who play the same game. From this angle, consumers and farmers are bound up only by an indirect economic relationship. Other parameters we use to describe the agricultural field are not relevant to consumers: They are not in competition with producers for positions of power, they do not seek agricultural capital, and they are not subject to the same rules, regulations, and

tendencies as the agricultural agents we mentioned above. Lastly, Merchants involved in agricultural product trade, regulatory public institutions such as the Turkish Grain Board, and cooperatives are also agents in the agricultural field.

The agricultural field borders some other fields. The intellectual field is one of those. Faculties of agriculture are critical for technical knowledge of modern agriculture. It produces new knowledge and attempts to reevaluate (and usually degrade) the traditional forms of agricultural practices. Agricultural engineers usually participate in both fields in different roles. Another neighboring field is bureaucracy: Municipalities, agricultural directorates, technical advisors, and civil servants can be cited in this category. These agents make regulatory decisions that affect the rules of the agricultural game, redistribute agricultural resources, and deeply impact inter-class relations. Last but not least, the economic field surrounds the agricultural field. Starting from all agriculture-related markets, actors of the economic field directly or indirectly affect the decisions taken in the agricultural field.

Although we start with agricultural production to embody the agricultural field, we draw the boundaries of the field by referring to non-economic forms of agricultural relations and capital. Once we consider that agricultural capital cannot be reduced to economic capital, we can easily eliminate some of the agents and economic relations from the agricultural field by referring to social and cultural forms of agricultural capital. The agricultural field is a theoretical construct that aims to understand a specific part of the social world where agents compete for a particular set of values, what we call agricultural capital. The following section will define agricultural capital and clarify its importance as an analytical concept.

#### 1.4.7.3. Agricultural Capital

Referring to an 'agricultural field' suggests the presence of various forms of capital that are considered valuable by the agents within that field. In other words, the 'agricultural game' is played with a specific set of resources at any given time. Whether economic, social, cultural, or symbolic, certain types of capital are more likely to be accumulated, distributed, and competed over within the agricultural field. For clarity, we classify these forms of capital as 'agricultural capital.' Agricultural capital can be defined as

the different forms of economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital that are recognized as valuable resources within the agricultural field.

Each major form of capital—economic, cultural, social, and symbolic—has a subset within the agricultural field, such as agricultural economic capital, agricultural social capital, and et cetera. For example, economic capital that holds value and circulates within the agricultural field can be classified as agricultural capital, or more specifically, 'agricultural economic capital.' This form of capital is primarily derived from agricultural production, which is essentially accumulated labor. As Bourdieu suggests, all other forms of agricultural capital are, *at their root*, tied to agricultural economic capital. The circulation of agricultural economic capital is directly linked to the agricultural cycle. Examples include money, credit, labor force, machinery, and seeds.

Similarly, we can refer to ‘agricultural social capital,’ which includes social networks within the local community or connections with the provincial directorate of agriculture and forestry. Agricultural social capital is characterized by the nature of social interactions in rural settings. Since Wirth’s (1938) work, it has been well established that there are fundamental differences in social organization and the ways people build social connections in urban versus rural areas. In urban environments, social relations tend to be more superficial, transactional, functionally differentiated, anonymous, short-term, and numerous, whereas in rural areas, they are typically long-term, fewer in number, and more densely interconnected. These qualitative differences in interpersonal relations are reflected in the nature of social capital in rural areas.

Local social networks in rural areas are often maintained through traditional exchange mechanisms. However, as the traditional social fabric dissolves, these symbolic forms of exchange are increasingly being replaced by new forms. It is also worth noting that, due to kinship networks and the spatial characteristics of rural life, social bonds tend to be stronger than those in urban areas. As a result, there are fewer social and spatial barriers between agents occupying different hierarchical positions. Class distinctions are less pronounced, and close social ties between agents from various hierarchical levels provide mutual benefits, as observed in examples from the field. The influence of friendship and kinship networks in enhancing economic capital, accumulating

various forms of symbolic capital, gaining political power, and accessing valuable information is far more significant in rural settings compared to urban life.

Agricultural cultural capital encompasses the cultural traits, knowledge, customs, traditions, and language valued within the agricultural field at a given time and place. This concept is not limited to the ruling class but also applies to the subordinated population, who possess their own exclusionary cultural capital. Agricultural cultural capital primarily reflects local farming culture, often associated with the subordinated class, and should not be confused with technical knowledge. While it includes technical farming skills, it refers to a broader knowledge encompassing the accepted and respectable ways of farming and living in a particular context. Thus, agricultural cultural capital can be divided into two aspects: the practical knowledge of farming and the culture surrounding agriculture. Farming techniques, as a form of agricultural cultural capital, are essential for entering the agricultural field. In practice, economic activity cannot be separated from cultural capital, as farming inherently requires both economic means and the knowledge of production.

The knowledge of production is a part of and foundational to a broader culture. From acquiring inputs to hiring labor, from marketing to selling, every step of the agricultural economy is embedded in and made up of social relations. Thus, the broader cultural circle surrounding agricultural production includes all the material and non-material cultural assets necessary to become a part of the agricultural community. Agricultural cultural capital includes, but is not limited to, a set of values, cultural traits, gestures, knowledge of local formal and informal rules, codes, regularities, credentials, and symbols, all of which can exist in embodied or structured forms. The culture of the local community and the values it generates are therefore inseparable parts of the ‘agricultural game.’

With that being said, it would be misleading to speak of a singular, monolithic culture waiting to be understood. Since the society in question is built on unequal power relations, class divisions, and other socio-economic factors, the culture itself is composed of hierarchical subcultures that mirror the divisions within society. When we refer to agricultural cultural capital, we are talking about unevenly distributed and hierarchically ordered cultural values and entities. The relative value of someone's

cultural capital corresponds to their hierarchical position and power within the field. Agricultural cultural capital not only serves as a prerequisite for entering the agricultural field but also determines one's power and position within it. It is expressed through symbols, gestures, and language, setting boundaries between ordinary farmers and those regarded as knowledgeable, respected, and worth listening to. In this sense, agricultural cultural capital defines one's eligibility to answer questions about agriculture, particularly in Çiğdemli.

The value of cultural assets is neither fixed nor equally appreciated by all. The evaluation and valuation of cultural capital are areas of conflict between different classes, age groups, political affiliations, and genders. As we delve into the interviews, we will see that certain cultural assets are embraced by some socio-economic groups while being rejected by others. The content of agricultural cultural capital is never static; it changes over time and space. Like other forms of capital, agricultural cultural capital evolves in parallel with the agricultural field and habitus, and is always subject to competition and struggle. The values associated with agricultural cultural capital are contested and continuously shifting.

There are two major competing sets of cultural values, each deriving its legitimacy from different sources. The first is the traditional/local set of values, exemplified by traditional farming techniques passed down through generations and rooted in local experience. Verbal agricultural and tenancy agreements, secured through regular local relations and traditional knowledge, also fall into this category. The second set consists of contemporary/global knowledge, acquired through institutions and experiences from urban settings or abroad. This includes modern farming techniques learned from experts or social media, gardening methods from places like Holland, and contract farming practices introduced by large corporations. While agricultural cultural capital was once rooted primarily in traditional and inherited forms, today, an increasing portion of it, particularly farming techniques and practices, has become linked to scientific knowledge. The agri-food industry and universities have staked a claim in producing this knowledge. As a result, a growing part of this knowledge is now transmitted through formal institutions such as agricultural faculties, courses offered by agricultural organizations, municipalities, or associations. As we will explore in the

following sections, white- and blue-collar part-time farmers have become key conveyors of this new cultural capital.

Age plays a significant role in the accumulation of cultural capital, cutting across socio-economic differences. There are those '*old enough to know better,'* and since the average age in Çiğdemli is high, many farmers possess this type of cultural capital regardless of their economic standing. However, higher education is often regarded as a more valuable source of cultural capital. Farmers with formal education tend to emphasize their technical knowledge, and it is common to observe a preference for the "scientific way of farming" over traditional methods. Younger, educated individuals especially rely on their technical knowledge and cultural background to support their arguments.

In contrast, expertise gained solely through institutions like universities or public entities is often downplayed. Government-appointed experts, in particular, are frequently put to the test by local farmers, as local experience is considered more valuable than formal education when it comes to outside experts. Farmers with urban or overseas experience also hold significant authority in discussions, often using their broader experience to comment on how things should be in Çiğdemli, especially regarding the town's agricultural challenges.

The most important form of agricultural symbolic capital is one's reputation within the rural community. As observed in the field study, a key indicator of a reputable farmer is their commitment to farming, regardless of its economic viability. Owning proper equipment and machinery also holds significant symbolic value. Additionally, occupational titles, degrees, and credentials obtained from educational or agricultural institutions serve as valuable forms of symbolic capital.

It is essential to note that for a form of capital to be considered agricultural capital, it must have value and a direct application within the agricultural field. In this context, neutral forms of capital, such as money, unskilled labor, or strong ties with relatives in the village, can be considered agricultural capital if they are invested in or utilized in agriculture. Otherwise, they fall under the broader category of 'non-agricultural capital.'

As noted in the previous chapter, capital can be transformed from one form to another, often involving a degree of loss, such as the conversion of economic capital into other forms. This transformation can also occur between a major form of capital and a field-specific capital, for instance, turning economic capital into agricultural economic capital. In a world where individuals occupy positions in multiple fields simultaneously, they are naturally inclined to adopt a multi-field approach, consciously or unconsciously, when managing their total capital. They tend to account for their relative standing across different fields when transferring resources between them. Therefore, it is important to explore the transformation between major forms of capital and specific forms of agricultural capital.

Certain forms of agricultural capital, such as a tractor or seeds, are highly specific to the agricultural field, and transferring these resources to another field results in a loss of time, energy, and value. For example, selling land to buy real estate in a city takes time and leads to a reduction in symbolic agricultural capital tied to land ownership. Similarly, selling an agricultural machine to transfer economic capital to another field, such as paying for a child's education, also involves a loss of social capital, as rural prestige is often associated with owning a high-end tractor. Additionally, the specialized knowledge of farming a specific soil, understanding seed varieties, and navigating local weather conditions is difficult to transfer to non-agricultural fields without significant losses in terms of time, energy, and financial value.

Some major forms of capital can hold value across multiple fields with minimal transformation cost. For instance, money and financial resources can easily be used in both agricultural and commercial fields as basic forms of economic capital. Similarly, personal traits tied to one's reputation serve as symbolic capital that provides advantages in various fields. This principle also applies to the agricultural field, which often intersects or overlaps with other fields. In such cases, certain forms of agricultural capital retain their value without significant transformation. For example, an agricultural cooperative manager can leverage their position for political influence within bureaucratic or political fields. Similarly, a student from an agricultural background might study agricultural engineering and apply their traditional farming knowledge to advance in the academic field.

Some major forms of capital can hold value across multiple fields with minimal transformation cost. For instance, money and financial resources can easily be used in both agricultural and commercial fields as basic forms of economic capital. Similarly, personal traits tied to one's reputation serve as symbolic capital that provides advantages in various fields. This principle also applies to the agricultural field, which often intersects or overlaps with other fields. In such cases, certain forms of agricultural capital retain their value without significant transformation. For example, an agricultural cooperative manager can leverage their position for political influence within bureaucratic or political fields. Similarly, a student from an agricultural background might study agricultural engineering and apply their traditional farming knowledge to advance in the academic field. Based on what we have discussed so far, we can position the general classification of capital and the subtypes of agricultural capital as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Division of Capital

| | **Economic Capital** | **Cultural Capital** | **Social Capital** | **Symbolic Capital** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Agricultural Capital** | Agricultural Economic Capital | Agricultural Cultural Capital | Agricultural Social Capital | Agricultural Symbolic Capital |
| **Non-agricultural Capital** | Non-agricultural Economic Capital | Non-agricultural Cultural Capital | Non-agricultural Symbolic Capital | Non-agricultural Symbolic Capital |

From a broader perspective, in a multi-field world, agents' long-term strategies toward the agricultural field are shaped not only by their position within that field but also by their positions in other fields. To clarify, capital investment can be understood in two dimensions:

1. The total amount of capital investment in the agricultural field and its distribution across various forms of agricultural capital: This dimension reflects in-field strategies aimed at gaining power and maintaining a position within the agricultural field.
2. General transfers between non-agricultural and agricultural forms of capital: This dimension indicates inter-field strategies, where agents transfer resources between fields based on their trajectory and interests. These decisions are influenced by agents' foresight and expectations of success in both agricultural and non-agricultural fields in which they currently participate or aim to enter.

If we consider the infinite number of potential strategies resulting from the interaction between agricultural and non-agricultural fields, we can identify four general groups of strategies:

1. **Entering the Agricultural Field**: This includes newcomers to agriculture, first-time agricultural entrepreneurs, and people returning to farming after retiring from urban jobs. These strategies are driven by an expectation or hope of either (i) success in the agricultural field or (ii) achieving a post-retirement life with a certain standard of living. Success is subjective and varies based on agents' positions, power, and capital. It may take different forms: an elderly man's desire for a peaceful retirement through yard work and gardening, an agricultural firm's ambition for high profits, or a city-dweller family engaging in part-time farming on inherited land to diversify their income. This strategy is characterized by significant investments in agricultural economic capital, such as acquiring or leasing land, purchasing machinery and equipment, hiring labor, and sacrificing involvement in other fields to varying degrees.
2. **Capital Transfers from the Agricultural Field to Non-Agricultural Fields**: This involves a steady flow of surplus agricultural income into other fields. For example, an agricultural cooperative might invest in the retail market or even a completely unrelated urban business. Similarly, a smallholder family might sell some of their livestock throughout the year to cover their children's education costs. This transfer can also occur through social, cultural, or symbolic capital, such as a well-known grain trader entering politics or a farmer opening a grocery store in the city using government agricultural subsidies. At the governmental level, a shift toward an import-oriented agricultural policy or reduced investment in the agricultural field can indicate a strategy of redirecting capital to more profitable fields to gain power in the 'field of power.' In these cases, the agricultural field is still maintained but is seen as relatively less important compared to other fields.
3. **Capital Transfers from Non-Agricultural Fields to the Agricultural Field**: Examples include retirees using their pension or non-agricultural income to finance agricultural production, or an international chocolate manufacturer investing in hazelnut producers to improve crop quality. These strategies

reflect a commitment to maintaining or improving one's position within the agricultural field, with the agricultural field seen as more strategic or valuable compared to other fields.

4. **Exiting the Agricultural Field**: This strategy involves transforming all agricultural capital into other forms and transferring it entirely to non-agricultural fields—essentially "selling out" and leaving the agricultural field. This applies to both small farmers and larger agribusinesses, cooperatives, and associations. As we will explore in the next chapter, this trend is linked to broader patterns of migration, deinstitutionalization, and the disintegration of social and economic structures.

As for now, we should emphasize that these strategies are pure theoretical constructs based on interest-oriented assumptions. We need to reconsider each of them in a historical context in order to find out which of those as a social reality, and as a historical tendency, appears more in our case.

### 1.4.7.4. Agricultural History as History of Agricultural Game

In Chapter 1.2, we saw how the history of the agricultural sphere was constructed by centering the peasant as a subject and how the peasant played a central and foundational role in understanding modern society. However, it is also possible to conduct a historical reading that, instead, focuses on agricultural relations and the agricultural 'game' played around these relations in the Bourdieusian sense.

When we approach the issue of peasantry through the lens of Bourdieu, it becomes evident that the term 'peasantry,' in its traditional sense, does not align with Bourdieu's concept of class or class fraction. Peasantry is often defined in relation to, and largely in opposition to, non-peasant groups, with differences focusing on aspects such as the social division of labor, modes of production, and cultural practices. However, these distinctions are insufficient to make 'peasantry' an operational category in our analysis, as the term offers little insight into the distribution of positions and capital within the agricultural field.

Moreover, if we move beyond the traditional notion of peasantry and consider the evolving historical forms that rural communities have taken today, it becomes

increasingly difficult to identify any social group with distinctive characteristics that can be classified as ‘peasantry.’ The reasons for this can be summarized as follows:

1. Agriculture now involves a wide range of individuals from various occupations, including workers, civil servants, merchants, agri-food industries, and cooperatives. A classification based solely on property relations no longer captures the complexity of social life in rural areas.
2. Rural areas are no longer isolated. Urbanization, improved communication, and transportation have led to complex social formations that cannot be fully understood within a strictly spatial context.
3. As Cloke and Thrift (1987) emphasize, intra-class social conflict has become more prominent in rural areas. Our case study also reveals that the emergence of new agents in rural communities and the disappearance of old ones contribute to a richer and more complex social stratification.

Consequently, we need to establish a class system that (i) moves beyond the narrow focus on land ownership and instead considers agents' overall ability to mobilize various forms of capital; (ii) transcends the urban-rural dichotomy by adopting a field-oriented approach that incorporates the inter-field maneuvers agents perform; and (iii) avoids oversimplifications, allowing us to capture the complexities of intra-class relations and stratifications. At this point, we can advance by reinterpreting the history of agricultural modernization through the lens of Bourdieusian terminology.

The topics addressed in Chapter 1.2. and 1.3. can be interpreted, from a Bourdieusian perspective, as the history of an agricultural field that emerges around the economic, social, and cultural values derived from agricultural production, and *the agricultural game* as an expression of the power struggles among the actors within this field. In this context, political and class struggles can be seen as expressions of the power struggles between the actors in the game. Technological, cultural, and social transformations, on the other hand, will represent the absolute or relative changes in the set of values being contested within the agricultural field.

From this perspective, it can be said that modernization, industrialization and urbanization are historical events that have fundamentally changed agricultural

relations, the actors in these relations, and the non-economic assets fought over in these relations, thereby affecting all the rules of the agricultural game, except that the basic economic capital is tied to land.

Modernization and urbanization introduced (i) new means of production and technologies, (ii) expanded the capitalist market over agricultural production and diminished economic self-sufficiency, (iii) dissolved the traditional non-capitalist transactions and commodified pre-capitalist common-properties. In accordance with those trends, agricultural field has rapidly changed.

As mentioned before, the value and validity of any form of capital is neither fixed nor given. All forms of capital are historical, and their relative significance shifts over time. This applies to agricultural capital as well. As we will explore in detail, both (i) the relative value of agricultural capital compared to non-agricultural forms of capital, and (ii) the value of each sub-form of agricultural capital in relation to one another, have changed throughout history.

Empirical changes have occurred in two key areas: the value of agricultural means of production and agricultural products. With the rise of modernity and capitalism, traditional agricultural technologies quickly lost their value. Since the Industrial Revolution, the relative worth of agricultural products has steadily declined. More recently, the introduction of medicinal and aromatic plants has further reduced the value of traditional crops in certain regions. In Bourdieusian terms, we can assert that not only has economic capital in agriculture experienced devaluation, but non-economic forms of agricultural capital have also diminished in value. For instance, as literacy rates rise and communication technologies advance, the significance of being 'literate'—once a valuable form of social and symbolic capital—has shifted. Similarly, occupations such as petition-writing are disappearing. The symbolic prestige once attached to visiting or living in a big city, which held great value in remote villages, is also waning due to mass media and improved transportation networks. Meanwhile, new farming practices and management techniques are increasingly replacing older ones.

Examples can be multiplied. From a Bourdieusian perspective, I believe an alternative historical perspective focusing on transforming agricultural relations is both possible and necessary. It requires acknowledging transformation and change as essential and ongoing dimensions of social reality. Bourdieu himself emphasizes historicity as a hallmark of his work (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 102). Therefore, the history of agriculture and agricultural policies, both globally and in Turkey inevitably become part of the analysis. However, in this thesis, the Bourdieusian analysis of agricultural relations will be conducted locally, centering on local agricultural relations. In this regard, it is important to keep in mind that larger-scale transformations also affect the agricultural field at the local level. The following chapters of the dissertation will demonstrate how general transformations and long-term trends influence the rules of the local agricultural game. In the next section, we will explore the ontological, epistemological, and methodological positions adopted.

## 1.5. Ontology, Epistemology, Methodology and Field Research

There are competing approaches in the social sciences concerning "what we study" (ontology), "how we know things" (epistemology), and "how we study" (methodology) (Della Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 21). While a detailed debate on the reality of social phenomena or the nature of knowledge derived from social studies exceeds the scope of this study, it is essential to briefly outline the basic ontological, epistemological, and methodological premises guiding this dissertation.

### 1.5.1. Ontology and Epistemology

As a study conducted within the context of agriculture, the very reality of the material world holds significant importance. The social entities we describe as real are deeply influenced by and connected to their material surroundings. This approach was central to the theories of pioneering thinkers like Ibn Khaldun and Montesquieu. Ibn Khaldun emphasized the decisive impact of climate and environment on social orders (Haldun, 1977, pp. 215-225). Over three centuries later, Montesquieu similarly argued that material conditions—particularly climate and soil quality—affect societies, their laws, family structures, customs, and more (Montesquieu, 2001, p. 246). As Montesquieu wrote, "The laws have a very great relation to the manner in which the several nations

procure their subsistence" (Montesquieu, p. 301). At its core, this idea encapsulates the essence of any materialist approach, positing that human-made laws and societal formations are deeply shaped by and exist within the limits imposed by natural laws.

Although this methodological principle finds its sophisticated forms in 20th century in the form of materialism, and in the schools such as *The Longue Durée* (Braudel, 2009), and later the *world-systems analysis* (Wallerstein, 1998), it has either been neglected or overshadowed by post-structuralist narratives. In fact, many so-called theoretical dilemmas that are empirically falsifiable, stem from a systematic failure to apply this principle to the subject of study. With these in mind, the second chapter is entirely devoted to demonstrate that the very material conditions and long-term trends set the unbreakable rules of the game for the rural community of Çiğdemli. The chapter will demonstrate that the external conditions and long-term trends establish the scene for the human-made structures and regularities. Once this stage is set, it is time to discuss the reality and knowledge of social constructions.

There is an endless debate over objectiveness or validity of the social reality on different levels. As Berger and Luckmann (1991) points out the reality and the knowledge of everyday life stems from the objectification of subjective perceptions. What makes the everyday social phenomena unquestionably real is its acceptance by the society. Behind both the persistence and change of social reality underlie an ongoing exchange between individual and society through externalizations and internalizations of social knowledge.

In this regard collectives and institutions which are recognized by both the observer and the participants, are regarded as social realities. In Çiğdemli, we 'discover' many social regularities and informal institutions that are already known and recognized by the local community. In this case, we bring such socially-shared structures into the dissertation as they are. The dissertation takes such social structures and categories as grounded social realities as long as they are socially accepted and manifested.

There are also structures, regularities, and mechanisms that emerge from a certain degree of abstraction and observation. As observers, we create categories and attribute them to the population we study. We also apply hypothetical causalities and

relationships between variables. In this case, the society under observation does not necessarily recognize or objectify these labels. For instance, terms like “new peasantry” or distinctions between “class in itself” and “class for itself” in Marxist literature are examples (Andrew E., 1983). When defined by their relationship to the means of production, class is considered an objective entity, an undeniable product of economic relationships. However, a “class for itself” refers to a self-conscious class that recognizes its existence, interests, and purpose, organizing accordingly. The categories, distinctions, and regularities we detect as outsiders are essentially falsifiable assumptions; they hold value only as long as they help us understand and explain social reality. These should be regarded as part of the theoretical framework rather than direct reflections of social reality. Just as Marx (1999b) did not consider the French peasantry a class despite their economic classification as such, we view terms like “new peasantry” as theoretical abstractions, not social realities.

Following Bourdieu, we will separate the categories we created to better understand the social relations and those that are recognized and shared by the society itself. In other words, the dissertation will employ the grounded concepts, self-illustrations and shared-perceptions as real social entities, and put them together in a theoretical framework, to understand and explain the connections among them.

It should be kept in mind that, Çiğdemli as a case study refers to two distinct study subjects at different epistemological layers. A case has many meanings, as a conception it might be specific or general; and it can also be understood as theoretical construct or empirical unit (Ragin, 2009, p. 9). In this context, Çiğdemli is primarily an empirical social and physical unit, with challenging but still explorable boundaries. In the second chapter, we will explore the case of Çiğdemli as an empirical unit with a history, territory, and a community with constantly changing boundaries. Secondly, the dissertation also deals with the concept of *agricultural field in Çiğdemli*. In this sense, Çiğdemli will be taken as a realm of social relations, a reference to defining a field. In this sense, what makes a social relation, or entity part of Çiğdemli is a matter of theoretical construction. The third chapter of the thesis is devoted to the case of Çiğdemli in this second meaning. The dissertation constantly moves in between these two kinds of cases, explores the social relation in Çiğdemli as an empirical case and use it to explore the agricultural field in Çiğdemli as a theoretical case.

As explained in detail in the following section, this dissertation adopts a mixed-methods approach, utilizing both quantitative and qualitative data to analyze the two-layered social reality. As Bryman points out, there are challenges in "marrying an objectivist account with a constructivist one based on people's discursive accounts" (Bryman, 2007, p. 16). To navigate these ontological contradictions, the dissertation will continuously move between quantitative and qualitative data while maintaining a clear distinction between the social constructions created by society and the theoretical relations proposed. A constant comparison of official data from various sources with the social realities observed in the field will be conducted. By aligning the quantitative data with the qualitative insights gathered, both the validity and reliability of the official data set will be evaluated, and the generalizability of social structures in Çiğdemli will be explored.

### 1.5.2. Field Research, Methodology, and Research Sample

I did not adhere to any predetermined methodology at the beginning of the study. The only thing in my mind was that, a case study would be an absolute necessity in addressing the general problems I had initially posed in the Introduction. Instead, I followed Crang and Cook's (2007) approach and visited some places that might become the case. While I was trying to figure out where to study, I also dig into alternative methods and strategies to find out the best one for this particular case. So, the case study and method evolved together. Lastly, after I collected enough material to work with, I decided on the theoretical background.

Considering the general question I have posed before, in the introduction, I chose the Central Anatolia as the region in which I was hoping that I would find a proper village to study. However, Çiğdemli was not the initial place as the location for a case study. The town has been chosen due to a specific search and observation.

The hinterland around Kayseri province was the first region to be observed and studied. It was chosen for being a region where characteristic Anatolian villages with local populations, farming, and livestock practices were thought to be located. After some consideration, I went to two villages in June 2019.

The first village was Saraycık, a neighborhood of the Kocasinan district, 18 kilometers away from the city center. A total of three visits were made, and some basic information was collected. In addition to that, a full interview with a randomly chosen farmer's family was conducted.

These contacts with locals revealed that the village's close distance to the urban area had significant consequences on its characteristics. The village has only been a few kilometers away from the constantly expanding Kayseri Organized Industrial Zone in recent years. Firstly, the village was in the process of absorption by the urban area, becoming a part of the “urban fringe” or an “edge-city” where a cluster of economic activity is at play (Nechyba & Walsh, 2004, p. 178). Faced with the potential for agricultural land to be zoned for development, village lands naturally became a subject of urban rent. Secondly, close distance to the city center and transportation lines makes it inevitable for locals to move to the city center permanently. Most of the villagers had an apartment in the city in which they lived for most of the year, and they visited the village only during the harvest season. Most non-retired locals had full-time jobs in the city. Farming had, therefore, become a marginal occupation and the village a seasonal workplace.

When the difficulties of studying such a location became clear, I searched for another village with more or less spatial integrity and a permanent local population. This second search ended with the village of Kalkancık. Kalkancık was also a neighborhood of the Kocasinan district, but this time, it was 38 kilometers from the city center. The village was livelier than the former, partly due to the harvest season. During July 2019, more contacts with multiple families were made, and five interviews were conducted.

However, a similar problem was encountered later in the fieldwork. It again turned out that most of the population was living in Kayseri. There were only a few households residing in the village year-round. Most of the people contacted were not locals but an urban population partly involved in farming at the city's periphery. The social and economic transformation of the villages on urban periphery is a well-studied subject (Masser & Stroud 1965; O’Brien et. al. 1996; Nagy, 1998; Kundu et. al. 2002). These two locations could not be defined without a reference to the urban center of Kayseri. Precisely speaking, agricultural field was still there, but it would not be easily isolated

from other fields since the interactions and intersections among multiple fields were intense. Similarly, the spatial boundaries of the village, would not be distinctive enough to distinguish a meaningful sample because I would need to visit the city center to conduct interviews. Flow of human, capital and goods between Kayseri and periphery led me to the conclusion that these villages were not proper to study the agricultural field. Not only the agricultural field in these villages was melted down in economic field of Kayseri, but also all social life were channeled through the city. Since the dissertation focuses on a place that is remote enough to keep its self-reliant entity and distinct identity, such urban-villages were out of the scope. A settlement where the agricultural field still distinguishable would serve better the purpose of the dissertation.

Although these two villages have not become the focus of the case study, the interviews made there still provides useful information on the matters discussed here. Both the farmer profiles and the problems they encounter in those villages show striking similarities to Çiğdemli. These similarities also indicate that our findings in Çiğdemli are applicable to a wider area.

Çiğdemli is the third and last location I explored for a possible field study. This time, it is located in Sorgun, a district of Yozgat. Yozgat is not a densely populated city. As of 2019, only 35% of the population lives in towns and villages. Agricultural activities constitute a high portion of the economy. Sorgun is the largest of the Yozgat's 13 districts. As of 12/31/2016, the population is 78.133 people which make up 34 % of the total population live in rural towns and villages (Sorgun District Governorship, n.d.). There are 8 municipalities, 7 towns -one of which is Çiğdemli, and 75 villages in the district (Sorgun District Governorship, n.d.).

During my visits to various villages and towns, as the research problem of the thesis began to crystallize, the methodology of the study I intended to conduct within the framework outlined in the introduction also started to take shape. An in-depth analysis of local agricultural relations necessitated a research approach predominantly governed by qualitative analysis tools. I think one of the most important features of the qualitative research is that it does not have a separate set of methods or practices unique to it. This allows qualitative researchers make use of tools such as discourse,

semiotics and narrative as well as graphs, tables and statistical tools (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003, p. 10). In the context, I utilized a *mixed-methods approach*, benefiting from both quantitative data and the in-depth insights provided by qualitative analysis.

There were numerous ways I used to find interviewees. A reputable teacher in the Sorgun district, who was originally from Burunören village has been the gate-keeper, and provided access to a wide local network. At the beginning, he introduced me to some big farmers of Burunören, to a gas station and to the new mayor of the town, which gave me an opportunity to expand my network even further. In addition to his teacher identity, he also gave information and insight into the sugar -beet production as a well-known sugar beet producer. In these interviews, I used a semi-structured question list as a starting point and aimed to cover the topics included in this list in each conversation.

After my initial interviews, I began employing two different methods together. On one hand, considering the purpose of the dissertation, I started with *random sampling*. However, in practice, since I could only reach new individuals by asking around in the field, I conducted the sampling using the *snowball method* rather than true random sampling. A snowball sampling procedure begins with a random sample of individuals from a finite population, where each individual names k different individuals. Those named form the next stage, and the process continues through multiple stages, with each individual in the subsequent stages naming k different individuals, until the specified number of stages is reached (Goodman L. , 1961, p. 148). In summary, I asked the individuals I interviewed to recommend new interview candidates.

However, at a certain point, I noticed that the interviewed individuals tended to attract people from their own social class for subsequent interviews, this opened up the risk of weakening the sample's ability to represent the broader population. To manage this risk, I decided to apply this sampling in a *selective* way which is known as “theoretical sampling”. Unlike a random sampling in statistical research, this approach involves *selectively approaching* individuals or groups who have relevance to the research problem. The emphasis is on gaining insights from diverse perspectives rather than focusing solely on the quantity, typicality, or representativeness of the participants (Crang & Cook, 2007, s. 14). This way I was, to some extent, able to control the sample

based on interviewees' relevance to the topics and representative capacity in regards to the case study.

While I was conducting these semi-structured interviews based on theoretically sampled snowball method, I made an effort to integrate into social life in a way that would allow me to observe from within. For this purpose, I started to make random visits to public spaces or social spots such as mosque courtyards, squares, gas stations, and markets where people gather. Over time, as the townspeople became accustomed to me, these visits often turned into a form of participant observation where I joined the conversations among the town's adult men. Regarding the degree of my participation, I balanced avoiding behaviors that would risk my position and the impressions people had of me, while also not remaining entirely passive, which could disturb the community with the silence of an external observer merely taking notes; I engaged in "moderate participation," as Spradley (1980, p. 60) terms it. In these conversations, unlike semi-structured interviews where I was not fully aware of the entire life story of the participants, I had the opportunity to listen to many people who participated in the topic within the heat of the discussion, becoming part of what could be described as the internal accounting within the social consciousness of the local community. These dialogues provided significant insights into the relationships between participants, which is distinct from one-on-one interviews.

There were three kinds of location I visited the most. The first one was the town square in Kale neighbor. There is the oldest and central mosque located right in the square, which makes it a meeting point. There were always elderly people sitting on the banks and spending time together. I have been there few times and involved in their daily conversations and debates on current issues. The other one was mosques. Mosques are also meeting and gathering points of males. Elderly people spend more time then the young. I visited mosques especially following the prayer times and I ended up speaking to the elderly. The third kind of place I had been to were gas stations. As I will discuss in detail in the following chapter, gas stations in Çiğdemli are the main meeting points where adult males spend time together. I have visited two gas stations in Çiğdemli, and one in Duralidayılı village, introduced myself and talked with the crowd.

As a result, I conducted numerous participant observations and interviews in various locations. In Sarayönü and Kalkancık Villages, all interviews took place in the homes of the interviewees. In Çiğdemli, in addition to 10 interviews conducted at the interviewees' residences, I held interviews at gas stations, a market, a square, a mosque courtyard, gardens, and a pasture land. Additionally, interviews were conducted at the Yozgat Sugar Factory, a community clubhouse, and cafés in the Sorgun district center (see Appendix C). Given that many interviews occurred in public spaces, this setting had notable effects on both the content and context of the discussions.

I used Burgess' (2006) concept of "theoretical saturation" to determine whether I had reached sufficient numbers in the interviews and enough amount of information. "Theoretical saturation" refers to the point where researchers notice a recurring theme in the accounts they are told. It signifies reaching a stage where the stories shared have a familiar tone, indicating that a comprehensive understanding of the community members' experiences and explanations has been attained. This saturation marks the stage where the various arguments regarding a particular matter have been thoroughly explored. (Burgess, 2006, p. 209).

In publicly held interviews, there were multiple participants, each with different durations of participation and varying levels of contribution. Over the course of two months from 08/03/2019 to 09/29/2019 in Çiğdemli, I conducted 33 separate interview rounds with 33 main interviewees and an additional 36 incidental or partial participants, totaling 53 hours and 35 minutes of interview time (see Appendix C).

Based on the depth and quality of the information they shared and the duration of the interview, there are three groups. In the first group there are participants who I made full interviews with. There are 28 interviewees who provided me with their life story, world view, and economic status to make an assessment about their position in class structure. They also touched upon most of the issues covered in semi-structured questionnaire and sometimes they rose topics that they consider as important. The second group consists of secondary and accidental participants. This group hosts 19 participants who (i) are family members of the same household, (ii) those who partly participate in the interview and missing some personal information and, (iii) those who participate only in a specific discussion, provide important information and

perspective, but does not want to keep up and/or talk about personal issues. When the participant is a member of the same family he or she is still counted as the same household so when it comes to class relations, I did not include same family members as separate agents. However, the contribution they made provided crucial information about extra-class divisions and intra-family power relations. It was especially true when women, notably the lady of the house introduced herself and directly jumped into the interview; and when debates or difference of opinions emerged between generations; elderly and middle-aged interviewees. As for the accidental participants, it is still possible to make assumptions of class positions of some of them, despite the lack of some personal information. Some others in this group does not provide any personal information but they still share their perspectives on the topic being discussed. The last category generally consists of audience, some family members and one-time participants. They are 22 in total. They participate in interview by making some comments, stating that they agree or disagree with the interviewee or asking me write down something they find important, but that is all. I included their sayings as long as they are relevant to the discussion. Most of them did not give their names.

In order to ensure the anonymity of the interviewees, I have assigned pseudonyms to each interviewee, I have also assigned names to those whom names are unknown, to increase readability (see Appendix C).

During the field work, besides the two former mayors, I also spoke with the new mayor several times. Meeting three mayors who ran the office for more than 30 years made it possible to get crucial information from-inside about the history and administration of the town.

It should be noted that the number of participatory observations exceeded the number of semi-structured one-to-one interviews. In some cases, I conducted one on one interviews or obtain contact information of the farmers to meet privately later. However, most of the time, our interviews were joined by others, and it quickly turned into a focus group. Although it was difficult to take notes, give a direction to the interview and participate in at the same time, focus groups had a clear advantage that it allowed me to observe interactions and group dynamics among farmers. In some

cases, participants accepted or wanted to fully attend to the interview. In other cases, they partly joined in order to speak on a specific topic and then left.

While some of the interviews gave personal information about their businesses and social status, some others refused or avoided giving any information about themselves. The lack of willingness to give personal information, and uneasiness towards researchers and surveyors sometimes stem from political atmosphere. In our case, such reactions were expected since local elections had just taken place and the ruling party AKP had just lost the municipality of Çiğdemli after 17 years. An interviewee clearly stated his suspicion that I could be an AKP official, tasked with making research in order to understand why AKP lost. I have encountered challenges and advantages arising from the fact that people in Çiğdemli have never encountered this kind of academic work before. On the one side some people responded more willingly to the interview request. On the other side, my attempt sometimes surprised the locals, since they stated that there was no point in making research in this town. Some people clearly said that the town was dying and there is nothing worth examining. Some people were not convinced that I was conducting a field search in their village without any other intention. For instance, a gas station manager had a doubt about that I could be a state official exploring the area to look for a suitable land to build a storehouse. Establishing and maintaining a relationship of trust with people was the most basic condition for healthy data collection. Establishing and maintaining a relationship of trust with people was the most basic condition for healthy data collection. Therefore, I tried to use trust-building communication methods and the right intermediaries as much as possible when making new contacts.

The dissertation not only draws upon insights obtained from the field study, but also benefits from diverse number of sources. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Sorgun District Directorate of Agriculture, Meteorological Service, and Turkish Grain Board provided valuable official datasets that allowed me to contextualize my field study findings within the broader regional and national picture. Official periodicals and local newspapers further enriched my understanding. Data from TUİK (Turkish Statistical Institute) provided reliable statistical information to corroborate and refine my own data analysis. Beyond these traditional sources, I have also made use of the relevant video footage and other contents on the internet. While video records like the

April 23rd National Sovereignty and Children's Day celebrations video, two recent documentaries, and Davut Kılıç's street interviews in Çiğdemli and nearby villages provided invaluable insights into the history of Çiğdemli, local perspectives and experiences. Similarly, an in-depth interview with mayor-in-office on local Yozgat TV shed light on contemporary perspectives and challenges faced by the community. My own photographic documentation during the field study has served as a further layer of evidence.

Lastly, the dissertation employed the computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software ATLAS.ti to manage and analyze the extensive interview notes, field notes, and other materials collected during fieldwork. The software facilitated the creation of codes and the establishment of connections between texts. Additionally, approximately four years after the fieldwork was conducted in 2019, during the finalization phase of the dissertation in 2023-24, artificial intelligence tools had advanced significantly. I utilized these AI tools for language correction and wording, which contributed to refining the final version of the dissertation.

# CHAPTER 2

## CASE STUDY: ÇİĞDEMLİ

This chapter aims to explore the town of Çiğdemli as a location where the agricultural field is manifested. The town, with its history, soil, environment, demography, and social and political institutions, constitutes the space where the *agricultural field* is formed, and where the *agricultural game* is played. This chapter stands between the theoretical application of Bourdieu's theory on agriculture and the demonstration of how different social classes play the agricultural game. It will examine how Çiğdemli is linked to previously discussed developments, transforms, and affects the positions and strategies of individuals, groups, and institutions.

Then, the rest of the chapter examines how the major technological, environmental, demographic, institutional, and political trends have shaped the town. These trends help us understand the conditions under which the rules of the game change and the agricultural agents adapt over time.

In his pioneer study, The Algerians (1962), Bourdieu demonstrated how multiple factors may lead to a profound disintegration of a society's social and economic structures. After examining the traditional agrarian order of the Algerians, he analyzed the disruptive forces such as European immigration, colonialism, population boom, introduction of the railroads, open market policies, etc. He demonstrated how these forces lead to a profound change in the value systems of traditional structures such as traditional family, clan, and economy by losing their functions and disintegrating (pp. 119-144).

The dissertation takes a similar approach by addressing major factors that influence the agricultural field. This chapter begins by setting the scene and exploring the agricultural environment in Çiğdemli, defining the context where the "agricultural

game" is played. It then examines the major trends that shape the unchangeable rules into which individuals are born and cannot easily alter in the short term. These include material conditions like climate, soil, water, and long-standing social structures, as well as global political-economic systems, demographics, and urban characteristics.

Although these factors will be discussed separately, their interconnectedness cannot be ignored. Various studies point out the combined effects of global trends. For example, O'Brien and Leichenko (2000) argue that being simultaneously exposed to globalization and climate change can lead to complex outcomes due to the interaction between the two phenomena. A region, sector, or social group could emerge as both a winner and a loser in different aspects, or could face double benefits or losses from these interacting trends (p. 227). This framework has also been adopted in studies on Turkey (e.g., Turhan et al., 2019).

The long-term trajectories of these material conditions result in deep changes in habitus and alter the 'rules of the game' over time. The combined impact of these trends influences social classes differently, with varying consequences across different groups.

However, it would be misleading to claim that agents and events in the agricultural field are solely *determined* by material conditions. Agents are born into social structures that are shaped and limited by these conditions, but they also interact with and are shaped by their structured dispositions, or habitus. Individuals are neither fully determined by material conditions nor entirely free in their choices. Rather, they are born into and engage with a set of prescriptions, patterns, and dispositions. Following Bourdieu, this dissertation departs from both rational choice theories and structuralist theories by emphasizing the role of internalized, embodied regularities that help individuals develop a *sense of the game* (Bourdieu, 1996a). Farmers' actions and worldviews are not simply a calculated response to changing material or systemic conditions; instead, these changes are reflected in how farmers perceive and engage with the 'rules of the game.'

At this point, it is essential to distinguish between the trajectory *we* statistically or scientifically construct and the trajectory that agents *themselves* perceive and

construct. We will utilize available data to demonstrate that the material conditions in Çiğdemli align with national and global trends. Additionally, we will examine the interviewees' views and actions in response to these conditions, revealing their understanding of the trajectory of the agricultural field in Çiğdemli. This dual approach enables us to explore how expectations about Çiğdemli's future are subjectively constructed, objectified in embodied forms, and manifested through the strategies agents pursue.

The best way to observe the interviewees' 'sense of the game' is when they discuss their hometown and personal stories. In most interviews, participants were encouraged to reflect on their experiences by comparing the past with the present. I also asked how they feel about the future, which, in the broadest sense, allowed them to express their role within the agricultural field and as citizens of Çiğdemli. This approach helps us uncover their habitus, map potential clusters of positions, and identify divisions among different groups within the community.

As expected, there is a widely shared perception of a negative trend in the agricultural field. The narratives collected from individuals with diverse educational backgrounds, income levels, and occupations were remarkably homogenous, essentially variations of the same story. With few exceptions, the collective view of Çiğdemli is that: (i) it was a beautiful and livable place in the past, (ii) conditions have progressively worsened, and (iii) there is no hope for the future. Most interviewees depicted the past in stark contrast to the present. While the details varied between individuals, nearly all participants expressed the belief that Çiğdemli is unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future, whether in terms of social life, agricultural production, or the economy. Farmers' portrayal of the town and the agricultural field aligns closely with the material conditions discussed in this chapter. In the following pages, we will examine how the relative decline of the agricultural field, worsening economic conditions, and the failures of agricultural policies are seen as the primary factors behind this outlook.

Despite the common trajectory, the image of the future Çiğdemli farmers share, they do not pursue the exact same strategy. Different classes with different amount and distribution of capital, tend to take different positions in agricultural field in respect to other fields. While some farmers plan to quit farming, others not, while some other

insist to invest more in the agricultural field. The differentiation between social classes becomes clear when they start to talk about the reasons behind this trajectory, and their suggestions to fix the problems.

Now, we examine five dimensions of the change in the agricultural field of Çiğdemli:

1. Changing technology,
2. Decreasing water resources,
3. Demographic shifts,
4. Changes in institutional and political structure,
5. Shifts in the agricultural policy framework and its implementation.

## 2.1. Stage Where Agricultural Game is Played

### 2.1.1. Agricultural Game

Before starting the chapter, it is necessary to explain what the *agricultural game* means with concrete examples from daily life in Çiğdemli. What *game* are we referring to here? The subject of this game is the growth of agricultural capital and the gain of power by individuals, families, and social classes, interconnected through agricultural activities, which are the primary source of livelihood in Çiğdemli. As we have previously discussed in theory, this capital is relational, encompassing both economic capital and the cultural, social, and symbolic capital accumulated through human relationships, which both demonstrate and sustain this economy.

The agricultural game covers agricultural relations, meaning all economic, social, and cultural activities and relationships organized around agricultural production. Since our thesis focuses on the agricultural game in Çiğdemli, we look for this game spatially in the local agricultural relations in Çiğdemli. Whether a capital can be considered agricultural capital and the extent to which it is valuable depends on the actors participating in the agricultural game. The relative value of types of agricultural capital is constantly redefined within a dynamic, contradictory, and conflictual society; the processes of valuation and revaluation are part of an ongoing struggle.

Economic, social, cultural, and symbolic qualities derived from agricultural relations cannot be separated. Agricultural production is at the heart of economic activities. Plowing the land, sowing, harvesting, aerating, spraying, and getting a good yield have economic value, but they also symbolically enhance the farmer's reputation. Not leaving the land fallow operates similarly. In a cultural context where leaving land uncultivated is condemned, cultivating land provides economic benefits and non-monetary values, as it becomes part of the farming culture and family reputation. Similarly, economic relations around the buying and selling of agricultural products and the reputation gained from these transactions are part of the capital used in this game. For farmers, being a good or large farmer, and for traders, being a reliable and reputable trader are essential values in this game.

Social relationships are also part of the agricultural game. People gain agricultural power through their political and social relationships. Kinship ties, political connections, friendships, and similar relationships give individuals advantages in agricultural activities. Such relationships may lay the groundwork for debt or guarantor relationships, and even if they do not provide direct economic benefits, they can influence the power dynamics in the agricultural game by shaping social prestige and political power relations.

Class dynamics influence all these relationships. In the Bourdieusian sense, there is a clear distinction and hierarchy between classes based on the amount of capital acquired from certain production relations and the habitus derived from those relations. The agricultural game is not only played among farmers but also between social classes. In this sense, the game includes the ways and methods used by dominant social classes that exploit rural mechanisms of exploitation to maintain the existing order and the symbolic violence they apply to lower classes, as well as the tactics and strategies employed by the lower classes to survive within this order, resist the upper classes, and, if possible, climb the social ladder.

Political relations are present in all aspects of this game. Power mechanisms, relationships with political power holders, and those who wield public authority are key tools for intervention in distribution relations and thus form an important means of winning in the agricultural game.

In this sense, the people of Çiğdemli strive to gain value within agricultural relations, using this relational value within the agricultural game to survive, rise, and fight for upward social mobility.

### 2.1.2. Town and Villages: Physical Boundaries of Field

Before examining the concept of the agricultural field, it is necessary to discuss the physical characteristics, boundaries, and attributes of Çiğdemli. Although the dissertation focuses on villages, villagers, farmers, and agricultural activities, it centers on a rural town. To discuss the reasons and implications of this choice, we must first review the differences between concepts such as village, rural, urban, center, and local and situate our research area within a specific conceptual framework.

From a legal perspective, population is regarded as the sole criterion for distinguishing between villages, towns, and cities. The Village Law of 1924 defines *settlements* with populations below two thousand as villages, between two thousand and twenty thousand as towns, and those with populations exceeding twenty thousand as cities (Köy Kanunu, 1924).

Although administrative and legal literature widely adopt population-based classification, social sciences often rely on qualitative differences to distinguish between rural and urban areas. For instance, Sorokin and Zimmerman (1929) identified nine key differences between rural and urban communities. Briefly, in rural communities, the primary occupations involve collecting and cultivating plants and animals, and farmers work outdoors more frequently than urban dwellers. The size of communities is negatively correlated with agricultural activities, and villages are less densely populated than urban areas. Rural populations tend to be more homogeneous in socio-physical characteristics, including beliefs, opinions, and behaviors, compared to urban populations. Social mobility is lower in rural communities, and migration generally occurs from rural areas to cities. Additionally, there is more significant social differentiation and stratification in cities than in rural communities, and the volume of social interaction in rural areas is less than in urban areas (Sorokin & Zimmerman, 1929, pp. 13-58).

Another frequently used concept in this field is *rural settlement*. *Rural settlement* is defined as "the spatial differentiation of the grouping of houses and highways in rural areas where social cohesion and cultural ties are strengthened according to the needs of the society and mankind" (Mandal, 1989, p. 2). Definitions of rural areas are typically based on criteria such as low population density, high levels of social solidarity, dispersed settlements, and a predominance of agriculture as the primary source of livelihood. However, due to technological advancements and the growing significance of non-agricultural activities, a need has emerged to redefine rural areas. In redefining rural areas, the prevailing approach remains to consider characteristics that are absent in urban areas as rural. In other words, defining the rural still relies on the urban-rural dualism (Pandey, 2003).

The continuous expansion of urban areas, particularly following World War II, has emerged as a development studied under "urban sprawl" within urban sociology, especially in the United States and the Western world. The term defined as "the scattering of urban settlement over the rural landscape" (Harvey & Clark, 1965, p. 1) or an "uncontrolled development that expands outward from city centers and consumes otherwise undeveloped land" (Gallagher, 2001, p. 219). The term is sometimes used to refer to postwar suburbanization with "its tendency to discontinuity - large closely settled areas intermingled haphazardly with unused areas" amplifying "the lack of continuity in expansion" (Clawson, 1962, p. 99).

The impacts of urban expansion on rural areas have been researched from various perspectives. With the growth of urban areas, the conversion of agricultural lands into residential areas, depletion of agricultural resources such as wetlands and underground water (Gallagher, 2001; Brueckner et. al., 2001) and the migration of the rural workforce to cities have negatively affected agricultural production. Additionally, the development of transportation facilities has led to the emergence of urban populations settling in rural areas while commuting to the city, altering the demographic structure of rural communities. The extension of urban services to rural areas on the urban periphery has further diminished the predominance of agricultural production as the primary economic activity in rural areas.

There are many transitional spaces where rural and urban areas converge, intersect, and where rural areas become urbanized, engaging in intense commercial, economic, social, administrative etc. interactions. Galpin was the first to conceptualize this phenomenon with the term “rurban” (Galpin, 1915, pp. 32-34).

Çiğdemli is historically a town centered around the *Kale Mahallesi* (Kale neighborhood) and consists of three villages that were later incorporated into it. Agriculture is the primary source of livelihood. As we will see in detail later on, Çiğdemli has urban characteristics in many respects such as infrastructure, settlement pattern, population density, etc., as it is a historically rooted town. While the town falls under the category of rural settlement, it can also be defined as a “rurban” settlement, as introduced by Galphin (1915) in the rural sociology literature.

However, the urban-rural dichotomy is not a criterion we need to consider when defining the area covered in the dissertation. It is because the agricultural game centers on agricultural relations and the agricultural capital valued within these relations. In this regard, since we are examining the agricultural game at the scale of Çiğdemli, we can argue that we focus on *local* relationships, regardless of whether they are inherently rural or urban. As indicated in the title of the dissertation, the term 'local agricultural relations' better reflects the perspective we aim to present at this point.

### 2.1.3. Concept of Agricultural Field in Çiğdemli

As pointed out before, the term *field* is a theoretical construct referring to “a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions” as Bourdieu and Wacquant define (1992, p. 97). The spatial extent of this network is principally limitless. It can reach anywhere where individuals in this network have a step. However, the spatial aspect narrows down when it comes to the term agricultural field. The agents of this specific field are more or less physically bound by the primary economic source of the agricultural game, the soil. Although there are increasing interactions and even infusions between the urban and rural areas, the soil still constitutes the agricultural game's playground for those who farm or depend directly on farming activity.

Çiğdemli is where we identify this specific network of agricultural relations between objectively definable positions. It includes farmer families, agricultural workers, merchants, agricultural institutions such as cooperatives, public authorities that allocate resources to regulate agricultural relations, local agricultural input distributors, etc. The agricultural field in Çiğdemli is the relations between the agents' positions. These objective relations create a structure through which the agricultural resources are accumulated and distributed. As pointed out in sections 1.4.3 and 1.4.5., the accumulation and distribution of specific agricultural capital manifest the hierarchical, uneven relations between positions, allowing us to identify social classes (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97).

Thus, before examining those positions, it is necessary to examine the source of the economic, social, and cultural capital, the soil, population, institutions, and their history.

### 2.1.4. Basic Climatic and Geographic Features of Region

Sorgun is located in the center of the Bozok Plateau, bordered by large ridges to the north and hilly areas to the south. It has a gently undulating topography shaped by the Eğriöz Stream and its tributaries (Bulut, 1998). In the south of the city, Üç Tepeler (1,146 m) has a basaltic structure, while in the north, the southwestern extensions of the Deveci Mountains can be found. Over 45% of the land in Sorgun is flat (Bulut, 1998). Plains dominate the Bozok Plateau, and the northeast is slightly hilly. The Eymir Plateau forms a natural border between Central Anatolia and the Black Sea Region. The elevation increases towards the north. Significant elevations in the area include Sivri (1,362 m), Halil Baba (1,600-1,700 m), and Durali Baba (1,456-1,792 m). The elevation in Çiğdemli ranges from 1,123 to 1,195 meters. As the elevation increases, factors such as lower temperatures, prolonged winters, and the early onset and late end of frost limit agricultural activities, shortening the growing period of plants and reducing agricultural productivity in higher elevations. This leads to the cultivation of species with low-temperature requirements and frost-resistant varieties, reducing crop diversity in northern Sorgun. Barley and wheat are commonly cultivated in these regions, but sugar beet farming is relatively rare (Yaşar, pp. 12-13).

The area's semi-arid climate leads to hot and dry summers and long and harsh winters (Bulut, 1998). The average temperature is 9.5-10 ℃. While the daily temperature difference is 10 ℃, the annual difference rises to 20 ℃. The averages are below zero during January-February and 20.9-21.2 ℃ in June-July. In Sorgun and Çiğdemli, the harvest season for wheat, barley, and rye is from July to early August. During the vegetation phase, it is vital for the crops to have the right temperature. In this context, the average temperature in Çiğdemli in July is between 18.6 and 19.2 ℃, which provides the right conditions for vegetation and the harvest, specifically for crops such as wheat, barley, and rye. The development period of sugar beet and corn crops coincides with July-August. Sugar beet farming requires irrigation and extensive use of machinery. Therefore, it is concentrated in well drained plains, plateau plains and valley floors where the sloping is low (Yaşar, 2022, pp. 18-24).

Rainfall and temperature play a critical role in agriculture, influencing crop yield and quality, as well as groundwater and surface water availability. Crops rely on rainfall and irrigation; however, most plants depend on precipitation due to limited irrigation. In Çiğdemli, the highest levels of rainfall occur in April and May, with significant precipitation also recorded in November, December, and January. The area receives an average of 465.2 mm/m² of rainfall annually (Yaşar, pp. 25-28). The region experiences dry summers, which is typical of its climate. Most precipitation is concentrated in spring, followed by fall and winter (T.C. Sorgun Kaymakamlığı, 2023). In the Sorgun region, with the snow falling in January-March, the snow thickness sometimes reaches 60 cm (Doğan, 1990, p. 60).

Water is vital for all life forms and supports agricultural activities by providing necessary moisture to plants through rainfall or irrigation. In arid climates like the study area, irrigation becomes crucial due to insufficient rainfall. Sorgun District is located at the confluence of the Eğriöz and Delibaş streams, being fed by several tributaries, including the Çiğdemli (Sorgun Özü) stream from the north. The streams in the area are predominantly seasonal, with increased flow in the spring and decreased flow in the summer, often drying up by June or July due to high temperatures and evaporation (Yaşar, pp. 29-32).

Soil is crucial for agriculture. The region of Sorgun is primarily home to brown soils, brown forest soils, chestnut-colored soils, and alluvial soils. In Çiğdemli, alluvial soils are commonly found. Due to the high water availability, these soils are typically used for water-demanding crops like sugar beet, corn, and alfalfa, and different crops are rotated to maintain soil mineral values (Yaşar, pp. 32-35).

These material conditions are the ultimate source of agricultural productivity and set the ground for the agricultural game. In Bourdieu's concepts, the farming habitus, such as fertilizer choices and irrigation practices, within the seasonal cycles of the agricultural economy are based on these and other geomorphological, climatic, and hydrographic characteristics of the region.

### 2.1.5. Past and Present of Çiğdemli

Çiğdemli is a town in the Sorgun district of Yozgat province, 45 km from the city center and 11 km from the Sorgun district center. Town's former name is "Sorgun Köyü" (Durna, 2013). It was also known as "Sorhun" in the 17th-century Ottoman records and "Sorkun" in the 1926 map (Nişanyan, n.d.). Today's Sorgun district is referred to as "Köhne-i Kebir" in Ottoman records (Sezen T., 2017, p. 694), and its name was changed to "Sorgun" in 1928 (Sorgun Kaymakamlığı, n.d.).

The name Sorkun was changed to Çiğdemli as part of the policy of changing place names during the Republican period. When the village of Sorkun became a municipality in 1972, the name was changed to Çiğdemli as part of a policy of changing place names, partly to avoid confusion with Sorgun, which is now the district center (Doğan, 1990, p. 137). In Turkish, "Çiğdemli" means "the place with crocus"; the name originates from the plant *crocus,* which is commonly found in the region (Doğan, 2011, pp. 153-155).

It would be appropriate to address the religious/sectarian characteristics of the population in Çiğdemli. Yozgat is a province with a significant Alevi population. Rençber notes that there are 19 Alevi villages in Sorgun (Rençber, p.272). Yüner states that the majority of the Alevi population in Yozgat resides in the city center and its surrounding villages, with Sorgun being the second largest Alevi settlement after the city center, including Kale Mahallesi in Çiğdemli among these Alevi settlements

(Yüner, p.379). The field study shows that the Alevi population in Çiğdemli is predominantly settled in Kale and, to a lesser extent, in Gülveren and Camiikebir. Although the Alevi population in the town has decreased over time, for reasons and with consequences that we will discuss later, Çiğdemli has maintained its characteristic as a settlement where Alevi and Sunni populations live together. Although this characteristic of the town is not one of the main focuses of the thesis, it is important due to its relationship with demographic developments in the agricultural field and its political implications. These topics will be discussed in more detail later.

The municipality of Çiğdemli was established in 1972. Çiğdemli consists of seven neighborhoods, four of which are central districts of the town (Kale, Karşıyaka, Camiikebir and Gülveren) and three of them, Burunören, Duralidayılı and İsmailhacılı are neighboring villages that joined the municipality in 2005 and gained the status of neighbors.

Although Çiğdemli has been administratively reclassified from a village to a town and has recently expanded by incorporating nearby villages, this change in status has not altered its agricultural character. Agriculture remains, and has always been, the primary source of livelihood in Çiğdemli. While the town has some non-farming occupations and light industry, these activities complement agricultural production rather than being alternatives. Despite the significant emigration, particularly labor migration, that marked the town in the 20$^{th}$ century, the material and cultural resources brought into Çiğdemli from abroad did not fundamentally change the town's mode of production or way of life. Even today, the "agricultural game" remains the dominant activity through which people in Çiğdemli sustain their livelihoods.

### 2.2. Changing Technology

Technology is "the application of scientific knowledge to practical aims of human life or, as it is sometimes phrased, to the change and manipulation of the human environment" (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2024). In this broad definition, technology encompasses practices that deeply influence social organization, production capabilities, and culture.

Technology as a topic of discussion has a limited space in Bourdieu's writings. With that said, he has examined particular technologies in detail to demonstrate their sociological and political functions. In "On Television," he discusses how television constructs reality, produces symbolic violence, and examines the journalistic field around television (Bourdieu, 1996b). In "Photography" he also stresses that one's interest in a particular kind of technology might be related to his class condition (Bourdieu, 1998b). However, technology does not constitute the focal point of Bourdieu's works.

Nonetheless, considering that technology does not exist independently of social practice, Bourdieu's studies can be interpreted in the context of the relationship between technology and habitus (Sterne, 2003). New technology reshapes existing social organizations and culture, transforming human relationships, the physical environment, and even modes of production. These transformations are accompanied by a profound change in habitus. The habitus shaped by a particular technology is not merely a technical set of actions, but also a marker of the agents' social class (Sterne, 2003). In the agricultural field, we can observe that technology manifests and operates in both of these ways.

In this context, we will attempt to interpret technological developments through their transformative effects on habitus in the agricultural field. Many technological advancements that have influenced rural areas and village culture have also directly or indirectly impacted agricultural practices. Technologies in communication and transportation, such as telephones and automobiles, have been widely studied for their effects on the relationship between urban and rural areas and their cultural implications. In this study, however, we will limit our focus to critical technological developments in agricultural production. Our aim is not to provide an exhaustive list or analysis of all technological advancements in the agricultural field but rather to illustrate how technological development, as a long-term trend, has shaped the agricultural field and transformed economic and social relations.

Changes in agricultural technology have significantly impacted the agricultural field, profoundly affecting the relative value of labor and machinery and their organization. Technology not only sets the boundaries for productivity but also shapes social

institutions by influencing the organization of production. Additionally, technology contributes to cultural capital by shaping production techniques and through the institutionalized forms of technological knowledge that emerge from its use.

Farmers' adaptation to technological change is not an automatic process. Different classes and segments adopt innovations in agriculture at different times. This period varies according to whether the innovation is optional or not, whether it is useful, appropriate, complex, testable, or observable. In addition, personal variables, socio-economic characteristics, and communication behaviors also play an essential role in the reaction to innovation (Boz, 1992).

In this sense, technological changes also make visible differentiations between individuals, segments, and social classes in the agricultural field, as well as different individual and structural tendencies.

Thus, we can say that technological change is key to understanding economic, social, and cultural capital and how they change. This section will show how technological advancements affect farmers' decisions and the agricultural field in Çiğdemli.

### 2.2.1. Technological Change in Figures

Turkish Statistical Institute provides agricultural equipment and machinery statistics from 2004 onwards at the sub-province level. It allows us to see the number of tractors, agricultural equipment, and machinery, the number of combine harvesters, and the number of tractors located in Sorgun in the last 15 years. The charts below show that today's Sorgun is home to highly mechanized agriculture. The progress of agricultural machinery in terms of quality and quantity is visible. Even though we do not have the exact figures for Çiğdemli, the statistics about the Sorgun district allow us to see the recent developments in the region, including Çiğdemli.

According to figures provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute, the number of tractors in Sorgun increased by 30% between 2004 and 2020 (Figure 1). Along with the increasing number of tractors, there has also been an improvement in their quality. From 2004 to 2020, the number of tractors with 51-70 horsepower increased 2.3 times, and the number of tractors with more than 70 horsepower increased 1.9 times.





Figure 1: Total Number of Tractors in Sorgun, 2004-2020

Source: Prepared by the author using the data obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2021a).

During the same period, the number of tractors with 35-50 horsepower decreased from 1,960 to 1,662 (Figure 2). These figures indicate that not only has the number of tractors grown, but they have also become more powerful.





Figure 2: Tractor Numbers by Hp Ranges, Sorgun, 2004-2020

Source: Prepared by the author using the data obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2021a).

Figure 3 below illustrates the increasing number of combine harvesters and beet harvesters in Sorgun. However, it is important to note that small-scale farmers do not typically own harvesters; instead, they rent from harvester businesses during harvest.

A recent study reveals that 56.83% of the combine harvester fleet is located in Central Anatolia, Western Anatolia, and Western Marmara, and harvesting is primarily conducted through contractual arrangements. These businesses provide services not only in the regions where they are based but across the country (Ünsal, 2020, p. 9). Consequently, most harvester owners are not based in Sorgun but are mobile, traveling throughout the country during the three-month harvest season. The increasing availability of combine beet harvesters is particularly significant regarding technological advancements, which will be discussed in detail later.





Figure 3: Number of Combine Harvesters in Sorgun, 2014-2020

Source: Prepared by the author using the data obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2021a).

The numbers of selected equipment items in the Figure 4 also demonstrate an upward trend. When we look at a period of about 17 years, it is seen that the number of cultivators increased from 615 to 3,240, moldboard tractor type plough from 2,400 to 3,240, fertilizer broadcaster from 1,175 to 2470 and Pto driven sprayer from 1,175 to 2037. From this point of view, the increase in the number of equipment confirms that mechanization continues, just like the increase in the number of tractors and other machinery. However, it should be noted here that, unlike in the other graphs, the increase in the number of equipment slowed down considerably after 2010 and the numbers appear to plateau.





Figure 4: Amount of Equipment in Selected Items, 2004-2020

Source: Prepared by the author using the data obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2021a).

In addition to the increased use of machinery, the use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers has also risen over the years. There has been a long-term trend of chemical fertilizers replacing organic ones. Over the past decade, the annual usage of chemical fertilizers has averaged more than 2 million tons (Figure 5).





Figure 5: Total Chemical Fertilizer Consumption by Plant Nutrient

Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2023, as cited in Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, 2024.

The use of plant protection products, including insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, acaricides, rodenticides, molluscicides, and others, has also seen a notable rise. Figure 6 shows that an average of 40,000 tons of plant protection products were used nationwide annually between 2006 and 2015. However, in the last five years, there has been a significant increase, with an average usage rise of 10,000 tons.





Figure 6: Plant Protection Products Usage by Year, Turkey, 2006-2020

Source: Prepared by the author using the data obtained from Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2023).

When examining recent figures at the provincial level, the annual amount of plant protection products used in Yozgat between 2016 and 2020 ranges from 215,000 tons to 393,000 tons (Figure 7). These figures demonstrate that in addition to mechanization, the use of chemical inputs has also increased in parallel with mechanization.

These figures, as we will discuss later, reveals many important changes such as the transformation in agricultural production methods, marketization in agricultural economic relations, and the increasing influence of financial institutions in financing agriculture. From a Bourdieuian perspective, this change also points to the transformation of agricultural economic capital and the way the agricultural game is played.





Figure 7: Use of Plant Protection Products, Yozgat, 2016-2020

Source: Prepared by the author using the data obtained from Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2023).

In addition to technological advancements that directly impact agricultural fields, general progress in transportation also has significant effects on agricultural land. The most notable of these is the Ankara-Sivas high-speed train line, which passes through the Sorgun route. At the time of my fieldwork, the construction of the train line was still underway (see, Figure 8), and it was completed and opened for service in 2023. The journey, which previously took 12 hours by regular train, has been reduced to 2 hours (Anadolu Ajansı, 2023). Once a train station is built in Sorgun, it is anticipated that increased human mobility, particularly in passenger transportation, will lead to a rise in both temporary and permanent reverse migration in Çiğdemli.

In Bourdieu's terms, all of the aforementioned material inputs and means of production correspond to agricultural economic capital. Alongside the soil, which is the ultimate source of agricultural products, these resources represent the economic assets that generate wealth and power within the agricultural field.

The statistics summarized above reflect a quantitative and qualitative increase in overall agricultural economic capital. This indicates an expansion in the total *amount* of economic capital but does not provide information about its *distribution*.



Figure 8: Ongoing Construction of the Ankara-Sivas High-Speed Train Line, Çiğdemli, 08/30/2019

Technological change is also connected to shifts in technique—knowledge related to agricultural practices—and organization, which refers to how production process is structured. Furthermore, it is intricately tied to finance, encompassing the monetary relationships that drive the production and distribution of high-tech capital.

### 2.2.2. Technological Change in Collective Memory

The statistics have led us to develop and quantify a theoretical framework regarding technological advancements in Çiğdemli. In our field study, we also encountered a social construct—a widely shared and manifested narrative about the changing technology.

Interviews with farmers in Çiğdemli provide insight into how rapidly technology has transformed the agricultural field. Elderly individuals, in particular, offer vivid descriptions of the past that stand in stark contrast to the present. These are the people who were born into a traditional social and economic life when very primitive means of production were still in use.

The most frequently mentioned technological advancement is the introduction of the tractor. It is a relatively recent development that machine power has replaced horsepower in Çiğdemli. Abdullah, an elderly farmer from Burunören Village, recalls

that electricity first came to the village in 1976, and until then, his family farmed without any machinery. According to the recollections of the elderly, the first tractor arrived in the village between 1964 and 1968. It is worth noting that the area cultivated by tractors in Turkey increased from 3,883,000 hectares in 1964 to 6,411,000 hectares in 1968, with the percentage of land cultivated by tractors rising from 16% to approximately 27% in just four years (Kızıldere, 1983). This indicates that tractor was introduced to Çiğdemli during this period of rapid mechanization.

Kerem, a large-scale farmer with 500 decares, proudly recounts how his father and uncle, who were among the notable villagers, purchased one of the first tractors in Çiğdemli. He explains step by step how technology has since revolutionized their farming practices:

> I remember well that we had 10 pairs of horses in 1961-1962. We bought a tractor for the first time in 1967. My father and uncle bought it jointly. I think the total number of tractors in the village at that time was three, including ours. Besides us, a man named Saffettin bought a tractor. So, the first tractor must have come in 1966 or 1964-65. We were small, they wouldn't let us near the tractor. Back then, we used to harvest the crops with sickles and scythes. The harvested crops were piled up with a pitchfork and then put into a heap. Then we would take it, and it would be brought to the threshing floor by tractor or horse. The engine, the tractor would revolve on it, we would turn it inside out, then we would transfer it, then we would plow it again. We would plow it 4-5 times like this, so that it would wear out and turn into straw. First, they would make a pile, then one, two, three people would pitchfork it. After the pitching, they would sift the mud and stalks with a sieve. The men would fill the wheat into bags with tins and take it to the warehouse. In the 1970s, the thresher. It continued until '72, '75. Then came the threshers with screw. In 1978 or so, mowers started to arrive sporadically. After 1980, mowers came continuously. (Kerem, Interview 14)

Kerem's recollection of technological advancements puts emphasis on two important points. First, we learn that Kerem's family, who were amongst the wealthiest ones in the village, did not content with the bunch of horses they had and embraced the technological advance by purchasing a tractor. It clearly shows how wealthy farmers were eager to use their economic power to invest in new means of production. This act of purchasing new machinery sheds light to *a habitus* of big farmers, which is to seek opportunities to gain more power in the agricultural field by taking risks. The introduction of new technologies into agricultural game is not a spontaneous, agentless, and automatic process but rather the result of risky decisions made

consciously by farmers with economic power. This takes us to the second point, the change in the *rules of the game*. Kerem's story reflects the rapid change in the rules of the agricultural game. Big farmers, including his, have changed the very technique of farming by investing in improved tools of production that no one had back then. This new technology has introduced several necessities: new inputs such as gas and spare parts, new competencies such as the ability to drive a tractor, and more money and financial support to purchase the machinery. It also changed the organizational structure of social life and gradually diminished the role of the labor force over the years. All of these changes are triggered by big farmers' initiatives to improve their technical capabilities by investing their economic capital into new technologies. It can be argued that the change in the rules of the agricultural game is caused by a major trend of technological revolution, carried through big farmers' class habitus in Bourdieusian sense.

Not just the tractor but other machinery, such as winnowing machines, has changed the nature of the work in the harvest season. Before the winnowing machine, threshing and winnowing were done by threshing sledge (board) and winnowing forks - wooden tools used to separate the grain from the chaff. A smallholder farmer, İbrahim (69), and his wife, Sultan, remembers how new machines made farming easier step by step throughout their lives:

> Interviewer: When was the last time you used a threshing board, do you remember?
>
> Ibrahim: When was the threshing board... I think it was around '67-'68...
>
> Sultan: I was a new bride then.
>
> Ibrahim: Back then we had the threshing board. With a horse cart… We'd load the harvest onto the cart and take it to the field. Then when the wind blew, we'd toss it with a fork. After that, the black thresher came out. That black thresher had a motor, but it didn't separate the grain from the straw; it would toss both together. Kind of like the threshing board. Then the blower thresher came out, it would separate the straw to one side and the wheat to the other. You'd take the straw and put it in a sack. Now, there's the combine with a trailer hitched to the back. It puts the grain into its own bin and fills the trailer with straw. They take the full trailer and swap it out for an empty one. (Interview 13)

As İbrahim points out, modern machinery has become capable of harvesting and winnowing by separating the chaff from the grain. Now, there are even combine harvesters with baler, which bales the straw right away.

Combined harvester is a good example of how new technologies have impacted the product range and the use of the labor force. As mentioned earlier, combine harvesters are not individually owned but rented due to economies of scale. Most farmers in Sorgun rent the combine harvester from outside businesses. These businesses rotate their combine harvesters across the country following the harvest season during the year. They start from low-altitude regions in the southeast to central Anatolia, ending up with high-altitude locations such as Sivas. In Çiğdemli, the farmers' assets protection union president organizes the harvest order. Harvesters are not paid in cash. Instead, the work is done in exchange for the chaff.

Seeing the impact of the widespread use of modern harvesters on seasonal agricultural labor in the context of the Çiğdemli case will help us understand the relationship between technology and agriculture.

### 2.2.3. Harvesters' Impact on Crop Choice

Observations in the field shows that the high cost of agricultural inputs and the difficulty in accessing cheap labor with increasing migration and aging have led to the avoidance of planting labor-intensive crops in Çiğdemli, where the elderly population is dense. At this point, technologies that reduce or eliminate the need for labor have an impact on the choice of crops to be planted. The widespread use of harvesters that eliminate plucking labor has increased the demand for crops that can be harvested with these machines.

Chickpea and lentil are a striking example. In the 1970-1990 period, Turkey implemented a support price policy to increase lentil and chickpea production and encouraged legume cultivation through the fallow land reduction project. As a result of these incentives, there was a large increase in production in the late 1980s. However, support purchases were abolished in the mid-1990s and production declined due to fluctuations in producer prices, prices lagging behind inflation, low yields and rising labor costs. Lentil production declined from 1,040 thousand tons in 1988 to 540 thousand tons in 2003, green lentils from 210 thousand tons to 55 thousand tons and chickpea production from 860 thousand tons in 1990 to 600 thousand tons in 2003 (Koç A. , 2005, pp. 137-138).

Today, we observe that this picture is slowly reversing. The fallow and cultivation data of recent years also demonstrates a parallel change in crop choice. According to the official statistics, chickpea and lentil cultivation has increased, while fallow areas have shrunk (Figure 9). This is in line with the information provided by farmers.





Figure 9: Cultivated Area of Cereals, Legumes and Fallow Land

Source: Prepared by the author using data obtained from the Sorgun District Agriculture Directorate (2020).

During the field study, a common complaint is observed that many people, even those who do not normally farm have started to plant chickpeas. According to locals, chickpea has not widely grown for a long time due to unsatisfactory government support and low prices. However, combine harvesters have significantly reduced costs and simplified the process, leading to the chickpea becoming popular again. Explaining why chickpea has become popular among local farmers, Yusuf, a 42 years old farmer, implies that the new harvesters reduced the harvest costs and eased the process:

> Interviewer: How much wheat, how much chickpeas did you plant?
>
> Yusuf: I plant wheat and chickpeas half and half. Normally, you split the land in two, right? One year, the side that needs to lie fallow is where I plant chickpeas. I plant chickpeas on that side, and the next year I plant wheat there and chickpeas on the other side.

> Interviewer: How long has it been like this?
>
> Yusuf: It's been like this for 3-4 years now. We used to plant chickpeas before too, but the harvesters charged a lot. Once these chickpea harvesters came along, the job got easier, and the harvester does it cheaper, so people started planting again. (Interview 30)

The harvesting technology has not only affected the crop choice, but also the variety of the crop itself. Crop varieties have also adapted to the new harvesting machines. Since the traditional chickpea varieties are too short (15-20 cm) to be effectively harvested by the machines, innovative new varieties with tall growth habits (30 cm and taller) have begun to be used in the region. It is observed in Çiğdemli that machine-harvestable ones have replaced traditional chickpea varieties.

From a Bourdieusian perspective, the adaptations of the crop varieties to the machinery refers to a change in the cultural capital itself. The knowledge of local varieties is a part of the agricultural cultural capital. Just as in the case of certified seeds, here we see that the agricultural cultural capital has been transformed in parallel to greater global transformations taken place in wider capitalist circles. Adapting to these changes creates becomes challenge for social classes, a distinctive non-material asset that is used to survive in agricultural field.

### 2.2.4. Harvesters' Impact on Seasonal Agricultural Laborers

One of the most notable effects of technology on agriculture is its impact on class structure and social relations. The most striking example of this in Turkey is the change in land ownership structure caused by tractors introduced through the Marshall Plan after World War II. A study conducted by the Faculty of Political Sciences (SBF) professors in the early 1950s showed that the purchase of tractors was accompanied by a tendency to acquire new land. Large enterprises that owned tractors expanded by purchasing land from small landowners (Köymen, 2009). New machineries have not only affected the nature, quality and the quantity of the production itself, but also the very structure among different social classes in the field. Innovations in the means of production lead to transformations in production relations and social composition. It allows new players to enter the agricultural field, but it also leads to the erasure of some players.

During the field research, I had the opportunity to observe the transformative effects of advancements in agricultural machinery in the existing class structure within the agricultural field. One of the most striking transformations in this area is undoubtedly reflected the widespread adaptation of combine harvesters, which has significantly limited the demand for seasonal agricultural labor and created new opportunities for other classes. In this section, we will examine how the new harvester technology has had this effect on seasonal agricultural workers, newcomers to agriculture and the existing elderly agricultural population.

Although we will examine the major agriculture-related-classes in detail in the third chapter, we will discuss the seasonal agricultural workers here in this section due to demonstrate the change in the class structure.

Seasonal or itinerant agricultural labor is a common form of agricultural labor in Turkey. Mobile agricultural work can be defined as "the migration of workers from their permanent settlements to work in regions with significant levels of labor-intensive agricultural production" (Büke & Çetinkaya, 2009, p. 54). Every year, around one million agricultural workers migrate with their families from other regions to the Mediterranean, Aegean, Black Sea and Central Anatolia regions, where labor-intensive agricultural products such as cotton, tobacco, sugar beet, hazelnut, tea, grapes, citrus fruits, watermelon, melon and vegetables are concentrated, to meet the temporary labor needed during maintenance and harvest periods (Tanrıvermiş, 2005, p. 105). Centers that attract agricultural labor include Çukurova (Adana-Hatay), Aegean (Manisa-Aydın), Central Anatolia (Eskişehir-Ankara-Konya), Western Black Sea (Bolu-Düzce-Adapazarı), Eastern Black Sea (Ordu-Giresun), Southeastern Anatolia (Şanlıurfa). According to data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, there are an estimated 1 million seasonal agricultural workers in Turkey (Yıldırım & Karakoyun, 2023, p. 63).

Seasonal workers have their own hierarchy, and relations of power. "Dayıbaşı" is the leader and representative of seasonal agricultural workers, who controls their movements and leads the group. He divides the workers into groups of 25-30 and appoints supervisors called "çavuş" (sergeant) to head these groups. Çavuş is the one who employs and supervises the workers and is paid double wage. Dayıbaşı finds the

jobs that workers need, coordinate between employers and workers, and receive a 10% share of workers' wages. They are also responsible for the coordination of groups of workers, the distribution of money and supplies, and safety (Yıldırım & Karakoyun, pp. 70-71).

Seasonal agricultural workers face significant work-related problems. Although they have the right to voluntary insurance on condition that they pay for it themselves, studies show that in many regions workers are not even aware of such an arrangement and that efforts to provide social security are insufficient (Tanrıvermiş, 2005, p. 96). They face the shortcomings of a legal arrangement, low wages, 12–16-hour work, deprivation of health, education, unionization rights, housing and transportation problems. Such problems are caused by the fact that agricultural workers work in temporary, short-term jobs, are dispersed, and have low levels of organization (Büke & Çetinkaya, 2009).

If these conditions are considered through a Bourdieusian perspective, it can be said that seasonal agricultural workers have been *a social class* that is positioned in a certain way within the relations of production, and at the same time shows common characteristics in terms of social organization and habitus, and is positioned at the bottom of the power hierarchy of the agricultural field. These features resonate the term “precariat”; a class defined by Guy Standing “characterized by unstable labor, low and unpredictable incomes, and loss of citizenship rights” (Standing, 2018, p. 2). It is interesting that the first use of the term by French sociologists in the 1980s was already to refer to temporary and seasonal workers. Although the contemporary meaning of the term is different and broader, still the seasonal workers can be counted as a subset of precariat (Standing, 2014, p. 15) .

Traditionally, in Çiğdemli the temporary labor need for maintenance and harvest is met by seasonal agricultural workers from Urfa and Diyarbakır – by ‘Kurds’ as it is commonly referred as, especially for chickpea, lentil and sugar beet. However, during the field study, it is observed that the conditions allowing the very existence of this social class has been changing. Increasing the use of combine harvesters for different types of crops diminished the need for a labor force, hence the need for seasonal workers. One recent example is the chickpea and lentil harvests. Just a decade ago,

these two legumes were harvested by hand, called ‘yolma’ (plucking). The seasonal workers from Urfa and Diyarbakır provinces used to do this work every year. Furkan (57), a farmer and retired civil servant, talks about the change:

> In the old days, workers would harvest by hand, and then we’d put it through the thresher. We used to call it ‘plucking,’ the word ‘mowing’ came to us from the folks down in the Southeast. Around here, we used to call them ‘pluckers.’ It’s been about 10 years since the harvesters came. Before that, workers used to mow by hand. (Furkan, Interview 9)

Interviews confirm that the role of seasonal workers has diminished with the advancement of harvesters.

Sugar beet is another recent example of the share of seasonal workers in production scaling down due to new machinery coming into the picture. The whole process involved an intensive labor force, from irrigation to harvest. Even after tractors were used, hoeing, thinning, and harvesting were still done by seasonal workers’ hands. However, things have changed in the last decade. Sugar beet harvesting machines have mechanized most of the harvesting process. Oğuz (39), who was engaged in beet cultivation until three years ago but now works as a security guard, describes the change from the past to the present as follows:

> Now, topping the head off the beet and so on, used to be done by hand, now it's all done by machine. In other words, labor has decreased, manpower has decreased. Now there are also hoeing machines, they are new, they have spread. Normally they used to come from Urfa for hoeing. I had a friend who worked in law enforcement, and once he told me about it. Since they keep track and check these things, he told me about 10 years ago that 20,000 people from the Southeast would come here for lentils, chickpeas, and beets. Now it has decreased. In fact, it's almost over now. The machine removes the beet, crushes it, puts it in the hopper and unloads it onto the truck (Oğuz, Interview 32).

Along with the mechanization of legume harvesting, sugar beet harvesters have reduced the need for seasonal workers to the highest degree. Umut, a 35 years old farmer involved in stockbreeding, chaff trade, and bailing businesses, explains how the role that the seasonal workers play in agricultural production has diminished over time:

> The ones who usually come from the Southeast do the work. First, they go to the areas where beets are planted and hoed—places like Konya, around here,

> and Kayseri. Some of them go from here to the hazelnut fields. Then they come back to pull up the beets… Those with machines use them, and those without rely on manual labor. A machine is a great thing. It saves both time and reduces labor to a minimum. Without a machine, you have the extra cost of loading the beets the workers pull onto the truck. The machine pulls up the beets, tops them, and loads them onto the vehicle. In the old days, the workers who came used to stay for a long time. They used to do all the work for chickpeas, lentils, and beets—people coming from the Southeast. Now, chickpeas and lentils are all harvested by combine. To sum it up for you, if back in the day 200 people from town made a living during the season, now it's only about 10. (Umut, Interview 21)

We observe that the organizations of the seasonal workers, and the hierarchical structure of the seasonal labor force structure is also disappearing from the agricultural field in Çiğdemli together with the seasonal workers. Dayıbaşı and çavuş are slowly replaced by the businesses who own and organize of the new mechanical means of production which replace the workers. Change is taking place not only within the oppressed and exploited social classes in power relations, but also within the social classes in dominant positions.

Crops that can be harvested with a harvester are feasible options for newcomers and part-time farmers who otherwise do not have the time, labor and network to organize seasonal labor. During the field study, complaints have been made, about those who return or start farming by using the opportunity of farming without the need for labor force. For instance, while a farmer and supermarket employer Emre (54), points out the role of the harvesters in the recent rush to chickpea farming, he does not hide his displeasure that people from different backgrounds are turning to agriculture because they see it as profitable:

> About 10-15 years ago, there wasn't the kind of technology we have today, but people used to plant chickpeas and lentils by hand. Then chickpeas and lentils got cheaper, and production stopped for a while. Later, when the chickpea and lentil harvesters came out, people started planting them again. Even those who didn't plant chickpeas before—teachers, civil servants, and such—got into it because chickpeas made good money for a year or two. Now, is there any empty land left in the village? No, there's none. The harvester comes, quickly picks up the chickpeas, and it's done without any hassle. But now chickpeas don't sell for much. (Emre, Interview 7)

So far, we have seen that the major technological trends have a significant impact on the social formation of the agricultural field. As seasonal workers gradually move

away from being part of the agricultural game, the very technologies that have overtaken them are bringing new agents into the agricultural field.

Interviews with Emre, Oğuz, Umut and others reveal that farmers are clearly know the impact of the new technologies on the rules of the game. Following the previous discussion in the section 1.3.2. on the matter of agency, it is possible to derive conclusions from the approaches of farmers. Farmers do not only witness the changes and their outcomes, but also act accordingly. However, farmers' choices to farm a certain crop, or to return farming etc. are not individual, isolated, stand-alone choices, nor are they merely the results of structural processes that determine everything. They reflect farmers' 'sense of the game'; a disposition fed by past and present, collectively shared experiences, feelings and beliefs, helping them play the social game of agriculture. The common pattern all interviews share indicates the existence of socially accepted, internalized and manifested *yesterday and today*, and providing with a general path, rules and manuals to survive in agriculture. The commonly-shared and manifested perception over the right way of practicing agriculture, including what to do and how to do, has been and is being put to test each time it is followed by a farmer. And the gradual shift in farming habitus is nothing but a consequence of constant testing of these structured dispositions of agricultural practices.

### 2.2.5. Technology's Impact on Social Transformation

New technologies have also changed the social fabric, the level of solidarity, and social organizations. Technological improvements reduced social dependence and cooperation. Solidarity as a social value and a code has slowly faded away. Most of the farmers do not welcome these side effects. This is usually mentioned when farmers tell their stories and talk about the past. Yaşar (62), who returned from Germany in 2006-07, where he had left in 1973 to work, explains how technology has transformed social relations during this time:

> Here, everyone would pile their harvests next to each other, and then it would be leveled and all that... The place where the asphalt runs now used to be the threshing floor. I came back after years, and everywhere had turned into houses. Of course, I used to come back occasionally, but each time, we found it a little more changed. This place used to have a better population. When I was my son's age, we were always helping each other. For example, if you had

> work in your field, we'd come and help. Now, everything has become about money. That shouldn't be the case in Çiğdemli. Back then, the population was much larger too. If you had crops to take care of, we'd go and help you. If I had work, you'd come and help me. No one had to ask. Everyone knew when someone had work to do, and it would get done in turn. This mutual help was especially common during threshing time. Threshing used to take a long time back then, not like now when it's done in a week. It would last until the tenth month. (Yaşar, Interview 28)

Umut (35) describes the change in Çiğdemli's social fabric in parallel with technological progress:

> I compare my childhood with my children's childhood. In our childhood, we had at least 20 peers in every neighborhood. In the evening, we would all gather and play. There is nothing like that now. My child does not have a single peer on his own street. He has no one to play with. Everything used to be very nice. I mean, how beautiful it was, people could exchange ideas with each other, they needed each other, so they mingled more quickly. Now this place has become like a big city. There are no neighbors left. People don't need each other. There are no neighborly visits. In the past, you were like a family with your neighbor, even if you had no relatives. Now everyone lives their own lives. Of course, the advancement of technology also has a share in this. There are also other factors. There is also something like this, people used to be content with little. People were happy even if they had nothing. Now you are in a constant battle to have this or that, you don't look back and see what your friends are doing. In the past, you didn't have washing machines, dishwashers or telephones, but now you are burdened with the cost of these things. Technologies have also advanced in agriculture. You have to buy new equipment every year. This forces you to keep up with technology.
>
> Going back to the past, agriculture used to be done with human power. Therefore, people needed each other more. I would go to your field, 10 of us would get together, I would go to his field and they would come here. We call this 'yamaç' here. (Umut, Interview 21)

Machines save a large amount of labor force and increase productivity. Individually affordable solutions to production problems eliminate the need for social solidarity. "Yamaç," as Umut mentions, as a form of collective work, has seemed to have disappeared. However, more and more stages of the farming process have been monetized. It makes the production process more vulnerable to financial and budgetary risks. Therefore, farmers like Umut complain that the endless race to catch up with technological standards causes more debt. As we will see in detail, most farmers have problems paying the loans they got for new tractors. Tractor loans have become a significant financial burden on many farmers.

Technology has been introduced to agricultural production, not only in the form of machines but also in the form of synthetic inputs, chemicals, and fertilizers. Organic farming is a reminder of a distant past when food and people were healthy. The narrative about technology comes with remarks on how healthier life was in the past. Furkan (57), a retired civil servant and a smallholder farmer, describes the hard work they put into the soil in the past and the healthy and natural food they received back then.

> In the time of my late father, I can remember, we had 100 *dönüm*[1] of land then. We had one ox and a donkey. We used to drive the ox together with the donkey. The year was 1968-69. Snow would fall on the crops in October, we used to plow with oxen and donkeys back then. I can't understand why agriculture can't get back on track. There are 37 thousand or 35 thousand hectares in total, half of which, 17 thousand hectares, are planted with wheat. Nowadays the threshing takes 15 days, whereas in the past it used to last until October. In the old days, the threshing used to take place in October, they used to call it "annual," we used to plant crops for the year, they used to water them well... We were fed then; everything was natural then. What else would have happened, for example there would have been vineyards in that season, there would have been excellent molasses. There would have been and there would have been. They call it "winter preparations," they call the things they prepare for the winter "preparations". Back then they used to make pickles, they used to make bread. They used to stack pickles in giant cubes and molasses in bowls. Now we do it with plastics. Now one out of every 50 people has cancer. I think there was not so much cancer in the past. (Furkan, Interview 9)

Furkan is not the only one who think that the increasing cancer is an outcome of unnatural food consumption. It is a common belief that deviation from the good healthy past, use of chemicals and plastic, abandoning old farming methods and dependence on processed food result in unhealthy generations and illnesses. A similar approach is that the use of chemicals is the reason for infertility of the soil. As Ahmet (51) puts it, "Man pills soil, the soil gets cancer." (Interview 3). Fatih (60), a merchant and an owner of a gas station in Çiğdemli, recalls old times when they did not use chemical fertilizers:

> Everything was good. There were no ready-made fertilizers like today, everything was organic. We used to fertilize the soil with animal manure. Now everyone uses pesticides. But pesticides kill both useful and harmful animals.

[1] A unit of land measurement commonly used in Turkey, equivalent to 1,000 square meters. Although in Çiğdemli, 1000 m² is referred to as *dönüm*, for readability in this thesis, this term will henceforth be translated as decare.

> It also harms people. In the past, we used to fertilize our gardens, vineyards and orchards with manure. We didn't plant with artificial fertilizers like we do now. (Fatih, Interview 8)

We can list some of the significant economic, demographic, and social consequences of the technological advances as such:

1. Tractors and other heavy machinery and equipment made it possible for the elderly people to keep farming. The less labor-intensive farming becomes, the longer the elderly farmers keep farming. Despite the aging population in Çiğdemli, people who could not work in the field can still farm thanks to the extensive use of machinery.
2. Since the vast use of machinery has shortened the time needed on the field, it became possible to do farming as a second job. Part-time farmers with full-time white- or blue-collar jobs are the consequence of this progress.
3. This ability to farm with less time and labor force also limits the range of production available to the elderly and part-time farmers. As many of the farmers mention, both the part-time farmers and elderly people who are old for man-handling prefer crops that are not labor-intensive.
4. Mechanization of previously labor-intensive steps of agriculture also affects the workload of seasonal workers. The amount of work requiring a seasonal workforce is diminishing over time.
5. As agricultural production becomes more capital-intensive, farmers depend more on the market for inputs, including fertilizers, plant protection products, machines, and equipment.
6. Diminishing the need for family members and traditional social networks for labor power to farm has transformed the social fabric.

What does this transformation tell us about the agricultural field in Çiğdemli in terms of agricultural capital composition? New technologies have impacted both the content and relative value of agricultural economic and social capital.

Overall, technological improvements have changed the composition of the agricultural capital to farm and increased its importance relative to the agricultural social capital. Growing the same crop now requires less labor, while new machinery and equipment

become necessary. It has four consequences in regard to the four types of agricultural capital.

First, more dependence on new technology tractors and equipment, chemical fertilizers, and plant protection products means more dependence on the market. Therefore, liquidity and cash position became crucial for most agricultural portfolios. While traditional sourcing methods such as exchange and borrowing are not feasible anymore, merchants, financial institutions, and other institutions are the only feasible options for getting funds in most cases. Today's agricultural economic capital consists of liquid assets as well as machinery and equipment; it is more fragile than before since it is bound up with the financial system in every aspect.

Since agricultural production has transitioned from a labor-intensive process to a capital-intensive one, mechanical forms of agricultural economic capital have mostly dispensed with the need for a labor force. Thus, the relative importance of agricultural social capital has been reduced. New technologies and commodification have weakened solidarity networks, and collective work as a form of agricultural social capital has fallen in importance. In other words, socially recognized informal social institutions in the name of *yamaç*, or *imece* have disappeared. While traditional forms of social capital based on cooperation among individuals, kins, relatives, and neighbors are losing their value, they seem to be replaced by professional networks and contractual relations. For instance, the level of protection social networks can offer as a safety net has reduced. The most frequently seen contractual relation that works as a safety net is, ironically, bailment contracts, which are signed to ensure the rights of farmers, not the ones of banks.

Third, new agriculture technologies trigger a profound transformation in agricultural cultural capital. On the surface level, each new technology comes with its own technical knowledge which eventually replace the technical expertise of the previous technique of farming. The traditional embodied forms of cultural capital, such as the technique of threshing with a threshing board, is replaced by the technique of using modern machinery. This particularly leads to significant qualitative differences in the embodied cultural capital possessed by different generations. While the embodied cultural capital of elderly farmers is more specialized in traditional agricultural

practices, younger farmers tend to dominate in what can be described as *technological proficiency* as their form of embodied capital. Secondly, the influence of national institutionalized cultural capital has increased within traditional agricultural operations. Knowledge produced by institutions such as universities, technology institutes, and the Ministry of Agriculture, along with the certificates and diplomas issued by these bodies, has become valuable assets within cultural capital, offering an alternative to the locally recognized and validated notion of *good farming*. Third, technological tools themselves have emerged as forms of objectified cultural capital, serving as symbolic indicators of cultural capital and distinguishing themselves in the symbolic competition within the agricultural field. At all three levels, we observe a significant shift towards a type of bureaucratic expertise in the Weberian sense which manifests itself as an anonymous, self-referential [T]echnical [T]ruth, detached from the land and local context, which is increasingly supplanting traditional agricultural [t]echnique[s].

The distribution of old and new forms of evolving cultural capital across social classes, as well as the reactions of these social classes to this transformation, serve as indicators of inter-class competition and class distinctions. These reactions are evident in debates over which agricultural techniques are most esteemed, whether technocrats and engineers truly understand agriculture, and the criteria for good farming, all of which challenge the value standards underlying cultural capital. This allows us to track the dynamics of the struggle over this transformation in cultural capital among different social classes. We will explore this topic in greater detail in subsequent sections.

### 2.3. Depletion of Water Resources

> *If the rats don't breed in March,*
> *If the rains don't stop in April,*
> *May will be a bumper harvest.*[2]

Technology is not the only factor that shapes the agricultural framework. Environmental changes also affect the agricultural field deeply. The most significant

[2]A local saying:
*Martta sıçan siymese,*
*Nisan yağıp dinmese,*
*Mayıs öğünse*

environmental change over the last few decades is the shrinking water resources. In this section, I will shortly describe the transformation of Çiğdemli from a town with plenty of water resources to somewhere constantly struggling with drought. Then I will examine the reasons behind the drought by referring to the official data, my observations, local newspapers, explanations from locals and former mayors. Next, I will describe how does the water scarcity affect the agricultural field in Çiğdemli. Lastly, I will elaborate the policies about the water problem and how it affects the local politics.

### 2.3.1. Drought, Past and Present

It seems that the town of Çiğdemli was praised for its wetlands. Durali Doğan, in his 1990 study, refers to the town as "attracting attention with its vineyards, orchards, lush green meadows and abundant flowing water to the east and west" (Doğan, 1990, p. 137). The main surface water in the region is the 'Çiğdemli Özü' 'Öz' or 'Büyük Öz', a stream flowing from north to south through Çiğdemli. Section 2.1.2., implied that the region's streams dry during June and July due to a semi-arid climate. However, the locals say that the stream has dried up most of the time in recent years. They stated that the stream used to flow all year round in the past, but now it runs only in winter.

My observations in the field also confirmed the information available. During our visit in the summer and fall of 2019, the bed of the stream was entirely dried (Figure 10).

The drought, which has attracted increasing attention in recent years, was also mentioned in a documentary about Çiğdemli filmed in 2021, where it was noted that all the streams had dried up over time (Sezen, F., 2021). The town lacks access to dam irrigation, and the only reliable water source is groundwater. Irrigation relies on groundwater wells, which can be costly and unaffordable for many.

The decline in water resources, the main source of agricultural activity, was one of the main topics of the Çiğdemli community in every interview, as a factor that made it difficult or even impossible at a certain point to play the agricultural game in every respect.



Figure 10: Stream Bed, Büyük Öz, 08/31/2019

Water scarcity is a significant concern for most interviewees. Nearly everyone who discussed droughts and water shortages agreed that Çiğdemli has lost most of its water resources over time, resulting in diminished agricultural activities due to water scarcity. According to elderly farmers, Çiğdemli used to have abundant ground and surface water. They specifically refer to Ortaçayır, a lowland situated between Duralidayılı and Gevrek, which was once known as a water meadow, flooding with streams and precipitation. (Figure 11).

> Çiğdemli was very different before. When we were kids, we used to fish in Ortaçayır. There were springs everywhere. The whole area was full of water. On this land, we used to plant beets, beans, corn, and sunflowers in the fallow areas. The fallow fields were irrigated. We'd set up irrigation ditches, and through those ditches, using small dams, everyone would water their own land. (Fatih, Interview 8)
>
> § § §
>
> In that Ortaçayır area, you couldn't access everywhere because of the water. İsmailhacılı Neighborhood, or whatever you want to call it, was the cradle of water. We referred to the cradle of water as "Zoo." The entire area of the meadow was covered with water; we couldn't enter those meadows. I don't

know how to say it in your area, but once you stepped in, you would get stuck and couldn't get out. (Oğuz, Interview 32)





Figure 11: Map of Çiğdemli and Ortaçayır

Source: Google (n.d.).

You know that mountain over there [pointing with his finger out the window in the direction of Ahmetfakılı-Araplı], 500-600 meters down there is a stream [the Araplı Stream as it is called on the map], under that opposite mountain. There was water there, never-ending water. There were arcs down there, and these villages, İsmailhacılı, Gevrek, Zeynedin, used to be irrigated. (Şeyhmus, Interview 5)

§ § §

30 years ago, we used to herd animals, I remember when we were children, there was water everywhere, we couldn't cross it. Now it has turned into a desert. There is no water for the animals. (...)These lively recollections of a marshy past contrasts with what we observe now. Today, Ortaçayır is fully arable and covered by farms. (Emrah, Interview 6)

During my visit to the Ortaçayır area mentioned by the interviewees, I observed that the area had almost completely been opened to agriculture. There were no traces of the reeds and marshes mentioned (Figure 12).

What lies behind the lack of this vital ingredient? The answer to this question helps us understand the environmental and social dynamics shaping the agricultural field in Çiğdemli.



Figure 12: Ortaçayır, 08/31/2019

According to most of the interviewees, two competing causes are identified for the decline of water in Çiğdemli: (i) decreasing precipitation rates (often referred to as drought and climate change) and (ii) extensive non-agricultural use of groundwater. Before exploring these factors, it is important to note that a thorough examination exceeds the scope of this dissertation. Our aim is twofold: (i) to determine whether the available data and alternative sources of information corroborate the interviewees' statements and (ii) if they do, to analyze how these patterns influence agricultural politics and policymaking processes at the local level.

### 2.3.2. Decrease in Average Precipitation

'Climate change' is a common term used by locals to describe the challenges they face. They also observe that snowfall, once a regular occurrence, has diminished over time, signaling a shift in climate norms. Particularly when asked about Çiğdemli's past, climatic differences are one of the first topics used to explain that the old Çiğdemli was a better place than today. Ömer, like many other farmers, compares the past with the present and notes that the amount of snowfall has steadily decreased:

> [in 1990-95] (...) There used to be snow in April. Now I don't even see snow in the second month. I plant chickpeas, February meant the peak of cold and snow. (Ömer, Interview 22)

However, it is not within the scope of this dissertation to determine whether the conditions in Çiğdemli are a direct result of climate change. Instead, our focus is limited to examining whether there has been any recent climatic trend that can be classified as 'drought.'

There is no precise and universally accepted definition of drought, making it a futile endeavor to seek one. While drought generally refers to a lack or delay of expected precipitation, its boundaries depend on the specific context in which the term is used. Drought has various conceptual and operational definitions, all of which are applied in different disciplines such as meteorology, climatology, and agriculture (Wilhite & Glantz, 1985, pp. 2-4).

High temperatures, rainfall deficiency and other factors has been posing a risk of drought in Turkey, specifically in the central and southeastern regions. The risk is significant especially in these areas because the main economic activity is agriculture (Komuscu, 1999, p. 7). It is also the case for Çiğdemli and the Sorgun district where agriculture is the main economic activity.

The long-term precipitation data of Sorgun region between 1985 and 2021 shows that there has been a gradual downtrend in annual precipitation during the last 36 years. The highest annual precipitation is 617,9 mm in 2009, while the lowest is 263,1 in 2015. The 10-year moving average (the green line) gives us a clear picture of the downtrend: The average precipitation between 1985-1994 is 472,30 mm, 1995-2004 is 467,34 mm and 2005-2014 is 404,73. The average of the last 10 years (2012- 2021) is 347,02 mm (Figure 13).

Can we measure and classify the drought years? There are a number of widely accepted indexes which uses different indicators such as precipitation, moisture and temperature to measure the severity of the drought. Here, for our limited purposes we use precipitation as indicator. It should be noted that this method will not be sufficient to make a definitive judgment on the drought in Çiğdemli. However, comparing farmers' perception of drought with the course of precipitation in recent years and showing to

what extent the perceived drought matches the available data will make it easier to reach a conclusion.





Figure 13: Annual Precipitation, Sorgun, 1985-2020

Source: Prepared by the author by using the raw data obtained from the Turkish State Meteorological Service (2021).

In order to assess the frequency and severity of drought events in the last 35 years, we apply the standardized precipitation index method (SPI) developed by T. B. McKee, N.J. Doesken, and J. Kleist (1993) and Edwards and McKee (1997). McKee and others propose a drought classification based on standardized precipitation. Standardized precipitation is "(…) the difference of precipitation from the mean for a specified time period divided by the standard deviation where the mean and standard deviation are determined from past records" (McKee, Doesken, & Kleist, 1993, p. 1) . The formula here is $SPI = \frac{x_1 - \bar{x}_1}{\sigma}$ where $x_1$ is precipitation (in our case 12-month precipitation data for a given year), $\bar{x}_1$ is the mean for a particular time scale (in our case, the 35 years from 1985 to 2020) and $\sigma$ is the standard deviation. SPI gives us a value that refers to the level of drought according to a set of categories develop by McKee and others (1993), presented in the Table 2. According to McKee and others (1993), SPI value of -1 or less is can be considered as drought but it is not a standard.

The SPI is a relatively simple drought analysis tool which requires precipitation as the only input. The ideal amount of data on which SPI can be calculated is 30 years and

more (Svoboda & Fuchs, 2016, pp. 13-14). Thus, it can be accepted as a valid index to use here.

Table 2: Drought Classification by SPI Value

| *SPI Value* | *Class* |
|---|---|
| *2.00 or more* | *Extremely wet* |
| *1.50-1.99* | *Severely wet* |
| *1.00-1.49* | *Moderately wet* |
| *0.00-0.99* | *Mildly wet* |
| *From 0 to -0.99* | *Mildly drought* |
| *From -1 to -1.49* | *Moderate drought* |
| *From -1.5 to -1.99* | *Severe drought* |
| *-2 or less* | *Extreme drought* |

Source: McKee, Doesken, & Kleist (1993).

When we apply the formula to the 35-year period on 12-month basis, we get the following SPI values for Sorgun in Figure 14:





Figure 14: 12-Month SPI for Sorgun Station

Source: Prepared by the author by using the raw data obtained from the Turkish State Meteorological Service (2021).

The first important information the Figure 14 gives us is that years with negative SPI values outnumbers the positive ones by 20 to 15. While there are total of 5 moderately wet or higher bars when the SPI is more than 0,1; there are 6 years with moderate

drought or worse. It is also visible on the chart that drought years are concentrated in the last decade which indicates that there is a wave of drought in the recent period.

Just as the local proverb at the beginning of the chapter suggests, getting enough precipitation during April and May is crucial for the wheat yield. If we apply SPI by taking the 2-month (April and May) precipitation as our analysis unit, we get a result similar to the 12-month SPI. According to the Figure 15, Sorgun region have had drought springs between 2002 and 2020 except for two years (2012 and 2015):





Figure 15: April-May SPI for Sorgun Station

Source: Prepared by the author by using the raw data obtained from the Turkish State Meteorological Service (2021).

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Çiğdemli struggles with lower yields, increasing number of droughts and water scarce. The decline in precipitation also perfectly matches with the farmers' experiences based on their life-time observations. Thus, the decreasing annual precipitation amounts seem to be a major contributor to the water scarcity. However, our examination shows that it is not the only source of the water problem in Çiğdemli.

### 2.3.3. Groundwater Overuse

Dry spells observed within decade-short periods are not necessarily reliable explanations of groundwater shortages. What we see in Çiğdemli is also a "hydrologic

drought" which is about "(…) the effects of dry spells on surface or subsurface hydrology, rather than with the meteorological explanation of the event" (Wilhite & Glantz, 1985, p. 7).

Many of the interviewees stated that Ortaçayır dried up because of the groundwater wells. I had the chance to observe some of the well houses during my visit to Ortaçayır region (Figure 16).



Figure 16: Groundwater Well, Ortaçayır, 08/31/2019

There are numerous groundwater wells in Ortaçayır, carrying the water through pipelines to Sorgun, as drinking-water. Exact number of the wells is not known, but according to interviewees and the previous mayor's statements, there are approximately 15 to 20 wells located in the area. According to the newspapers and online websites, during the last decade, Sorgun's water problem has been solved again and again by opening new wells in Ortaçayır: two wells were drilled in 2011, another three were drilled in 2015, and new wells have also drilled in 2018. Even today, Sorgun Municipality still keeps drilling the nearby locations to solve Sorgun's drinking water problem; and each time Sorgun's water shortage is solved *again*:

İleri Gazetesi: *"Sorgun's Water Shortage Eliminated"* (2011), Memurlar.net: *"Sorgun District will not face water shortage"* (2012), Hürriyet: *"The number of water subscribers in Sorgun exceeded 21 thousand as of the end of 2015"* (2016), Municipality of Sorgun: *"City water was reinforced in Sorgun"* (2018), HaberTürk: *"Water Problem Solved in Sorgun"* (2021).

### 2.3.4. Consequences of Water Scarcity

The decrease in the water resources has had numerous negative impacts on the agricultural field. Vegetables, fruits and certain crop types that depends heavily on flood water has decreased. Secondly, animal feeding has dramatically reduced. Since water scarcity is not the only reason behind the fall of agricultural production, it has added up to the other factors including agening, economic factors and agricultural policies.

The stream "Öz" was used to irrigate orchards and gardens. Flood irrigation was an available option for growing vegetables. Vetch, clover, all sorts of fruits and vegetables were grown by using flood water. Thus, the death of the stream hit the gardens and orchards.

> In the past, we used to plant gardens on the left and right sides of the village. We used to plant orchards and that water used to pass through Çiğdemli and go to Burunören. Beans were planted there too. People used to plant beets, there were wells everywhere. Now it flows for 6-7 months. It is finished. (Yunus, Interview 29)

§ § §

> In the past, these used to be clover, meadows, vineyards, gardens; there were always poplars and meadows on the edges. The fruit and vegetable fields here were flooded. Vetch, fruit and vegetables were planted. Now there is none. (Rıza, Interview 16)

After the stream mostly dried up, the flood water has been replaced by groundwater wells. The increased and monetized irrigation costs have restricted growth of those plants.

> We used to water this place with keel water, now I water it with a probe. It's a garden, we plant vegetables. In the past, 25-30 years ago, we always used to irrigate with keel water. Water used to flow here, water from Ortaçayır. We used to plant beans 25 years ago. (Zafer, Interview 31)

Production lost due to water scarcity is not limited to garden plants. Sugar beet production – a high value plant that was used to be widely grown, also went down. Overall, water shortage has narrowed the range of agricultural products available in the region.

> Wheat, barley... They used to plant a lot of beets. There used to be a beet competition, the villagers would compete with their beets. Now there are no beets, what are you going to compete for? In the past there used to be such a beet that it would be the size of a cube. (Kerem, Interview 14)

§ § §

> The biggest problem is water. We lack water. When there is no water, life dries up. The farmer cannot plant anything different because there is no water. When you say agriculture in Çiğdemli, there are two things, cereals, chickpeas, let's add lentils, three things. They don't do anything different. There used to be beetroot, that's over too. (...) This land was completely irrigated from the bottom of our village to this side. These days, it used to smell of tomatoes. Now they have uprooted them all, they have all become wheat. (Yaşar, Interview 28)

The drought of the surface water accelerated the monetization of the water. After flood irrigation is replaced by ground wells, it added to the cost of sugar beet farming. It is not just the cost of water itself, but also the price of diesel and electricity needed by the engines to extract water. Oğuz (39) puts it as follows:

> In the past, we used to irrigate beets with stream water, that is, with flood irrigation, without paying anything. Now it is irrigated with a probe, people pay for the water. No one irrigates beets with flood irrigation now. This also contributed to the decrease in beets. The cost of beets increased when we spent money on water. (Oğuz, Interview 32)

The variable costs of water extraction add up to the total cost, which decreases the profits:

> My electricity cost in beetroot is about 10 thousand liras a year, but if I did it with diesel, I would spend 30 thousand liras. Plus, the water engine doesn't last on diesel either. It breaks down after a while. If you run it with electricity, your cost is standard whether the well is close or far away, but if you use diesel, the cost increases as the distance increases and the depth increases. (Emrah, Interview 6)

The variable water and energy costs are not the only obstacles before production. These costs come after opening the well. Sugar beet is a crop that requires a fixed investment -the ground well itself - not everybody can afford. Although there is a

transition in sugar-beet areas from furrow and sprinkler irrigation to drip irrigation systems due to its high profitability (Albayrak, Güneş, & Gülçubuk, 2010), I have encountered no one who has initiated such an investment in Çiğdemli. As one of the few a high value – high return crops in the region, sugar beet is available to a limited range of farmers who have either the necessary infrastructure ready to use or the financial resources to invest in:

> One well cost about 20,000. A branch of the Kızılırmak river passes through here. There is water at 75 meters, water we can irrigate beets. Around here, there is plenty of water at 7-8 meters. An 8-meter well can run 22 fountains very easily. Those 75 meters are the upper part of the village, on the high side, the beet field. (Adem, Interview 2)

Another big impact of the depletion of the ground water has been on livestock farming.





Figure 17: Number of Livestock, Sorgun, 2004-2020

Source: Prepared by the author by using data from Turkish Statistical Institute (2021b)

The number of animals in Sorgun, which was 63,101 in 2005, reached its recent peak at 87,250 in 2005. However, it declined steadily afterward, dropping to 50,706 by 2009. Following this, the number started to rise again, reaching 73,602 by 2020 (Figure 17).

On the other hand, as seen in Figure 18, the number of buffaloes in Sorgun was quite negligible and almost reached zero between 2010 and 2013. However, it rapidly

increased afterward, peaking at 137 in 2017 before declining and being recorded at 94 in 2020.





Figure 18: Number of Water Buffalos, Sorgun, 2004-2020

Source: Prepared by the author by using data from Turkish Statistical Institute (2021b)

When we speak of the Çiğdemli scale, we will mostly depend on what interviewers say due to the lack of data at this level. Today, the number of cattle in Çigdemli is approximately 100 per village (neighborhood) despite the few water buffalos in the region.

> 30 years ago, we used to herd animals, I remember when we were children, there was water everywhere, we couldn't cross it. Now it has turned into a desert. There is no water for the animals. (Emrah, Interview 6)

§ § §

> At that time there were plateaus here. What I mean by plateau is that four or five herds of cattle used to come out, there was livestock farming, big cattle, small cattle. We also had plenty of water, now we have scarce water. Since Sorgun's drinking water goes from here, we have no streams. (Süleyman, Interview 26)

According to the interviewers, the grazing season has shortened as the water supply has been depleted, and the cost of animal feeding has increased over time:

> Running out of water has affected this place very badly. It also finished the livestock. We have animals in our village. We used to graze animals until the

> eleventh and twelfth months. Now there is no pasture left. In the past, they used to spread the livestock until the twelfth month, but now we have to pull the livestock in the seventh, eighth, ninth month. It's all because of the water. (Tacettin, Interview 32)

The depletion of ground water is followed by the conversion of most pasturelands into farms, leaving little area for grazing. Just like the water itself has become a commodity, the pasture, a byproduct of the water, is mostly replaced by feedstuff sold in the market, adding to the feed cost.

> In the past, we used to have 3-4 water buffalos in every house, everyone had them. Now only a few houses have them. It has been 30 years since we quit livestock farming. There is no more pasture for the animals, everything has been cultivated (Emre, Interview 7)
>
> § § §
>
> There used to be a lot of water in Ortaçayır. There is very little livestock farming here now. There used to be thousands of animals. Everyone had all kinds of animals at home. There used to be both cattle and sheep in a house. There used to be cattle. There were also water buffaloes back then. Now there is not even one here. (Furkan, Interview 9)
>
> § § §
>
> We have no livestock left. I herded many animals in my childhood. There were pastures then, now there are no pastures left. (Altan, Interview 3)

Loss of pasture is also related to the loss of fallow lands. While farmers used to lay half of their lands fallow under a two-field rotation system, they have begun to farm both fields yearly without laying fallow in recent years.

> It's hard work. There is no place to spread the animal. We call it *Öz*, there is a stream there, it used to flow 365 days a year. It used to flow with a flow rate of 0.5. Now when summer comes, it dries up in the sixth or seventh month. If you have a well, you draw water. In the past, one side of the field was cultivated and one side was fallow. Now, because of lentils and chickpeas, when the fallow is over, there is no place to spread the animals. (Hüseyin, Interview 11)

Among the livestock, water buffalo used to be important. Most of the interviewees who touch upon this topic mention that households used to feed 3-4 water buffalos, but they are all gone due to the lack of marsh. During the field study, I did not find anyone who feeds water buffalo in any of the villages around Çiğdemli.

> Now, there are no buffalo in our village. Why? Because there's no water. In the past, every household had buffalo; we used to have four or five buffalo in each home. (Yaşar, Interview 8)
>
> § § §
>
> (...) There used to be water buffalo in every house. Now it is over. Also, people don't care about livestock farming like they used to. There is no more pasture either. When everything was cultivated, pasture ended. Treasury lands and pastures are always plowed and cultivated. (...) Livestock was quite a lot in the 80s. At that time, when they came out of the houses, there would be 100-200 water buffaloes. Now two people have cattle here in the center. (Şeyhmus, Interview 5)
>
> § § §
>
> That whole area used to be a meadow. Back then, there was plenty of feed for the animals, and they spread out a lot. Now, it's all gone. In the past, every household had three or four water buffalo. But now, without water, there are no buffalo left. (Ibrahim, Interview 12)

Water, one of agriculture's most important ingredients, sets a formidable barrier around the agricultural field in Çiğdemli. There are two overlapping processes concerning the water resources. First, the water scarcity itself has had direct effects on agricultural production. It has narrowed the range of the agricultural products available to the community and reduced the total agricultural production. We have already summarized those consequences above. It does not only affect the actual state of the agricultural field but also its future. The collective memory of Çiğdemli is stigmatized with the fact that water resources of Çiğdemli is running short. Interviews indicate that it affects most farmers' long-term strategies and decisions. The agricultural field cannot be understood without acknowledging that.

Secondly, water has stopped being a collectively owned economic capital and turned into a commodity, a scarce resource that farmers need to consider as a cost item in every step of agricultural production. Agricultural use of the water is contested by other needs, such as industrial and drinking purposes. We observe both cases in Çiğdemli; the groundwater is being used not only in agricultural production but also by the nearby urban area for drinking water and by the sugar beet factory. It makes the groundwater subject to the politics of distribution and redistribution of scarce resources. Deciding where to channel this scarce resource and how to distribute it among different communities, sectors, and social classes is a means of power. So, the

water problem has become a permanent part of the political realm, political discourse, and policy-making process.

### 2.3.5. Water Policy/ Politics of Water

The drought is a highly politicized subject that reflects both the dispute over the municipality and the rivalry among the villages.

When I asked about the water problem, the interviewers pointed out the factors we mentioned. According to most of the interviewees in Çiğdemli, the main reason for water scarcity is that the groundwater of Ortaçayır is being transferred to Sorgun and the Sugar Factory. Although some interviewees added that climate change and snow shortages also play a role, the main focus was on the ground wells of Sorgun.

There is almost a consensus among interviewees in Çiğdemli that the water scarcity occurred because Sorgun is using the groundwater of Ortaçayır. Although some people also refer to the sugar factory as another reason, the majority still emphasize the role of Sorgun:

> The reason why the sap dried up is that the main source of water came from a place called Ortaçay. The waters of the mountains would merge there and flow through our village. In the summer it was cut off again, but it was flowing fine. Now it is completely cut off. Because the source where the water was collected went to Sorgun as drinking water. That's why. Drinking water wells completely took the surface water here. After those wells, the water here decreased. (Umut, Interview 21)
>
> § § §
>
> (...) I think the reason why the water is running out is not because of the beet but because Sorgun's drinking water is supplied from there. Although the sugar factory's water also comes from above. But there is a pond over there, there was a stream running through Sorgun, they drained the water of the stream into the pond with a machine. They also draw water for the factory from that pond. (Oğuz, Interview 32)
>
> § § §
>
> Çiğdemli has no future, teacher. They stole our underground water. The water goes to Sorgun. My own water was flowing more or less. Our underground water started to dry up because of the drilling up there. (Hasan, Interview 10)

The mayor preceding Halil, Rıza, gave a detailed explanation of the case. According to him, just a few of the wells are belong to the sugar factory, the rest pumps water to

Sorgun. Ortaçayır water transfer is based on an agreement between the village of Duralidayılı and the Municipality of Sorgun. According to the agreement, in return for sharing the ground water, the village would use the drinking water without any charge. Rıza implied that the agreement was done just before the general elections of 1984. It was also before Burunören and İsmailhacılı joined Çiğdemli.

Municipality of Sorgun has no right or legal authority to take the ground water of Ortaçayır, unless the permission is given by the beneficiary party. So the agreement between the Duralidayılı and Sorgun Municipality is considered as an appropriation of a common property/ public resource and to transfer to an urban area. This, for many dwellers of Çiğdemli, is a political decision that takes away their right to access water. İbrahim, for instance, puts the blame on the previous mayor for making the decision to transfer water to Sorgun:

> Ortaçayır is the place I said the drilling was done. Our municipality looted that water. It was within the borders of our municipality, but they gave our water to Sorgun. It happened during the time of the former mayor. They gave it for politics. (İbrahim, Interview 12)

Another farmer, Kerem, directly accuses Duralidayılı of selling out their water to Sorgun and to the Factory for *free water*:

> They wasted a lot of water. They drilled 20 wells in Ortaçayır and brought water from Ortaçayır to Sorgun. In Gevrek, Zeynedin, İsmailhacılı, Duralidayılı, the field owners sold their water... Now look, Duralidayılı drinks water for free. They don't pay for water. They always sold the water. They also sold it to the factory. They were going to build a dam on the Boğazlı side of Gevrek, I don't know what happened. (Kerem, Interview 14)

Former Mayor Halil, said that the transfer of the water started before his term:

> Water has been supplied to Sorgun since the late 1970s, and Sorgun's water has been coming from our region since the 80s. As I always say, when I do something, I look in the mirror, I don't speak before I know something. There are fountains on every street in Çiğdemli, plus the municipality has a water network. The water from the fountains is always wasted, it goes into the sewer. They are doing a perception operation as if someone else caused the damage we caused to ourselves. That water was not given in my time. (Halil, Interview 33)

For the people of Çiğdemli, the water shortage is a direct consequence of the transfer of the underground water to Sorgun. In most cases, the undertone is accusing the villages near Ortaçayır of greed and selfishness. Former mayors' explanations are also defensive in the sense that they do not want to take responsibility for the groundwater wells, which is simply a bad policy with a disastrous consequence for the town.

However, the almost consensus over the reason for water scarcity suddenly disappears when it comes to Duralidayılı. The Mukhtar of Duralidayılı, Raşit, in his long and detailed response to the question, does not see the well drilling as the real problem and points to climate change:

> Interviewer: I want to ask you about the water issue. I heard that there used to be a lot of water, but because of the wells that were drilled, it has decreased. Is this true?
>
> Raşit: Let me explain it to you. The thing is, I am a person who works with spring water. My children are diggers, they have been doing this work here for 30 years. They can look and say there is water here, there is water there, that's how much they know. Now let me tell you my opinion, whoever wants to agree or disagree. I don't attribute it to the well, I don't attribute it to anything. I attribute it to the climate. It happened because of climate change.
>
> Sertaç: Exactly, brother, it doesn't snow anymore.
>
> Raşit: My village is Gevrek. I am 64 years old. Now, we used to graze animals, in May the snow would turn to ice, we would put that snow in our ration bags and take it with us and come to the village in May. Then we used to call it sap, also known as tea, Zeynedin sap, Gevrek sap, where water would flow until the seventh month. (...) I mean, this depends on the climatic conditions. Otherwise, only the place with a well would run out of water. However, water ran out everywhere. Let's say the wells drained Gevrek's land, but [he points to a place with his hand] who drained the water there? Did they all run out of water? The area with the well is our land. So, let's say the wells drained Gevrek's water, who drained these areas? (Interview 17)

Water scarcity was discussed when we were in a gas station near Burunören Village. The Mukhtar of Burunören, Ramazan, does not even believe that there is a water problem:

> Ramazan: (...) Duralidayılı, İsmailhacılı, Çiğdemli, our village Burunören, Osmaniye, Miravur... These are all in a bed, in a hollow area. Once they came from the MTA to search for coal, they did a search, they told us, "There is an excessive amount of water under the ground". I had a probe for my field, and I had 20 fountains of water at 8.5 meters. So there is not much decrease in the water.

> Kemal: [objecting] But recently there has been a decrease...
>
> Ramazan: Ha, recently, yes, there has been a little decrease. But what kind of a decrease, let's say if I have 20 fountains of water, it drops to 15 in the fall. Like this, I mean... There are no rivers here anyway. There is a stream, it continues from here and goes to Gelingüllü Pond. It flows for one or two months of the year, let's say three months. But it doesn't flow for three months... Other than that, that stream has always dried up. Now we are trying to think of a solution. The state thinks of dams and ponds everywhere, but we don't have one here. Actually, if there was a pond here to hold the water... (Interview 23)

Another farmer from Duralidayılı, Yunus, who happens to be a cousin of the Mukhtar, considers the agreement as a well-done deal:

> Our mukhtar was my uncle's son. During his time, they came to take water to Sorgun. He told the men, “You are taking the water from our village. This is our property, if you are going to take this water, you will bring it to us, you will give it to us for free.” In other words, he says, “We don't pay for water.” The villagers don't pay for water. I think he did well. (Yunus, Interview 29)

Interestingly, as seen earlier, the agreement with the Afghan shepherd in the village was that the shepherd would pay for the electricity, and the village would pay for the water. In the interview with the shepherd, it is doubtful whether the shepherd knew that the water was already being used free of charge.

The drought issue is asked of Ahmet Sungur, the mayor-in-office, on a local TV program (Sungur, 06.07.2021, Yozgat TV). He states that Sorgun is using Çiğdemli’s water resources, and they are planning to open new water wells to avoid potential water cuts in the future:

> Çiğdemli has had its share of this drought... From an outside perspective, Çiğdemli is the source of water. There is no source of water. It is about how you use the water... Unfortunately, we have to learn this. As you know, Sorgun takes our main water. We do not have a problem with drinking water at the moment. However, we have problems in our underground resources due to the low rainfall and the increasing tendency towards irrigated agriculture. So we started a study last year. We don't need it today, but if we need it tomorrow, where can we get it from? We found water sources in one or two places, so we don't know what will happen five years from now, next year. Çiğdem has no need today, but it may happen tomorrow. We have started a study to take our precautions and draw our projects. We found 1-2 sources and focused on them (...) (Sungur, 06.07.2021, Yozgat TV)

As we see from the explanations coming from the Mukhtar of Duralidayılı and two previous mayors of Çiğdemli, the political bodies of the local communities tend to maximize the output they get from water resources. Water, as an economic capital in the form of public property, has been subjected to political competition among Çiğdemli, Sorgun, and nearby villages. Even though during the interviews, I asked about the water problem as a matter of agricultural policy/water management issue with no underlying political tone, answers quickly turned political. Channeling more public property or getting more benefits is key to political success. In this case, using water resources to satisfy the needs of urban Sorgun siphons off a vital agricultural economic capital away from the agricultural field of Çiğdemli and the nearby villages. Duralidayılı and some other villages seem to get at least some political and economic returns by selling the right to have access to underground waters. However, Çiğdemli is the loser of this political competition. While Sorgun is solving (or postponing) its water scarcity in the easiest way possible, an agricultural field in Çiğdemli needs a huge investment in an irrigation dam project to address its water problem. So, the scope of this problem now goes beyond the local agricultural field, calling for a government intervention. Any politician who manages to channel public resources to Çiğdemli to address this problem could gain immense political power.

### 2.4. Demographic Transition

There are two major demographic trends in Çiğdemli: (i) an aging population and (ii) rural-urban migration. In terms of demographic tendencies, Çiğdemli is not unique. Çiğdemli, Sorgun, Yozgat, and Turkey can be seen as parts of a matryoshka doll, each reflecting some characteristics of the larger one—to some extent. However, they are not identical. To understand what is specific to Çiğdemli and to what extent it diverges from general trends, I will make comparisons across different scales.

In this context, after examining the trends observed under headings such as migration and aging, we will focus on how they affect the agricultural field in Çiğdemli. As these factors also interact with each other, throughout the rest of the dissertation we will need to repeatedly refer to the multifaceted and combined effects of demographic trends on agricultural game.

### 2.4.1. Migration to Urban Areas

*"The donkey doesn't run away from a warm stable."*[3]

We had focused on migration as the movement of labor between the agricultural and industrial sectors. Here, we will limit ourselves to a broad overview of the literature on migration. Migration can be defined as "(…) a permanent or semipermanent change of residence" (Lee E. , 1966, p. 49). Migration emerged as a distinct subject of study, particularly with the works of Ravenstein (1885; 1889) at the end of the 19th century (de Haas, 2008). By examining migration movements in the United Kingdom, in his 1885 paper, Ravenstein introduced *migration laws*, revealing that rapidly growing centers act as attractions for the surrounding population, and that in long-distance migrations, migrants preferably move to the country's major trade and industry centers (Ravenstein, 1885, pp. 198-199).

Various schools of thought have developed different theoretical approaches to migration. The push-pull school examines migration at the micro level, focusing on the push and pull factors affecting migrants (Ravenstein, 1885; Lee, 1966). The segmented labor-market theory explains migration based on the internal dynamics of labor markets, urban-rural income differential and urban job opportunities in modern industrial economies (Lewis, 1954; Todaro, 1969; Douglas, 2015). Both push-pull theories and dual sector theories conceptualize migration on the basis of "a certain spatial-economic equilibrium" (de Haas, 2008, p.4). This perspective is similarly reflected in neoclassical economic studies, which analyze migration through the geographic differentiation of labor supply and demand. The neoclassical economic framework, which interprets migration in terms of equilibrium and disequilibrium between labor supply and demand, is also evident in the developmental studies' approach to migration (Rostow, 1960). The dependency school (Gunder Frank, 1966; Wallerstein, 1974; 1980) analyzes migration in the context of core-periphery relationships (Castles & Miller, 2003). Marxist theories consider migration within a historical-materialist framework, using concepts like the labor theory of value, the inverse relationship between profit and wages in the capitalist mode of production, and the reserve army of labor (Vogel, 2013). It should be noted that a comprehensive

[3] A local proverb: *Sıcak ahırdan eşek kaçmaz.*

review of all migration literature is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, as we explore the dynamics between rural and urban areas, we will primarily reference push-pull theory while presenting our observations in Çiğdemli within our main theoretical framework.

A detailed examination of the extensive literature on migration is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, an overview of the push-pull factors influencing migration through the lens of Lee's (1966) approach will be appropriate and sufficient for the objectives of our study. Lee (1966) has also formulated certain universal laws concerning migration and migrants. According to him, the volume of migration within a specific territory is influenced by the diversity of the areas encompassed within that territory. Additionally, the migration volume fluctuates with the heterogeneity of the population. The extent of migration is also connected to the challenges posed by intervening obstacles. Economic fluctuations further impact migration volume. In the absence of significant restrictions, both the volume and rate of migration generally tend to increase over time (1966, pp. 52-54). Migration is selective, meaning migrants are not a random sample of the population at origin. People respond differently to factors at both origin and destination, possess varying abilities to overcome obstacles, and differ in personal characteristics, leading to positive or negative selection in different streams. Migrants drawn by positive factors at the destination are typically well-situated individuals seeking better opportunities, while those pushed by negative factors at the origin tend to be less advantaged. Selection among migrants tends to be bimodal, with a mix of positively and negatively selected individuals, resulting in a J-shaped or U-shaped distribution of characteristics. The degree of positive selection increases with the difficulty of overcoming intervening obstacles. Migration propensity also varies with life cycle stages, influencing selection based on age, marital status, or family size. Migrants often exhibit characteristics intermediate between those at the origin and destination, reflecting their adaptation to new environments while retaining some traits from their origins. This intermediate nature can paradoxically lower population quality at both origin and destination (1966, pp. 54-57).

There is a sharp opposition between Turkey’s growing urban population and rapidly decreasing rural population. The chart below clearly shows that despite the steady

population growth in the last 5 decades, rural population of the country felt down from 20.585.604 in 1965 to 6.003.717 in 2019 (Figure 19).





Figure 19: Population of Turkey, 1965-2019

Source: Prepared by the author by using data from Turkish Statistical Institute (2020a, 2020b).

Despite the overall population growth, not all the districts follow the same line. Districts with low population density, low levels of urbanization and more rural settlements have lost their population. Similarly, population of Yozgat has been decreasing for decades. Data provided by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TSI) indicates that from 2000 onwards, Yozgat has lost 22% of its population (Figure 20).





Figure 20: Population of Yozgat, 2000-2018

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2022). 2000-2006 period was estimated by Turkish Statistical Institute based on Address Based Population Registration System (ABPRS) results.

When we look at the population distribution between villages and cities, the chart below, clearly reveals that, between 1965 and 2000 the total population of villages in Yozgat decreased in proportion to urban population; and since the year 2000, it has been followed by a net population loss (Figure 21).





Figure 21: Rural and Urban Population of Yozgat, 1965-2019

Source: Prepared by the author by using data from Turkish Statistical Institute (2020a, 2020b).

The population loss seems to be driven by the net out-migration. The data derived from TSI clearly shows that between 1975 and 2017, out-migration exceeds in-migration. Yozgat has a negative net migration since 1975, except the year 2018. Despite the positive net migration in 2018, it is still early to predict that there is a permanent shift in net migration from negative to positive (Figure 22).

Social surveys continue to indicate a strong propensity for migration in the region (Central Anatolia Development Agency, n.d.). A community profile based on field surveys conducted by the Central Anatolia Development Agency in 2016 shows that nearly half of Yozgat's population tends to migrate. According to the survey, 27.8% of participants answered "Yes" to the question, "Do you plan to migrate elsewhere?" However, when asked, "Would you like to migrate if given the opportunity?" the

percentage of affirmative responses rose to 47.9% (Central Anatolia Development Agency, 2016, pp. 24-25).





Figure 22: Migration to and from Yozgat, and Net Migration, 1975-2018

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2020a; 2020b). Foreigners residing within the country's borders are included in the data for the periods 1975-1980, 1980-1985, 1985-1990, 1995-2000, and 2017-2018. For the data between 2007 and 2017, foreigners residing within the country's borders are not included.

In response to the question, "Do you think there is a promising future for you and your children here?" 60.4% answered "No." When we break down the responses by occupation, the results for farmers are surprising. Among farmers, only 18.2% indicated that they are actually planning to migrate, while 53.5% said they would like to migrate if given the opportunity. In other words, compared to all participants, the number of farmers actively planning to migrate is below average, but the number of farmers who wish to migrate is above average. Additionally, 78.6% of farmers stated that they do not see a promising future for themselves or their children in Yozgat, significantly higher than the overall average of 60.4% (Central Anatolia Development Agency, 2016, pp. 59-62). These figures suggest that while the majority of farmers desire to migrate, they lack the opportunity to do so.

Although a similar tendency is observable in Çiğdemli, there are also important deviations from Yozgat in some aspects. Interpretation of the population statistics of Çiğdemli requires more effort than it would normally take because of two reasons. The first one is that the administrative boundaries of the town have expanded. In 2005, three villages have joined Çiğdemli, therefore we need to take the additional population they brought in into account. Secondly, the date of this merge also overlaps the change in the method of population census. Between 1927 and 2000 (including 2000) 14 general population censuses were carried in Turkey. However, starting from 2007, population numbers have been annually derived from the Address Based Population Registration System by Turkish Statistical Institute. For these reasons we need to distinguish the two period (pre-2007 and after 2007) to properly analyze Çiğdemli's population.

The Figure 23 demonstrates the populations of Çiğdemli, and the villages of Burunören, Duralidayılı and İsmailhacılı based on the general population censuses provided by Turkish Statistical Institute.





Figure 23: Population of Çiğdemli 1965-2000

Source: Prepared by the author by using the data obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2020b).

The Figure 23 shows that there is no significant uptrend from 1965 to 1985 for any of the settlements. However, we witness a sharp rise in 1990 and 2000, specifically in the population of Çiğdemli. It seems that between 1985 and 1990 the population of the town more than doubled. It is followed by another 45% increase between 1990 and 2000. This is a striking deviation not only from the previous censuses, and what we will see between 2007-2019 period. This not a tendency peculiar to Çiğdemli; other districts of Yozgat have a similar positive trend between 1990-2000, and a negative trend beginning from 2007 (ORAN:10). Yet we need to apply to the findings of our field study in order to unveil the reason behind it. Briefly, it is possible that the population estimates of 1990 and 2000 could be based on overstatements and therefore misleading. We will come back to this topic after examining the population between 2007- 2018.





Figure 24: Population of Çiğdemli 2007-2018

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2020b).

The population of Çiğdemli between 2007-2019 is the combined population of the central Çiğdemli and the newly joined neighborhoods of Duralidayılı, displayed in the Figure 24. Burunören and İsmailhacılı. The first result of the address-based population registration system belongs to 2007, 7 years after the last census conducted in 2000. From 2000 to 2007, Çiğdemli seems to have lost almost two-thirds of its population,

dropping from 6,891 to 2,943. Following that year, the population sets to fall gradually. Except 2008, 2009 and 2018, population keeps moving downwards.

We previously noted that there is an Alevi population in Çiğdemli, whose numbers have decreased over time. It appears that migration has been a significant factor in this decline. Field research indicates that Alevis, particularly since the 1990s, have migrated extensively to large cities, especially Ankara. Although there have been tensions and incidents in the town's history that exerted pressure on the Alevi population, it is understood that the wave of migration post-1990 primarily followed general migration dynamics, with economic reasons being the main drivers.

The migration of Alevis from rural to urban areas in Turkey accelerated in the 1960s. Following the attempted Alevi massacres in Malatya and Maraş in 1978, and in Çorum in 1980, combined with the reduced impact of the military coup on human mobility starting in the mid-1980s, a new wave of Alevi migration occurred from the late 1980s to the end of the 1990s. This wave included movements from rural areas to cities, from smaller to larger settlements, and to Europe. While general migration dynamics were at play, the political dimension of this migration should not be overlooked (Salman). Interviews conducted during fieldwork reveal that Çiğdemli has a mixed Alevi-Sunni population, but the number of Alevis has decreased significantly due to migration to Ankara. This shift likely led to notable changes in Çiğdemli's political structure, as we will explore further.

### 2.4.2. Ageing

G20 countries is facing an ongoing demographic change. Common characteristics are slowing fertility and increasing life expectancy. This process is called “demographic transition” (Bloom & Williamson, p. 422). Although countries change along the same lines, they are not with the same speed and in the same phase. According to IMF, there are three stages of demographic transition. The late-stage group includes most of the developed countries such as United States, Canada and Germany. Working age population is declining in these countries. Some countries including Turkey, Argentina and Brazil are called “advanced stage demographic transition group”. These countries have had an expanding working age population until recent years but this peak is or

about to over. They are now about to transition to the late stage. The last group is "the early-stage demographic transition group". This group contains developing countries such as South Africa, India and Indonesia with relatively high fertility rates and high share of working age population which is expected to peak (International Monetary Fund, 2019, p. 5).

As we can see in the Figure 25, Turkey has an ageing population. In the last decade, the population of 0-14 has decreased from 26% to 23.1%; the population of 65+ has risen up from 7% to 9.1% of the total population.





Figure 25: Turkey's Population by Age Groups 1935-2019

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2022).

Dependency ratios are another indicator of demographic structure in a given population. The old age dependency ratio, is the ratio of people older than 64 to the working-age population between 15-64, while the young age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents younger than 15 to the working-age population. The IMF notes that the G20 countries, including Turkey, are on the brink of a major demographic transformation and that the old age dependency ratio is increasing rapidly in these countries (International Monetary Fund, 2019, p. 6). Looking at Figure 26 with data for Turkey, we can see that the youth dependency ratio is decreasing due to factors like the declining birth rate, while the old-age dependency ratio is rising. As a result, recently the total dependency ratio, which combines both, is approximately 34%.





Figure 26: Dependency Ratios of Turkey, 1935-2019

Source: The World Bank (n.d.).

At the provincial and sub-provincial levels, we observe similar demographic trends. However, notable differences emerge between urban and rural areas. Therefore, when we examine these regions more closely at the province and district levels, we will also highlight the variations in age distribution across these scales.

Pyramid structures are powerful tools for demographic analysis. There are three major types: expansive, constrictive, and stationary, each reflecting distinct population conditions. An expansive pyramid, characterized by a broad base, represents a larger young population and fewer older individuals. This structure is typical of developing countries with high birth rates, high fertility rates, and low life expectancy. As birth rates decline, the pyramid takes on a constrictive shape, resembling a beehive, which indicates a growing elderly population and a shrinking younger generation. This pattern is more common in countries with higher levels of social and economic development. A stationary pyramid displays a population relatively evenly distributed across age groups and is typically found in developed countries with low, stable birth rates and high living standards (Richmond, 2002, pp. 64-65).

When examining the general censuses from 1985 and 2000, we see that Çiğdemli had an expansive pyramid in both years. Figures 27 and 28 depict a population with a large number of young people and progressively fewer people in older age groups. However, significant changes seem to have occurred over the 15 years. In 1985, the number of

adult males was relatively low compared to females (Figure 27), possibly due to out-migration for work. By 2000, Çiğdemli had a higher percentage of middle-aged individuals compared to 1985, with a more evenly distributed population by gender (Figure 28).





Figure 27: Population Pyramids for Çiğdemli, 1985

Source: Prepared by the author using the data obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2020b).





Figure 28: Population Pyramids for Çiğdemli, 2000

Source: Prepared by the author using the data obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2020b).

Unfortunately, we cannot trace the latest situation of the age structure of Çiğdemli since Address Based Population Registration System does not provide information on population size of town municipalities by age groups. Therefore, it is not possible to produce population pyramids of Çiğdemli after the year 2000. However, population pyramids are available on district-level and structures of urban and rural population pyramids of Sorgun provide clues to estimate the latest picture of Çiğdemli's population (Figure 29 and 30).





Figure 29: Population Pyramid for Urban Sorgun, 2019

Source: Prepared by the author using the data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2020a).

Sorgun district center reflects a population switching from an expansive pyramid to a constrictive pyramid. Bottom lines of the graphic have fluctuations reflecting a decrease in birth rate. Age groups between 0-44 are roughly similar, and it tapers in by the age group 40-44 (Figure 29).

The Figure 30 which shows the population structure of Sorgun's villages is totally different than the district center in Figure 29. Population pyramid of the rural Sorgun is thin at the bottom and fat at the top, and the mid-age bars are relatively shorter than

both old-age and young-age groups. It is a clear indicative of a community with relatively high fertility, extended longevity and constantly out-migrating working-age population.





Figure 30: Population Pyramid for Villages of Sorgun, 2019

Source: Prepared by the author using the data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2020a). Urban population contains the population within the boundaries of Sorgun district center, while villages of Sorgun includes the population of the places (towns and villages) outside the Sorgun district center.

As seen in Figure 31, the dependency ratio for Sorgun district center is 53.02 % by 2019 which is significantly higher than the country's average. What is more, it appears that there is a striking difference between dependency ratios in urban area (the district center of Sorgun) and the rural area (villages and towns) (Figure 32).

Just as the district center, in rural Sorgun the decrease in young-age population rate is offset by the increase in the aged population during the last decade, leading to a steady total dependency rate floating around 60%. However, the total dependency rate in rural areas stay still much higher than urban; in 2019 total dependency ratio is 53.02% in the district center, and 61.23% in rural areas (TSI). The main reason behind this is that while the old age dependency ratio in rural areas is about 20 points higher than in urban areas, the young dependency ratio is about 10 points lower (Figure 31 and 32). In other words, the number of non-working youth migrating from rural to urban areas cannot

compensate for the increase in the number of elderly in rural areas. In addition, the higher out migration of the working-age groups might have be an additional factor behind this difference.





Figure 31: Dependency Ratios of Sorgun District Center, 1985-2019

Source: Prepared by the author using the data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2020a; 2020b).





Figure 32: Dependency Ratios of Sorgun Villages and Towns, 1985-2019

Source: Prepared by the author using the data from the Turkish Statistical Institute (2020a; 2020b).

This data tells us that there is a significant trajectory which specifically affects the rules of the game in agriculture. While the average working population is aging, its share in the total population is dropping specifically in rural areas.

As a secondary property in Bourdieusian terms, aging affects availability and limitations of the occupations. In the practical and actual reality of labor market, aging shapes and limits the labor, which is theoretically assumed to be homogenous, uniform and measurable under the given level of skill. Aging indicates that the labor has its use as long as the laborer has the intent and social capacity to do. Labor as a bodiless form of energy that can be taken into account by being isolated from its host, is not realistic. For that reason, it becomes a pertinent property of class structure of the agricultural field.

From a farming-family perspective, increasing dependency ratios, increasing number of elderly and a smaller number of working-age family members affects the survival strategies families adopt, both in short and long terms. It also affects the division of labor, expectancies from the family members and their risk appetite.

As we will see in the third chapter, aging as a pertinent property of class structure affects the small farmers more than any other classes.

The depopulation of the town is mainly due to migration to urban areas, especially to Sorgun, Yozgat, Ankara and other cities. Living and working abroad has been also a very common phenomenon in Çiğdemli. New generations leaving the town to start family and to work. Only three of the interviewees (parents in the same household counted as one) stated that their children work in Çiğdemli. Except school-age children, all the next-generation lives and works out of town. Leaving the town to study at a university is also common.

### 2.4.3. Return Migration

Immigration takes an important place in Çiğdemli's history. It also has significant economic outcomes which affects today's relations of agricultural production.

*Return migration* can be defined as "the movement of emigrants back to their homelands to resettle" (Gmelch, 1980, p. 136). Migrants may return to their homeland

upon retirement, driven by emotional attachment, which is described as “return of retirement.” Alternatively, they may also return to start an innovative venture with the experiences they gained abroad or start a new life in their place of birth (King, 1978, p. 178). Similar to general migration dynamics, there is a variety of economic and non-economic factors both pull migrants to their homeland and push them from their host country when they decide to return (Gmelch, 1980, pp. 138-142).

Return migration has significant economic and cultural consequences. Migrants, who sent money to their homeland during their working years, save and invest the funds they bring back upon their return. Although it was anticipated that returnees would apply the knowledge, skills, and entrepreneurial spirit acquired abroad to make innovative investments in their homeland, empirical data suggests that such investments are not substantial. Instead, the funds brought back are predominantly used for purchasing real estate, setting up or buying small-scale businesses such as small shops, and acquiring items that symbolize status, such as tractors (Cerase, 1974).

According to Rıza (72), the mayor of the town between 1989-2009, first villagers started to immigrate to Germany as *guest-workers* in 1969-1970. Village development cooperative in Çiğdemli played an important role in emigration. A regulation put in force in 1966, gave priority to villages which establish village development cooperatives (Köy-Koop) for sending migrant workers abroad. This brought about hundreds of new village development cooperatives popping up across the country in a short period of time. Rıza states that the same motivation led villagers establish a cooperative in Çiğdemli. Cooperative submitted a beer factory project to be entitled to quotas. The factory was built; however, it never became operational. First it was owned by municipality, then it was sold by tender to a guest-worker family (Figure 33).

Yaşar, son of the buyer, who was also an emigrant worker between 1973-2007, turned the factory into a two-family house. His family, his son and daughter-in-law live together.

> We bought this place in 1985 or '86 or something. It was previously owned by the municipality and they sold it through a tender. My father even bought it for a lot of money. [Laughs] It came down to a bet. My father was stubborn and

said, “I will buy this place.” He paid 12 thousand liras for a place worth 2 thousand. (Yaşar, Interview 28)



Figure 33: Old Factory, Çiğdemli, 09/08/2019: The beer factory or (supposedly) wine distillery built by the village development cooperative – it now serves as a home for Yaşar’s family.

This story is impressive, in a way that it shows how dramatic the impacts of immigration on Çiğdemli’s economy had been. According to interviewees, emigrated families tended to purchase lands and built houses in their home town. Emigrant workers’ high purchase power led to an increase in real-estate prices over time. We will see in the following chapters that land purchases have also significant impact on accumulation of wealth.

In addition to those returning from abroad, individuals who have migrated to major cities within the country and subsequently return for various reasons are also part of the reverse migration movement. The phenomenon of migration to rural areas in Turkey has become notable since the 1980s. The expansion of cities leading to villages becoming part of urban areas, the desire of people to escape the negative effects of urban life such as noise and pollution by moving to the outskirts, and retirees and elderly individuals wanting to spend the remainder of their lives in their villages are among the primary reasons for rural-to-urban migration (Tezcan, 1989). Some studies have shown that retirement is the most dominant factor in return migration to one's hometown (Gümüş, et. al., 2013; Doğanay & Orhan, 2014).

Return migration causes new resources, both economic and non-economic, to flow into Çiğdemli's agricultural field, while also affecting the class structure of the town. While the capital composition of the agricultural field changes, the new ideas and

values carried by returning migrants trigger new divisions and transformations in the agricultural field. We will return to this issue in the future.

### 2.4.4. Changing Face of Seasonal Agricultural Labor: Refugees

In recent years, refugees, especially from Afghanistan and Syria, have been increasingly arriving in the region (Table 3). The field study revealed that refugees are employed to meet the need for agricultural labor in the region.

Table 3: Migration to Yozgat from Abroad, 2016-2021

| Migration to Yozgat from Abroad 2016-2021 | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 |
| Number of Migration | 4,378 | 3,656 | 4,018 | 2,782 | 4,646 | 4,646 |

Source: (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2024)

Besides the migrants, there are Syrians under temporary protection. In 2018, there are 4,473 Syrians which is 1.05% of the population of the province (Kara, 2019, p. 5), and as of 2024, and according to the most recent data published by the Turkish Migration Authority this number has risen up to 5,089, which is 1.20% of the provincial population (Ministry of Interior, Precidency of Migration Management, 2024).

Shepherding is mostly done by Afghan immigrants in the region. In Çiğdemli, there is a Syrian shepherd in İsmailhacılı, and an Afghan shepherd in Duralidayılı.

An interview is done with the Afghan Shepherd of Duralidayılı Village, Mustafa. Migrated 10 years ago, he spent 4 years in a village near Ankara, 4 years in construction work in Aksaray. He has been staying in Çiğdemli for 2 years. He has 7 children. He herds the village's animals, which number around a hundred in total, in exchange for 200 liras per animal from the owners (a gross annual income of 3,436 USD). The villagers provide him with shelter and electricity, and in turn he provides his own water.

Despite years spent in Turkey, he still relies on residence permit. When asked, he says he is a “half citizen” and explains:

> The United Nations gave me a residence permit, I am here with their permission. I don't have real citizenship. We applied for it, but we haven't heard anything yet. According to the law, they were supposed to give it to us in 5

> years, it has been 10 years and nothing. We went to the Ministry of Interior, they said, 'When the time comes, we will call you and give it to you ourselves, until then it is not possible'. They said, 'There is no need for you to ask'. They are right too, which one of them to give it to and which one to accept. Syrians are coming, Afghans are coming, which one should he take? Now, since I don't have citizenship, I can't buy a field or a house. (Mustafa, Interview 19)

Information from my interview with the Afghan shepherd is in line with the findings of Karadağ & Sert's study (2023) suggesting that there is a non-deportation policy implemented by the state that operates as a disciplining apparatus by using the fear of deportability.

Our observations in the field indicate that the migrants arriving in the rural area of Çiğdemli are likely to change the social composition here over time by taking on jobs such as shepherding and other kinds of labor work. This demographic change could lead to outcomes that might reverse the population projections we have discussed so far. Moreover, from a Bourdieusian perspective, these groups, seen as new players entering the agricultural field, may pursue agricultural asset acquisition by gaining access to citizenship rights and demonstrating class mobilization over time. In any case, the refugee/migrant population in the rural area of Çiğdemli has added a new dimension to the agricultural game.

### 2.4.5. Effects of Demographic Trends on Agricultural Field

*"The meat of an old ox is not eaten and its hide is not worn"*[4]

The data shows that, migration has been shaped the demographics of Yozgat region dramatically. Yet, it has different effects on urban and rural areas. Rural population is ageing faster than urban population; and districts are ageing faster than city centers. The socio-economic damage for Çiğdemli, as a rural town has been more severe than Yozgat. It is a typical rural settlement where depopulation is accompanied by ageing. This demographic trend that depopulation is accompanied by ageing sets another significant determinant for the future of the agricultural field.

As long as labor force has been subjected to monetization, households in Çiğdemli became dependent on the labor market to run their business. Just as we have seen that

[4] *A local proverb: "Goca öküzün eti yenmez gönü giyilmez"*

the mechanization of the agriculture, and new technologies are ***enabler*** for certain plants, ageing of the population and the lack of family labor to work on the land is a *disabler*. As the agricultural production of an aged household depends more on the labor market to deal with the labor intense field work, growing labor intense plants becomes more expansive and market depended. The death of gardening and orcharding in Çiğdemli is due to the lack of present labor force as well as lack of water.

Animal feeding also became an issue due to the need for professional shepherds. In the past, shepherding was not an issue. There used to be many shepherds in villages. As a result of migration and ageing, there is no young people in the town to do the job. Here, İbrahim (69) explains why he sold his animals:

> İbrahim: I had 2-3 black cattle, 2 water buffalo, and 100 sheep. We sold the sheep and built these houses.
>
> Interviewer: Why did you sell them?
>
> Ibrahim: There is no shepherd. We sold them because there was no shepherd. In the past, this village used to have 4 herds, 500 sheep each, 2,000 sheep. 2,000 sheep and 1,500-2,000 lambs, think about it. (Interview 12)

Today, we see an increasing role for migrants, especially in hired and seasonal labor.

However, hiring shepherd is not always affordable also because small numbers do not justify the cost. Ramazan (34) says that animal owners do not want to hire one just because of this:

> Interviewer: In the village, in Burunören, how many large and small livestock are there?
>
> Ramazan: There are about 120-130 large livestock here. As for small livestock, there are 150-200 animals. And all of them belong to just 2 people.
>
> Interviewer: Is there a shepherd?
>
> Ramazan: There's no cattle shepherd. We can't find one.
>
> Interviewer: Why?
>
> Ramazan: There are 4-5 households in the village. They say, "If I hire a shepherd and pay him, I won't make any money." So, it leaves 40-50 animals. Then the others are not willing to either, so we can't keep a shepherd.
>
> Interviewer: Was the number of animals like this in the past?
>
> Ramazan: No, it has decreased in the last 10-15 years. There used to be more. (Interview 23)

Net out-migration is can be understood as a structured long-term disposition in agricultural field. Leaving the village or town permanently requires to quit the current occupation (farming), which is usually identified within the agricultural field. It also indicates a permanent tendency for the rural population to transform partly or completely their agricultural capital into non-agricultural forms of capital and transfer it to other fields in urban locations.

Migration has also a huge effect on the major clusters of dispositions in the local agricultural field. As we have seen, most of the migrating population is working-age population. These are the ones that need to adapt themselves to the new field(s) in urban realm that they struggle to be a part of. A considerable amount of remaining population is elderly. Elderly people in similar occupation and income level tend to share similar conditions of living and thus share similar habitus. This is especially true for the elderly, who have a similar amount of agricultural capital. In Çiğdemli, the most important group - and social class - that shows relative homogeneity in this sense is small farmers.

In rural areas, senior population's expectations for the future are mostly limited to their children, who have already settled down in cities. The labor power they are able to put into soil tends to fall away day after day as a result of decline in productive capacity. On the other hand, aged groups' incomes do not necessarily depend solely on their work. They tend to have access to additional income items such as family transfers, public transfers such as pension payment, income supports, and asset incomes.

As a result, their position within the agricultural field does not comes from having a profit-oriented agricultural enterprise or a skilled agricultural labor force. In other words, elderly farmers' relation to the agricultural market is not the determinant in their social position. Elderly farmers do not have the motivation and the means to take their agricultural production to a competitive level. These means are not limited to economic capital but also embrace social and cultural capital. Since elderly people form the most part of the small farmers, the attributes occurring from the demographic transition become a key axis to understand the class formation in rural areas. We will further discuss this relationship when we analyze habitus of elderly small farmers in Çiğdemli.

### 2.4.6. Population Policy/ Politics of Population

Depopulation has not only negative consequences in agricultural field, but also in political and administrative fields. Loss of population means loss of political power for politicians and administrators. It also means less capital and public investments. For these reasons, keeping Çiğdemli's population high has been a top priority for the local mayors.

Ageing, on the other hand, changes the priorities of the population. Because the natural gas is a crucial need for elderly people, the political struggle to bend the gas pipeline toward the town has become an urgent step local leaders need to take.

According to the relevant regulations, population of a settlement determines (i) the type of local government the population would have, and (ii) the amount of revenue transferred to the local government from the general budget. For this reason, population has been a vital issue for the politicians and political field. To explain this, we will take a closer look at the regulations and the steps taken to address the population problem.

According to the Municipality Law No. 5393, municipal revenues consist of (i) statutory municipal taxes, duties, charges and contributions; (ii) municipality's apportionment of tax revenues under the general budget; (iii) payments made by authorities funded under the general and special budgets; (iv) revenues obtained from lease, sale and other uses of movable and immovable property; (v) fees to be collected for services provided, according to the fee schedules determined by the municipal council; (vi) revenue from interest and fines; (vii) donations; (viii) revenues obtained through enterprises, shareholdings and activities of all sorts and; (ix) other revenues (Law No. 5993, article 59, paragraph 1).

Some of the revenues are exclusively owned and collected by municipalities. For example, some of the taxes such as property tax and sanitation tax; and charges could be cited as municipal own revenues. However, more than half of their revenues are the share from government tax revenues. In 2019, 12% of the general budget allocated to the local governments; 1.15% to provincial executive committees, 5% to Metropolitan municipalities and 5.35% to other municipalities (Gelir İdaresi Başkanlığı, 2022).

Municipalities other than metropolitan municipalities (i.e. provincial, district and town municipalities) are even more dependent on the revenues from the general budget. In 2019, shares from tax and fees from central government revenues accounted for 62% (3,724,413 TL) of the total budget revenues (5,984,780 TL).

The allocation of the revenues is based on various criterium depending on the type of local government. 80% of the share to municipalities other than metropolitan municipalities is distributed by population, and 20% by the index of social and economic development (Law No. 5779). More population means more revenue, and that law as 'a rule of the game' sets the very playground on which political actors of Çiğdemli, notably the mayors are positioned.

The depopulation of Çiğdemli not just brings about a decrease in the town's revenues, but also puts the legal personhood of the municipality in danger. According to the article 11$^{th}$ of Municipality Law which was enacted in 03/07/2005 (Law Number: 5393), "Municipalities whose population falls below 2,000 shall become villages by a joint decree upon a proposal from the Ministry of Interior after consulting the opinion of the Council of State".

When the Municipality Law has been enacted in 2005, municipality would have been terminated, and Çiğdemli would turn back to a village again. In order to prevent this to happen, three nearby villages, namely, Burunören, Duralidayılı and İsmailhacılı, were merged into the town and legal personality of these three villages have been terminated. Since then, these three villages are also legal neighborhoods of Çiğdemli.

Çiğdemli is still on the edge of the legal population limit for a long time. This takes us back to the irregularities in the population trend of Çiğdemli. Former mayors give us clues of strategies they adopt to slow down the course of events.

Both of the former mayors stated that the official population of Çiğdemli is deceptive. They say the real numbers are much lower that it reads. The other former Mayor Halil, points out the deviation from the official records:

> Let me give an example. In 2009, the population of Çiğdemli was 8,000. When I took office on April 1, the population was 2,400. Where is the rest? [Laughs].

> 10 years ago the population was around 7,800-7,900 before I took office in 2009. It was 2468 when I took over, on April 1, 2009. Now it is 2050, but in reality I guess it is 1,500-1,600. I don't think it would be 1,500 if a census was done today. (Halil, Interview 33)

According to former mayor Rıza, it is simply because they exaggerated the numbers in order to increase the revenue from the central government:

> Interviewer: (...) These periods you mentioned coincide with the times when the population was 5-6 thousand...
>
> Rıza: [He leaned a little towards me, lowering his voice] Don't look at it, when the population was 5-6 thousand, there were not 5-6 thousand people here, the population here was around 2-3 thousand. Since the municipalities received money according to the population, we registered whoever we had in Ankara, whoever we had in Sorgun, friends and relatives, the dead and the living, and that's how we increased the population. It's not like the population dropped from 6 thousand to 2 thousand. In 1989, this place had a population of 1938. In 1990, I increased it to over 2,000. What happened after that, we opened 2 high schools, 15 teachers came, 10-15 civil servants, agricultural credit, agricultural chamber, gendarmerie came, so the population may have increased by 300-500. If you look now, there is no population of 2,000 here. (Interview 16)

Rıza also complained that civil servants do not live in the town anymore, and that contributes to the decrease in population.

We see that the municipality manipulates population statistics in order to increase its political and economic power. This situation shows that population records are not only a basic data for policies, but also a tool for policies.

Just as the case with water, population is also an important issue that has turned into a subject of political field. Local policy makers are aware of the fact that ageing and migration hurts the agricultural production a lot. So, they aim at keeping the youth in the town and preventing the elderly to leave the town. Besides, we see that the focus is put on keeping the official population high enough so that the town does not lose its legal personality and continues to get public funds. Agricultural field is deeply connected and intertwined with the political field in many areas just because their existence in this local scale is bound up with each other. Political returns from the increase in agricultural capital and the use of political capital in agricultural field can be seen as two dynamics that feed each other.

## 2.5. Collapse of Local Industry, Commercial Life, and Public Institutions

Overall, the region Çiğdemli is located is less industrialized than the national average. As of 2020 Sorgun has 108 industrial facilities employing a total of 1559 people.

The public institutions, businesses and light industry have left Çiğdemli, while the district center of Sorgun has been more attractive to its periphery in terms of social environment and economic opportunities. This process has also accelerated the depopulation of the town.

It is not a coincidence that, both the village of Kalkancık and Çiğdemli, welcome their guests with an abandoned flour mill by the side of the main road they are located (Figure 34). Those are remnants of an era when small scale agricultural industries were fairly widespread in rural areas. Now, expectedly investments are attracted by industrial zones with numerous economic advantages.



Figure 34: Abandoned Flour Mills, 08/30/2019: Çiğdemli (Left) and Kalkancık (Right)

Çiğdemli was a promising town, like many others. It was not just the traditional rural family structure and agricultural activities that hold population together, but also the light industry and public institutions.

We learn from the former mayors and town dwellers that there used to be a branch of Ziraat Bank, a branch of Agricultural Credit Cooperative (ACC), local chamber of agriculture, a Turkish Post Office (PTT), a branch of Turkish Electricity Administration (TEK) and a community health center in Çiğdemli. Durali Doğan, in his 1990 study, mentions that Çiğdemli has "(…) official institutions such as High

School, Primary School, Turkish Electricity Authority Branch, Village Group Agricultural Technician, PTT Branch, Health Center and Agricultural Credit Cooperative" (Doğan, 1990, p. 139).

One of the most significant government investments in Yozgat is the Yozgat Sugar Factory which is located in Sorgun, 8 kilometers away from Çiğdemli. The foundation of the factory was laid on August 23, 1990, and it was put into service on February 15, 1998. The factory had a daily beet processing capacity of 3 thousand tons when it was established, and production capacity has been increased over time (Türkşeker, 2021). The factory is owned by the public company Türkşeker AŞ. Although it is located in Sorgun, it has an important effect in Çiğdemli's agricultural economy through creating jobs and promoting sugar beet production.

Today, the municipality and public schools are the only public institutions in Çiğdemli. There are currently three public schools in Çiğdemli; a primary school, a secondary school and a high school. The first school of the town was Çiğdemli Primary School, opened in 1931. It became Imam Hatip Secondary School in 2015 (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, n.d.). The other primary school, Çiğdemli Yunus Emre Primary School was established in 1992. It currently employs 11 personnel 7 of whom are teacher (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, n.d.). The high school of the town is called Çiğdemli Multi-Program Anatolian High School. It was first established in 1989 as Çiğdemli High School and turned into a multi-program high school in 1999. It has 18 personnel in total, including 12 teachers, 3 administrators and 3 other staff (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, n.d.).



Figure 35: Screenshots of the National Sovereignty and Children's Day Ceremonies, Çiğdemli, 04/23/1986

Source: "Bir 23 Nisan Bayrami Yil 1986 CIGDEMLI Kasabasi Yozgat Sorgun 2. Bölüm" (1986). The two-part video found on YouTube shows that hundreds of villagers gathered in the square to watch the folk dance performed by children. The

signboard in the background (the picture on left) belongs to the TEK (Turkish Electricity Administration).

The three outer neighborhoods of Çiğdemli, Burunören, Duralidayılı and İsmailhacılı has no primary and secondary educational institutions whatsoever. Students in those neighborhoods are carried by school services[5]. There is also a local library in the town, which stores 6,617 books. It has currently only one staff, a computer operator (Sorgun Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası, 2020, pp. 6-8).

During the 80s and 90s, Çiğdemli was a settlement where you had access to a great variety of public services including communication, finance, agriculture, health and education. There were two kinds of value that those public institutions brought to the table. First, the local people benefited from the wide spectrum of public services provided by these institutions. They did not need to leave the town to meet most of their daily needs. In terms of agriculture, farmers had more chance to interact with the agricultural engineers and experts thanks to the local public organizations:

> There was a chamber of agriculture, technicians would visit the vineyards and gardens, they would guide the farmers by saying "Use this pesticide," "Spray the crop," they would visit the fields with the farmer protection. (Rıza, Interview 16)

Secondly, civil servants who were assigned to the positions in those local institutions, moved to and permanently resided in Çiğdemli as a legal obligation[6]. This was a legal obligation due to Thus, they, with their families, contributed to the local economy with their purchasing power. Lastly, as we discussed before, public servants also increased the income municipality gets, due to being counted as a part of the local population.

Not only did Çiğdemli have public institutions and services, but also a lively commercial life. Hasan (61) remembers that there used to be many local businesses in the town in his youth:

[5] This transportation service is organized by the provincial organization of the Ministry of National Education in accordance with the Regulation on Access to Education via Transportation Published in the Official Gazette dated September 11, 2014 Nr. 29116.

[6] Law No. 657 of July 14, 1965 on Civil Servants, additional article no. 20/1 "It is essential that civil servants reside in the settlement centers (within the borders of the municipality and village, including the adjacent areas) where the institutions and service units they work for are located" (Devlet Memurları Kanunu, 1965). The law is no longer in effect since 02/25/2011.

> When we were young, these neighborhoods were lively. There were 6-7 thousand inhabitants. My children and grandchildren were among them. Everyone was here, 8 grandchildren and children, 14 people in total. Now look, there are only 2 people left. It is emigrating. We're down to two thousand. There were 7-8 coffee houses. There were more than 10 shops. There were dairies. We had a cheese factory. There were 2-3 chicken farms. They closed down due to losses. They always closed down. (Hasan, Interview 10)

Another senior farmer Ömer, who was born in 1963, helped me visualizing the past, while he was showing me around the town square:

> I remember, like yesterday. In 1990-95 there were only 3 cafes and 6 grocery stores in the square. It was only here. (...) There were two internet cafes, they used to work until the morning. Where Acer Market is now was a coffee shop back then, in front of the mosque there were always shops. The old municipality building was also here. In front of Instructor Ziya Park. Now you wear pants... [Laughs] There's a saying, in the past the patch was big, the hole was small. Now the hole is bigger and the patch is smaller [Laughs]. So of course, the pants... The population here used to be 6 thousand, but they used to show it as 9 thousand. Now it has officially dropped to 2 thousand. Now there are 750 households here but no one lives here. (Ömer, Interview 22)

Former Mayor Rıza says that there were numerous shops and different types of workplaces before 2009:

> (There were 15 people working in a cheese factory and 10 people working in a mill. We see it as small now, but it was rising like that. The market used to stand in that square, people from the surrounding villages used to come to the market. There were three or four bakeries, eleven or twelve cafes. So these have disappeared since 2009. There were eight or ten grocery stores at the bottom of the wall near the mosque. There was a building there where we performed the funeral prayer, just like that, the bottom was a grocery store and the top was the municipality building. Where the bakery was... They closed the grocery stores, the coffeehouses closed, then I removed those buildings. We demolished them and opened a square there. There were two to four bakeries, cafes, grocery stores, a texting shop, a sausage shop, things like that. Minibuses were running at that time. I also put in a municipality bus, two to three times a day (Rıza, Interview 16)

These recollections refer to that there used to exist a considerable size of nonfarm economy in Çiğdemli. Coffee houses, local market, and shops were indicators of a lively social life. The manufactures and food processing workplaces such as mills, butchers constituted a local agri-food economy. The cheese factory which remained in operation from 1989 to mid-1990s, was an indicative of high volume of milk production and diary in the town (Figure 36). This local economy was crucial for the

agricultural field not only because it helped keeping the population in the town by allowing them to meet their needs locally, but also because it created nonfarm jobs for the population that assisted the agricultural economic activities as additional sources of household income.




Figure 36: An Old Çiğdemli Yogurt Container Produced by Çiğdemli Cheese Factory in 1990s, 09/29/2019

This picture has gradually changed in the last two decades, according to Rıza. He claims that it was the government policies that led to the loss of population along with the closure of public institutions.

> This migration phenomenon has been going on intensely for 10 years or so. In the past Çiğdemli did not emigrate, on the contrary, it used to receive immigration. In my time people were coming here. There were people coming here from other villages, other places. There were official organizations, PTTs, Agricultural Credits, Chambers of Agriculture... There were 15 staff working at the health center. Later, when the Ak Parti period started, I switched to the Ak Parti in 2002 as the mayor. After the Ak Parti period, these gradually started to lose population. The chamber of agriculture became bankrupt. The place where the gendarmerie now sits was the agricultural chamber, we gave it to the gendarmerie when it closed. Agricultural Credit went bankrupt. The schools were the same... There were three schools here.
>
> The closure of these institutions was entirely due to government policy. There was a PTT branch, they closed it down. (...) The chamber of agriculture also closed down. There was an agricultural credit cooperative, all the surrounding villages were connected to it. I don't know if you've seen it now, they put a sign there saying it's for sale. The warehouses, the land, everything rotted away.

> First the official institutions closed down, then people started to leave. For example, there was TEK back then, it had an office here.
>
> (...) In my day, the health center had 12 staff and an ambulance. For 10 years, the population here has fallen, as a result of the state's policy. They downsize the small ones and enlarge the big ones, this is a state policy. In my childhood there was agricultural credit cooperative here. Did it stay afloat for all these years and then go bankrupt 50 years later? Did these people pay their debts for years but not in the last 5 years? (...)
>
> (...) Teachers, civil servants, nurses don't stay here, they leave. There are no workplaces left. (...) I mean, these have disappeared since 2009. (...) They closed the grocery stores, the cafes also closed, then I removed those buildings. We demolished them and opened a square there. (...) I also put a municipality bus, two or three times a day. Then, when the number of vehicles increased, everyone started to meet their needs there, in Sorgun, and then the grocery stores closed one by one. (Rıza, Interview 16)

Most of the local public institutions shut down permanently. Today, the only public institutions still exist in the town are 3 schools, a family health center at which one doctor and 3 other personnel work (Çiğdemli Aile Sağlığı Merkezi, n.d.), and the municipality. The closure of the branches of public institutions one by one has reduced the number of civil servants working in Çiğdemli. The town became a part of and administered by the district branches of public institutions located in Sorgun.

Türkşeker was gone under privatization process in 2000, sugar factories the company owns have been slated for privatization. Yozgat Sugar Factory has privatized along with other 12 sugar factories on April 9$^{th}$ 2018. It was sold to Doğuş Yiyecek ve İçecek Üretim Sanayi Tic. AŞ for 275 million Turkish Liras (DİSK-Genel İş, 2018). However, the company did not take over the factory and thus the privatization tender has cancelled. In 2021 after transfer of the factory to the company did not take place (HaberTürk, 2018; Cumhuriyet, 2018).

What's more, as Karadavut points out, the more transportation services developed, the easier it became to travel back and forth between Çiğdemli and Sorgun to work. That is followed by a new regulation in 2011 that lifted the obligate civil servants to reside in the place of duty (Bazi Alacakların … Kanun, 2011, article 117). With the law being put in force, the remaining civil servants, specifically the teachers had no reason left to reside in the town. They started to live in Sorgun and travel to Çiğdemli on daily basis. The former Mayor Halil, tells how this affected the quality of education in the town:

> In our time, teachers used to live in Çiğdemli. There were extra advantages for a teacher to live in that place. First of all, there was fear in the students. Teachers were following them well, preventing bad habits. Now parents don't follow and raise them either. Now they see things on TV and smartphones and they are influenced. In our time, there was a sports club in Çiğdemli. I had the astroturf built for that purpose. We built the astroturf and established a sports club to keep those young people away from bad habits, but most of the children in that club live in the city. They do not live in the village. Let's say I am retired and I have children. I take the child to the field on Saturday and Sunday, and the child either works in an official institution or in a government office. This is partly why agriculture is in trouble. (Halil, Interview 33)

Considering that employees working at the municipality are local, there is almost no civil servants residing in Çiğdemli. The distance between Çiğdemli and the public institutions mean less interactions between the locals and public servants, specifically in terms of agricultural services (Figure 37). It also means less population, less demand for the local goods and services, and thus less economic activity.



Figure 37: Abandoned Building of the Çiğdemli Agricultural Credit Cooperative, 08/30/2019

This process has been accompanied by the closure of shops, workhouses and other light industry. Today, there are only three small shops where only basic food and other consumption goods are being sold. In terms of light industry, the only significant business is the brickyard and three gas stations. The lack of nonfarm jobs leaves accelerates unemployed youth leaving the town.

> Of course it used to be more crowded in the past, just like the conditions of the world are changing, this place has also changed. Why have people decreased, for example, when a man wants to find an insured job, he wants to leave. The man will have a certain amount of land so that he can stay. If he doesn't have land in agriculture, if he has 30 decares, 50 decares, what will he do here? (Yusuf, Interview 30)

Dissolution of the nonfarm economy and disintegration of social life have had numerous effects on the agricultural field. We can now summarize these effects from the perspective of agricultural field.

1. The amount of economic capital circulating in the town has fallen due to decreasing nonfarm economic activities. Closure of local shops and other workplaces meant that less and less amount of the agricultural income is spent in Çiğdemli, and more of it has been taken out of the town.
2. Food processing activities such as cheese factory, mills and wine factory were all part of the local agri-food economy. Without them, the local agricultural economy has been limited almost only to the raw material production. In other words, Çiğdemli has reduced to the economic periphery of the Sorgun district in terms of spatial organization of agri-food chain.
3. The loss of nonfarm jobs made it more difficult to diversify the household income without leaving the town. This also accelerated the depopulation process, which led to a diminishing supply-demand cycle.
4. Without any alternatives, municipality as an employer became one of the very few options for the unemployed. Employing more people has become a priority for the municipality and became a significant budget item. Therefore, the number of employees and employees' identities has been a hot topic for the local politics.
5. The loss of civil servants, specifically agricultural experts who actively participate in local life, has reduced the volume of interaction between experts and local community. Overall, local community has lost an important source of agricultural cultural capital in the form of technical expertise, information and experience. This also marks the end of the developmentalist public policies which were designed to transform the traditional agricultural culture.
6. Local institutions, commerce and industry mean more local social connections. Public institutions and businesses, specifically the agricultural ones provide

social networks of which the agricultural field feeds off. The collapse of the local institutions and non-farm economy has brought about depletion of the social resources upon which farmers can grow their agricultural social capital. After the coffee shops shut down, gas stations became the only places for farmers to gather, socialize and share information.

### 2.6. Municipality and Politics

Just as we can speak of an "agricultural field" in the Bourdieusian sense, we can also speak of a *political field* composed of political actors and institutions, in which each subject is partially a part through their political existence. In this political field, power, political authority, and economic and social capital are transmuted, and the different faces of symbolic violence manifest in the public sphere. For instance, the farmers, community leaders, village chiefs, traders, and others we observe in Çiğdemli are as much participants in a political game as they are in an agricultural one. If we consider the political field in a narrow sense, it is a game of acquiring shares of state power and thereby influencing the redistribution mechanisms of the state apparatus. On the other hand, the agricultural field, as previously detailed, involves acquiring power through social and cultural capital, ascending social class layers, converting acquired power into resources and vice versa, and thus becoming part of a distinct class habitus, maintaining *the difference*.

Here, the difference between the power in the agricultural field and the power in the political field is, from our perspective, theoretical and conceptual, while for the farmers, it is at most a discursive difference. As our field research indicates, the positions of players in these two fields practically overlap, and the positions and resources acquired in everyday life in one field can be utilized in the other. Therefore, while it is possible and meaningful to consider the agricultural and political fields as separate game arenas as theoretical constructs, in daily life, every agricultural issue is political, and every political issue is vital.

Even if we are referring to the local political field when we speak of the political field here, it cannot be said to be entirely disconnected from general politics or the national level. High politics, or "the agenda" as popularly termed, and the practical difficulties of everyday life are interconnected through two main issues. The first is local public

matters, such as how public resources are utilized and to whom these resources are redistributed, essentially municipal issues. The mayor, as a direct representative of a political party, is a party to the country's political struggles and the visible face of his party in the municipality through his actions. The second is the agricultural intervention policies implemented by the government, particularly procurement policies.

As we will see below and in the rest of the thesis, every interview and conversation conducted in the field has been encounters where gossip about corruption, insinuations, complaints, mutual accusations, partisanship, whispers, and endless quarrels that go from the daily life to the state of the country and vice versa come to the fore. While examining the political agenda of the agricultural field, we will see how farmers, especially concerning municipal affairs, use the kind of weapons Scott (1985b) calls “weapons of the weak.” Now, let's look at the municipality, one of the intersecting points of the political and agricultural games. The Municipality is can be considered as a realm of political field that has close ties to the agricultural field. In a rural town like Çiğdemli, municipality has become more and more important source of public transfers since the local economy and institutions have moved away.

### 2.6.1. History of Municipality

Before moving on to field observations, it would be appropriate to examine the historical trajectory of the support received by political parties through municipal elections in Çiğdemli. Table 4 shows the municipal council elections from 1977 onwards. The central left (CHP, SODEP and SHP) has lost grassroots in 1984, 1989 and 1994 elections. From 1999 to present day left parties are not presented in the municipality. Last 15 years, political scene has been dominated by the two major parties on political spectrum: the AKP as the conservative right and the Nationalist Movement Party as the representative of the nationalist right. The Welfare Party also has grassroots that comes to surface from time to time (Table 4).

Since the municipality was established, 6 mayors took office. One of them (Halil) was appointed by the military government following the coup d’etat in 1980. Rest of the mayors were elected.

Table 4: Municipal Council Elections, 1977-2019

| Municipal Election | 1st Party | % | 2nd Party | % | 3rd Party | % | 4th Party | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1977** | CHP | 32.29 | MHP | 26.24 | AP | 21.47 | MSP | 20 |
| **1984** | SODEP | 52.11 | ANAP | 47.89 | | | | |
| **1989** | ANAP | 43.94 | SHP | 34.45 | RP | 21.61 | | |
| **1994** | ANAP | 45.72 | RP | 36.68 | SHP | 17.6 | | |
| **1999** | ANAP | 83.57 | BBP | 16.43 | | | | |
| **2004** | AKP | 51.48 | MHP | 48.52 | | | | |
| **2009** | AKP | 44.17 | MHP | 38.96 | SP | 16.87 | | |
| **2014** | AKP | 53.96 | MHP | 44.69 | SP | 1.35 | | |
| **2019** | MHP | 59.16 | AKP | 38.87 | İYİP | 0.53 | CHP | 0.3 |

Source: Republic of Türkiye Supreme Election Council (2023).

The first local election held in Çiğdemli is won by CHP in 1977. It was followed by the SODEP in 1984. ANAP with its candidate Rıza, has won three consecutive elections in 1989, 1994 and 1999. In 2004, Rıza has switched to AKP, and won as the AKP mayor, for the fourth time. Among the former mayors Rıza is the one that stayed longest in office, for uninterrupted four terms in total, between 1989 and 2009. In the 2009 and 2014 elections, AKP's candidate Halil won the elections. In the local elections of 2019, Halil ran for the office again, but this time he has lost against the MHP's candidate, and Cigdemli Municipality has been taken by the MHP for the first time in its 38 years of history, after 15 years of AKP rule.

Over nearly 40 years of its corporate life, the municipal council election results show that the dominant ideology in the council has moved from social democracy to the central right and then to the conservative/nationalist right. It is necessary to discuss the reasons behind the shift in voter preference in Çiğdemli from the center-left to the nationalist and Islamist right. Undoubtedly, this development cannot be assessed independently of the general atmosphere that emerged in Turkey after the 1980 military coup and the subsequent rise of the right across the country. Additionally, we must consider the potential impact of the decreasing Alevi population in Çiğdemli, as previously discussed.

Alevis have historically been natural allies with leftist movements, due to both their socio-political elements stemming from a history of conflict with the state dating back to the Ottoman period and their affinity for the egalitarian and social justice-oriented

discourses of the left. This closeness was particularly reinforced during the 1970s when leftist/socialist organizations defended Alevi communities against paramilitary attacks (Ertan, 2019). The high vote percentages for CHP in 1977 and SODEP in 1984 in Çiğdemli can be attributed to this *political habitus* of the Alevi population.

However, explaining the shift to ANAP and the subsequent absolute dominance of right-wing parties in the town requires deeper analysis. While Rıza's success as a mayoral candidate from ANAP partially explains ANAP's success, it is also important to note, as Yalçınkaya (1996) emphasized, that the Alevi electorate's allegiance to CHP and its derivatives was neither absolute nor monolithic. From 1994 onwards, Alevi voters clearly began seeking new political affiliations, attempting to establish dialogues with ANAP, DYP, and even RP (pp. 190-196).

Even with these factors in mind, the complete disappearance of leftist-social democratic parties from the scene and the confinement of the political spectrum to AKP, MHP, and Saadet Party can largely be attributed to the significant impact of Alevi migration, as previously discussed. This migration, which intensified during the years of this political transformation, likely played a crucial role in reshaping the town's political landscape.

On this matter, it would be appropriate to include the detailed account of Bünyamin, who was born in 1962 as the son of a landless laborer and Alevi father who migrated from the village to Sorgun. Bünyamin was involved in leftist movements during his youth, later converted to Christianity, and now, along with his wife Ayşe, makes a living through relatively large-scale livestock farming in Çiğdemli.

> Interviewer: Was Sorgun a stronghold for the left during that period?
>
> Bünyamin: Until 1977, the CHP (Republican People's Party) in Sorgun could elect two deputies and one senator. After the coup on September 12, it ended. For a certain period, they managed to elect two deputies, but later they couldn't get more than one. Recently, in the last elections, they elected one deputy, but that was due to the coalition with the İyi Party. Actually, even getting that one deputy was a result of the government's appointments.
>
> Sorgun was a place of revolutionary movements until 1989. The district started leaning to the right with the arrival of certain district governors and police chiefs. Students who came to study were labeled as communists. They would ask me who the communists were. People categorized communists as dishonorable, so they started looking for some kind of hairy monster when they

> heard “communist.” After high school, I went to Ankara in the 1980s. During that time, the coup on September 12 happened. I had gone to Ankara to complete my studies and work because I couldn't finish high school in Sorgun. I took the external high school completion exams in 1995 or 1996, I think. In 1982-83, I came back to our town, and my mother came back as well. Our neighborhood was Yenidoğan in Sorgun. Back then, Yenidoğan was entirely composed of Alevis. That neighborhood dropped from 200-250 households to 25-30 households in a short period in 1980. Everyone sold their homes and left. They were forced to migrate.
>
> Interviewer: How did that happen?
>
> Bünyamin: The coup of September 12 brought blessings and prosperity to the right-wing. Previously, both Alevis and Sunnis were part of revolutionary movements. After the coup, Sunnis within the revolutionary movement started to see it as an Alevi cause and began to withdraw. Unity and solidarity were lost. Everyone turned against each other. (Interview 27)

In Bünyamin's account of events throughout Sorgun, the coup of September 12 stands out as a pivotal moment. He emphasizes that in the political climate that emerged after the coup, the ideological unity that had developed between the Alevi and Sunni populations on the basis of the leftist movement gave way to religious conflict. This testimony is crucial for understanding the broader framework of political transformation that occurred in the 1990s in Çiğdemli. Ultimately, the political landscape of Çiğdemli and its surrounding region, including the values in circulation, the political actors and organizations, and the nature of political capital, underwent significant changes. In Bourdieu’s terms, it can be argued that *the symbolic violence* generated by these changes had a profound impact, as reflected in the demographic shifts.

### 2.6.2. Investments and Debt Crisis

The 15 years long AKP rule over the municipality of Çiğdemli has come to an end in 2019. The very first thing the new mayor did was to announce municipality’s statement of income and the list of liabilities to the public. The municipality’s high indebtedness has found wide coverage in the media (Sözcü, 2019; Yeniçağ, 2019). It is stated that the municipality's per capita debt is 5 times higher than in Istanbul and Ankara (Oda TV, 2019); which makes Çiğdemli one of the most indebted municipalities in Turkey.

According to the official document shared with the media, the total amount of debts municipality has is 11,234,897.04 TL. When we look at the debt structure, 58.3 % of

the total obligations (6,550,366.00 TL) are public debts and credits granted by İller Bankası AŞ (İlbank Inc.) whereas the loans taken from private Denizbank is 360,415.60 TL (3.21%). There are debts from 2 major investments, namely the solar energy power plant and the cultural center. The debts about those projects are 1,400,000.00 TL (12.46%) and 1,024,435.00 TL (9.12%) respectively. The rest is tax liabilities, social security liabilities and other debts to third parties.

There are three public projects built in recent years that is discussed by the local people, wastewater treatment plant, solar power panels and the cultural center. According to the local news, the cultural center costs 2,200,000.00 TL and half of the cost is granted by the Ministry of the Culture and Tourism (Yeni Ufuk, 2018). It had not been finished yet during the field study. Another project which was discussed by the people I met is the solar power plants which was built in 2016. The power it generates is being sold to the Turkish Electricity Distribution Corporation (Solarist, 2018). Lastly the wastewater treatment plant is another public investment, which was planned to be built as a part of sewage system renewal project (Haberler.com, 2013). Although the basic structure of the plant has been constructed, the plant has not gone into use yet.

### 2.6.3. Political Rivalry, Favoritism and Corruption

The municipality has always been a means to distribute public funds, based of political affiliations. Creating jobs, initiate tenders, attract national and international funds for public projects and organizing social aids are few to mention. This gives municipality an important place in both political and agricultural fields. Farmers directly or indirectly benefit from any public intervention municipality does. Even the most irrelevant public spending in a rural town has a positive or negative externality on the agricultural field. However, this effect is not evenly distributed among the players. (Re)distribution of the public funds among different classes, social groups and political groups affects the power relations and the relative strength of these groups in the agricultural field.

The relationship that the municipality mediates between the agricultural and political fields can be evaluated on two different levels. Firstly, power relations in the political field, social and symbolic capital, are utilized to accumulate power and access

economic resources in the agricultural field. Here, the organization of the municipality and the election mechanism emerge as arenas where political, social, and economic power relations are regulated and reconfigured, channeled through various forms to achieve different goals. This reflects an institutionalization of regular relations that mediate the relations of redistribution. At this level, we will observe what patterns of relationships and informal institutions, whether legal or illegal, official or unofficial, exist in the redistribution of resources.

At the second level, in this redistribution struggle, we see that the practices such as corruption and favoritism, which are in fact part of the agricultural game as informal institutions, are exposed as immorality, illegality, and injustice, bringing symbolic power struggles in the political field to the forefront. In almost all interviews where these topics were raised, the emerging allegations of corruption, rumors, and discussions reflect the power struggle between those close to the municipality and those who are not. Now, we will discuss these two levels in an intertwined manner, supported by excerpts from the interviews we conducted in the field.

During the field study, the municipality is among the frequently discussed topics. There are two main points regarding the municipality are made: First, almost all of the interviewees questioned the amount of debt the municipality owns. It is often stated that the last mayor has invested in unnecessary areas, and the put a heavy burden on the budget. Secondly, they discuss who and how many personnel municipality employs. The resources municipality use to create jobs is strictly bound up with the other spendings, and affected by its budget management.

A notable feature of the heated debates among the elderly small-scale farmers, which we will elaborate on below, is the rapid circulation of gossips throughout the town and villages in regard to the favors granted by the municipality to certain individuals, the hiring of unqualified relatives, and the misuse of municipal assets. As Scott (1985b) accurately points out, we see how gossip is used as a *weapon* by the weak against those in power. Gossips usually target the social prestige of those in high positions within agricultural and political spheres and those who gain advantages through them in distribution relations, attempting to weaken their *symbolic power* in the *political field* through labeling and stigmatization. A spontaneous conversation between friends

İbrahim (69) and Enes during a group discussion with elderly farmers shows how heated the topic is:

> Interviewer: How are the job opportunities here? What are the chances of finding a job for your children and grandchildren?
>
> İbrahim: There are no job opportunities. Now everyone is eyeing the municipality. The municipality will open a vacancy and hire their children and grandchildren. But how long they will work. They will work for 3-5 months and then they will leave. There are no jobs here...
>
> Enes: It was good before; the municipality was hiring a lot of people.
>
> Interviewer: Why not now?
>
> Enes: Now there is no money in the municipality, the municipality cannot feed 10 people.
>
> İbrahim: The municipality doesn't have a budget.
>
> Enes: The man ate it. The previous mayor ate it before he left. Look, we are walking on pebbles too.
>
> İbrahim: [pointing to the fountain 20 meters away in the square] Do you see this, look at this fountain. The man spent 1 trillion for that fountain. In total, he spent 11 trillion.
>
> Enes: Inshallah he can't eat it... Inshallah he can't take it from his children...
>
> İbrahim: He took a loan for his son, bought three apartments for his son and one for himself.
>
> Enes: He built a stone on that road, he left without paying for it. He installed it. But the water is broken from the beginning. An inspector came here to inspect, he left without even opening the ledger because of politics. They never looked at what this man did or spent.
>
> Interviewer: He owes a lot of money, but I saw his statement on Facebook, he said that if there is a debt, there is a return. He says he built so many culture houses and solar panels?
>
> Enes: He built a cultural house, build it at the bottom of hell. He built it at the beginning of that road. See who goes there? No one goes to the wedding hall. Look, there's already a wedding hall here. He put the municipality in two huge debts. After he left, the bailiffs started coming. I ask you, why didn't the bailiffs come when he was there? Because he was from the AK Party and this one was from the MHP. Now the lawyers are coming with buckets and cars for execution. They have been hiding the diggers and cars for three days. Those diggers are our hands and feet, what will happen without them?
>
> İbrahim: You say what will happen, but why did your son go and take a loan? If something happens tomorrow, who can dig with a pickaxe and a shovel? (Interview 12)

In these group discussions, responses to value-neutral and/or technically-oriented questions, which do not have an overt political implication, quickly turned into a race to inform me about the "schemes" circulating within the town and municipality. Sometimes, natural progressions of discussions led to debates among the small-scale farmers about which family benefitted from which mayor, turning into accusations and blame. For the small-scale farmers, the greatest sin was the mayors' diverting resources to their relatives, close friends, and acquaintances. Accessing the already scarce economic resources in the agricultural field through political support and social relationships was perceived as a cheat against the rules of the agricultural game, a significant violation of norms. In other words, favoritism and benefiting from it, using the municipality as a source of patronage, all these actions were seen, in Bourdieu's terms, as a violation of the "moral economy" that constitutes the ethical codes of the agricultural game, representing the farmers' sense of social justice and moral values. The key distinction here is that this rural morality is posited not against market rules but against the corrupt intervention of political power in redistribution relations.

In the following discussion the group emphasize that the size of the spendings do not justify the outcome. Unreasonable overspendings are also seen as the reason behind why municipality cannot afford to employ more people. They also think that the oversight and control the government exercises over the local spendings are partisan and unbiased.

> Abdullah: There are many thieves robbing our state. They built a section of the big Çiğdemli road last year. Now they are dismantling the new road. It was built two years ago; they dismantle it and build it again. Then they built a treatment plant here, but there is no treatment. They built a treatment plant but it doesn't work.
>
> Interviewer: When was the treatment plant built?
>
> Abdullah: It's been 10 years since it was built.
>
> Yücel: I came and looked at the treatment plant, the iron bars are sticking out. If you leave it like that, it will rust, it will eventually rot and take it away. They built a wall [leans his torso to the side] and that's how it stands. You looked at it when you came to take delivery of the treatment plant, why did you take delivery of it like that? Now it's just rough construction. (Interview 1)

§ § §

> Oh, they built a treatment plant, you know what you said about Haluk Hodja, that treatment plant is in Haluk Hodja's village, below Burunören village. I'll take you to see the rats running around in it! (İbrahim, Interview 12)

The last mayor is especially at the center of the allegations of favoritism and corruption. There are complains about that the former mayor has allegedly used the public funds in favor of his supporters.

> It means that the men did not do the road well, they dismantled the brand new road and now they are rebuilding it. This man was the mayor for 10 years, what did he do? He just ate, drank... He made his relatives rich. He used the municipality's facilities for them and made them work with his bucket. He built a sports and culture center. This is a tiny place, what do you need a building like that for? If you want to use it as a wedding venue, you need to spend another 100 thousand liras so that you can use it. The men did the rough construction and left it. It looks finished on the outside, but not on the inside. Then he built a solar power plant, but with a grant. Half of these are grants, so the state gave half of them. So how did you end up 11 million in debt? Where did this money go? Now if the new mayor wants to serve, he can't. He can only think about how to pay the debts, there is no money in the coffers. That's why this [former] president left. (Emre, Interview 7)

§ § §

> Interviewer: What about the water treatment plant? They say it is not working.
>
> Halil: The current mayor is making such taunts not politically, don't misunderstand, but because he has no state experience. We started investing in infrastructure. After you build sewage, you have to build the treatment plant. I had this done with a 50 percent grant from the Bank of Provinces. I act with this in mind, and we employed three or four people. For example, a man works as a watchman in solar energy. Because the municipality is small, citizens always expect work there. How will you respond to this? Are you going to buy vehicles with the money from the provinces, are you going to do your main duties, are you going to give jobs? (Interview 33)

The newly elected mayorship terminated 11 workers' contracts to the cut some of the expenses. When I first arrived at the town, I encountered some of them, who used to subcontract the transportation service between Çiğdemli and Sorgun. They complained about the new mayor, supported the former mayor's performance and accused the people who criticize him of being hypocrite.

Since the number of nonfarm jobs available in the town has gone down over time, the municipality as the major employer became more important for those who look for nonfarm/additional income. People are very sensitive to the number and identity of those who get jobs at the municipality.

> People's children work in such and such municipality. The municipality has a subcontractor who has been transporting from Çiğdemli to Sorgun and from Sorgun to Çiğdemli for 10 years. Other than that, the employees work as trucks, shovels, transportation, sewage. Of course there were layoffs, there were twenty-seven people, eleven people left the subcontractor, leaving sixteen people left. (Furkan, Interview 9)

§ § §

> Interviewer: So, are there any job opportunities in the municipality?
>
> Hasan: There were already thirty people in the municipality, then they increased it to fifty. Fifty people can't get a salary anyway. There are no municipality facilities. (Hasan, Interview 10)

Some interviewees mentioned that the true motivation behind employing people at the municipality is not the need for those people, but the trade-off between votes and jobs:

> Two months before the election, they came from Ankara to recruit workers. This [former mayor] sent out the news that he was going to hire henchmen. He brought them all from Ankara and filled the municipality. Those 50 people worked here for free. They didn't get paid either. How could they get money, there is no money in the municipality. They hired them, then they realized that the money was not enough and sent them back. (İbrahim, Interview 12)

In some cases, job is only a cover to subsidy the employed-on-paper:

> Everyone gets [government] support. During this AK Party period, many fraudulent things were done in our village. How many hundreds of people were given salaries here. They made them look like workers in the municipality. The woman's name is Kevser, we are on the bus together, we are going, she is ignorant, she trusts me. 'Girl,' I said, 'I have polyps in my gallbladder, I need surgery, but we don't have health insurance, who covers your health?'. 'Huri Abla,' she said, 'I'm a worker at the municipality, I'm insured.' The man [Halil] sat for 2 terms, 11 trillion debts... I think that debt is actually the debt of the villagers (...) Now those aids have been cut. He fired ten of them, and this mayor made a promise when he fired them. (Ayşe, Interview 27)

Halil, the former mayor does not deny that he overemployed people whom contribution is not needed in the municipality. However, he argues that creating additional income is the very essence of what the people of Çiğdemli demand from the municipality: Providing as many jobs as possible is also one of the most important criteria for getting reelected. Employing certain families' and relatives' members is also key for maximizing the votes. Therefore,

> People here see the municipality as a breadwinner. They all have their eyes on the municipality. These are also additional income. For those who are engaged

> in agriculture, the municipality gate is an additional income. For the man in the municipality, agriculture is an additional income. This is how it is.
>
> (…) For people, projects and so on don't matter. I'll give your child a job, I'll give you a salary, that's all they care about. Look, I gave jobs to a lot of women, I gave them a salary from İş-Kur. When I say I gave a job, what will the woman do in the municipality? I gave them all a room, they came in the morning and left in the evening. The purpose is to get a salary from the Employment Agency, otherwise they don't do any work. When I started doing these projects later on, all these employment opportunities stopped. This is the main reason why they sent me away. I may have employed someone for two terms, someone for one term. The one I gave work to for one semester becomes my enemy. Why, because I will treat them equally. It's not that I couldn't. They say you are in power, you can handle it if you want. I didn't work as a mayor, I worked as a marabout. They call me, "My child is sick, come." Why? Because I'll arrange the doctor. Ismail, come here, come here... (Halil, Interview 33)

It is clear that providing as many jobs as possible is also one of the most important criteria for getting reelected. Employing certain families' and relatives' members is also key for maximizing the votes.

### 2.6.4. Municipality's Impact on Agricultural Field

Although the municipality do not have many activities directly concerning the agricultural field, distribution and redistribution of the municipal resources have a significant impact on the positions in the agricultural field.

1. First, it creates nonfarm jobs, and additional income, which specifically differentiate smallholders' ability to survive in the field. The more jobs created by the municipality the more families are assisted with a non-farm income.
2. Expenditures on infrastructure are potentially helpful in making the town attractive for the dwellers. Roads, and wastewater system are examples to the infrastructural investments that make the town livable.
3. Due to the small population and the face-to-face nature of local relations, the struggle over municipal resources is intense. Proximity to the mayor has direct economic consequences in everyday life. In turn, this feeds populist political practices. We see that proximitiy to the mayor as a form of social capital which feeds on both kinship and social relations, has direct consequences on economic capital.

We have seen a number of major trends which constitute a framework for the agricultural field in Çiğdemli. These are, the advances in agricultural technology, decreasing and aging population, migration, water scarcity, closure of institutions, commercial businesses and light industry and the changing agricultural policies.

The trends under each of these headlines have changed the capital structure of the agricultural field over time. The relative value and the content of each type of the agricultural capital have changed.

Given the changing external conditions and the dynamic agricultural capital structure, households in Çiğdemli with different class positions and demographic background adapt to the circumstances to survive in agricultural field. What is more, they apply their enter or exit strategies in short and long terms, they invest more in the agricultural field or sell out. In the next section we will examine how the class structure in Çiğdemli is, and how the differentiation in class positions affects the strategies and decisions concerning the agricultural field.

### 2.7. Change in Agricultural Policies

This section is devoted to the examination of the government, public actors and the public policies that directly targeting the agricultural market as long as Çiğdemli is concerned. There are many public institutions that are charged with different policy areas orchestrated by the government.

In this chapter, we will examine the major actors who shape the local market conditions for the farmers in Çiğdemli. First, we will see how government policies directly or indirectly impact the local agricultural markets. We will explore the current support policies and the institutions enforcing them. Although there are numerous specific agricultural products that the governmental bodies intervene in, we will limit our focus on the policies concerning the major agricultural products seen in Çiğdemli, namely cereals and sugar beet.

### 2.7.1. Public and Private Organizations in Çiğdemli

There are multiple government interventions in the agricultural market through various means, implemented directly and indirectly by different public bodies. These interventions aim to apply national agricultural policies, some of which are specifically tailored for the region. Such policies include both indirect and direct investments, subsidies, incentives, government procurement, and price support.

In this section, we will provide a brief overview of the governmental and private organizations that significantly impact the local agricultural field.

#### 2.7.1.1. Financialization of Agriculture and Increased Role of Financial Institutions

One of the most significant structural characteristics of enterprises in the agricultural sector is their constant need for external resources to sustain economic viability. The equity of agricultural businesses, particularly family farms, is often insufficient to support their operations. Given that most agricultural enterprises are not large enough and lack adequate capital, factors such as long periods between harvest seasons, price fluctuations, seasonal variations in agricultural income, production losses due to disease and pests, and technology-driven input needs all contribute to the necessity for loans (Berberoğlu, 1978, pp. 48-50).

Agricultural loans are a crucial source of agricultural finance. Banks that provide farmers with agricultural credits play a vital role in sustaining the continuity of agricultural businesses in times of liquidity shortages. They offer short-term, medium-term, and long-term loans. Short-term loans, with maturities of up to one year, are used to cover operating expenses, provide for the family's livelihood, and renew expired debts. Medium-term loans, with maturities between one and five years, are utilized for establishing irrigation systems, creating seedling and sapling nurseries, improving soil quality for agricultural production, purchasing breeding animals, and financing necessary machinery and equipment. Long-term loans, with maturities ranging from five to twenty years, are typically used for real estate purchases (Arslanbey, 2011, pp. 52-53). It is important to note that there is no clear distinction between the needs of an agricultural family and those of the agricultural business. The resources of an

agricultural business also constitute the budget of the family running the farm. Therefore, agricultural businesses use loans not only for business purposes but also for non-agricultural expenses; conversely, they may take non-agricultural loans to cover agricultural expenses and renew expired debts (Çelik, 2019, p. 68).

Thus, in the agricultural field, the economic resources needed by farming families for both familial needs—social, cultural, and symbolic existence—and for sustaining agricultural activities are subject to dependency relationships with inseparable financial structures. Consequently, the increasing prominence of financial structures within the economy leads to the dependency of agricultural actors, particularly small farmers, not only on economic capital but also on social, cultural, and symbolic capital derived from financial mechanisms.

Until the early 2000s, agricultural financing in Turkey was almost entirely provided by public banks. However, structural improvements by the government have allowed other financial institutions to enter the market. As of September 2022, the total agricultural loans provided by banks reached 259 billion TL, with private banks holding a 22% market share. The proportion of farmers using bank credit has increased, with 60% of interviewed farmers working with banks on a credit basis, indicating a competitive and developing credit market (Kredi Kayıt Bürosu, 2022, pp. 37-38).

Today, there are 15 banks operating in the agricultural sector. For the purpose of this dissertation, we focus on two of them—Ziraat Bank and Denizbank—most frequently mentioned by farmers during the field study. Ziraat Bank is a state-owned agricultural bank in Turkey, founded in 1888 as the first bank established specifically for agricultural finance to support agricultural development. The bank offers specialized loans for various agricultural purposes, including farmer support loans, agricultural SME loans, loans for women farmers, loans for young farmers, solar irrigation loans, cooperative loans, animal production loans, crop production loans, and agricultural mechanization loans. It also provides services such as intermediary support for payments, state-supported agricultural insurance, and traditional agricultural insurance (Ziraat Bankası, 2023).

Denizbank entered the agricultural sector in 2002 by purchasing the cooperative bank Tarişbank. Since then, it has aimed to increase farmers' productivity and facilitate their access to finance through agricultural consumer loans, insurance, and crop insurance services. Denizbank provides farmers with producer cards, which ease transactions and meet their cash needs. Agricultural banking services cover producers with farmer certification, including those who earn a living from agricultural activities and agricultural organizations with legal entity status. Denizbank operates 375 branches in 46 districts, reaching 31,000 (82%) of 38,000 villages (DenizBank, 2022, p. 70).

In 2019, Denizbank reported a total loan volume of over TL 13.6 billion, with loan usage exceeding TL 9.5 billion and more than 1.3 million customers. The bank leads agricultural loan allocations among private banks, holding a market share of 44% (DenizBank, 2019, p. 44). It has integrated the Farmer Registration System (ÇKS) into its operations, using data uploaded to calculate a credit score for producers applying for agricultural banking loans (DenizBank, 2022, p. 72).

Following Denizbank, other private banks have also begun to show interest in agricultural financing, leading to new solutions for agricultural loans (Esenkar, 2019). This overview emphasizes the current stage of the banking system's influence in the agricultural field. The widespread establishment of branches, the increase in credit volumes, and the diversity of credit types indicate both deepening and quantitative growth in financialization.

It has been noted that economic activity in and around the Yozgat province primarily relies on agriculture, which is reflected in the distribution of loans. According to data from the Q3 2019 obtained from the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, agricultural loans constitute 70% of all loans provided (Figure 38).

There is currently no bank branches located in Çiğdemli. The branches of Ziraat Bank, Vakıf Bank, Halkbank, İş Bank, TEB, Yapı Kredi Bank and Akbank are located in Sorgun. However, the most mentioned banks among farmers in Çiğdemli are Ziraat and Deniz Bank. From the interviews with farmers, it is understood that farmers have intensive financial relations with these two banks in particular.





Figure 38: Sectoral Distribution of Loans, Yozgat, Q3 2019

Source: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (2019).

Banks, like many other private and public institutions, have physically withdrawn from the town of Çiğdemli as both a cause and consequence of the population decline and the reduction of non-agricultural activities. However, they continue to be one of the key pillars of the agricultural game in Çiğdemli, functioning solely as a financial power and an organization of pure economic capital.

### 2.7.1.2. Agricultural Credit Cooperatives of Turkey

Agricultural Credit Cooperatives, along with Ziraat Bank, are two key organizations that finance the agricultural sector. Agricultural Credit Cooperatives are regulated by Law No. 1581 on Agricultural Loan Cooperatives and Unions, dated April 18, 1972. This law outlines the organizational structure of the cooperatives. According to Article 1, cooperatives within one or more provinces establish regional unions, and at least five regional unions form the central union. The central union is the sole parent organization and is located in Ankara (Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri ve Birlikleri Kanunu, 1972).

The Cooperatives' primary objective is to meet funding needs arising from insufficient agricultural capital accumulation (FAO, n.d.; Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri, p. 2). Agricultural Credit Cooperatives

were established to perform functions such as meeting all kinds of short and medium-term loan needs of its partners in cash and in kind, handling their products, providing all kinds of machinery, equipment and facilities for common use; providing production and essential consumption supplies of their members and other producers, increasing their vocational and technical knowledge, rendering social and cultural services, rendering banking and insurance services (Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri, p. 2).

Agricultural Credit Cooperatives provide two main groups of services. First, they offer financial services, which include short-term business loans. These loans cover credit-in-kind for agricultural input needs such as fertilizers, feed, diesel, agrochemicals, and other member necessities, as well as cash credit for services, insurance premiums, and soil analysis. On the other hand, medium-term loans are intended for investment purposes, including credits for agricultural machinery, equipment, and livestock investments. In addition to business and investment loans, cooperatives also provide documentation and consumption loans (Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri, 2023b). The distribution of loans by subject between 2014 and 2019 is shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Distribution of Loans Provided to Partners by Group (Thousand TL)

| Distribution of Loans Provided to Partners by Group (Thousand TL) | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Business Loan** | **2014** | **2015** | **2016** | **2017** | **2018** | **2019** | **%** |
| General Purpose Loan | 2,182,363 | 2,064,669 | 2,522,397 | 2,899,349 | 2,877,906 | 3,052,838 | 6.08 |
| Seeds, Seedlings and Saplings | 303,347 | 348,669 | 366,501 | 382,167 | 395,374 | 451,157 | 14.11 |
| Fertilizer | 1,283,246 | 1,453,146 | 1,225,391 | 1,394,681 | 1,652,841 | 1,808,926 | 9.44 |
| Agricultural Control | 54,463 | 62,782 | 75,886 | 86,659 | 123,517 | 139,991 | 13.34 |
| Livestock | 460,808 | 486,736 | 563,627 | 762,373 | 947,663 | 1,260,221 | 32.98 |
| Petroleum Products | 563,010 | 500,481 | 490,945 | 587,571 | 724,439 | 1,023,058 | 41.22 |
| Seafood | 5,703 | 7,702 | 5,563 | 5,255 | 5,049 | 2,846 | -43.63 |
| Consumption | 93,169 | 139,521 | 146,941 | 206,221 | 138,433 | 167,025 | 20.65 |
| Insurance Premium | 55,343 | 63,563 | 64,201 | 43,571 | 627 | 0 | -100.00 |
| Other Business Loans | 437,460 | 433,439 | 442,947 | 548,705 | 698,140 | 96,409 | -86.19 |
| **Investment Loan** | **2014** | **2015** | **2016** | **2017** | **2018** | **2019** | **%** |
| Equipment | 248,392 | 479,371 | 482,770 | 375,790 | 251,210 | 144,756 | -42.38 |
| Irrigation System | 107,692 | 125,432 | 121,343 | 79,934 | 53,210 | 22,365 | -57.97 |
| Building and Facility | 17,521 | 44,846 | 40,515 | 48,195 | 41,802 | 25,314 | -39.44 |
| Animal Husbandry Loan | 101,575 | 189,132 | 207,752 | 185,323 | 111,226 | 20,897 | -81.21 |
| Sapling | 446 | 652 | 834 | 109 | 0 | 26 | 100.00 |
| Other Investment | 33,049 | 5,655 | 7,616 | 13,411 | 5,055 | 6,449 | 27.58 |
| Total | 5,947,587 | 6,405,799 | 6,765,229 | 7,619,314 | 8,026,493 | 8,222,278 | 2.44 |

Source: Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri (2019, p. 29).

Cooperatives secure their receivables through guarantors and mortgages. Until 2002, loans from Agricultural Credit Cooperatives were utilized collectively in the form of group loans, where 20 individuals mutually guaranteed each other. This system has

since been abolished and replaced by the implementation of the Credit General Agreement. Joint lending was initiated by T.C. Ziraat Bankası A.Ş. in 2002 and finalized by the Agricultural Credit Cooperatives in 2004 (TBMM Tarım, Orman ve Köyişleri ile Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonları, 2007). Analyzing the loan collection rates of Agricultural Credit Cooperatives over the past 11 years, as shown in Table 6, reveals that the repayment rate for loans granted by the Cooperative varies between 89.34% and 96.24%.

Table 6: Collection Rates, Agricultural Credit Cooperatives, 2011 – 2021

| Year | Overdue Receivable | Collection Amount | Collection Rate (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2011 | 301,181,684.00 | 3,134,360,190 | 91.23 |
| 2012 | 317,879,812.00 | 3,773,691,483 | 92.23 |
| 2013 | 314,881,414.00 | 5,019,552,105 | 94.10 |
| 2014 | 339,955,952.00 | 5,341,619,963 | 94.02 |
| 2015 | 414,179,167.00 | 6,290,477,822 | 93.82 |
| 2016 | 390,533,355.00 | 6,691,916,061 | 94.49 |
| 2017 | 304,136,334.00 | 7,834,702,259 | 96.24 |
| 2018 | 513,956,884.00 | 8,680,759,680 | 94.41 |
| 2019 | 981,456,446.30 | 10,760,116,308 | 91.64 |
| 2020 | 1,175,189,496.41 | 9,850,070,932 | 89.34 |
| 2021 | 768,898,388.57 | 10,711,571,893 | 93.30 |

Source: Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri (2019, p. 35; 2021, p. 34).

The second group of services includes marketing and sales. Cooperatives sell various products to support production, such as plant nutrition products, diesel, plant protection products, animal feeds, seeds, agricultural equipment and machinery, and essential consumer goods (Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri, 2023d).

The Agricultural Credit Cooperatives of Turkey also engage in procurement, purchasing over 300 types of agricultural products from farmers through cooperatives at market prices. These products are then sold at Tarım Kredi Markets and other supermarkets to facilitate market access and support farmers. Notably, cereals such as wheat and barley, along with fresh vegetables and fruits, are among the products purchased by the cooperatives (Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri, 2023d). With the

establishment of supermarkets known as Tarım Kredi Market, cooperatives are involved in all steps of the production chain (Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri, 2023a).

Lastly, the cooperatives provide insurance services, including agricultural, life, and retirement insurance, through their companies Bereket Sigorta and Bereket Emeklilik ve Hayat A.Ş. Farmers registered in the Farmer Registration System also receive state sponsorship covering 50% of their insurance costs (Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri, 2023c).

As mentioned in Chapter 4.2.4, the local branch of Agricultural Credit Cooperatives in Çiğdemli has been permanently closed. The nearest branch is the 2450 no. Sorgun Agriculture Credit Cooperative, located in Sorgun. Nevertheless, the cooperatives still rank among the top options for farmers seeking to fulfill their agricultural needs.

#### 2.7.1.3. Beet Market, Sugar Factory and Cooperatives

Sugar beet production is the main raw material of sugar. Development of the sugar beet agriculture is connected to the sugar industry. In addition, pulp and molasses, which are by-products of the sugar industry, contribute to the development of livestock farming. The total sugar production in the world for the 2021/22 season is estimated to be 181 million 184 thousand tons, of which 38 million 471 thousand tons (21%) are from sugar beets. Turkey ranks 10$^{th}$ with a share of 1.5% in sugar production (Ünsal, 2022, p. 3).

Turkey traditionally based its sugar policy on self-sufficiency. However, due to the years of excess production the increase in sugar stocks, a quota system was implemented for sugar beet production in 1998 (Tosun & Arslan, 2016, p. 329).

The Sugar Law No. 4634, which came into effect on April 19, 2001, in Turkey, aims to ensure stability in sugar production, open the industry to competition in the domestic market, and comply with European Union regulations, World Trade Organization agreements, and other international commitments. It also seeks to prepare the legal infrastructure necessary for privatization (Tosun & Arslan, 2016). In the same year, the Turkish Sugar Authority was established under Article 12 of the Sugar Act to

implement this law. To maintain stability in sugar production and supply, the law introduces a quota system that allocates market shares among sugar factories (Ünsal, 2022, p. 7).

Article 2 of the Law defines Quota A as the amount of sugar produced based on domestic demand and available for the domestic market during the marketing year. Quota B refers to the amount of sugar produced that corresponds to a certain proportion of Quota A and is kept for safety purposes. Raw and white sugar produced outside of the A and B quotas, which cannot be marketed domestically but is acquired for processing with export purposes, is referred to as "Sugar-C." The amount of sugar to be marketed is determined by quotas, if necessary, for each type of sugar separately, based on sucrose and other sugars. The total A quota for starch-based sugars cannot exceed 10% of the country's total A quota. The Council of Ministers is authorized to adjust this ratio by up to 50% based on the recommendations of the Sugar Beet Authority (Şeker Kanunu, 2001).

The Sugar Authority was dissolved by a decree dated December 24, 2017, and its powers were transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The authority to determine, cancel, and transfer A and B quotas has been granted to the President (Olağanüstü Hal Kapsamında Bazı Düzenlemeler Yapılması Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararname, 2017). The upper limit set for starch-based sugars has been reduced to 5% of the country's total A quota, and the President is authorized to adjust this ratio by up to 50%. Each year, the President determines the A and B quotas for companies, considering domestic sugar demand and the processing and production capacities of factories, no later than June 30 for the upcoming five-year periods. According to the Presidential Decree published in the Official Gazette, the total A sugar quota for the 2019-2020 marketing year was set at 2.7 million tons, with the sugar beet A quota at 2,632,500 tons and the B quota at 131,625 tons (5% of the A quota). The quota for starch-based sugar was determined to be 67,500 tons, which is 2.5% of the total A quota (Web Tarım TV, 2019).

The quantitative distribution of sugar beet quotas for the last 12 years from 2010/2011 to 2021/2022 is presented in Table 7.

Table 7: Sugar Beet Quota Distribution, 2010 - 2022

| (BİN TON) | 10/11 | 11/12 | 12/13 | 13/14 | 14/15 | 15/16 | 16/17 | 17/18 | 18/19 | 19/20 | 20/21 | 21/22 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A Kotası | 2.200 | 2.200 | 2.200 | 2.215,9 | 2.259,9 | 2.250 | 2.385 | 2.536,5 | 2.565 | 2.632,5 | 2.632,5 | 2.632,5 |
| A Kotası Üretimi | 2.105 | 2.131 | 2.112 | 2.207 | 2.055 | 1.891 | 2.383 | 2.525 | 2.206 | 2.458 | 2.632 | 2.469 |
| Top. Üretim (A+B+C) | 2.262 | 2.270 | 2.129 | 2.390 | 2.058 | 1.976 | 2.559 | 2.770 | 2.273 | 2.536 | 3.069 | 2.520 |
| Yurtiçi Satış | 1.867 | 2.151 | 1.918 | 2.083 | 2.019 | 1.988 | 2.389 | 2.268 | 2.455 | 2.468 | 2.507 | 2.573 |
| Yurtdışı Satış (C Şekeri) | 283 | 290 | 339 | 319 | 192 | 33 | 56 | 77 | 224 | 56 | 427 | 126 |
| Yıl Sonu Stok A Kotası | 333 | 48 | 118 | 83 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 257 | 8 | 0,004 | 125 | 22 |
| Yıl Sonu Stok B Kotası | 88 | 88 | 88 | 66 | 43 | 28 | 83 | 120 | 128 | 132 | 132 | 100 |
| Yıl Sonu Stok C Şekeri | 113 | 227 | 31 | 76 | 7 | 3 | 63 | 194 | 29 | 45 | 56 | 10 |

Source: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2022, p. 4). The B quota amount allowed in the 2015-2016 and 2016/2017 marketing years is included. The amount of C sugar and B quota allowed for domestic sale in the 2021/2022 marketing year is included.

Sugar beet production is carried out by signing contracts between producers and factories in the cultivation areas, subject to the sugar quotas determined every year. According to the Sugar and Raw Materials Regulation, before singing any contracts, companies inform the Ministry of Agriculture regarding the applied rotation method and the principles for determining the amount of sugar beet for A and B quotas allocated to the producers to fulfill their allocated sugar beet quotas. Companies are obliged to ensure that farmers plant according to the declared rotation period and principles. Sugar beet produced and delivered as a sugar raw material other than A and B quotas is considered as C-beet. Whether the sugar equivalent of C beet is purchased or not depends on the agreement between the companies and the producers or their representatives.

According to the article 11 of the Sugar and Raw Materials Regulation Sugar beet prices or advance prices are determined each year through negotiations between companies and producers or their representatives, which begin in October before the beet planting, and are finalized by the end of November (Şeker ve Hammaddeleri Yönetmeliği). The purchase price of sugar beet for A and B quotas is separately determined. C beet prices corresponding to C sugar are determined by the real and legal persons operating the factory, under the supervision of a producer observer, by the end of December each year, taking into account world market prices. C beet prices are in general significantly lower than the A quota sugar beet.

Today there are 16 sugar companies operates in Turkey, 15 of which are privately owned. Only the Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları A.Ş. (Türkşeker) with its 15 factories is publicly owned (Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları A.Ş., 2019).

The sugar beet production in the Çiğdemli and Sorgun region is regulated and channeled to the Yozgat Sugar Beet Factory owned by Türkşeker, which is located in Sorgun, 8 km away from Çiğdemli. As of 2019, a total of 280 people is employed at the factory, including 199 permanent workers, 65 seasonal workers and 16 civil servants (Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları A.Ş., 2020, p. 17).

In 2019, the A quota beet production of 15 sugar factories operating within the company was determined as 8,300,000 tons, and 34,741 producers in 1,194 settlements signed contracts for the production of 8,300,000 tons of beet. In this context, 495,000 tons of beet quota has been allocated for Yozgat province, and a total of 2,880 producers in 116 villages in Yozgat have made production commitments for this amount. As part of the commitments made, a total of 2,879 producers have planted sugar beets on 7,029.2 hectares of land (Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları A.Ş., p. 24).

The usual procedure is as following: The quotas are determined on a producer basis by the Regional Chiefs of Agriculture. Then the villages are visited to make a contract with the producers who want to produce beets. The contracts are signed with a group of farmers between 5 people and a maximum of 30. The amount of beet they are committed to produce are written on individual basis. The first producer on the top of the list is assigned as the representative of the group. It is remarkable that all farmers in the group are joint sureties to each other.

In the contracts, A Quota Beet is defined as

> (…) the amount of beet without wastage that each producer written in this contract undertakes to produce in accordance with the conditions determined for the production of sugar produced according to domestic demand and which can be given to the domestic market within the marketing year. (Türkşeker, 2021)

The C Beet is defined as “the amount of beet without wastage that the producer produces and delivers above the amount of A quota beet committed by the producer”

(Türkşeker, 2021). Unless the farmers do not commit to the specific area they are supposed to farm, the excess amount of harvest is still accepted as C-beet.

The base purchase price is the price of 1 ton of net A quota sugar beet containing 16% polar sugar with reduced wastage is determined. Additional payment or deduction is made according to the sugar content of the beet delivered by the producer. Average prices for different quota types are shown in Table 8.

Table 8: Türkşeker Sugar Beet Procurement Prices, 2015-2020

| Türkşeker Sugar Beet Procurement Prices, 2015-2020 | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year | A Quota Beet Price (TL/Mt)* | The Average Purchase Price** | C-Beet Price (Contract) | C-Beet Price (Extra-Contract) |
| 2015 | 190.00 | 179.82 | 105.00 | - |
| 2016 | 190.00 | 195.80 | 115.00 | - |
| 2017 | 210.00 | 210.77 | 140.00 | 115.00 |
| 2018 | 235.00 | 228.88 | - | 130.00 |
| 2019 | 300.00 | 317.71 | 200.00 | - |
| 2020 | 336.00 | 347.93 | 250.00 | |

Source: Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları AŞ (2002 - 2020). *The definitive purchase price for one metric ton of sugar beet, based on A quota and with a guaranteed delivery of 16% polar sugar content. **The average purchase price for one metric ton of A quota sugar beet with reduced impurities, based on the actual polar sugar content.

If the producers fill the committed A quota, a "Quota Completion Premium" is paid for per ton of net A quota sugar beet. In places where the vegetation period is short and the yield is low due to regional climatic conditions, the Company may also grant "Beet Production Incentive Premium" (Türkşeker, 2021). If producers have not planted the beets they are obliged to, the beets they receive to the company are not accepted.

In the case that the Company decides to purchase C beet produced above the A quota in accordance with the rotation plan, the amount, price and purchasing principles of C beet to be purchased are determined by the Company in accordance with the Law No. 4634 and related regulations. However, no ± polarization difference is applied to the determined price (Türkşeker, 2021).

Sugar beet production subsidies are applied for A quota beets. Sugar beet production supports are mainly granted in forms of advances in cash and in kind. The company

supplies the necessary beet seeds from certified seeds of our country and gives them to the producers. Chemical fertilizers are also carried out by the company or be outsourced to another organization. The Company pays cash advances to the producers at 4 separate times during the maintenance, irrigation and dismantling periods of the beet. All the cash advances, input costs and other expenses are deducted from producer receivables. Producers who deliver their beets to the factory's central weighbridge are paid transportation support according to the distance (Türkşeker, 2021).

Beet cooperatives (Pankobirlik) were established in 1951 as a response to the growing sugar industry. Among Turkey's agricultural production cooperatives, beet cooperatives have the smallest number of members. As of 2019, there are only 31 cooperatives with a total of 1,448,171 members. Despite this, beet cooperatives represent the most organized structure among agricultural cooperatives, accounting for 41% of the total 3,559,627 members in this sector (Çiçek & Acar, 2019, p. 105).

Following the adoption of Cooperative Law No. 1163, the Sugar Beet Farmers Cooperatives established a union in 1972 known as Pankobirlik (Kooperatifler Kanunu, 1969). This union has 328 branches across 13,750 settlements in 64 provinces, along with six Cooperative Sugar Factories located in Amasya, Kayseri, Boğazlıyan, Konya, Çumra, and Turhal (Pancar Ekicileri Kooperatifleri Birliği).

The cooperative representing beet producers in Yozgat province is the Yozgat Beet Farmers' Cooperative, with its headquarters situated in the Sorgun district.

As seen, regulatory authorities at various levels, Yozgat Sugar Beet Factory, and beet cooperatives, play a decisive role in the agricultural game involving sugar beet producers. They hold significant weight in areas such as the physical conditions of beet production, the value of beet as an economic capital in the Bourdieu sense, and the organization of beet production. This transforms these institutions into arenas of power struggle.

As we will see in Chapter 3, sugar beet producers in the agricultural game attempt to assert influence within and over these institutions based on their political power, class position, and the social capital they can mobilize. They strive to intervene in

distribution relations in their favor, becoming part of informal distribution relationships through the quota system. We will revisit this topic later.

#### 2.7.1.5. Turkish Grain Board

Turkish Grain Board (TGB) is the public enterprise, a subsidiary organization of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry found in 1938, which is mainly responsible for the regulation of grain market. According to the article 4 of the main statute of the company, TGB operates

> (…) to prevent the prices of cereals and legumes in the country from falling below normal levels for producers and from rising abnormally to the detriment of consumers, to take regulatory measures for the market of these products, to carry out tasks related to other agricultural products besides cereals and legumes as assigned by the President when necessary, and to manage the state monopoly imposed on opium and narcotic substances (Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi Genel Müdürlüğü Ana Statüsü)

In order to stabilize the markets, TGB conducts purchase and sale of the products at prices determined according to their type and location annually, establishes necessary warehouse facilities, and stores the products. In necessary cases, it is also allowed to import products from foreign markets.

As previously mentioned, the Turkish Grain Board (TGB) purchases grains at a minimum price set by the government, preventing prices from falling below this level. The difference between the set minimum price and the market price at the time of the public purchase constitutes the amount transferred from public resources to the actors selling their products to TGB. This intervention by the public institution directly impacts distribution relationships through its market purchases. If TGB incurs a loss as a result of this intervention, it is covered as a duty loss by the Treasury. Consequently, this intervention ultimately redistributes taxes collected from society in favor of the actors selling their products to TGB.

Except in exceptional cases, TGB purchases products directly from farmers, with the quantity purchased limited by the farmer's registered cultivation amount in the Farmer Registration System. This condition indicates that TGB, at least de jure, restricts access to those bringing products from others, such as traders, thereby prioritizing support for

certain social classes within the agricultural field. On the other hand, TGB also buys from large farmers, suggesting, as reflected in the slogan “The Office is the Farmer's Friend,” that its purchasing policies do not differentiate between large and small farmers.

TGB purchases mostly cereals including wheat, barley, oath, triticale and corn; legumes such as lentil and chickpeas; hazelnut and poppy. New products such as potatoes, dried apricots, dry fig and raisins have been added to the list in recent years. The types of products to be purchased, purchasing criteria and conditions are determined by Presidential Decisions and the procurement circulars issued based on these decisions. Actual implementation of purchases is carried out by the provincial organization (2019 Faaliyet Raporu, pp. 28-35).

For this purpose, Turkish Grain Board operates warehouse facilities all cross the country. As of 2019, the provincial organization of the Turkish Grain Board consists of a total of 207 workplaces, including 1 management office, 33 branch directorates, 106 agency directorates, and 67 facilities teams (2019 Faaliyet Raporu, p. 14). There is a branch office in Yozgat, an agency directorate in Sorgun and 5 facilities in the hinterland of Yozgat including Saray, Sarıkent, Sekili, Şefaatli and Doğankent. The two closest delivery points to Çiğdemli are Sorgun agency directorate, 13 kilometers away, and Doğankent, 28 kilometers away.

Farmers can physically deliver their products to TMO warehouses. TGB usually purchases the farmers' products in advance. Besides, TGB can also receive products as collateral through electronic product receipt (ELÜS) or receipt certificates. Producers who deliver their products to licensed warehouses established under the Law on Licensed Warehousing of Agricultural Products No. 5300 (Tarım Ürünleri Lisanslı Depoculuk Kanunu, 2005) and want to sell their products to TMO can do so through Electronic Product Receipt (ELÜS).

Although we do not have procurement statistics at Çiğdemli level, we do have them for Sorgun (Table 9). The annual agricultural product purchase quantities by Sorgun Agency Directorate gives us an idea about how active Turkish Grain Board in the region.

Table 9: Turkish Grain Board Procurements in Sorgun, 2005-2021

| Year | Durum Wheat | Wheat | Forage Wheat | Others (Barley, Lentil, Chickpeas) | Total (kg) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2005 | 905,340 | 38,349,500 | 1,912,700 | 271,860 | 41,439,400 |
| 2006 | 47,790 | 18,193,670 | 166,240 | 199,840 | 18,607,540 |
| 2008 | | | 161,480 | | 161,480 |
| 2009 | 3,579,210 | 37,450,420 | 17,724,180 | 3,291,460 | 62,045,270 |
| 2010 | 329,560 | 12,519,200 | 573,960 | 681,420 | 14,104,140 |
| 2011 | 3,166,700 | 2,160,020 | 8,520,720 | 2,940 | 13,850,380 |
| 2012 | 110,480 | 7,591,740 | 113,720 | | 7,815,940 |
| 2013 | 2,466,640 | 2,839,910 | 20,372,980 | | 25,679,530 |
| 2015 | 10,714,600 | 4,180,080 | 18,950,940 | 248,380 | 34,094,000 |
| 2016 | 14,204,920 | 8,429,580 | 1,716,540 | | 24,351,040 |
| 2017 | 5,413,240 | 6,198,640 | 220,960 | | 11,832,840 |
| 2018 | 2,885,660 | 1,723,260 | 5,192,080 | 2,978,460 | 12,779,460 |
| 2019 | 7,560 | 71,940 | 14,580 | 15,067,420 | 15,161,500 |
| 2021 | | | | | 102,340 |
| **Total** | 43,831,700 | 139,707,960 | 75,641,080 | 22,741,780 | 282,024,860 |

Source: Turkish Grain Board (2022b).

The Turkish Grain Board (TMO), as an institution that directly intervenes in the market using tools considered market-antagonistic by initiatives aimed at liberalizing international agricultural trade, is positioned to be the first and most directly affected by these international trends. It can be said that the rise or decline of neoliberal policies can be most accurately determined by observing the changes in the policies of the Turkish Grain Board. During the EU harmonization process, TMO underwent significant changes in two key areas. First, there was a gradual plan to end direct market intervention, manifested in delaying the market intervention process and aggregating procurement quantities to prevent direct purchases from small farmers. Second, regulations were introduced concerning the quality standards in purchases and the reduction of product variety. Third, efforts were made to expand the financialization of agricultural products through electronic warehouse receipts, entrusted purchase systems, and grain exchanges. The goal was to transform TMO into an independent agricultural regulatory institution by the end of this process.

The objectives of delaying procurement and gradually increasing the minimum procurement amount were postponed and eventually shelved due to public backlash and political concerns from the outset. Consequently, the plan to become an independent regulatory body, which was considered several times, was not implemented. However, efforts towards financial deepening yielded results, with

projects like electronic warehouse receipts and licensed warehousing being put into practice. Although some goals, such as the liquidity of the agricultural market and the privatization of storage capacity, were partially achieved, the state did not take radical steps that would eliminate its political and public sovereignty over the agricultural sector. Furthermore, the reversal of international developments, such as the 2008 crisis and subsequent food security concerns, has led to the abandonment of these projects, at least in the current conjuncture.

#### 2.7.1.6. Merchants

Merchants are those who trade agricultural inputs and agricultural products. They may be in an institutionalized form, such as local businesses; or individual traders. While some of the big farmers in the region tend to trade agricultural commodities individually, there are also corporate businesses that both trades agricultural commodities and inputs.

In Çiğdemli, the most significant representor of corporate merchantry is the owners of gas stations. There are two gas stations in Çiğdemli (hereafter gas station A and B), and one in Duralidayılı (gas station C). There are also others, in Sorgun and other nearby settlements but these three are the ones that directly affect Çiğdemli's economy of agricultural input and product the most.

The gas stations in Çiğdemli play a crucial role in the local agricultural market (Figures 39 and 40). The families that own these stations not only sell fuel oil and diesel but also operate offices and facilities for agricultural input and product trade on the same premises. They serve as distributors for major national industrial fertilizer corporations, such as IGSAŞ, GÜBRETAŞ, Toros Tarım, and BAĞFAŞ. In addition to fuel, they sell pesticides, seeds, and fodder, acting as the final link in the distribution chain for essential agricultural inputs. Although the district center of Sorgun also has an agricultural input and commodity market, most of the small farmers I interviewed prefer to sell their products to and purchase inputs from these local gas stations. In this respect, gas stations are like centers through which all kinds of agricultural capital flow, concentrate and distribute.




Figure 39: Gas Station A, 08/04/2019: A typical business complex in the region, consisting of a gas station, an agricultural inputs-distributer market, a weighbridge and a storage for agricultural products.




Figure 40: Gas Station B, 08/30/2019: The market is next to the gas station and the storage, filled up with wheat, stands behind.

### 2.7.2. Recent Agricultural Policies

National agricultural policies undoubtedly constitute an important part of the rules governing the agricultural game. However, following Bourdieu (see section 1.4.5.2), when we conceptualize the state as a field of power struggle, we can assert that the determination and implementation of policies that intervene in public distribution relations are shaped by the struggle among players in the agricultural and political fields. Thus, as we will see below, it is essential to keep in mind that current agricultural policies do not represent an absolute set of rules. Instead, they signify codes that reflect the balance of existing power relations at a specific historical moment, while being subject to continuous change and the dynamics of power struggles. In the next chapter, we will examine how these policies have produced different outcomes in the everyday agricultural game in Çiğdemli, impacting the relationships among various social classes and groups.

#### 2.7.2.1. Licensed Warehouse System

Licensed warehouses and warehouse receipt systems are commonly used in many countries to finance agricultural production and facilitate transactions. This system allows agricultural products to be used as collateral to access funds (Höllinger, Rutten, & Kiriakov, 2009, p. 17).

The World Bank funded warehouse receipt systems in Turkey, as well as in several other developing countries such as Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Poland during the 1990s (Varangis & Larson, 2015). On July 16, 1998, the World Bank approved the Commodities Market Development Project (CMDP), which aims to: (a) increase the marketing efficiency of grains and cotton through selected commodity exchanges; (b) demonstrate the benefits of enhanced private commodity marketing; and (c) provide a model for the development of other private exchanges, encouraging governments to reduce their intervention in the marketing of other commodities. The project includes introducing quality grades for wheat and cotton, designing and implementing a warehouse receipt system, and improving commodity exchanges (WB). In 2005, Law No. 5300 on Agricultural Products Licensed Warehousing came into force (Tarım Ürünleri Lisanslı Depoculuk Kanunu, 2005).

From the outset, the system has faced criticism. In 2005, the Chamber of Agricultural Engineers (UCTEA) noted that the warehouse receipt system in the U.S. is part of an integrated support system, which requires both credit and support mechanisms to function effectively. They argued that the new regulation in Turkey only transfers the warehouse receipt system as a transaction facilitator, without incorporating the necessary credit and support systems. Additionally, they pointed out that Turkey lacks the appropriate physical and legal infrastructure, as well as a standardization system, for the warehouse receipt system to operate effectively. Finally, they claimed that the government's gradual reduction in agricultural support meant that the intent of the new law was merely to privatize publicly owned warehouses (Ziraat Mühendisleri Odası, 2004b). Kaya (2018) contends that the licensed warehousing system in Turkey is ineffective because it is not complemented by a supportive procurement system. Furthermore, the system does not attract small farmers, as the advantages are negated by costs associated with small-scale operations (p. 58).

Since its implementation, licensed warehouses and the warehouse receipt system have not achieved the expected level of success (Kaya, 2017, p. 2).

During the field study, there were no licensed warehouse nearby the town. However, in 2019 a company named ULİDAŞ, has leased a warehouse with 67,000 tons capacity from its Ulusoy Un Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ in Sorgun, got license and start its operations (Tarım Ürünleri Lisanslı Depoculuk Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ). In Çiğdemli, small farmers have well established relations with traders, where they usually been financed by them.

For wheat, barley, rye, oats, corn, paddy, rice, lentils, chickpeas, beans, sunflowers, soybeans, cotton, hazelnuts, dried apricots, pistachios, raisins, olives and olive oil products stored in licensed warehouses, rent, transportation and analysis fee support payments are made to the producers. The data in the Table 10 provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry General Directorate of Agricultural Reform shows that the number of producers who are entitled to the licensed warehouse support payments were increased from 54 in 2018 to 796 in 2019; and it has dropped to 234 in 2020. The numbers indicates that farmers have not showed much interest in licensed warehouses in Sorgun yet.

Table 10: Rent, Transportation, And Analysis Fee Supports Paid to Producers Storing Their Products In Licensed Warehouse

| Years | Türkiye | | Yozgat | | Sorgun | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of Producers | Paid, ₺ | Number of Producers | Paid, ₺ | Number of Producers | Paid, ₺ |
| **2018** | 26,066 | 49,398,109 | 2,604 | 2,478,686 | 54 | 23,188 |
| **2019** | 32,134 | 47,466,386 | 3,439 | 2,379,480 | 796 | 139,935 |
| **2020** | 31,516 | 30,103,562 | 4,447 | 3,097,424 | 234 | 136,381 |

Source: (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry General Directorate of Agricultural Reform, 2022)

Although the General Directorate have not provided us with data on a town scale; I have not observed anyone in Çiğdemli who take his crop to the licensed warehouse during the field study.

### 2.7.2.2. Supporting Young Farmer Projects

Regarding the rural development efforts, article 15th of the Agriculture Law No.5488 reads that The Ministry is responsible for developing agricultural and non-agricultural

employment in rural areas, increasing and diversifying incomes and increasing the education and entrepreneurship level of women and young people (Tarım Kanunu, 2006).

There have been alternative subsidy policies aiming at ensuring sustainability in agriculture, supporting the entrepreneurship of young farmers, raising the income level, creating alternative income sources and supporting projects for agricultural production in rural areas that will contribute to the employment of young people in rural areas. For this purpose, the Decree on Supporting Young Farmer Projects within the Scope of Rural Development Supports (Decree Number: 2016/8540) is issued in 2016 (Kırsal Kalkınma Projeleri Kapsamında Genç Çiftçi Projelerinin Desteklenmesine İlişkin Karar, 2016). It is followed by communiqués that determine the procedures and principles regarding the support of projects. According to the regulations projects would be supported with an amount up to 30,000 TL. The Table 11 provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry General Directorate of Agricultural Reform indicates that the number of projects supported varies between 24 and 31 in the first three years of the program. The annual amount of grant paid is 810,000 TL on average.

Table 11: Young Farmer Support Payments, 2016-2018

| Years | Türkiye | | Yozgat | | Sorgun | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of Producers | Paid, ₺ | Number of Producers | Paid, ₺ | Number of Producers | Paid, ₺ |
| **2016** | 14,978 | 449,090.3 | 229 | 6,869.3 | 24 | 720.0 |
| **2017** | 16,067 | 482,010.0 | 247 | 7,410.0 | 26 | 780.0 |
| **2018** | 16,730 | 501,900.0 | 257 | 7,710.0 | 31 | 930.0 |

Source: (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry General Directorate of Agricultural Reform, 2022)

During my fieldwork in Çiğdemli, I did not encounter any farmer who benefited from such support. Considering that only 31 farmers in Sorgun district received young farmer support in 2018, it can be argued that this support remained insignificant in the agricultural field. We can think that the low number of young people in the town is also effective in this result. Redistribution policies targeting young people do not seem to have had an impact on small farmers in Çiğdemli as they are generally older.

#### 2.7.2.3. Income Tax

In the context of tax policies, there are many taxes that affect the agricultural field. However, since we will focus on income tax as a tax that influences farmers' agricultural strategies in the later sections of our thesis, it is appropriate to discuss it here.

Farmers are subject to income tax. According to Article 54 of Income Tax Law No. 193, farmers who either exceed a certain enterprise size defined by the law or who voluntarily choose to be taxed under the real method are taxed accordingly (Hayran, 2012). These businesses pay a tax rate ranging from 15% to 35% of their income. Another form of income tax is tax withholding, where an amount equal to the withholding rates—ranging from 2% to 4%—is deducted from the purchase price of agricultural products, with the remainder paid to the farmer (Hayran, 2012, p. 11). This law aims to prevent tax evasion by collecting tax at the source.

Our field observations indicate that the agricultural products obtained by farmers can circulate in the market without being registered and, consequently, without being taxed. Therefore, the current tax policies are not absolute rules from the perspective of the agricultural game; rather, they are rules that players consider but can violate. Moreover, it is important to note that this violation or disregard can become a regular tendency, evolving into a form of *agricultural habitus*. This topic will be revisited later.

#### 2.7.2.4. Farmer Registration System

The lack of adequate records in relevant organizations has been a major concern for policy makers. In order to collect statistical information in a systematic manner, registering producers and keeping records of agricultural business owners and their production activities are set as policy goals in the 7$^{th}$ Development Plan (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı). In the 8$^{th}$ Development Plan, Farmer Registration System, Land Registry-Cadastre System, Geographical Information System and Farm Accounting Data Network are planned to be developed (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 2001-2005, p. 133).

The article 3 of the Law no. 5488 defines Farmer Registration System as "the agricultural database created by the Ministry of Agriculture where farmers are registered" (Tarım Kanunu, 2006, article 3).

The Farmer Registration System (FRS) is designed, in its ideal application, to record and track all agricultural transactions of farmers, thereby eliminating unregistered agricultural activities. If such a system were fully implemented, it would not be incorrect to say that the role of informal relationships in agriculture would decrease, tax collection rates would rise, and the actual impacts and outcomes of implemented policies could be monitored. This system would result in significant influence from bureaucratic players and the organization of bureaucracy over the agricultural field. However, our field observations reveal that the current implementation of the Farmer Registration System is far from this scenario. As we will see in Chapter 3, there are transactions both within the Farmer Registration System and outside of it in the local agricultural field. Moreover, whether to appear within the FRS or not remains a choice based on the benefits that players hope to achieve in the agricultural field. This topic will be revisited later when discussing issues related to land fragmentation and support.

#### 2.7.2.5. Policies targeting Conservation of Soil and Sustainable Use of Land

Between the first years of the Republic of Turkey and 1990s, the number of farmlands has been constantly increased due to the rapid population growth and introduction of agricultural machinery. During this period most of the arable lands were opened for cultivation. Since 1990s, farm land amount has been dropping.

Agricultural business scale and the level of fragmentation are among the determinants of effective and sustainable use of farmlands. Fragmentation can be described as the fact that the lands of an enterprise are divided into many parcels and each of the divided parcels is located in different places (Tarım Özel İhtisas Komisyonu, 2014, p. 9).

According to the 2001 General Agricultural Census, there is an average of 4.1 parcels per enterprise in Turkey, and the average parcel size is 1.5 hectares. 2005 Agricultural Enterprise Structure Study, fragmentation of agricultural lands continues. According to the Farmer Register System, average farm size per enterprise has increased to 6.3 hectares in 2006 and 6.8 in 2011 (Tarım Özel İhtisas Komisyonu, 2014, p. 10).

In the last two decades, laws and regulations were made to prevent further fragmentation to occur. The provisions of The Turkish Civil Law no. 4721 on inheritance, prohibited the division of the agricultural businesses without adequate agricultural assets (Türk Medeni Kanunu, 2001).

Law No. 5403 on Soil Conservation and Land Use passed in 2005 aimed at "determining the minimum agricultural land size and agricultural land size with sufficient income and prevention of fragmentation" (Toprak Koruma ve Arazi Kullanımı Kanunu, 2005, article 1). In the first version of the Law, the minimum agricultural land size is determined by the Ministry, taking into account the social, economic, ecological and technical characteristics of the region and regions. Below the determined sizes, agricultural lands cannot be subdivided, allotted, the number of shares and stakeholders cannot be increased, except the sales transactions of immovable properties belong to the Treasury.

> The minimum agricultural land size is determined by the Ministry, taking into account the social, economic, ecological and technical characteristics of the region and regions. Agricultural lands that reach the specified minimum size become indivisible commodities

The 9th Development Plan envisaged the acceleration of land consolidation (Dokuzuncu Kalkınma Planı, 2007-2013, p. 49).

Law No. 6537 amending the Law No. 5403 passed in 2014, determines minimum sizes for each class of agricultural land. The minimum size cannot be smaller than 2 hectares for absolute, marginal and special product agricultural lands; 0,5 hectares for tree farming lands and 0,3 hectares for greenhouse farming lands . This new regulation also determines agricultural land sizes of provinces and districts with sufficient income. Agricultural lands cannot be allocated or divided below the agricultural land sizes with sufficient income. According to the List (1) attached to the Law, in Sorgun the agricultural land with sufficient income is 70 decare for irrigated farms, 130 decare for dry farms, 10 decare for forest farming and 3 decare for greenhouse area (see, Toprak Koruma Ve Arazi Kullanimi Kanununda Değişiklik Yapilmasi Hakkinda Kanun, 2014, art. 8 and List 1).

The law ensures that the transfer of the ownership of land must be completed within a year. If heirs do not come to an agreement on transfer, the dispute is then should be brought to trial. If not, then the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry have the authority to apply to court for transfer of the land to the competent heir, to the heir offering the highest price among competent heirs or to third persons (Article 5).

The implementation of the law has caused some important problems. The mechanism law envisages is built upon the assumption that heirs are *disposed to* mutually come to an agreement on the distribution of the inherited properties in a certain way. If that is not possible, the law foresees that parties would appeal to court. However, as we observe in Çiğdemli, this mechanism is not working or taking a long time in practice.

#### 2.7.2.6. Use of Political Power to Secure Agricultural Supports

The field study gives us important clues about that social capital plays an important role in securing public funds and supports in agricultural field. So, kindship ties, political and social relations with the local bureaucracy and politicians allows someone to channel resources more than those who do not have such connections. In other words, social capital is crucial to increase the agricultural economic capital.

The data in the Table 12 provided by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry General Directorate of Agricultural Reform shows that during the last 16 years from 2006 to 2021 a total of 3,996,430.500 TL is granted to a total of 15,553 project. During the same term, 95 projects from Yozgat received a total amount of 45,436,860 TL. When we look at Sorgun, only 15 projects received a total of 7,386,900 TL in the same period. There is no project from neither Sorgun nor Yozgat that received any grant in 2019.

Şamil states that no one knows about agricultural subsidies:

> Interviewer: I noticed that although Yozgat is within the scope of support, I haven't come across many people who benefit from the support?
>
> Şamil: Supports are given, but there are no farmers who benefit from them. We have TKDK [Agriculture and Rural Development Support Institution] there, they had a stand at the fair recently, the fair just ended. I went, their stand was empty. Not a single farmer. There was a time when we wanted to get into safflower. At that time, medicinal aromatic plants were supported. I also

received support. And people don't know the way. There is nothing to tell them about these supports. There is no institution that can guide them. (Interview 29)

Table 12: Supports Under Rural Development Investments Support Program

| Years | Türkiye | | Yozgat | | Sorgun | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Number of Projects | Paid, ₺ | Number of Projects | Paid, ₺ | Number of Projects | Paid, ₺ |
| **2006** | 86 | 9,747.59 | - | - | - | - |
| **2007** | 669 | 68,346.32 | - | - | - | - |
| **2008** | 880 | 139,076.79 | - | - | - | - |
| **2009** | 168 | 37,114.98 | 8 | 1,907.77 | 1 | 243.46 |
| **2010** | 1,350 | 308,646.37 | 6 | 1,581.74 | - | - |
| **2011** | 14 | 2,901.92 | 12 | 3,974.41 | 1 | 329.34 |
| **2012** | 777 | 201,043.49 | - | - | - | - |
| **2013** | 677 | 160,838.18 | 6 | 1,553.73 | - | - |
| **2014** | 860 | 218,339.51 | 14 | 4,754.55 | 2 | 197.25 |
| **2015** | 1,696 | 522,007.71 | 23 | 14,384.47 | 5 | 3,481.50 |
| **2016** | 566 | 312,194.59 | - | - | - | - |
| **2017** | 82 | 37,367.94 | 15 | 8,376.09 | 4 | 1,967.90 |
| **2018** | 1,641 | 616,414.30 | 4 | 3,154.47 | - | - |
| **2019** | 1,796 | 392,572.10 | - | - | - | - |
| **2020** | 1,991 | 534,277.55 | 7 | 5,699.63 | 2 | 1,167.45 |
| **2021** | 2,300 | 435,541.17 | 1 | 50 | - | - |
| **Total** | 15,553 | 3,996,430.50 | 96 | 45,436.86 | 15 | 7,386.90 |

Source: (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry General Directorate of Agricultural Reform, 2022).

It is understood that the knowledge of when and how to apply for agricultural support can actually be acquired as part of a specific network of social relations. This can be considered as a part of agricultural social capital. Undoubtedly, the information we gathered in the field hints that larger farmers have easier access to such information.

It is also worth emphasizing that not the small farmers, but big farmers complain about favoritism in agricultural support system. They know the impact of politics and social networks in reaching out to public funds. Many big farmers pointed out that agricultural subsidies go to those who have political and economic power, not to needers. As Hüseyin puts it,

> For example, the projects they give as grants. You look, it's always the deputies of district chairmen, provincial chairmen who get these grants. Those who need them don't get them. There was a project the other day, they were going to give a sifting device with a grant, to sift chickpeas, lentils, wheat. What should

> happen, it should be given to those in need. You see, wherever there is a millionaire, he went and bought a sifting device from the grant. Rich people got it. There is no support for ordinary people. Grants go to rich people, political people. A minister, a politician does not come to a village and ask about the price of fertilizer and diesel. You give support, but see if it benefits a farmer. (Hüseyin, Interview 11)

İbrahim, a small farmer, also speaks of grain cleaner machines granted to powerful people. It is again quite familiar how he grasps the relationship between politics, power and distribution:

> İbrahim: (...) Last time I took chickpeas to Şahbazlar, there are Şahbazlar, they buy chickpeas and lentils. The man took it and looked at it and said, "18 liras." I said, "Fear God, son," and the man said, "Why do you say fear God? If you give me, I'll take it, if you don't, it's yours, take it away." I came from there, there is a place called Konuklar on the right side of the asphalt, I gave it to them for 22 liras. There is not 4 kilometers between the two. They have a sieving machine. Both Şahbaz's and Konuk's screening machines are state grants. There is a sign there, they hung it on the wall, it says "Grant from the Ministry of Agriculture". The state protects the bigwigs. It never protects the weak. Men sift chickpeas there for 80 liras a ton. Ahmet and I sifted 1 ton each, we paid 160 liras. The state is on the side of the tycoon. How does he get the grant, he has a relationship with a tycoon, an MP, a general manager, so they give it to him. If I were with them, would they give me a grant?
>
> Sultan: Of course, because they are Tayyipists, that's why they give it to them. Because they are all Ak Parti members... [He paused, paused] ... God bless the government anyway. (Interview 13)

Ibrahim's, Sultan's, and other interviewees' narratives reveal the close relationship between the agricultural field and the political sphere. Strong social classes in the agricultural field leverage the relational power they bring from the political sphere as social capital within the agricultural field, thereby ensuring the transfer of economic resources to themselves by intervening in distribution mechanisms through bureaucratic processes. As seen, in the interplay between the political and agricultural fields, public mechanisms do not provide equal benefits to the actors in the agricultural field. Instead, they produce outcomes that reinforce and reflect existing inequalities, as an inevitable result of the power struggle.

# CHAPTER 3

## FARMERS AND STRATEGIES

In the previous chapter, we examined the general trends affecting the agricultural field. On the one hand, we observed that soil structure, geographic location, and climate characteristics determine the limits of agricultural potential in Çiğdemli. On the other hand, we noted that decreasing water resources, changing demographics, and advancing production, communication, and transportation technologies have altered the overall structure of the agricultural field over time.

Consequently, we identified long-term trends in social, economic, and political structures such as commodification, monetization, financialization, deindustrialization, individualization, and urbanization. All these parameters contribute to a profound change in the rules of the agricultural game over time. When familiar paths of dealing with challenges are blocked, agricultural memory of the past fails to withstand life's challenges, and the form and content of agricultural value constantly change; social classes seek new paths, develop new strategies, and perceive the world through altered value judgments.

In this chapter, we will examine the major social classes in Çiğdemli, focusing on how they survive and adapt to the changing rules of the agricultural field. First, we will analyze how agricultural capital is distributed within the population. While the distribution of income and wealth among farmers in Çiğdemli is relatively narrow, differences in capital structure and relative positions in production relations create significant variations in their habitus, strategies, and responses to specific situations. Our focus will primarily be on big farmers and smallholders while acknowledging other social groups.

Secondly, we will explore how big farmers and smallholders differentiate and pursue distinct strategies in the agricultural field to survive, grow, and accumulate capital. Different social classes adopt varied solutions to the challenges they encounter in the agricultural landscape. Their positions within the field also shape similar worldviews and perspectives regarding other social classes. Because the rules of the game are not static and evolve over time in accordance with long-term trends, the survival strategies and dispositions of social classes are constantly changing.

### 3.1. Social Classes in Çiğdemli

As we discussed in chapter 1.3.5, there are multiple and competing theories about class structure. In this regard, the dissertation could have approached the class structure of Çiğdemli in different but equally valid ways.

The first approach could be conducting a class analysis of Çiğdemli from a Marxist perspective regarding their relations to the means of production. In this case, we would have been discussing the existence of classes such as big land owners, smallholders, and landless workers, et cetera in the classical Marxist sense. In such an analysis, some of the issues we will encounter pertain to the problems of land inheritance, ownership, and determining who controls the land. Here, the involvement of traditional and familial problems, such as complex use relationships among extended farming families, must be considered to identify property relations, potentially extending classical Marxist class analysis into neo-Marxist and even post-Marxist theoretical frameworks. Another challenge in examining the class structure in Çiğdemli from a Marxist perspective arises from contradictory class positions. The striking diversity of white-collar farmers, trader-farmers, blue-collar part-time landless workers, and civil servant farmers entails analyzing individuals' multiple and conflicting positions within production relations and their mixed-income streams from rent, wages, and commercial profits. Although theoretically possible, this analysis is highly challenging.

A significant issue remains even if such an endeavor results in a somewhat accurate class mapping. We will likely encounter irreconcilable differences between the emerging classes, their worldviews, and the practices of individuals occupying these

class positions. Under these circumstances, discussing ideology and class consciousness in a pejorative sense offers a low probability of providing a meaningful framework for understanding local agricultural relations, contradictions, and struggles.

On the other hand, analyzing the class structure in Çiğdemli from a Weberian perspective would require framing it through market relations. However, such an evaluation might overshadow class conflicts, distribution struggles, and symbolic struggles over differences.

Therefore, the dissertation prefers to consistently use Bourdieu's take on social classes using his methodology and relational approach. This would grant us analytical tools to deal with the grey and complex areas of the local community. It also allows us to base the categories upon objective economic relations as well as manifestations of social dispositions (habitus).

### 3.1.1. Principles of Classification

As seen in section 1.4.5.2, Bourdieu criticizes definitions of social class based on transhistorical/fixed properties. He also refuses to take a fully subjectivist approach as well. Instead, he argues that the structure of relations between the properties in a given society makes a social class a social reality. Similar positions in a social space create similar dispositions and interests. These dispositions bring about distinct class habitus, and social classes are manifested through those habitus performed by the actors. These properties might be primary (one's relation to the means of production) or secondary (such as sex, age, race).

Following Bourdieu's approach, the dissertation will take social classes as relational constructs with primary (economic) and secondary properties. To identify the social classes in Çiğdemli requires (1) a set of properties that help us distinguish one social class from another and (2) a set of habitus, and group dispositions manifested by those social classes. In this context, we define three parameters to classify agricultural fields. The first parameter is the indicators of capital inventory and configuration. It refers to the total volume and the composition of economic, social, and cultural capital, as well as agents' trajectory in terms of their capital. Occupations, as well as an income approach, help detect them. The second parameter is the presence of embodied and

objectified structures of dispositions, namely habitus. Mapping clusters of habitus indicates the subjectively constructed structure of a class. The dissertation will also consider secondary properties, such as age, sex, and ethnic identity, as long as they affect the formation of a class.

A class structure is conceptualized on a matrix, where the total capital volume and distribution of the species of capital are placed on opposing axes. The total amount of capital determines one's inter-class position. Distribution of the species of capital determines intra-class position (Swartz, 1997, p. 159).

Classes do not differentiate based solely on the means of production or a widened version of capital alone. Objective dispositions, such as informal institutions as well as secondary properties, also play a role. This way, the dissertation's understanding of social class differs from most Marxist approaches. Because Bourdieu's notion of class structure includes the entire occupational division of labor, it grants a broader scope than Marxian theories, which focus on ownership and control over the means of production. As Weininger (2005) accurately points out, this approach allows us to avoid the issue faced by many Marxian theories of classifying positions that do not fit neatly into the owners vs. workers dichotomy (Weininger, 2005, p. 85).

Studies on villages and towns often reveal low levels of class differentiation and social stratification. Villages are usually not places where wealth is visibly prominent, at least not compared to cities. It is particularly true for Çiğdemli. Although various factors, such as soil fertility and tourism potential, may lead to significant differences in wealth among villages and towns, external conditions limit Çiğdemli's potential to most extent. As examined in sections 2.1 and especially 2.1.2, Çiğdemli, a town in Central Anatolia, does not have the fertile soils of Çukurova, the Mediterranean climate, or Thrace's location advantages. Limitations of the local market, soil structure, climate, and many other reasons keep the capital accumulation of Çiğdemli relatively low.

What is more, most of the workers and farmers in the agricultural field are among those who are most deprived of economic and cultural capital. These two factors boil down to an overall low amount of total capital where neither inter-class nor intra-class differences are at extreme levels. As we will discover in upcoming chapters, the

economic, social, and cultural differences in the society's highest and lowest ranks seem less significant if we consider the nationwide cultural and economic differentiation.

However, on a local scale, the differences between social fractions in Çiğdemli's agricultural field are large enough to make the field a dynamic, competitive arena where fractions and actors seek to survive, compete, and climb up the social ladder. The relative differences in accumulated capital affect their methods of making a living, agricultural habitus, and long-term strategies, such as whether to invest in or quit the agricultural field.

Also, the cultural and social agricultural capitals lead to a significant differentiation among small farmers. The composition and quality of agricultural capital significantly affect how farmers grasp the problems they face and their overall views on the future of agriculture. These different sets of attributes allow us to distinguish different social classes in the Bourdieusian sense and retrain from a holistic village community approach. In other terms, although the dissertation benefits from Chayanov's school of thought in many ways, our field observations reveal a different picture than Chayanov observed in 19$^{th}$-century Russia. Even portraying Çiğdemli as a typical Central Anatolian village dominated by small farmers and ignoring significant class differences would lead us to misinterpret the behavioral differences, divergent worldviews, and strategic decisions that arise from these class distinctions.

The dissertation classifies farmers based on (i) the theoretical framework we have elaborated in the previous chapter, (ii) the field observations, (iii) the data obtained from the Sorgun District Directorate of Agriculture, (iv) interviews with the locals, (v) the publications of various organizations, (v) the media sources and other material sources.

While examining the capital structure of the farmers, the study takes (i) property relations, occupation, and income level as criteria to assess the economic capital; (ii) reputation, family network, social network, association membership, and occupation for social capital; (iii) technical knowledge and educational background for cultural capital, and (iv) reputation, credentials, and occupational titles for symbolic capital.

Note that since the scope of the field study does not allow us to work on a quantifiable data set, the classification will be based on semi-structured interviews and observations. Also, note that these criteria are not always clearly distinguishable and are usually strongly related.

In addition to the capital analysis, we observe three secondary properties deeply affecting farmers' social class. The first one is the position of the greater family and the farmer's position inside the family. Usually, for the purpose of analysis, a farmer's family is taken as the basic social unit. It also corresponds to the economic unit, the farm business run by the very family. However, from an economic or a social perspective, a farmer's family cannot be isolated from the greater family members, such as the elders, children, and siblings.

In most cases, new generations migrate to urban areas to set up their own family but keep their social and economic relations with their parents. Farmer families may have also worked wage jobs or worked abroad and transferred their wealth to the next generation. In any case, to understand a farmer's family's short- and long-term intentions, we need to analyze them in the context of their greater family and consider the complex social and economic relations. It usually refers to the inter-generational migration process.

Similarly, age is another key determinant in farmers' position in the agricultural field and their social classes. Farmers' abilities and social and cultural capital are largely affected by their generation. Elderly farmers are mostly incapable of doing certain activities; thus, they depend on external factors in their decision-making. Besides its effects on the individual, a farmer's age indicates the stage a farmer's family is through its life cycle. Their agricultural decisions are affected by the stage a farmer's family is in regarding their long-term plans in the agricultural field. Therefore, the farmers' age group indicates their limitations and capabilities.

Off-farm employment and sources of income are other factors that play an important role in understanding social classes. Farmers' household income has long been diversified through off-farm jobs. It is not purely an economic matter. Off-farm jobs mean many farmers or their greater families are involved in a non-agricultural field. A

farmer can also be a teacher, a non-agricultural commodity trader, or a university student. Therefore, a farmer's short- and long-term economic decisions are not only based on their position in the agricultural field but also his relative position in the other field. It affects the distribution of economic resources and social and cultural capital investments. Thus, a detailed analysis is required to understand how farmers distribute their time and resources among multiple fields and how they plan their position in a field concerning one another.

Using Bourdieu's relational approach, the dissertation distinguishes three major classes and intra-class differentiations that would otherwise be indistinguishable in other approaches.

As far as Çiğdemli is concerned, farmers belong to one of three distinct social classes. (1) The first one is elderly **small farmers**, farmer families who mostly rely on agriculture. Their primary definitive property is that they are mostly deprived of economic capital. They produce small volumes of cash crops on small-scale farmland for living. Their agricultural income, including other marginal income items such as pensions, is barely enough to make a living. Since they rely on financial institutions to sustain and survive, they are more vulnerable to financial risks than the other groups. Their definitive secondary property is that they are predominantly **elderly**. It dramatically affects their habitus, and position in the agricultural field. There is a significant difference between the culture they belong to and the younger farmers. As the oldest generation alive, they are the last representatives of a greater family in the agricultural field, other members of which quit farming through two to three generations. It shapes the characteristics of their short- and long-term decision-making in the agricultural field.

(2) The second group consists of wage laborers, civil servants, and white collars, who are also **part-time farmers**. This group contains various fractions, making them more of an unstable and transitional category between the small and big farmers. However, their common features, capital structure, and habitus allow us to recognize them as a distinct social class that seems to grow over time. The main advantage this group has in common is that they have enough additional wage income to deal with the financial difficulties that smallholders struggle with. They also have an urban background,

making their position unique regarding social and cultural capital. While some participate in the agricultural field as a marginal activity, others turn back to the field as a priority.

(3) The third group is the **big farmers**. Their primary property is to have de facto control over a relatively large amount of land through tenancy, individual or family ownership. They farm commercially and have revenues, real estate, and businesses that grant financial power. They have a good reputation, connection to and good relations with society's leaders, public officials, merchants, and other large farmers. They occupy social, political, or administrative positions. They have significantly more social, cultural, and symbolic capital than small farmers. They had been abroad or in big cities to work in the past, which gives them a distinct worldview. Their main habitus is aggressively increasing their capital and investing in the next generation by giving them the highest education possible.

Gas station owners, merchants and seasonal workers, and landless tenant families are also significant actors who deserve a detailed class analysis. However, considering the limitations of the dissertation, they will not be considered major subjects of the study. Instead, we will examine their positions in the agricultural field to describe the local agricultural market. Similarly, distinctions such as kinship, gender, belonging to a village, etc., have a relatively high impact on agents' motivation. However, adding every social axis into the analysis would not help fulfill the purpose of the dissertation. Therefore, they will not be subjected to a separate examination except for some significant cases.

### 3.1.2. Social Classes and (Survival) Strategies

Since this dissertation also seeks answers to the same phenomena from a different angle, the term "strategy" takes on significant importance. It refers to how farmers seek ways to overcome obstacles, survive, and succeed in the agricultural field, or how they approach agriculture in relation to other sectors. Before examining farmer strategies in Çiğdemli, it is essential to explore the concept of (survival) strategy within peasant studies and clarify how these terms will be used in the subsequent parts of the dissertation.

As seen in the literature, the survival of peasants against the dispossessive tendencies of capitalism, as well as state and class domination and exploitation, has been a subject of debate. In Chapter 1.2, we discussed how some theories predict the elimination of the peasantry as a class, based on its position within capitalism, while others, such as Chayanov (1966), opposed this prediction by emphasizing factors that make family farmers resilient in the capitalist market. Throughout the 20th century, there has been an increasing focus on how small farmers have managed to survive. Anthropology, ethnography, and sociology have increasingly centered their attention on villages in both the Western and Third Worlds. In the field of history, there has been a shift away from the Rankean approach, moving from events to structures, and from the stories of kings to the -untold- stories of people and lower classes, examining history from the bottom up. During this period, researchers studying how small farmers survive capitalism and exploitation turned their attention to the everyday practices of peasants.

James Scott's approach, as presented in his work *Weapons of the Weak* (1985b), provides a significant perspective for understanding farmer behavior, which is a central focus of this dissertation. Scott argues that, given the rarity and often unsuccessful outcomes of peasant revolts and revolutions throughout history, true peasant rebellion is not found in collective, organized uprisings but in the small, daily, covert forms of resistance that peasants use against those who exploit and dominate them. Historically, some of the most common forms of this resistance have included evading military service and avoiding taxes, though peasant resistance is practiced not only against the state but also other dominant and exploitative classes. Scott conceptualizes these unorganized, daily practices of resistance, defiance, and foot-dragging as "weapons of the weak"—the silent resistance peasants have employed throughout history, often unrecorded in history books (Scott, 1985b).

Farmers' positions within the agricultural field influence how they respond to policies and regulations in specific circumstances. The agricultural field is as much a part of the political field as it is an agricultural one. In the face of state apparatuses seizing agricultural surplus, local actors resort to what Scott (1985b) terms "everyday forms of resistance."

In many studies on peasantry, a major theme is how different social classes, particularly the lower classes such as landless workers and smallholders, cope with the problems they face and find ways to escape extinction. In some cases, they face the risk of class-based or even physical annihilation. Rahmato's study (1991) on survival strategies during famines in northeast Ethiopia is one example of how farmers survive under extreme conditions. Other studies have focused on survival strategies not only in response to immediate threats but also to broader, structural trends that pose long-term risks. For instance, Stoltzfus (1973) demonstrates that Amish communities follow "adaptive strategies" to survive in the face of national agricultural and socio-economic trends in the USA. Farmers may also adopt strategies against state control. In his study of small family farms under the expanding bureaucratic control over agriculture, Lees (1986) examines how small farmers "deviate" from formal rules by unauthorized access to resources such as water and tax evasion, resulting in the emergence of an "underground economy" beyond bureaucratic control (Lees, 1986).

There is also a rich body of literature on how farmers in Turkey implement survival strategies. Boratav, in his study on how the distributional relations between the peasantry and commercial/industrial capital deteriorated to the detriment of the peasantry in Turkey in the 1980s, refers to the peasantry's response to this deterioration as "mechanisms of adaptation and defense" (Boratav, 2005, p. 134). According to him, in the face of a price collapse, farmers may react in three ways depending on the agricultural structure. In a fully capitalist agricultural system, capital may flee from agriculture due to falling profitability. In a system with underdeveloped productive forces, peasants who produce for the market may withdraw from market-oriented production and become more self-sufficient. Thirdly, in a system with developed productive forces, peasants may choose to increase production by utilizing more domestic resources, increasing both domestic exploitation and productivity. Boratav notes that Turkish peasants responded to the price collapse between 1977 and 1989 with increased productivity (Boratav, 2005, pp. 134-138).

Unpublished field studies conducted by Nükhet Sirman and Mehmet Ecevit in the villages of Söke, Samsun, and Central Anatolia, as cited by Boratav, provide examples of adaptation and defense mechanisms such as villagers reducing their use of agricultural inputs, increasing borrowing from traders, suppressing ostentatious

consumption, limiting spending on work tools, young men marrying in poor villages due to their inability to afford the costs of settling down and wedding, and young women shifting their expectations of marriage from villages to towns and cities (Boratav, 2005, pp. 140-141).

In another study, Sonmez (1993) focuses on the persistence of the peasantry within a capitalist framework through a case study of hazelnut producers in Kayadibi, Turkey. The research examines the peasant household's role in navigating socio-economic changes, particularly through survival strategies such as income diversification and reinvesting savings into production rather than consumption. The study concludes that these strategies are crucial for the peasantry's survival as a property-owning social class in a capitalist society (Sönmez, 1993).

Aydın (2002), examining the effects of structural adjustment policies implemented in Turkey on small farmers, has scrutinized various survival strategies employed by small farmers whose resources have been significantly reduced by neoliberal policies. His fieldwork in Tuzburgazı and Kınık villages reveals that households have developed "coping mechanisms" including "income-generating strategies," "strategies based on borrowing" and "cost-cutting" (Aydın, 2002, pp. 195-203). A field study conducted by Aydın in 2012-13 around Antalya similarly demonstrates that farmers do not act as the "new peasant" described by Ploeg. Instead, they rely on survival techniques rooted in Chayanovian self-exploitation to endure (Aydın, 2016, s. 55).

Exploring peasant land occupations in Turkey between 1965 and 1980 as a form of peasant resistance, Gürel et al. (2022) examine how agricultural modernization and the promise of land reform created conditions for land conflicts. Peasants used a combination of direct action and legal arguments to challenge landlords' claims, insisting that contested lands were public property. Although nationwide land reform was not achieved, these occupations led to the distribution of public land and other concessions (Gürel, Küçük, & Taş, 2022).

Farmers resisting the European acquis in the EU accession process also provide examples of *everyday forms of resistance*. The EU imposed neoliberal agricultural policies on candidate states, including Turkey, which led to significant challenges for

local farmers who were excluded from the decision-making process. Kzenevic (2014) notes that farmers in the Balkans have shown strong resistance to these changes. While the EU prioritizes international trade and market expansion, the process often marginalizes democratic participation and increases inequality, particularly in food markets. In response, small-scale farmers and communities have resorted to informal markets and local production practices, and gave up production for global markets as a form of resistance, although this resistance is largely non-political and driven by consumer choices (Knezevic, 2014, pp. 228-252).

Bourdieu, uses the term strategy to refer to the ways through which agents succeed in a particular field. The term does not necessarily imply a conscious or intentional pursue of the path chosen (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 138). It is neither an outcome of a pure rational calculation nor structurally determined path. As he puts it:

> It is the product of a practical sense, of a particular social game. This sense is acquired beginning in childhood, through participation in social activities, and particularly-in the case of Kabylia, and no doubt elsewhere as well-through participation in children's games. The good player, who is as it were the embodiment of the game, is continually doing what needs to be done, what the game demands and requires. This presupposes a constant invention, an improvisation that is absolutely necessary in order for one to adapt to situations that are infinitely varied. (Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986, p. 112)

Strategies are connected to each other. Matrimonial strategies, educational strategies, economic strategies etc. are all interconnected in a way that they are all pursued by agents to keep their positions in the social world (Lamaison & Bourdieu, 1986, p. 116).

It has been previously mentioned that, according to Bourdieu, similar class positions are related to similar dispositions, i.e. habitus. The relationship with habitus and social class reveals itself when social classes pursue distinct strategies in the field. When we interpret the agricultural field as a power relationship, it is possible to view the situation of subordinate classes at the bottom of this hierarchy as a matter of life and death. In this context, survival strategies would refer to the strategies adopted by the classes at the bottom of the class hierarchy. It may also refer to strategies agents adopt, such as individuals or households at the bottom of the social hierarchy, aiming at survival.

However, strategies are not exclusive to subordinate classes, nor are they limited to survival strategies. There can also be strategies aimed at maintaining and reinforcing the dominance of the ruling classes, strategies for upward mobility of certain class members, and strategies for actors in one field to transition to another. Therefore, in this thesis, we often prefer to use the broader concept of strategy rather than limiting it to survival strategies.

The strategies and tactics mentioned above are integral to our discussion dynamics. As we have seen, farmers "play around" with agricultural policies; how they ignore the formal rules and create alternative survival paths becomes the rule of the game. Agricultural regulations are articulated to and merge with the rules of the game uniquely based on how players interpret, apply, or overlook them.

### 3.1.3. Elderly Small Farmers: Farming out of Necessity

#### 3.1.3.1. Capital Structure

*"Even a farmhand can't work without a wage here"*[7]

The previous section stressed that the term small farmers is not based on Marxist class analysis. Instead, it refers to a social class in the Bourdiesian sense.

Small farmers are farming families with little -and exclusively agricultural- capital. They are not part of any significant economic field except the agricultural field, i.e., they are not involved in any other economic activity for a living. Most of their economic capital is in agricultural form and circulated in the agricultural field. This feature puts them in a marginal position when we consider that agricultural income is becoming a marginal part of most farmer families in the world. However, in the case of Çiğdemli, relying mostly on agricultural income is a common feature of the small farmers.

Although official figures indicate that the lands in Çiğdemli are very fragmented, I have spoken to a relatively low number of small farmers. Among those, eight farmers

[7] A phrase spoken by an anonymous farmer in Çiğdemli to emphasize the importance of having a salary income: "*Burada mayışı olmayan rençberlik de yapamaz."*

can be considered small farmer families with no significant additional source of income. As we will see later in the following chapter, the main reason for this inconsistency is that the fragmented farmlands have already been united under a few farmers off the books.

Since the size of most farms is not large enough to make a living, many farmers with insufficient land have wage jobs and additional income resources. We can put farmers on a scale where the ratio of off-farm income to total income gradually increases. Because the farmers with significant off-farm income have a different type of capital distribution and a more comprehensive range of capabilities, we examine that group separately. Thus, the term small farmer refers to those heavily dependent on agricultural income. In other words, being exclusively in the agricultural field is one of the defining features of the small farmer.

Due to these characteristics, they cannot instrumentalize the non-agricultural opportunities of the rural economy as survival strategies. It differentiates them from partial and large farmers who mobilize non-agricultural resources. Despite having similar land sizes, one of the main reasons for considering part-time farmers as a separate class from small farmers is that small farmers lack the mobility and corresponding behavioral tendencies of part-time farmers. It is not merely about economic freedom; the opportunities and possibilities arising from their ways of relating to different social centers and institutions and the culture and lifestyle afforded by this flexibility significantly distinguish these two social classes.

Labeling these small farmers in Turkey as ‘peasants’ with an archaic connotation is not entirely inaccurate, given that they continue the tradition of subsistence farming often seen in Turkey. Their possession of just enough land to barely sustain themselves and the impression of being trapped in a vicious cycle supports this view. However, unlike their counterparts from a century ago, small farmers today are fully engaged in market production, sourcing all their consumption from the market. Unlike subsistence farmers, who operated outside market relations, these small farmers have become fully market-oriented, producing goods for market consumption. The financial-debt relations and long-term strategies keep them at a subsistence level, which we will discuss later.

Their farms do not generate enough sales to be commercially viable. The farmland alone is not enough or barely enough to sustain itself. Among the ones I have spoken to, eight small farmers declared that they farm on lands between 10 and 150 decares, some of which are rented out. Most of the farmlands are non-irrigated, which means that soil fertility is heavily dependent on precipitation. Also, the product range available to non-irrigated farms is limited.

The most significant demographic aspect of the small farmers is that they usually consist of elderly people. They generally have a retirement pension from farming. However, the pension amount is far lower than that of white- and blue-collar retirees. In 2019, the minimum retirement pension for farmers was 1,269 TL, while for blue-collar workers, it was 1,904 TL (HaberTürk, 2019). That means the retirement pension for farmers is 33% less than blue collars. Some of them also receive public subsidies for the elderly and coal support.

The farm business of a small farmer is usually financially fragile. Due to low agricultural economic capital, they heavily depend on loans and credits to keep farming. Most small farmers are in a 'debt cycle,' which in turn forces them to take loans and sell their products under unfavorable market conditions.

High inflation and constantly rising input costs make small farmers vulnerable. Almost all of the small farmers I interviewed drew attention to the high diesel, fertilizer, and pesticide prices as the most urgent problem to be addressed. It is usually said that the income from the harvest is not enough to cover the costs.

Their overall cultural capital comes from life experience and local traditional knowledge. Since most of them are elderly farmers, their degree of formal education is generally low. Most small farmers complete primary education, but secondary and graduate levels are not very common.

The experience of living and/or working somewhere outside the town in the past constitutes a cultural difference among the farmers. People who leave the town for a period gain a cultural capital, which they tend to stress.

When it comes to agricultural cultural capital, small farmers tend to rely on traditional knowledge of farming practices. However, their choice of seed, farming practices, etc., originates from multiple factors, including economic concerns, social regularities, and past experiences. These factors constitute informal structures of farming practices. In the following chapters, we will see how farmers adapt to the change in agricultural culture.

In terms of agricultural social capital, small farmers' social networks and institutional affiliations seem to be weakening and transforming. The major demographic and technological trends we discussed in the second chapter have a negative impact on this social class's agricultural social capital. Immigration to urban areas and farmers' aging led to the wide social networks being dissolved. Kindship relations are especially affected because most of the farmers implied that most members of the families had left the town and migrated out. The immediate effect of the absence of kindship networks is that the elderly small farmers are extremely dependent on the labor market to farm, which limits the number of crops they can cultivate without cheap labor.

The legal problems regarding the inheritance of farmlands cause many agricultural transactions to stay within the informal economy. That causes many small farmers not to register in the Farmer Register System. Also, many small farmers express dissatisfaction with the agricultural institutions due to the high membership fees, high interest rates, mortgage, and other conditions. Farmers' bonds with cooperatives are weak and incidental. Considering that many local institutions and branches of agricultural organizations have shut down in recent years due to the neoliberal transformation, we can confidentially say that there is no safety network provided by official and farmers' organizations in Çiğdemli.

In addition, the prevalence of the informal economy and problems with official recording of agricultural transactions lead to the fact that small farmers mostly rely on informal social structures and relations with merchants to secure safe, regular, and foreseeable market relations. Indeed, this dominant nature of relations with merchants is a characteristic feature of Çiğdemli. It also contributes to the dependency relations between small farmers and merchants.

Some of the examples will be helpful in understanding the small farmer profile. Serhat (57) is a retired farmer who lives with his wife, his son, and his son's wife. He has a deaf son, and since he cannot find other jobs, he stays in the village and helps him with the farm. They grow chickpeas and wheat on 60-65 decare lands. They also rent out 20 decares of irrigated farms to grow sugar beet. They purchase the inputs they need from Agriculture Credit Cooperatives on credit and sell their produce to a gas station. He says he cannot sell his crops to the Turkish Grain Board because he needs the cash as soon as possible to pay their debts until the end of August (Interview 25)

Adem (59), is also a retired farmer. His son works as a tractor repairman in the Sorgun industry, while his two daughters are still studying in the college outside of the town. He lives with his wife and mother. He grows lentils and chickpeas. Because TGB paid late, he sold his crops to merchants. Because he finds it expansive, He does not purchase seeds; he produces his own. He buys his other agricultural needs from the Cooperatives and the merchants. He used to feed the animals, but he sold his animals ten years ago because he could not afford them and did not have enough power to keep them. He also used to grow sugar beet but could not find the labor he needed to keep growing it. He also wishes he had the manpower to do greenhouse gardening. Although he has a very suitable garden for greenhouse production, he says he has no manpower to do the work (Interview 2).

Hasan (61), is another retired farmer. He has four children, all married. Three of them live in Ankara, and one in Germany. Although he has 5 decare of lands on his own, he cultivates 120 decare lands he rents out from his brother and uncle (Interview 10).

Abdullah, a retired farmer, lives with his wife. They have two daughters and three sons. The daughters are married and live in Ankara, and their sons also run a marble business in Ankara. Abdullah grows chickpeas and wheat on 150 decare farmland that belongs to him and his brother. He says they have planted alternative crops in the last five years instead of laying the land fallow to make a living. He does not buy seeds from the market but saves his own seeds. They used to feed animals but not anymore due to their old age (Interview 1).

Muhammet (74) is a retired farmer with 150 decare farmland. He bought his lands from his brothers and nephews, who all left the village and moved to the urban areas. He has five children; one is a school principal, the other is a lawyer, and all left the village. He grows chickpeas and wheat on rotation and sells his wheat to the gas station and his chickpea to a merchant in Sorgun. He stopped feeding animals five years ago due to his age. He does not think his children will take over the business (Interview 17).

### 3.1.3.2. Elderly Small Farmer Strategies

Up to this point, we have summarized the economic, environmental, demographic, and other conditions that make agriculture challenging, particularly for small farmers. The obstacles to making a living in agriculture raise the question of why and how small farmers continue to farm. The answers to this question reveal how small farmers perceive their role in Çiğdemli and their individual positions within the agricultural field. In the following excerpts, we see the responses of various farmers on this issue, which follow the same pattern.

> Interviewer: Some people say, 'don't listen to the farmers, if they don't earn, would they plant, of course they earn'. What do you say to that?
>
> Muhammet: What will I do if I don't plant? I am 74 years old. Will they give me a civil service job after this time? What am I going to do if I don't plant? If we plant, it is out of hopelessness, out of desperation. (Interview 17)
>
> §§§
>
> Now you'll say, “why do you plant?” What would we do if we didn't? You're sitting here doing nothing. Actually, we plant in the hope of earning something, but it doesn't work. It was better before. Now it rains untimely. Look, the reapers are waiting. (Hasan, Interview 10)
>
> §§§
>
> Interviewer: If farming is so hard and you can't make money, why do you plant?
>
> Kağan: Why do we sow; we sow so that the tractors won't be idle.
>
> Mehmet: A man plants, he says maybe it will make money next year... (Interview 15)
>
> §§§
>
> Interviewer: If the costs are so high and the farmer can't earn, why do they continue farming?
>
> Serhat: Let's say I have 50 decares of land. If I leave it empty, what would I do? If I don't plant it, the community will say, ‘Look at this, why don't you

> plant it?'. Diesel is expensive, this is expensive, that is expensive, what can we do? We plant it so that it doesn't sit idle. Now if there is an empty field over there. The man comes and says, 'Brother, why don't you plant it?' If you say, 'I couldn't grow it, that's why I didn't plant it', that doesn't work either. (Interview 25)

First, despite all the adversities, small farmers continue to farm simply because they have no alternative, especially since many of them are elderly citizens. Second, even if the current harvest season does not go as expected, small farmers find it difficult to give up hope that the next harvest might be fruitful. As the mukhtar of Duralidayılı puts it:

> The farmer will not quit this job, he will always do farming. He says, "It didn't happen this year, but maybe next year," he can't quit. (Raşit, Interview 17)

Therefore, the subjective expression of the individual motivation behind keeping farming can be summarized as two words: Hope and despair.

These subjective but similar stances towards the agriculture are in fact a collective expression of a disposition, emerging from objective conditions. As farmers get old, as an individual being, it is the best use of their abilities, experiences, local knowledge of doing work, in other saying, his agricultural capital for an elderly farmer is to keep up farming.

However, it should be noted that this habitus is limited only to the lifespan of the elderly members of the farming families. Considering the future plans for the other members of the farming families, staying in the agricultural field becomes a marginal and short-term component of a longer strategy pursued by the farming family, that is, exiting the agricultural field.

The short life stories of the small farmers reveal a strategy based on long term tendencies, that is gradually executed by these farmer families over decades. Almost all of the farmers expressed that the agriculture in Çiğdemli has no future. They do not want their children to keep farming as a profession either.

Small farmers have an incentive to give their children a proper education to get an off-farm job. Bourdieu emphasized the importance of the education as a class differentiating cultural asset (Bourdieu, 1996a). In Çiğdemli, it is a significant pattern

of collective behavior, a habitus, that families invest more or less in formal education to have their children climb up the class ladder. Although adopted by part-time and big farmers as well, this disposition is specifically giving the character of small farmers' ambition to exit agricultural field in an intergenerational strategy. During the interviews, families put great emphasis on their constant efforts to provide their children the best education they can, and are proud of their educational achievements. As most farmers out loudly and proudly stated, their children are going after non-agricultural professions which would allow them to emancipate from their ancestors' occupation. Education is not only a means for upward mobility, but also leaving the agricultural game altogether, and participate in another game, preferably an urban one.

Samet, for instance has a son and two daughters. His two adult daughters studying at university. His daughter is studying physical education in a small city called Bartın, while the other one is studying at an imam-hatip department for religious services. His son on the other hand, did not continue his education further and works at a New Holland dealership in Sorgun.

Serhat (57) has a son who studied metal in a vocational high school. Because his son has a hearing disability, he stays with them and help his family in farming (Interview 25).

Muhammet, 74 years old small farmer who is still actively farming his land has two children one of whom is lawyer and the other one is a school manager (Interview 17).

A similar pattern is also observable in part-time farmers. Emre (54) has two children, one studying and one working. His daughter is studying. His son works in a supermarket in Sorgun (Interview 7).

By employing the Bourdieusian terminology, it can be argued that the common *class habitus* is to encourage education and off-farm jobs, start a family and move to a non-agricultural field. Here at the lower side of economic spectrum, although the education is preferred, children's education can be supported in proportion to the economic power of families. Among children, blue collar or unskilled jobs and early marriages seem to be more common.

During this process we witness an intergenerational transformation in overall capital structure of the farming families, through the use of agricultural resources and educational institutions, as Bourdieu puts it: “The reproduction of the structure of the distribution of cultural capital is achieved in the relation between familial strategies and the specific logic of the school institution” (Bourdieu, 1998a, p. 19).

Small farmer families push their children to obtain non-agricultural skills and experience, to leave the agricultural field. The low amount of agricultural capital is transformed into non-agricultural capital and life-style through a generation. During this process, by sending their children to school, families give up labor that could be used in agriculture. Farmer families pay their children's school fees with the income from the harvest, sell their real estate in the provinces and buy houses for their children in the city where they study at university. Such moves actually mean the transformation of agricultural capital into non-agricultural cultural capital within two or three generations. Combined with other long term economic and social choices, education has become one of the most crucial strategies for a farmer family to exit the agricultural field through preparing the new generation for an entirely different game. This long-term strategy increases the non-agricultural intellectual capital which is useful in other fields, at the expense of agricultural capital.

The local agricultural field is therefore left with a generation of elderly farmers, doing their best to assist their children by using their survival skills and toolkits i.e. agricultural economic and cultural capital. With this collective disposition of farming families, the town becomes full of “retirement farms,” as Mendras puts it:

> If the mother loses hope that her children will have a decent life in the country, she turns their ambitions toward other occupations and other horizons. Then the farm, instead of being modernized, gradually loses its character of an economic enterprise until it is no more than a means of survival and subsistence. The result, obviously, is that all economic concerns of management are subordinated to family needs. The departure of the children transforms the farm into a retirement farm, until it disappears with the death of the parents. (Mendras, 1970, p. 91)

What we are witnessing is the urbanization and migration through generations take place.

From a long-term perspective, small farmer families' investments in non-farm areas indicate that they conduct a series of activities to exit the agricultural field. This can be called as *a strategy*, specifically *an exit strategy* which is taken into account at every stage of their life, every individual micro or macro decision.

The way small farmers participate in the agricultural field, and their short and long-term decisions cannot be isolated from the overall execution of this transition. Since they have no plan to transfer their farms to the next generation, they gradually quit agricultural activities and keep only the production that they can do without help. At this point the concrete conditions surrounding the agricultural field come into play, and set a ground on which small farmers make agricultural decisions. At this stage, quitting animal feeding and gardening seem to be some of the consequences of the lack of labor force and water scarce in the villages, however it should be kept in mind that the farmer family's initial decision to exit the agricultural field is how this change has actually materialized.

Not only the long-term changes in agricultural field, but also the short-term agricultural decisions made by the elderly small farmer families can be explained and understood by considering that they are part of an *inter-generational exit strategy*. In the following chapters we will see that small farmers use their agricultural capital in a certain way and participate in social relations to address some particular agricultural problems. The way they approach to the agricultural problems can only be properly understood if we take their overall and long-term approach into consideration.

### 3.1.4. Part-Time Farmers

The number of farmers whose only source of income is agricultural production is decreasing. A part-time farmer is defined in 1953 as a farmer who "lives with his family on a small farm but he gets a big part of his income from sources other than his farm" (Scoville & Smith, 1953, p. 1). Farmers who work for other farmers, in industries, trades and professions, even those who have retired and lived on pensions or annuities are included in this category.

This is not a new trend in the west; by 1950, two thirds of the part-time and residential farmers in US (Scoville & Smith, 1953, p. 1). As early as 1961, Pahl conducted a

detailed examination of the professions and class status of the "newcomers" who settled in the rural parishes around London (Pahl, 1964, pp. 46-54). Combining the socio-economic advantages of both cities and villages has become an important welfare enhancement strategy, especially with the development of transportation facilities. Households have been able to take advantage of the employment, education, proximity to public institutions, and health opportunities offered by urban areas, while benefiting from the kinship and social relations, and safe and quiet life in their villages (Şahin H. , 2022).

Recently many studies have shown that non-agricultural diversification has been a successful strategy for family farms across the globe (Barrett, et al., 2001; Barnes, et al., 2015; Salvioni, et al., 2020), specifically for small farms (USDA, 2024). From households' point of view, the literature usually takes this trend as a risk mitigation strategy. The trend is also supported on the policy level, as a part of sustainable rural development programs. In this regard, the policy of "on/off-farm diversification" have been specifically promoted by European Union (European Commission, 2005, p. 21).

The concept of the semi-proletariat, first introduced by Lenin in "The Development of Capitalism in Russia," refers to those within the poor peasantry who, in order to survive, also engage in wage labor. As previously mentioned, this term is used to describe the segment of the peasantry that is on the path to becoming proletarianized (Lenin V. , 1977, p. 506). The concept of the semi-proletariat was later utilized to describe households in dual economies, such as those in industrializing countries like China, that derive income from both agricultural and wage labor sources. This demographic's economic behaviors and their impacts on the dual economy have been the focus of subsequent studies (e.g. Qi, 2019; Tsz Fung Ng, 2021). Notably, while the term semi-proletariat refers to those in the transitional stage towards proletarianization due to their contradictory positions within production relations, the term part-time farmer calls attention to a different social/class segment, with distinct reference points and implications in class theory.

The part-time farmer concept primarily considers income diversification and economic differentiation, whereas the semi-proletariat pertains to the transitional nature of its class position, emphasizing the contradictions within production relations.

The historical usage of semi-proletariat, particularly during the early capitalist and industrialization periods of the 20th century, signifies a temporary, transitional phase. In contrast, part-time farmers are viewed as a permanent fixture of a rural economy where non-agricultural incomes provide opportunities and stability.

In our thesis, we adopt a Bourdieusian class perspective and have established criteria for class distinctions accordingly. The preference for the term part-time farmer stems from its inclusiveness, covering all positions with balancing non-agricultural income sources, not just worker-farmers duality. By redefining this term within the context of Bourdieu's framework of capital distribution, we aim to strip away other connotations and utilize it purely in a Bourdieusian sense.

A trend, similar to those discussed in the beginning of this section, is observable also in Çiğdemli, not as an outcome of a diversification policy, but as a habitus, a disposition followed by a certain local demographic group of mostly mid-aged farmers who seek strategies to survive in the agricultural game. Over time, part-time farming became available to those who live outside of the rural area, in the nearby city. While mechanization, urbanization and the decrease of job opportunities accelerates migration, the very same mechanization and the advances in transportation made it possible to do part-time farming along with wage-jobs. Also, those who worked at urban locations, started to come back to their villages and start farming. All of these farmers need additional attentions since their capabilities, capital structure and background make their presence in agricultural field different than others.

During the field study, I have talked to small farmers with (i) white collar and blue-collar occupations, and (ii) small farmers retired from those positions in Turkey or abroad. These farmers have extra-agricultural wage and pension funds that ensures financial flexibility in agricultural activities. So, they are less vulnerable to price fluctuations than small farmers. Most of these farmers also have an urban/abroad background, work experience and higher educational credentials that affects their cultural capital.

Some of the white- and blue-collars return back to Çiğdemli after retirement and involve in agricultural activities as much as they want. These elderly farmers were

once worked as blue or white-collar workers in Çiğdemli, other cities or abroad during most of their work life. They tend to have additional retirement funds and other savings and assets as a result of their off-farm earnings. They are similar to other elderly small farmers in terms of the limited farming capacity due to their age. However, the difference is that they are in a relatively better financial position than small farmers in dealing with agricultural challenges thanks to the assets and wealth they saved throughout their lives.

Another sub-group is actively working white- and blue-collars who also farms. These occupations vary from public services in municipality to working at private businesses such as gas stations. The average age of part-time farmers is lower than the average. They have a cash flow that allow them to cope with seasonal financial problems occurring from the agricultural market.

#### 3.1.4.1. Farmers Retired from Blue and White-Collar Jobs

Increasing share of wage income in the income of farm families is not a new phenomenon. As we discussed before, immigration and migration has been a demographic characteristic of the town for decades. I have encountered with farmers who were previously employed in wage-jobs in or outside Çiğdemli, or even abroad. They are back to farming after retirement. I have interviewed with four farmers in this group. In order to discuss the peculiarities of this group we take a brief look at their lives.

We have seen Yaşar (62) in previous chapter. He is a farmer who lived and worked as a worker in an automobile factory in Germany between 1973-2006/7. He has two children. The younger one, Enver, studied at the Culinary Arts Academy, Turkey's best cooking school according to his father. He is running a caffe at Sorgun. His brother has studied architecture at Erciyes University in Kayseri. He is preparing to start his own business.

Yaşar has a total of 160 decare lands that he sharecrops away, except for the 8-10 decare of garden he works on. He says that he never grows crops after he returned to Çiğdemli. Yaşar, as it seems, has no ambition to farm in a competitive way, he rather gardens for pleasure, and organizes his life around his children:

> Interviewer: Do you sell the produce you get from this garden, or is it just for your own use?
>
> Yaşar: I don't do it for commercial purposes. I came back from abroad, I liked this work, so I started doing it. Occasionally, we get 500 kilos to 1 ton of quince, I give it to my sister-in-law, friends, and say, "Sell it, and if you make some money, give it to me," that's all. My other son was still in Germany, Kadir's older brother. He was in the sixth grade. He said, "I want to study in Turkey." I said, "Gladly," and came back. I always adjusted myself for Turkey, always planned that I would return one day. I had a three-story house there, I sold that too.
>
> Interviewer: How do you make a living? Are you retired from abroad?
>
> Yaşar: I am retired from SSK, and we retired my wife from Bağ-Kur. I didn't retire from there [Germany], I left early, didn't want a pension, instead, I took a lump sum payment. (Interview 28)

The second farmer Zafer, 63, had moved, lived and worked in Ankara and came back after he retired. He bought an apartment in Ankara with his savings in addition to the house he has in Çiğdemli. He has 3 sons, all lives in Ankara and he stays with them during the winter, since it is hard to light a stove for a man his age.

Zafer has 20-25 decare farm land on which he grows chickpea and wheat. He purchases the diesel on 1 month credit, and fertilizers on harvest due. He does not attempt to buy a new tractor on credit, because his 1970 model tractor does the trick.

He does not think that people lose money in agriculture, the very evidence they do not is that they keep farming:

> Oh, and generally there is no conviction in our society. You have to be a little bit content. You know that mosque over there, the construction of the mosque was finished, we built the mosque, I left it for some reason and went to the big city. I had nothing when I left, I just took my jacket. We worked and Allah Almighty gave us something. I have a house in Ankara, I have a house here, the children got married. If you work, you can take care of yourself. If you don't work, they say you don't work, you are useless. They say he is lazy. Society ostracizes that man. I mean in general, a person doesn't do a job where he makes a loss. If a tradesman makes a loss, does he do that job? He closes the shop and leaves. (Zafer, Interview 31)

İbrahim is a farmer retired from Ankara Sugar Factory. He lives with 2 of his 3 blue collar sons who work as drivers. He was working as a seasonal farmer and use that income to feed a flock of 100 sheep between 1978-1998. The family then quitted the

livestock farming and sold their flock, and built the house they currently live using that money. They have now Muhsin's retirement pension, a few animals and 30 decare of farm land on which they usually farm wheat, lentil, chickpea and clover.

He recently grows wheat on 50 decare, by renting an additional 20 decare farm land. He states that he made a bailment agreement with a gas station and wait for the wheat prices to go up to settle the accounts:

> I harvested 1,000 *çinik*[8] of wheat from 40 decare. I took it and stored it on consignment. They [the gas station] will sell it, and in 6 months, we'll settle the account. The market picks up a little in the first and second months. The seller takes their cut, and whatever is left goes to you. (Ibrahim, Interview 12)

İbrahim says that his family's involvement in agriculture will come to an end by the time he passes away, because none of his sons want to take over the business.

Furkan, 58, is a former civil servant, has recently retired from the Ministry of Education. He grows chickpea and wheat on 50 decare lands, some of which he rents from friends and relatives. The family has no source of income other than his pension and agriculture. He has four children, one of which lives in Ankara, two in Sorgun, and one with himself. He believes that the farmers have financial problems because they do not manage their debts properly and spend the subventions and credits to unproductive areas instead of agriculture:

> There are many debtors. Because they don't use the support they receive from the state properly. For example, he received tractor support, he doesn't use it. He received diesel support; he doesn't use it. He goes and has a wedding, buys a car, I don't know, spends it on other things. And what does the state do, it executes him and takes his money. The state is right in that policy. The state has given you your money, if you use it properly, there will be no problem. Recently, the number of people in debt has been increasing. For example, this year there will be more debtors. Because the yield is low, no one will get what they expect. (Furkan, Interview 9)

Furkan has no record in the FRS and he purchases the inputs he needs from one of the gas stations on credit. He does not find the credit terms offered by the ACCs in his best interest. He thinks that the ACCs act like a merchant.

[8] A Turkish unit of measurement for grains. "1 *çinik* is approximately equal to 8 kg.

Regarding the future of the agriculture, he does not expect his sons to take over the family business and do farming.

There are some similarities these farmers share with small farmers. They are elderly and therefore the same limitations concerning the age apply to them. The farm volume is not enough for living. With that being said, they have some additional resources that the other small farmers do not. As we see, these farmers are less dependent on the agricultural activities for living. Thanks to their previous savings and works, they successfully managed to have additional properties in urban areas, and supported their children to start their own families.

Better pension income and previous savings put these farmers in a better position in the agricultural field. They seem to be in a better financial position allowing them to practice farming without having too much debt.

It is also noteworthy that they tend to imply their urban experience to criticize the laziness and poor budget management of the farmers as they say. The tendency to put the blame on small farmers' farming and living practices for the poverty and agricultural problems is something we encounter more and more as we move upwards in the agricultural hierarchy.

They also keep farming but do not want the next generation to continue farming in the future. Apparently, the next generation has already chosen a path outside of the agricultural field.

#### 3.1.4.2. Farmers Actively Working as Wage Workers

There are many farmers in Çiğdemli who are actively employed as wage workers. The balance between the wage work and agriculture depends on the temporal and economic weight of each of them. In some cases, wage workers might have considerably large farm lands. Farming is the major part of their total economic activity. These farmers will be discussed under the 'big farmers' section. On the other hand, for small farmers, finding additional income sources, especially a temporary or permanent job is crucial to be able to provide for their family. This is especially true when they have children still financially dependent on them. So, we can speak of a spectrum depending on

relative weight of wages and agricultural income; which makes one of them the primary occupation.

There is a wide range of occupations. While some of the farmers have a second job in Çiğdemli, some others work outside of the town. While some farmers are working at temporary jobs, there are also blue and white-collar farmers. Some of them have always been farming while some others have recently joined agriculture for seeking additional income. We will examine interviews case by case, before making further analyses.

Emre (54), is a farmer living in Çiğdemli. He has two children, a school age daughter who lives with him, and a married son living in Sorgun with his family. Aydın lives with his mother, wife and daughter. He grows wheat, chickpea and lentil on 145 decare farm land. In addition to this, he does casual work such as dyeing, construction work and gardening. The additional income increases his cash flow which is used to purchase inputs on cash. This way, he is able to manage his debts and financial balance in agricultural field. He explains the rationale of buying needs in cash as follow:

> I have no debts. I never buy anything on credit. I do field-garden, house and construction work on a daily wage. I don't touch the money I get from chickpeas and wheat. I don't borrow money because I don't want people to talk about me behind my back. I always buy seed and fertilizer in advance. (Emre, Interview 7)

Emre is pessimistic about the future of agriculture in Çiğdemli. He does not think that his children will take over the farm.

Şeyhmus (49), is a farmer who also works at one of the gas stations in Çiğdemli. He is son of a *Gastarbeiter* family but he never left Çiğdemli and go abroad. He has a 19 years old son preparing for the university entrance exams, and he does not want him to stay in the town (Interview 5).

Şeyhmus grows wheat and chickpea on 70-80 decare farm land he owns. He does not have a tractor, so he rents it out when needed. He sometimes works in return for his debt. So, his wage job and farm work are integrated in a way that pays his debts not

only with the harvest, but also directly with his labor. In his case, the off-farm income contributes to the farm business which is the major concern (Interview 5).

In case of permanent employment, farming itself becomes a complementary source of income. This is especially true when it comes to the blue- and white-collars who farm in spare time. These farmers grow crops as a secondary activity in addition to their blue or white-collar occupations. Concerning the farming size, most of the part-time farmers do not farm significantly more than small farmers. The farmers I interviewed with farm between 30-160 decare. What makes them different from the other small farmers is that:

1. The nature and the organization of the agricultural activity is dependent on and limited by the work schedule of the wage-job.
2. The debt cycle we have described above does not apply to this group. Part-time farmers are able to make use of their extra-agricultural resources to fund their farming.

Those who work outside of the town do not permanently reside in Çiğdemli. Therefore, their farming practices and crop choices are determined by the necessities of their non-agricultural profession. According to the interviewees, this kind of part-time farming is a recent trend in Çiğdemli.

Oğuz, 39, works as a private security at the Sugar Factory. He is responsible for the livelihood of 5 people including himself, his wife, mother and 2 children. They used to grow sugar beet on 40-50 tons worth of farmland. After his father's death, lands were divided between the heirs and he had no irrigated land left to keep up except for the 3 decare land he rents out to a sugar beet producer. He farms totally 50 decare lands, half of which is rented from Treasury and the other belongs to his brother. Only half of the land is registered, so he is entitled to support payments only for that part. He is currently growing wheat and chickpea on 30-40 decare farm land for an additional income. He has no tractor, so he borrows one from his father- and brother-in-law. He buys his needs from a gas station in cash and he has no debt whatsoever.

Job opportunities provided by the municipality allows farmers to have a permanent income without leaving the town. Altan, for instance, is a health officer working at the

municipality. He is the cousin of the former mayor. Since he is working in Çiğdemli, he carries out the farming and civil service together. He grows wheat on 77 decare farm lands he borrows from his sisters.

Some interviewees mentioned that there is a growing trend among civil servants about starting farming in Çiğdemli in recent years.

> When you plant something, everyone plants a lot. The laborer sows it, the civil servant sows it... Then it doesn't make any money. Now a man is a civil servant, let's say like you. He comes, sows and harvests on the weekends, returns to Sorgun, Ankara and sits at home during the week. This is a new thing, they started after chickpeas made money. I know that the first year I sold 1 *çinik* [8 kg] for 45 liras, so we saw that money was not enough. The next year we sold it for 28, and now it has dropped to 20-22 lira. (Serdar, Interview 20)

Interviewees point out that introduction of the chickpea combine harvesters made chickpea farming easier for blue and white-collars to farm by diminishing the time and labor force needed. Aydın puts emphasis on the link between this technology and the civil servants who come to Çiğdemli to farm:

> In the past, 10-15 years ago, there was no technology like today, but people used to plant chickpeas and lentils by hand. Then chickpeas and lentils became cheaper and cheaper, production stopped for a while. Later, when the harvester for chickpeas and lentils came out, people started planting them again. People who didn't plant chickpeas in the past, teachers, civil servants, etc., got into chickpeas because chickpeas made good money for 1-2 years. There is no empty land in the village. The harvester comes and takes the chickpeas click by click, no hassle. But now chickpeas are worthless. (Emre, Interview 7)

Those who raised this issue implicitly or explicitly accuses these the newcomer part-time farmers for lowering the market prices by increasing the production:

> There is also a situation like this, now people who have nothing to do with it came and planted chickpeas. For example, teachers or civil servants, they realized that people got good money from chickpeas that year, so they planted chickpeas here. That's why there were so many chickpeas. People who have nothing to do with this business got into this business. (Emrah, Interview 6)

"People who have nothing to do with farming" is one way of implying incompetence of the newcomers. There lies more than a condescending overtone under this expression. For those who has a steady income, farming itself becomes an additional

income source. So, as a marginal activity, farming receives care and attention just enough to continue farming. Adem summarizes the difference as following:

> Interviewer: Question: Are there people who are civil servants or salaried and farming at the same time?
>
> Adem: Many... A man cultivates his father's field. He is both a farmer and a civil servant. Now this is for support. Men are both civil servants and farming for support in case they get a few cents here and there. They do it consciously or unconsciously. (Interview 2)

No matter how good at farming, any profession who has the opportunity, can start farming to get additional income.

Part-time farmers are able to maneuver financially by using their wage income. They are more likely to have access to inputs without getting into large amounts of debt.

> Interviewer: Do they have any difference or advantage in terms of borrowing or being able to buy inputs in cash?
>
> Adem: Now that man has money in his hands. He is doing this job with his salary. He has the chance to pay his debt month by month. But the farmer does not have the chance to make such a payment. The farmer pays his debt at harvest time, and he takes a blow from there. You get a salary; you pay your debt at the beginning of the month. I leave my debt for the harvest time of chickpeas and wheat. The men take back your debt differently from you, they take it differently from me. That's where I get a blow. (Interview 2)

Because part-time farmers do not solely depend on the agricultural income, it is more likely that they have enough resources to wait before selling their harvest until prices to go up. Thus, they make bailment agreements with merchants and leave the product at their stores without payment up front. This gives them the flexibility to wait for 3-4 months and ask for the sale later in the winter, in order to get higher returns. Emre explains the advantage of this deal:

> Interviewer: What did you get for the wheat? How much did you sell it for?
>
> Emre: I bought 1,250 çiniks [10 tons] of wheat. I left it in escrow, but I haven't sold it yet. I can buy and give what I need in advance, so I'll keep it waiting and sell it when I need it in November or December.
>
> Interviewer: When do you determine the price of the goods you put in escrow, on what date?

> Emre: Whatever the price is at the time I am going to sell it. For example, if people are going to buy it from me in the twelfth month, they will pay whatever the price is at that time. (Interview 7)

In short, the additional wage income sets a significant source of finance that allows the part-time farmers to use seasonal price fluctuations to their advantage.

Farmers with wage-jobs have wider social capital than other farmers. They are also a part of a non-agricultural field, and a social network. In some cases, local politics, kindship or other relationships play an important role in finding a wage job. Finding a job at the sugar factory or municipality already requires a social or kinship network, yet it also reproduce a social network that allows one to transfer that social capital into other forms of capital. Specifically, those who are employed in municipality, public sector, or gas stations may take some economic advantage of their social position. To give an instance, Furkan, who has just a retired from public services 9 months before the interview, emphasizes the importance of knowing people in business:

> Interviewer: Where do you get the inputs?
>
> Furkan: I buy inputs from here [Gas station B] for example.
>
> Interviewer: Do they impose a maturity?
>
> Furkan: No, I mean, I say “wait” and they wait, of course because we are sincere. They can manage for 3-5 months. (Interview 9)

The blue- and white-collars who are not part of the local social network is another story. Those who start farming with no history in and kindship connection to the village are seen as opportunists who are not real farmers but adventurers.

#### 3.1.4.3. Part-Time Farmer Strategies

Just like the small farmers, I also asked part-time and retired blue/white collar farmers that why they keep staying in agriculture despite the difficulties. This time, in addition to the previous answers, we also learn that leaving the field uncultivated is not welcomed by the local people.

> Interviewer: If you don't get anything from planting, why do you plant?
>
> Ibrahim: Why, you plant it so that it will not remain empty.
>
> Sultan: If you don't sow, they will curse you for not sowing. They will say you didn't sow, they will say many other things...

> Ibrahim: It didn't happen this year, maybe next year we will earn something [Laughs].
>
> Şeyhmus: We plant it, but you know... We do it so that it won't be empty. So that they don't talk about it, so that they don't say that so and so left this place empty. (Interview 3)

As we will see in the next chapter, there is a deeply rooted belief that leaving the farm land uncultivated is a sign of disrespect for the ancestors. This an attitude that is generally condemned and gossiped about by the locals. This traditional belief is a part of the perception of the ideal farmer, that farmers are expected to follow. Since it is a behavior adopted and reproduced by the local community, it is one of the components of a farmer's reputation. Farming as an act of actively claiming ancestral heritage is a form of **symbolic capital** that farmers seek to have. Thus, this belief also works as a driving force behind farmers keep farming. We will again touch upon this topic later on.

Not surprisingly, part-time farmers too gave answers similar to small farmers by pointing at hope and despair:

> Interviewer: It is said something like, "What do you care if farmers say they can't earn... They always say that, if they couldn't earn, would they do this job, if they couldn't earn, would they have a tractor in front of every door." What do you say to that?
>
> Murat: First of all, those tractors are always bought with debt, that's one... Secondly, the farmer has nothing else to do, he does farming out of obligation. What else can he do?
>
> Interviewer: I would also like to ask you this. If the situation is so bad for farmers, why do they continue to cultivate? Sometimes it is said that the farmer's situation is not bad, that everyone is buying new tractors.
>
> Yunus: They are planting out of desperation. (Interview 18)

Farmers with off-farm jobs have a balanced distribution of agricultural and non-agricultural capitals. They are able to transfer funds between the agricultural field and other fields. This makes them less vulnerable to fluctuations and financial problems in the short term. While they make short term investments in agricultural field, they make use of the non-agricultural funds. In the short term there is a two-way capital transfer between agricultural and non-agricultural capitals.

In the long term, we see the same tendency with small farmers that most of the part-time farmers give priority to the non-agricultural fields they and their children take part of. Part-time farmers invest in non-agricultural fields and save non-agricultural capitals by purchasing assets, investing in the next generation's education in the urban and so on. However, this prevents part-time farmers from overinvesting in the agricultural field and make their presence in the field temporary and fragile.

To summarize, doing additional jobs becomes important since the farming in small volumes is not enough to make a living. Some farmers work in temporary and daily jobs to have access to additional income. There is also another group of farmers -or part-time farmers as we call them, who are employed in permanent blue- and white-collar positions. Some of them practiced both professions together from the very beginning, while some others have recently returned to farming seeking an opportunity. Having a wage job that is embedded in another field provides part-time farmers a steady income and assurance as well as a distinct social and cultural capital. Their presence in the agricultural field and the income they get from agricultural activities are marginal. So, for many of them it seems that they keep farming as long as it helps their overall economic capital increase. It has important consequences in terms of their agricultural habitus, and strategies. This has important consequences.

1. Because they are negative about the general trend of the agricultural field, they do not to think of agricultural production as a family business in the long term. For this reason, part-time farmers do not make long term investments in agricultural field.
2. With that being said, they still transfer funds to agricultural field in short term, in order to capitalize the maximum marginal return from agricultural production.
3. Part-time farmers do not organize their lives around the agricultural activities due to the necessities of the non-agricultural permanent positions. They farm within the limits that their professions allow. Therefore, this affects their crop choice and the amount of interest they show in the production.
4. Their take on agricultural matters is affected by their non-agricultural background. This contributes to the transformation of agricultural cultural capital.

We end this section with a long but striking quote from the previous mayor of Çiğdemli, who excellently summarizes the current dynamics behind and the consequences of the part-time farming:

> Now a man has somehow retired, he comes and does farming as a hobby, whatever God gives him. He has no livelihood problems. He cultivates with his tractor so that the field will not be empty. However, maybe 10 percent of the people here do not think about how to plant alternative crops, how to plant them better. 80% of Çiğdemli is retired. The state is self-sacrificing and thinks of its citizens, but the citizens do not think of the state. In Boğazlıyan and Develi, they get 2 crops a year. That is also within the Yozgat border, but we try to be content with one crop. Alternative products are not turned to after October as a season. Or it is not encouraged. Our citizens are used to comfort, so to speak. I will sow and reap on Saturday and Sunday, whatever the soil gives us will be an additional source of income. There is comfort in that. Let me give you an example, a relative of mine, I don't need to mention his name, worked in Germany for 40 years and now he is working in agriculture. He has a neighbor who sleeps from morning till night. He says, "Look at him, he worked in Germany and now he is here working like a dog." It discourages him. People here see the municipality as a breadwinner. They all have their eyes on the municipality. These are additional income. For the agricultural worker, the municipality is an additional income. For the man in the municipality, agriculture is an additional income. This is how it is. (Halil, Interview 33)

### 3.1.5. Big Farmers

Big farmers have relatively the biggest amount of economic and social agricultural capital. Their relatively large scale of farm lands is usually backed by other forms of economic capital such as real estates, machineries, other assets, a large inheritance from family etc. This economic capital does not come alone, but attached by the social, cultural and symbolic capital that give big farmers various advantages in the agricultural field. Some of them also run other businesses and hold positions in economic, bureaucratic and political fields as well.

Despite the general negative trajectory in agricultural field, big farmers tend to increase their agricultural capital over time, expand the scope of their business, and pursue strategies to not only stay in agricultural field but also to strengthen their position on local level. Here, we will see how big farmers differentiate from the rest of the local population in terms of economic, social, cultural, and symbolic agricultural

capital. Then we will cover their short and long-term strategies with respect to the agricultural field.

#### 3.1.5.1. Capital Structure

The first thing we need to understand is that what makes big farmers “big” is not the scale of the farms they own, but the volume of the crops they produce. Big farmers farm on a commercial scale. They achieve high volumes of production by expanding the land sizes they farm. It is observed that in Çiğdemli, big farmers usually do not purchase, but make tenancy and share-cropping agreements to grow their businesses. 10 farmers out of 33 interviewees stated they farm 200 to 1.300 decare. Nine of them make tenancy and/or sharecropping agreements with others. The proportion of the rented/crop shared lands vary up to 700 decare.

Irrigated farms constitute a small fraction of the total lands in Çiğdemli. Irrigation requires more input, labor force and spending than dry farming. Due to economies of scale, increasing the scale of the production helps reducing the costs and thus leads to more profit. According to official figures, only 10 farmers declared a total of 227,95 decare sugar beet farms in 2020.

Big farmers do not just farm more, but also tend to farm high value-added, high-priced products. As far as interviews are concerned, most of the irrigated lands and sugar beet production belong to big farmers. Irrigation makes high value-added products available, notably sugar beet. It requires more input, labor force and spending than dry farming. The economies of scale help reducing the costs and thus leads to more profit. While among the small farmers no one except one actively farms sugar beet, six out of ten big farmers I interviewed have sugar beet farms. Most of the information about sugar beet farming comes from big farmers.

In addition to farming, some of the big farmers do have livestock. However, the numbers are not high enough to say that it is a major part of their business. Ali (42) has 20 sheep, Yusuf (42) has 20-22 cows, Ramazan (34) has 3 cows and Umut (35) has “3 to 5 livestock”. Only one family, Ayşe and her husband run an animal farm exclusively. They have a herd of 100 sheep, 90 lambs, along with a large number of chickens. Big farmers tend to grow bait such as forage barley to feed the animals and

reduce their costs by making use of the business synergy between livestock and farming.

All of the big farmers I have interviewed with own at least one tractor and the necessary equipment. Yunus (50) has 2011, 2015 and 2019 model 3 tractors. Adem has 2 tractors and all the necessary equipment for sugar beet and wheat production. Hüseyin bought his tractor in 2011 for 40,000 € with 2-year loan. Kerem renewed his 1967 model tractor with a new one in 2019. Interviews show that most of the big farmers bought a new tractor or renewed the old one in recent years. Tractors are all bought on loan. Big farmers are eager to have new machineries to run their businesses.

Big farmers have multiple sources of income. Some of them have an accumulated wealth usually left from their migrant farmer families while others run multiple businesses together. For instance, Hüseyin runs a market, Umut runs a bail trade business. Here we can speak of a non-agricultural economic capital that serves as an additional financial source. Agricultural commodity trade is also another activity big farmers involve in. These two positions usually overlap: Some merchants also possess big size of lands and tend to increase their assets while some big farmers trade commodities.

Big farmers, like part-time farmers, can engage in both agricultural and non-agricultural activities. However, there are two key distinctions that set big farmers apart from small farmers. First, big farmers typically have a permanent presence in agriculture, while part-time farmers do not necessarily. Second, in terms of total economic capital, the non-agricultural economic activities of big farmers often include both substantial assets and business operations. In contrast, the non-agricultural activities of part-time farmers generally consist of wage labor or small-scale self-employment with minimal capital. Therefore, the quality and quantity of the economic capital held by these two classes differ significantly.

This additional capital is vital for managing the agricultural risks. Big farmers have the option to use some of the non-agricultural economic sources to overcome payment difficulties just like the part-time farmers. This gives them a great flexibility in their

decision making when they maneuver over financial problems that small farmers have difficulty coping with.

As we have discussed in previous section, most of the big farmers have either a-guestworker past, or work experience in a big city. They tend to apply to the values and the worldview they got from abroad. They tend to give importance to the scientific methods in agricultural practices and emphasize the need for a rational management to ensure local development.

It is no surprise that a large economic capital goes hand in hand with a large **social capital**. Social capital holders become visible, especially when information about the village is sought. As Yücel Çağlar puts it:

> Power relations are different in the village. if there is power, it means there is an imbalance. everyone, people of every status, every person in the village cannot experience the decision-making processes in the village in the same, equal way. when we go, who do we communicate with in the village? (Doğa Gözcüleri Derneği, 2005, p. 47)

As he points out, visitors to a village tend to gravitate towards the village leaders on various occasions. The flow of information in the village flows through the village headman, the big farmer, and the families who come first. Those who are higher up in the village hierarchy, that is, those who have high economic capital in the village in the Bourdieuian sense, also have a strong position in terms of social capital.

Big farmers and merchants have a wide social network and correspondingly bureaucratic and political positions in public and other organizations on local level. Our field study shows us that the ones with great agricultural economic capital tend to (i) occupy political, bureaucratic and organizational positions in local level or (ii) to have close kinship or social ties to the ones in these positions. Social, economic, political, bureaucratic/institutional and kindship relations constitute a wide, overlapped and/or intertwined sets of networks nested in the local community, that provides social capital.

Big farmers being active members of cooperatives is something we encounter more often than small farmers. Seven out of ten big farmers I spoke to said that they have multiple memberships to agricultural or governmental organizations. Some of them do

or did have an administrative position. One of the three remaining big farmers gave no information, while the rest of two said that they do not see any reason to be a member of those organizations.

Umut, for instance, is a member of Pankobirlik and the local chamber of agriculture. He also happens to be a member of the town council for the last two terms.

> Umut: Former President Rıza was very enlightened. The previous one [referring to Halil] was bad. I will have good projects with this current president, I will visit him some time, I will enlighten him.
>
> Interviewer: Were you in the parliament in the previous term?
>
> Umut: I was a member of the council last term, but I was in the opposition, whether it was 5 to 3, 6 to 3, I don't remember exactly now. This year we are in power 6 to 2. (Interview 21)

Umut enthusiastically talks about agricultural policies and how municipality and the government should look into them. It is not a coincidence that he has aforethought and sophisticated ideas about the problems of the agriculture and Çiğdemli.

Yunus, who is a former bank employee, professionally farms since 2014. He is a son of a guest-worker family and he himself also went abroad for a while. He is a graduate and now studying for a second degree. Yunus is not a regular member of the chamber of agriculture, he actively participates in. He says that he ran for the office this year and lost to someone who made use all of his means and connections to get elected:

> Interviewer: Well, can official institutions, for example, chambers of agriculture, make a difference with their work on these issues, would there be a change in the practices of farmers if they focused on these issues?
>
> Yunus: Why not, they can. This year we almost took the chairmanship of the chamber of agriculture. We were candidates. Then Mevlüt President used all his means and connections and took the presidency. Look, if this is done consciously, something really happens. For example, you may have heard of the Izmir-Tire Milk Cooperative. Now you can't afford it. It has 37 milk collection vehicles, not including the fixed collection center in the villages. For example, if the state banned the slaughter of female heifers… We need such measures. (Interview 29)

Just like Umut, Yunus also has specific projects and ideas about agricultural policies. He tells why government and local authorities fail to implement proper policies to help local agriculture develop, and come up with a specific prescription.

Adem and Emrah are also members of Pankobirlik, the chamber of agriculture and the agricultural credit cooperative. In addition to being member of these three organizations, Ramazan is the mukhtar of Burunören.

Ali, who is a member of Pankobirlik, the chamber of agriculture and the agricultural credit cooperative, harshly criticizes these organizations. While talking about how non-effective they are, he says that as the head of Protection of Farmers' Property, he once called the head of the chamber of agriculture to complain about the problems:

> I am a member of the chamber of agriculture, I am a member of agricultural credit. I am also a member of Pankobirlik, I was even one of the first members. They give us papers from the Chamber of Agriculture, so I pay my dues every year, but what do they do? They don't do anything; they have no services for me. I am the head of farmer property protection in this village, I call the district chairman of the Chamber of Agriculture, "come and check the combine harvesters, let the citizens see if they are breaking or spilling." He says, "OK, we will come," but no one comes.
>
> There is also the beet cooperative, Pankobirlik. They rob us the most. Below 750 TL, they don't sell to their members. They ask for a guarantor. One guarantor up to 2,000 liras, two guarantors up to 4,000 liras, and so on. When you buy something, they ask for a guarantor like this. (Ali, Interview 4)

Hüseyin says he is only a member of the chamber of agriculture as an obligation. He does not think that those organizations are beneficial to farmers.

Kerem is not a member of any of those organizations. Just as Hüseyin, he says he quit agricultural credit cooperative because it had no benefit to him. He is a former head of local farmers union and worked as an expert in the Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre.

> It was the same back then, maybe even less so. The situation has been the same since 2005. I was the head of the farmers' union until 2005, and until 2007, I worked as an expert at the land registry office. I know every part of this area. One day, a guy from the Kayseri land registry came here to inspect a piece of land. He took four village heads with him. The four village heads and this guy searched and wandered around but couldn't find the land. In the end, they said, "If anyone knows where it is, it'll be Ramazan Abi." They called me. I came right away, found the spot, and showed them. (Kerem, Interview 14)

Social capital cannot be reduced to formal and institutional relations. It also includes informal social networks, which as we see here, are helpful in having access to public and private funds. Social connections allow big farmers to set political connections which in turn are used to channel more economic and social resources. Strong relations

between big farmers and merchants facilitate the trade and give big farmers advantages. A wide network also increases the possibility of hearing about market opportunities and certain public subsidies. Those who do not have connections do not know the ways to get particular subsidies and funds given to farmers. We will explore how and through which mechanisms public resources are distributed in the following chapters.

If we put all of these statements together, it is clear that big farmers tend to invest some of their agricultural capital in a long-term strategy to take their children out of the agricultural field. For that sake, they do not prepare their children to take over their business, they do not want them to inherit their agricultural cultural and social capital they have. In an inter-generation period, the agricultural cultural capital, (the localized knowledge of the agricultural life) the social capital (agricultural networks and social relations), and the symbolic capital (their family image, credentials, reputation etc.) will not pass through the children and will be lost. So, in the long term, the exit strategy does not only cost the transaction costs of the transfer of the economic capital from the agricultural field to another field, but also an enormous number of valuable but non-measurable agricultural capital in different forms.

#### 3.1.5.2. Big Farmer Strategies

Big farmers use their agricultural and nonagricultural capital to farm on a commercial level. They allocate their agricultural capital to increase their agricultural production to the optimum point. They also take cost-reducing measures, and tend to expand the land size they farm through renting or sharecropping in the long term. However, when it comes to the long-term plans, big farmers share the same vision with the other farmer groups. They tend to exit the agricultural field in the long run.

> I have two sons and a daughter. My goal is not to keep them here. My whole effort is to keep them in Ankara or in a big city, I mean, maybe they won't be able to reach high places, but if they become a policeman, a specialist sergeant, if they get a government job, if I buy their apartment and car... That's my goal. This place will be finished by then. This is the most beautiful village here. If even this one is finished, the other villages will be abandoned. (Ali, Interview 4)

Even if the risks and the worsening conditions are still manageable for the big farmers, they do not foresee a sustainable agriculture in the future, considering the general trajectory. According to Kerem for instance, the major reason for not envisaging his children in agricultural field is the drought:

> Interviewer: So, will your children continue farming after you? How do you see the future of Çiğdemli?
>
> Kerem: After I'm gone, my kids will sell everything I leave behind from A to Z and divide it up. Everyone will look after their own comfort—who's going to farm? In the future, farming in Çiğdemli will completely disappear, brother... If a place is dry, nothing will come from it. It's been dry here for a while, and the climate has changed a lot. (Interview 14)

For Adem, the problem is obvious that returns of farming is too low to keep the business running:

> Interviewer: When you think about the future of Çiğdemli, let's say 10 years from now or after you, how do you see this place? Will the people after you, will your children continue farming?
>
> Adem: It doesn't make money, why would they continue. After 10 years no one will be here. The main problem is profit.
>
> Interviewer: Then why do you continue farming?
>
> Adem: I am doing it out of obligation now, what can I do? If I had the opportunity to find a job right now, if I had a job and an income of 3 thousand liras, I would leave. If the children had a job, I would send them too. (Interview 2)

Almost all of the big farmers I met pay close attention to that their children get a high-quality education and set up a life outside of the town. Most of them want their children to have non-agricultural occupations and a life in an urban place. Therefore, they spend some of their assets for the next generation to exit the agricultural field. Adem, Kerem, Hüseyin, Ali… Most of the big farmers' children is in, or graduated a university. Many of them married and settled down in a big city such as Ankara and İstanbul.

> Interviewer: Do you think your children will be farmers in the future, that they will continue your profession? More generally, how do you see the future of Çiğdemli, the future of farming here?
>
> Hüseyin: The obvious is not a guide. My son became a doctor and is now an assistant at Samsun Education and Research Center. My daughter went to university to study nursing. There is no possibility of my children farming. Villages will become ghost villages in the future. I don't know if the state will

> import or if the fields will be transferred to companies. Villages will end in the future. (Interview 11)

The population loss is another reason to be mentioned. What Ramazan says below is an expression that is heard many times during the field study: He wants his children to become a civil servant with steady wage income, rather than struggling with the same problems he faces:

> Interviewer: Do you think your children will continue farming after you in the future?
>
> Ramazan: I give a definite answer to that: I will make a will, I will say, "After me, absolutely none of you should go near the village." There is no advantage, no profit. Even if they become a specialized sergeant, it is better. Better if they are a teacher, a nurse. They will go to work in the morning and come home in the evening. Let me tell you about Sorgun, this is the fate of 80 villages in Sorgun. Villages with 50 households now will have 20-25 households in the future. But if you look, 50, 60 percent of Çiğdemli are Germans, their fate will be different. (Interview 23)

Almost all of the big farmers I talked to say that the economic conditions are becoming more and more hostile against farmers and they are struggling to keep their business running. They also mention that it is hard to keep their businesses profitable because of the high costs of inputs, inflation and lack of proper subsidies. When I asked them why they keep farming, they point at two reasons. First, cost of transferring what they have in the agriculture to another sector is too costly or not possible because of various reasons.

> Interviewer: You say you don't earn enough from farming. So why do you continue farming if you can't make money?
>
> Ali: Now I have a house here, I have an established order, I have tied all my money here. If I sell this place, if I go to Ankara or Izmir, can I find a job? If I had done it when I was single, maybe I would have. But now it is very difficult. If I sell my house here now, if I spent 200 money on this house, a man will not come and buy it for 50. (Interview 4)

One of the obvious reasons that they keep farming is that there is no alternative. It is similar to the previous quote in a way that it implies a lack of necessary capital to be able to compete in another field. Although big farmers have agricultural capital at hand, relying solely on the economic capital to start a off-farm job outside of the town, probably in an urban area is not possible. It is because such a change is not a simple

changing the job, but also the field. Transferring the social and cultural capital is not possible, and adapting to a new field, getting familiar to the rules of a new game is both too costly and risky, in terms of the amount of time, energy and resources devoted into.

> Interviewer: If it is so difficult to make a living from farming, if there are so many problems, why do people continue farming?
>
> Ramazan: Okay, people should stop farming, but then what will they do? For example, what will I do if I quit farming? Plus, these are the lands left by our ancestors. There is no one to cultivate it except me. We have to cultivate it. (Interview 23)

Beside the lack of alternative, farmers also refer to the traditional belief that farmers should keep farming out of respect for their ancestors. If they leave their fields empty, they are condemned by the local community:

> Interviewer: Well, if there's nothing left for you, if the situation is as bad as you say, why do you keep doing this job?
>
> Ali: You mean why do you cultivate... If you don't cultivate here, people will say something. They say, "He left it empty and didn't plow his fields." That's why we plow. (Interview 4)

As Umut puts it, farming is a tradition:

> Interviewer: If the situation is so bad, why do you keep planting?
>
> Umut: We plant because we have to. We have nothing else to do, so that the ancestral land will not remain empty. We don't really want to plant and make a profit. Planting has become a tradition. We plant so that it will not remain empty. (Interview 21)

As we have discussed before, the act of farming is not an economic practice, but also a social and cultural practice, that constitutes an embodied cultural capital. A farmer family's involvement in farming activity, enhances their ties to the local community, feeds their identity and reputation as "the ideal farmer" among the population which, can be considered as a symbolic capital. Farming regularly is a sign of long-lasting participation in the field, giving farmers a social credit that can be used in agricultural transactions.

Consequently, we see that while big farmers preparing a life out of the agricultural field for the next generation, by spending considerable amount of economic resources

for them to set a new life outside of the agricultural field. For them the agriculture has no future in the greater picture. However, they still keep their business operating as large and effective as possible, to keep being profitable in the short run.

#### 3.1.5.3. Return Migrants' Asset Purchasing Strategy

Before we move to the land fragmentation problems in the next chapter, it is important to discuss the migrant worker families land purchases and its effect on the agricultural field. Various studies have observed that migrants returning to their homeland after retirement use their savings from abroad to increase their social status. To this end, they often build new houses, purchase tractors, and acquire farmland (King, 1978, p. 179). Although they do not use their wealth for innovative and entrepreneurial motives, the wealth of returning migrants is passed on to subsequent generations in Çiğdemli through inheritance, positively affecting their agricultural capital and thus their position in agriculture.

This situation is also applicable to Çiğdemli. During my field research, I observed that the houses built by individuals returning to the town from abroad after retirement stand out among other houses, both in terms of architectural qualities and grandeur. When asked about this topic, the interviewees emphasized that those returning from abroad consistently purchase land and farmland. Fragmentation through heritage is long term tendency that has serious effects on the agricultural field. There is also another trend I have observed in Çiğdemli is the real estate purchases made by return migrants. As we have seen in the previous chapter, immigration takes an important place in the history of Çiğdemli that has formed the sociologic, demographic and economic structure of the town. Now we will examine how these purchases affect the agricultural field in general, and farmers economic assets in particular.

When it comes to land ownership and expansion by purchase, the most frequently mentioned segment of people during the interviews are the return migrants who return back to Çiğdemli after retirement. Although it is undetectable by looking at the farming data, my field observations indicate that expanding the land portfolio is a strategy that return migrants often use. It pays off in the long term, by contributing to the agricultural economic capital of the new generations.

When asked, interviewees usually mentioned that the migrant workers used their economic resources to buy real estate in Çiğdemli, including land and houses. I am given this information when I asked some old farmers that who buys the lands that bankrupt farmers sell to pay their debts:

> Interviewer: So, is there anyone selling their land or machinery to pay off their debts?
>
> Ibrahim: Many people are doing that…
>
> Interviewer: So, who is purchasing these fields?
>
> Ibrahim: It's someone from here. If a person has connections in Europe and can earn money there, then those people can buy the land. (Interview 12)

Another interviewee, Kerem, a big farmer in Çiğdemli says that migrant workers purchased many lands and rented away to have a steady income:

> Interviewer: What about those living in Germany or elsewhere abroad, or those with relatives there? How does the income from there affect them?
>
> Kerem: Their situation was good in the past. Now it doesn't make much difference. The cows in Germany have dried up too [laughs]. In the past, the money from Germans was plenty; they bought land and houses around here. They came here and collected land from Osmaniye, Karakız, and Canşalı. These people get a pension from Germany and also receive income from here. Smart folks. They also rent out their fields. Wherever the cash comes from... (Interview 14)

Also, a big farmer, Umut, emphasizes the motivation behind return workers' land purchasing strategy:

> The lands are indeed in the hands of the *Almancıs*[9]. Those who would plant don't have land. When someone sells, they buy it; the locals don't have the power to compete. They buy it, rent it out, or farm it themselves; even if they don't farm it, they want to own the land, perhaps with an old-fashioned mentality. Generally, it's the Almancıs who are collecting the land, especially those who aren't involved in farming. (Umut, Interview 21)

Rıza (72), one of the former mayors of Çiğdemli, speaks of the effect of the purchase power of return migrants on the local economy:

> They came back and, often unconsciously, built 4-5 story houses and engaged in a competition to buy land from each other. If a piece of land was 10 lira,

[9] Almancı: "Turkish citizens working in Europe, particularly in Germany." (Türk Dil Kurumu, n.d.)

> they tried to buy it for 20. One person would go and say, 'If he has a Ferguson, I want one too,' and buy a tractor. Of course, this had its benefits. They helped their neighbors, for instance. They capitalized on Çiğdemli's land. They provided assistance during weddings, holidays, and to their relatives. In the end, money flowed into Çiğdemli. (Rıza, Interview 16)

Here, as pointed out by the former mayor, there is a significant competitive element that encourages the flow of economic capital into the agricultural field. As we previously mentioned with reference to Sutherland and Burton (2011, p. 243), the symbolic function of assets like tractors, as a form of objectified cultural capital, drives the intense competition among return migrants to purchase them as well as acquire other ostentatious assets. The acquisitions of assets and equipment by migrant workers in Çiğdemli serve a strategic function as a way to maintain high social and cultural capital.

As Furkan puts it, regular transfers from family members working abroad have a big impact on the rest of the family living in Çiğdemli:

> There are many expats here. A man sends 200-300 Euros as pocket money to his child from abroad, that money corresponds to the minimum wage here. (...) Apart from that, there is some comfort because of the money that parents bring to their children from abroad. (Furkan, Interview 9)

As we see, migrant workers who came back to Çiğdemli seem to be using their economic power to purchase lands along with other type of real estate to accumulate wealth. Interviews also reveal that they usually act as land lords and prefer to rent out their lands instead of farming themselves. These conclusions are also consistent with our previous observations that most of the big farmers tend to rent out new lands to increase their production volume instead of purchasing it.

However, there are also indicators that migrant workers have an indirect positive effect on some of the big farmers' economic capital. Considering there has been four to five decades since the very first-generation migrant workers immigrated to European countries; it is not surprising that there are not many return migrants who actively farms in Çiğdemli. However, there are second generation migrant workers who still do. Ömer (56) who is a son of guest-worker and also lived in Germany between 1976-85, still actively farms large-scale. The lands he owns left from his guestworker father

and uncle, and the tractor was brought from Germany in 1980s. He, as we will see in following sections, works hard to stay in the agricultural field as a farmer.

More than active first-generation migrant worker farmers, I have encountered second generations, who has large sizes of land. 4 big farmers, Yunus (50), Ömer (56), Hüseyin (50), and Ali (42) stated that their father or family had a guest-worker past. Adem, and Hüseyin also stated that they have still siblings in Germany. Among the eleven big farmers I have encountered, it seems that five of them bear the traces of migrant-working. Hüseyin puts stress upon the role of the income from abroad:

> Actually, the reason why people stay here is the money coming from abroad. Without that money everyone would have left. If my father had not gone abroad, 99.9 percent of the time I would be either in Ankara or Istanbul. My father went to Germany, we stayed here, he retired and came back. My two brothers are in Germany now. (Hüseyin, Interview 11)

As we see above, farmers who do not have access to such a resource, tend to emphasize the unjust imbalance between the two party's purchase powers. Some farmers speak with envious undertones. For example, here some old farmers complain about how easy the life is for the migrant workers:

> Interviewer: What about those who retired from abroad?
>
> Mehmet: They get everything in advance. One lira is worth 6 liras. Doesn't he? They always buy in advance.
>
> Baran: But they also have their own debts.
>
> Kağan: No, no... What debt does he have! He goes and buys his house in Sorgun.
>
> Mehmet: He buys land here...
>
> Kağan: The man eats and eats for a lifetime... (Interview 15)

The economic power brought by immigration is visible and a source of regret for those who have not worked abroad. During a small farmer family visit, the housewife Cemile grumbles about his husband Süleyman who did not go abroad in the past:

> Interviewer: Have you been abroad?
>
> Süleyman: No, and God willing, I never will. Why should I go?
>
> Cemile: Oh, don't go, you don't need to go anywhere anyway...

> Süleyman: What's Europe anyway… The money from the old pro-Europe days is long gone. Does Europe bring money into Turkey anymore? (Interview 26)

Not just the small farmers, but also the big farmers who do not have an immigrant past reflects a degrading attitude towards them. When I told an anonymous farmer that I was going to meet Hüseyin, who has a large plantation, he reacted like this:

> Who, Hüseyin is a farmer? Get out of here, what does that Hüseyin have to do with farming, they didn't do any farming, they always bought the land later on with the money his father collected from Germany' (Interview Notes)

Field observations and these quotes give a remarkable clue that the migrant worker families in Çiğdemli might successfully have capitalized their gains abroad and channeled this income to the next generation in the form of lands and real estates. This is an example of how a non-agricultural economic capital transforms into an agricultural economic capital and increases the status of migrant worker families in agricultural field within two generations. However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, most of the wealthy retired and elderly migrant workers do not put too much effort into farming themselves. Instead, they use their economic power to implement an exit strategy for the next generation.

So, we can conclude that immigration had an important impact on the land accumulation and wealth distribution in Çiğdemli. The lands bought by the first migrant worker generation are now being run by the second generation, and an important source of accumulation of wealth. It also seems that some of the big farmers owe their economic capital to this accumulation process.

In the next three chapters, we will explore (i) how farmers under given circumstances cope with the agricultural problems and engage in socio-economic relations, (ii) how informal structures and habitus play a role in shaping the way agricultural relations work, and most importantly (iii) why and how agricultural policies in this picture do not work as intended, and fail most of the time by integrating into the rules of the game in a unique way. We will do this by referring examples from three areas: (a) the local structure of land ownership, fragmentation and inheritance problems, how farmers cope with issues arising from land ownership and how support policies based on farmer registry system are affected from these problems; (b) the agricultural market

structure, farmers agricultural transactions and policies aiming at intervening in the market and (c) how political field and agricultural field interact, and how power relations affect the distribution relations.

### 3.2. Land, Farmer Strategies and Policy Implementations

The fragmentation of agricultural land and ownership disputes are the very root of many agricultural problems in Turkey. In agricultural economy, it is accepted that agricultural enterprises below a certain size cannot be operated efficiently. Although factors such as development activities, buying and selling, and urbanization are effective in the fragmentation of agricultural lands, the main reason for fragmentation is inheritance (Ünal, 1979). In parallel with the increase in population, the size of land per capita has decreased over the years in Turkey, just like everywhere else in the world.

Complex land ownership practices, the pursuit of non-monetary benefits, and adherence to traditional norms all lead to challenges in resolving the issue. It should also be kept in mind that the land ownership extends beyond the legal purview of title deeds. It encompasses a multifaceted network of political economy, socio-cultural significance, and power relations, ultimately influencing land use for production, exchange, and social status construction (Gülçubuk, 2013, p. 17).

The public authority has made various legal and legislative arrangements to prevent the fragmentation of agricultural land. In 1926, the first version of the Civil Code, which entered into force in 1926, dealt with the inheritance regulations regarding agricultural assets; to whom the inheritance would be allocated and the rights of other heirs. Although separate regulations were made from the general inheritance law in order to prevent the division of agricultural holdings, agricultural holdings and lands continued to be fragmented due to the equal sharing envisaged by the law. In the revised Civil Code No. 4721 dated 22/11/2001, clearer language has been used in the inheritance provisions related to agriculture and the concept of ‘agricultural enterprise’ has been introduced instead of ‘agricultural property’. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the inheritance must include an agricultural enterprise with economic integrity and sufficient agricultural assets (Sayın, Altunkaya, Taşçıoğlu, Sav, & Kavasoğlu, 2017). In 2005, Law No. 5403 on Soil Conservation and Land Use classified soils according

to their intended use and productivity and prevented the division of soils below a certain size (Toprak Koruma ve Arazi Kullanımı Kanunu, 2005). Law No. 5578, published in the Official Gazette No. 26429 dated 09.02.2007, increased the size of the indivisible parcel, which was previously determined for absolute agricultural lands and was 10 decares, to 20 decares (Ekinci & Sayılı, 2010). With those and other regulations as such, the principle of freedom of division has been limited specifically in regard to absolute agricultural lands and agricultural holdings.

Especially in agriculture and agricultural economics studies, the issue is treated as a problem that needs to be solved because it reduces land productivity and prevents mechanization, and the focus is on examining the obstacles to land consolidation and solutions. Various studies have been conducted to show that farmers are skeptical about land consolidation attempts due to unfounded concerns and that farmers need to be educated and raised awareness in order to accelerate consolidation (Kızılaslan & Almus, 2001).

From a Bourdieusian perspective, the gap between de jure distribution of land and de facto situation, creates a domain for both intra-class and inter-class struggle where farmers compete for taking control over most resources possible through various informal means and informal institutions.

There is a large body of research on the difficulties faced by farmers due to land fragmentation. For example, in a study conducted by Dönmez (2021) in Adana - Seyhan, 95% of farmers have problems with other shareholders on issues such as use, benefiting from subsidies, paying taxes, not receiving their share of payments, but 94% of them do not want to be a party to the lawsuit for the elimination of partnership and have reservations about the process, financial burden, damage to ties between relatives. In the study, it was revealed that there were disagreements on land use and share distribution, joint decisions could not be taken, there were problems during the leasing phase, there were difficulties in benefiting from farmer loans and direct income support, and they could not take action alone in the relevant institutions and organizations. All of the farmers who are share owners are uncomfortable with multi-share ownership and state that they would like to be sole owners considering the financial burden (Dönmez, 2021).

It is evident that, the uncertain legal status of a farmland, paves wave to a series of relevant uncertainties that can only be solved through informal relations among relatives, tenants, landlords, and even bureaucrats. These structures, constitute the redistribution mechanism, through which, harvest, rent, taxes and subsidies are distributed among various actors.

We would like to look at the issue in terms of how it affects power relations within the agricultural field. First of all, the fragmentation of agricultural land in Çiğdemli creates difficulties in identifying and analyzing class differentiation in the field. Secondly, it creates problems for small farmers in receiving support, and how farmers struggle against these problems becomes important. Farmers' relations with bureaucratic and political institutions, as well as rivalries among relatives, stand out as a playground for micro-struggles in agriculture affecting different social classes at different levels.

The field study demonstrates that there are substantial difficulties before revealing the property relations and land distribution in the town. The problem occurs from the significant differences between the official figures/transactions and unofficial/unregistered ones. It is because (i) the legal procedure for land inheritance and succession does not work effectively due to various reasons and (ii) the prevalence of the informal economy and agricultural transactions that are not been put into the Farmers Registry System.

In order to draw a more accurate picture of the property relations, we first need to see how the land is distributed among the farmers. In the following sections we will also see that how farmers adopt various practical solutions and possession strategies to achieve their end-goals in the agricultural field under these conditions. We will also see how policies aiming at regulating this area fail.

### 3.2.1. Land Fragmentation, Acquisition and Registration Policies

If we look at the general trend in entitling to agricultural property in Turkey, those who tillage their own land has been the majority of the population. In 2006, 85% of the agricultural businesses farm their own farmlands including that are held the possession.

There is a high level of land fragmentation in Turkey. According to the Agricultural Holding Structure Survey done by TSI in 2016, 80.7% of the agricultural holdings operate lands smaller than 100 decare (Turkish Statistical Institute). The recent data provided by The General Directorate of Agricultural Reform presented in the Table 13, shows that the average land size for Turkey is 96,51 decare, and it is 102,08 decare for Sorgun. However, the average farm size in Çiğdemli is 24,53 decare, which is much smaller than Sorgun.

Table 13: Farmers, Land Size, and Rental Contracts, 2019

| Location | Number of Registered Farmers | Average Land Size (da) | Number of Registered Rental Contracts |
|---|---|---|---|
| Turkey | 2.061.629 | 96,51 | 1.616.226 |
| Sorgun | 6.839 | 102,08 | 6.602 |
| Çiğdemli | 891 | 24,53 | 298 |
| Burunören | 119 | 33,93 | 136 |
| Camiikebir | 153 | 19,40 | 30 |
| Duralidayılı | 66 | 32,79 | 9 |
| Gülveren | 160 | 20,69 | 48 |
| İsmailhacılı | 70 | 33,43 | 1 |
| Kale | 137 | 13,43 | 22 |
| Karşıyaka | 186 | 27,96 | 52 |

Source: (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry General Directorate of Agricultural Reform, 2022).

When the average farm size is examined on a neighborhood basis, the smallest average farm size is found in Kale, the oldest and most urban neighborhood of Çiğdemli. In contrast, average farm sizes increase in more 'rural' neighborhoods like Duralidayılı, İsmailhacılı, and Karşıyaka. This indicates that fragmented, small plots of land used for housing or gardens have an impact on agricultural farm size.

The District Agricultural Directorate of Sorgun also provides data from the Farmers Register System, which contains the size of the farm land used, produce, irrigation method, and yield quantities based on farmers' statements. The official declarations made by the registered farmers in Çiğdemli between 2014 and 2020 shows that the average size of farmland per farmer including both follow and planted lands is around 50 decare (Figure 41). Keep in mind that the figures include officially rented lands and they do not indicate ownership:





Figure 41: Average Farm Size Per Farmer, Çiğdemli, 2014 - 2020

Source: Prepared by the author using data obtained from the Sorgun District Agriculture Directorate (2020).

Lastly, we can also see the distribution of average land size by population. Again, based on the Farmers Registration System, if we group the farmers by ten-decare slices based on farm land size (again, both rented and owned), we get the distribution of farm size per farmer as displayed in Figure 42.





Figure 42: Distribution of Farm Size Per Farmer, Çiğdemli

Source: Prepared by the author using raw data obtained from the Sorgun District Agriculture Directorate (2020).

The Figure 42 demonstrates that by 2020, only 4.46% of the population farms on 150 decare and larger area. As the total farm size decreases, the number of people increases

in a parabolic way. Another important conclusion we can draw is that the number of farmers who have declared farms up to 10 decare has increased significantly in the last years.

If we group the population into slices of 50 decare we see that the first two layers who farms up to 100 decare, farms 84,4% of the population in Çiğdemli farms 57.83 of the total lands, where the rest of the population (15.6%) farms the 42.17% of the lands (Table 14).

Table 14: Distribution of Farm Size Per Farmer

| Land Size Categories (decares) | 2014 | | | | 2020 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. farmers | % | Size of the land | % | No. farmers | % | Size of land | % |
| **Up to 50** | 214 | 61.32 | 4,749.53 | 27.24 | 218 | 60.72 | 4,392.83 | 24.03 |
| **50-99** | 93 | 26.65 | 6,625.82 | 38.00 | 85 | 23.68 | 6,177.96 | 33.80 |
| **100-149** | 29 | 8.31 | 3,557.15 | 20.40 | 40 | 11.14 | 4,692.31 | 25.67 |
| **150-199** | 10 | 2.87 | 1,713.36 | 9.83 | 13 | 3.62 | 2,168.89 | 11.87 |
| **200 +** | 3 | 0.86 | 790.25 | 4.53 | 3 | 0.84 | 845.98 | 4.63 |
| **Total** | 349 | 100.00 | 17,436.10 | 100.00 | 359 | 100.00 | 18,277.97 | 100.00 |

Source: Prepared by the author using raw data obtained from the Sorgun District Agriculture Directorate (2020).

If we evaluate that whether the size of the average land is sufficient to make a living, it may be misleading to take these figures with their face value. We know that wetlands are more productive than dry lands. We have also seen that the Law No. 6537 states that the minimum size of agricultural land with sufficient income for Sorgun is 70 decare for irrigated farms, 130 decare for dry farms, 10 decare for forest farming and 3 decare for greenhouse area (Toprak Koruma Ve Arazi Kullanimi Kanununda Değişiklik Yapilmasi Hakkinda Kanun, 2014). If we use these figures to calculate weighted sizes, (i.e. 7/13 irrigated farm land for each unit of dry farm land), in 2020 only 29 out of 359 registered farmers farm more than the size equals to 130 decare of dry land which is the minimum size for a living.

The shape of the distribution, at the highest level of abstraction, gives us a hint about the distribution of the agricultural economic capital among farmers. This picture also a sign of an extremely unequally distribution of population among social classes solely based on land *control*.

These statistics clearly shows the level of fragmentation and how small the average farm land is. However, our field study reminds us of significant limitations to the accuracy of the official data. This is mainly because always the official records do not include the unofficial transactions and deals. Thus, to avoid drawing misleading conclusions from registered transactions, it will be important to take the information gathered from the field into consideration to project the true picture of the land distribution.

In Çiğdemli, there two traditional ways of farming a land owner's farm land. The first one is renting, where there is a tenancy agreement. The second way is called crop sharing. In this form of agreement, land owner and tenant farmer split the costs in a certain way.

> In a sharecropping, the other party pays for the tractor labor, diesel, processing fees in exchange for the field owner's field. Everything else is 50-50. In short, labor and diesel oil for the field, the rest is half and half. And when I say the rest, the fertilizer and seed you sow is half and half. (Umut, Interview 21)
>
> [Sharecropping] is done by word of mouth. The cultivation belongs to the tractor, the field belongs to the sharecropper. The rest is shared half and half. Seed, fertilizer, medicine are all shared. (Ömer, Interview 22)

The first notable finding about the interview process is that, although I have interviewed with a random sampling method, the number of big farmers were much more than expected. Out of 33 semi-structured interviews, 10 farmers stated they farm 200 to 1.300 decare, and 23 farmers said that they farm up to 160 decare. This means that one third of the farmers I had interview with cultivate relatively large areas compared to the farm distribution given by the FRS. The Table 15, summarizes the legal status of the lands farmed by those ten big farmers:

Table 15: Land Ownership of Big Farmers, Çiğdemli

| Name | Age | Total Cultivated Area | Details |
|---|---|---|---|
| Umut | 35 | 500-600 | Owns 80-90 decares of land registered in the FRS. Not all of it is in his name, as he farms it with his brothers. Farms 400-500 decares through sharecropping or renting, with a total of 500-600 decares cultivated. |
| Yunus | 50 | 1,200-1,300 | Owns 600 decares and rents an additional 600-700 decares. He **cannot receive support payments** for the rented land. |
| Adem | N/A | 400-500 | Owns 230 decares and rents 200-300 decares. He **cannot receive support payments** for the rented land. |
| Ömer | 56 | 420-430 | Owns 50 decares and rents/cropshares the rest. He **cannot receive support payments** for the rented and cropshared lands. |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ramazan | 34 | 500 | Owns 250 decares and rents/cropshares another 250 decares. He **cannot receive support payments** for the cropshared land but does receive support payments for land officially rented from his brothers. |
| Yusuf | 42 | 200-300 | Jointly owns 120 decares with his siblings and rents the rest. He **cannot receive support payments** for the rented land. |
| Kerem | N/A | 500 | Owns 250 decares personally, and the other 250 belongs to his uncle. All land is jointly owned. |
| Ali | 42 | 700-800 | Owns 200-250 decares and rents the remainder. He **cannot receive support payments** for the rented land. |
| Hüseyin | 50 | 500 | Owns 500 decares. |
| Emrah | 40 | Up to 1,000 | Owns 135 decares and rents 750 decares. He receives support payments for the land he owns but **cannot receive support payments** for the rented land. |

As summarized in the Table 15, nine out of ten farmers rent out or crop share to increase the production and to expand their farm lands. Sharecropping (*ortakçılık* or *yarıcılık*) and tenancy (*icar*) are the most common ways to farm others' lands. The proportion of the rented and owned lands for big farmers are very divers. The size of the lands those 11 farmers own range between 70 to 600 decare, when the rented/crop shared lands they farm also vary from 0 up to 700 decare. The renting in some cases, completely replace the purchases. Some of the big farmers are also big tenants and increasing the scale of farming through tenancy is common. These farmers who have enough agricultural capital to expand, seem to increase their volume of production through renting lands and using family members' lands off the books.

This observation seems to be in line with the general trends in Turkey. The survey in 2016 gave clues of that as the land size grows, the amount of rented lands increase (Table 16).

However, our observations and interviews show that that unregistered tenancy is very common, which is usually based on oral contracts. The some of the small farmers and eight out of ten big farmers I spoke to stated that they do not get or partly get the support payments for the lands they rented/crop shared, but the land owners do. This is a clear indicator that the most tenancy agreements are not registered to the FRS and most of the agreements are in the verbal form.

The unregistered use of the agricultural lands is not limited to big farmers' renting. When an interviewee farmer state that they "have" a certain size of land, it is usually a de facto ownership, or a possession. Farmers usually deem themselves as owners even if the inheritance has not legally done yet. They usually jointly own lands with

other family members. Although the owner of the lands is passed away, the heirs do not start the legal process to inherit assets for various reasons.

Table 16: Distribution of Agricultural Holdings and Land by Holding Size

**Distribution of agricultural holdings and land operated by holdings by holding size and land tenure, 2016**

[A. Holdings] [B. Agricultural land]

| Holding size (decares) [2] | Total | | Holdings having their own land | | | | Holdings not having their own land | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | | | Holdings operating land by sole type of tenure | | | | | | | |
| | | | Holdings operating only their own land (possession land included) | | Holdings operating both their own land and other's land | | Holdings operating only rented land | | Holdings operating land only on share basis | | Holdings operating land in other types of tenure (1) | | Holdings operating land by more than one type of tenure(1) | |
| | A | B | A | B | A | B | A | B | A | B | A | B | A | B |
| Total | 100,0 | 100,0 | 79,5 | 59,9 | 17,1 | 36,4 | 3,0 | 3,2 | 0,3 | 0,4 | 0,1 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,1 |
| -5 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 96,5 | 95,5 | 1,3 (1) | 2,1 (1) | 1,9 | 2,1 | 0,2 (1) | 0,3 (1) | 0,1 | 0,1 | - | - |
| 5 - 9 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 91,5 | 91,3 | 4,2 | 4,3 | 3,5 | 3,7 | 0,2 (1) | 0,2 (1) | 0,5 | 0,4 | 0,0 | 0,0 |
| 10 - 19 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 88,9 | 88,2 | 8,1 | 8,9 | 2,6 | 2,5 | 0,3 (1) | 0,4 (1) | 0,0 | 0,0 | - | - |
| 20 - 49 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 81,9 | 80,3 | 13,6 | 15,0 | 4,2 | 4,3 | 0,4 (1) | 0,4 (1) | 0,0 | 0,0 | - | - |
| 50 - 99 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 73,5 | 72,2 | 23,7 | 25,0 | 2,4 | 2,4 | 0,4 (1) | 0,4 (1) | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 |
| 100 - 199 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 63,4 | 61,8 | 33,7 | 35,4 | 2,4 | 2,3 | 0,5 (1) | 0,5 (1) | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,0 |
| 200 - 499 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 53,5 | 52,0 | 43,5 | 44,9 | 2,4 | 2,6 | 0,2 (1) | 0,1 (1) | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,4 | 0,3 |
| 500 - 999 | 100,0 | 100,0 | 42,7 | 41,6 | 54,1 | 55,2 | 2,5 | 2,5 | 0,6 (1) | 0,6 (1) | 0,0 | 0,0 | 0,1 | 0,1 |
| 1000+ | 100,0 | 100,0 | 45,7 | 51,9 | 49,6 | 41,5 | 3,7 | 5,7 | 0,9 (1) | 0,6 (1) | 0,0 | 0,2 | 0,1 | 0,2 |

TurkStat, Agricultural Farm Structure Survey, 2016

Figures in table may not add up to totals due to rounding.

- Denotes magnitude null

(1) Advised to use with caution since there is not enough observation.

(2) Holding sizes were formed on the basis of total land operated by agricultural holding.

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2016)

Many interviewees stated that the lands they farm have multiple shareholders (Abdullah, Ramazan, Abdurrahman, Enes, Ali, Şeyhmus). In some cases, although the deceased has passed away a long time ago, the division of the properties has not done, and the ownership has not been transferred among the beneficiaries. The high number of heirs also obstructs any possible solution. As the number of generations involved increase, it becomes harder to find heirs to make tenancy agreements. There are usually many heirs from different generations, who had migrated to different locations in the country and abroad. This, in practice, means that a huge effort needed to be exerted in order to even reach to heirs and deploy a communication channel among them.

> Interviewer: How many pieces are these lands?
>
> Serhat: These 55-60 decares are 4 pieces in total. We haven't solved that issue yet, but with God's will, we will solve it in winter or so. I don't know if they will transfer their shares to me or not. For now, it's continuing like this.
>
> Interviewer: What is the reason for the fragmentation of these lands?
>
> Serhat: The reason is this: our grandfathers passed away back in the day, and for the inheritance left by their grandfathers, let's say there are 40 people. We

> can't find or bring all 40 of them. When you look at the title deed, some have passed away, leaving behind inheritance. In fact, even the heirs of the deceased have also passed away.
>
> Interviewer: How much of the total land in the village is like this, with shared ownership?
>
> Serhat: About 70% of the land in our village is shared ownership, no matter how you look at it. That's why we can't transfer it. I mean, first the grandfather died, then the eldest son passed away. There's the heir of the grandfather, there's the heir of the son, and if their children have passed away, there are heirs there too. For example, let's say someone passed away in Europe. He died, but he has children. They are entitled to it. That's why it's so hard to resolve. I don't know how the government would handle this. We can't do it. (Interview 25)

Inheritance disputes are always more than a problem of math, emerging from accumulation of complex and many-sided conflicts throughout family's history. Long-lasting disagreements and resentments among family members also sets a barrier before the settlement. In some cases, heirs cannot settle the dispute over the inheritance for decades, and a family member living in the town, *de facto* uses the land.

> Yes, also because of the inheritance problem, people cannot get support. For example, my grandfather passed away in 1967, there is still land on him. Brother is angry with brother, sister is angry with sister, no one comes to anyone. When the heirs are resentful, people cannot do anything. (Ali, Interview 4)

Here, we witness the close connection between property relations and the social relationships among family members. The ability to convince a family member to transfer their share, the strength of familial bonds, and the presence of a family structure that can unite its members directly impact the distribution of economic capital, property, and usage relations. In Bourdieu's terms, it is not incorrect to consider familial dynamics as part of social capital; likewise, the traditional rules governing how this distribution is carried out can be regarded as part of cultural capital. Therefore, the intra-family distribution relationships over inherited land in a farming family are determined more by the nature of this social and cultural capital than by legal regulations. The embodied form of these types of capital, manifested as regularly observable practices or habitus, provides us with insights into the nature of the capital.

Our observations in Çiğdemli reveal that conflicts and deadlocks regarding inheritance distribution are prevalent. These conflicts stem from the dissolution of traditional

family values and the emergence of individual-centered property relations driven by commodification. This creates a contested social values domain where family members frequently disagree. In other words, norms that would ordinarily resolve distribution without state intervention are becoming invalid, while legal mechanisms fail to fully replace the void left by these norms. This environment leads extended family members into deadlock over the property-based distribution of economic capital.

Sometimes the problem is not just about the size of shares, but also is about possession of particular lands. Some heirs do not want to sell/transfer their shares while others do not want to buy any shares. Even if they do, sometimes they cannot afford to. As an alternative solution, selling the whole property to a third party is not desirable for almost anybody, because of the traditional belief that “ancestral” lands should stay in the patrilinear decent. This leads us to another structural tendency that is not reflected in official records but still persists within society: the restriction of women's inheritance rights.

The changing rules of the game regarding inheritance are most evident in the context of women's inheritance rights. While this may initially seem unrelated, a key characteristic of the old order is the exclusion of daughters from being considered children. Below is a brief excerpt from a conversation with small farmer Abdullah about his children, which illustrates this point.

> Interviewer: Do you have any children?
>
> Abdullah: I have three children.
>
> Haluk: Come on, don't be like that. What about the girls?
>
> Hacer (Haluk's wife): Aren't you counting the girls? There are five children, five. Three sons and two daughters.
>
> Abdullah: Here, we talk about the boys. Three sons and two daughters, yes. (Interview 1)

Interestingly, in this dialogue from my very first field interview, I sensed a hint of embarrassment in Abdullah's wife Hacer's intervention to correct her husband. Her reaction suggested a feeling of shame about her husband's faux pas in front of a researcher from Ankara, something she might not have addressed otherwise. Although I did not focus on it at the moment, I later observed in nearly all instances where

daughters were excluded from the count, there was an attempt to rectify the situation as if it were a mere slip of the tongue:

> Interviewer: How many siblings do you have?
>
> Kerem: [Paused] Five including the girls. One passed away, so now we are four.
>
> Interviewer: How many siblings do you have?
>
> Muhammet: Three… Boys… There are also three girls. So, three boys. [Here, he initially said "three," then paused to clarify "three boys," and then added "three girls" to give the total number of siblings as I intended.]
>
> Ramazan: Yes. We are four siblings… Four boys, and four girls, making a total of eight siblings including me. Now, I am the only one living here. [Here, Ramazan first said "four siblings," then added his sisters to raise the total number to eight.] (Interview 23)

These hesitations and corrections, though presented as mere linguistic remnants of the old social order, reveal a deeper reality in the actual relationships. Interviews indicate that efforts to keep inherited land within the paternal line persist, with women being "persuaded" in various ways not to claim land. Common practices include denying land to women, offering cash or other assets instead of land, or, if necessary, giving them insignificant and less valuable plots. This shows that the legal framework governing property transfer is not fully integrated into the local rules of the agricultural game in Çiğdemli, or at least is not fully considered in all its aspects.

In a Bourdieusian framework, the social codes regulating inheritance distribution continue to exist as an enduring habitus within the agricultural field. However, it can be observed that the acceptance and social value of these codes are declining due to the spread of market relations, the weakening of familial ties, and the rise of individualism. Consequently, the practices of inheritance distribution, which embody this diminishing cultural capital, are also decreasing. This decrease, of course, does not occur smoothly but manifests as an increase in inheritance crises, where actors opposing the distribution complicate the process.

Even if the parties are willing to set aside their traditional attitudes and accept a distribution based on the values established by current laws within a framework of justice, they often cannot take the matter to court. Because the challenges related to taking inheritance disputes to court extend beyond merely gathering the heirs together.

Additionally, taking legal action is considered as a risky and costly option, simply because bringing the case to court could end up with undesirable outcomes for all parties. Taking the risk may not worth it. Long trials, litigation costs, tax on transfer of the land and other transaction costs are also disincentive to taking legal procedures.

> Interviewer: Is there any inheritance, title deed division problems, inheritance disputes here?
>
> Ibrahim: Very much... For example, a man's father died and he has 10 heirs. They don't get together. Whoever is left here must be planting them. But there is no support.
>
> Enes: They don't let them plant the fields either.
>
> Interviewer: What do you mean?
>
> Enes: The lawyer doesn't let them plant the fields when it becomes official. Let's say someone comes along and asks for his share. When they can't agree, they take it to court. When one of them gives it, they all end up in court. What does the court do, it puts that field up for sale and divides the money. The state sells the whole field. Then, when there is a lawsuit, no one can cultivate it.
>
> İbrahim: That case doesn't end in 1-2 years. (Interview 12)

Sometimes, as Zafer puts it, farmers who possess the lands de facto, may not want the status quo to end. In that case the heir farming the lands does not want the division of property to be made officially, simply because he could lose control over some or all the lands if he is not determined as the competent heir.

> I might not want it either. Some people deliberately don’t want it. For example, I’m farming all the land, so I don’t want it to be divided. If I wanted it divided, my share would decrease, and then maybe I wouldn’t be able to farm it at all. (Zafer, Interview 31)

In short, there are too many heirs, relatively low value of shares for each, a long and costly procedure to take, and many family disputes to come to surface. Status quo is considered better than taking the long path.

> Now here you have 2 decares, even 1 decare plots of land. They’ve been divided. If you look at the deed, it says 20 decares, but in reality, it’s down to 1 or 2 decares. There are disagreements between siblings, feuds over land. Brothers have become enemies. (Emrah, Interview 6)

Instead of dividing the inheritance, farmers farm the inherited lands by depending on simple contracts, verbal agreements with other heirs or de facto practices. According to interviewees, after the deceased passed away, heirs who are legally expected to be

successors to lands make unofficial agreements or just implicitly accept to leave the usufructuary rights to a family member, generally the only heir who still lives in the town. The fact that almost all other heirs live in different cities or even abroad, and they do not have immediate interest in division, makes such utilizations to last for years.

All of the verbal and informal ways that farmers come up with to keep farming the farm lands that they practically control, can be described as habitus, a set of structural dispositions that is followed by farmers. These informal dispositions are solutions to the inheritance problems under given circumstances and rules of the game. As we see, laws and regulations are only partly in effect, which makes them not the rule of the game, but a component of the rules of the game, by articulating with other codes, principles and values in complex ways.

So, there are two processes in place at the same time: The first process has been the up-to-day fragmentation of the lands and the increasing number of legal heirs, which seem to be more than the official figures. The second process is the de facto unification of these fragmented lands under the hands of few farmers.

With that said, it should be noted that there are different class habitus' to overcome the obstacles outlined above. While small farmers take control of the family members' shares through various in-family negotiations and tactics, bigger farmers who farm on a commercial scale tend to rent out or sharecrop lands on verbal agreements. Farmers follow one of the following tactics of (a) making verbal agreements, (b) staying away from legal processes that will disrupt the current situation which is in their favor (c) becoming a part of the informal economy and giving up some subsidies in exchange for not paying tax. While these habitus' make it possible for small farmers to stay in the agricultural game and survive, it also gives an advantaged position to the land owner by allowing them to keep subsidies that are paid based on land ownership. Thus, just as other structures of local agricultural relations, here too the impact of unequal relationships between classes is reflected in informal structures.

Another conclusion is that, government records do not give us a complete picture of the current relations of property and the informal structures that plays role in property

relations. What is more, since the official records do not contain the whole universe of the agricultural transactions, support policies dependent on those records are failed to be properly implemented.

While out migration and depopulation of the town ends up with most of the farm lands being left to a few hands in practice, the number of disputed lands keep increasing. Similar results were obtained in a field survey conducted by the KBB (Kredi Kayıt Bürosu – The Credit Bureau) in 2019. The report points out to an increase in average average land size, but not due to an increase in agricultural land but to a decrease in the number of active farmers. The arithmetic average of 192 hectares found in the field survey indicates that there may be fewer active farmers in Turkey than what is officially recorded. It also insists on the fact that although most landowners do not actively engage in production activities, they register with ÇKS under their own names. In addition, it is observed that the divided properties due to inheritance are also registered under the names of different family members in ÇKS, although they are jointly operated by the same household. Furthermore, it is thought that unofficially leased lands and lands that appear as forest, pasture and/or treasury land in the land registry but are actually used for agriculture also increase the "actual" land per farmer. So, the official registration systems such as the Agricultural Registration System (ÇKS) do not reflect the actual situation at the field since they rely on land ownership or official leases/consent forms. Our findings are also with the same line with these conclusions (Kredi Kayıt Bürosu, 2019, p. 12).

### 3.2.2. Informal Property Relations and Agricultural Support Policies

Problems with the inheritance of the lands is closely related to and have significant effects on support payments. As a result of the land inheritance and registration problems, there are a lot of land in Çiğdemli which is utilized without being legally inherited. However, producers who farm the lands *de facto*, cannot access to the subsidies that are granted to *de jure* producer.

Diesel and fertilizer payments, just like the other indirect income support policies, stipulates agricultural production. As we have seen before, in order to entitled to get subsidy payments, a farmer needs to be registered to the Farmer Registry System (FRS); declare the lands he or she farms and submit relevant documents such as

property deeds or tenancy contract to prove that he or she is eligible. Diesel and fertilizer payments are associated with the farming area, for instance in 2020, diesel payment is 19 TL per decare and fertilizer payment is 8 TL per decare.

The key point here is that diesel and fertilizer subsidies are paid to the *farming beneficiary on paper*, for the per decare farmer tillage. If a land is registered at the system in the name of land owner, but in practice it is farmed by someone else, then the payment is made to the owner unless the tenancy contract is registered to the system. If the farmer does not register in the farmer registry system, he cannot receive any the support payment. In this scenario, if the registered land owner declares the production he becomes entitled to the subsidiaries.

> Interviewer: How do you use the land you cultivate that isn't registered in the FRS?
>
> Umut: We have 400-500 decares through partnerships or rental agreements.
>
> Interviewer: How are the costs shared in a partnership?
>
> Umut: In a partnership, the landowner provides the land, while the other party covers the tractor work, fuel, and labor costs. Everything else is split 50-50. In short, the land is exchanged for labor and fuel, and the rest—like the fertilizer and seeds—is shared equally.
>
> Interviewer: What about the support payments given for the land?
>
> Umut: The support payments usually go to the owner, mostly staying with the landowner.
>
> Interviewer: Is it the same with rental agreements?
>
> Umut: Yes, in rental agreements too, the landowner generally takes 90% of the support.
>
> Interviewer: So, if I understand correctly, there's a difference between the actual cultivated areas and the ones officially registered in the FRS for support payments?
>
> Umut: Yes, there is a difference between the FRS-registered land and the actual cultivated area. The people who are actually doing the farming don't get the support. I plant wheat, but I can't receive the support. (Interview 21)

§ § §

> Interviewer: Can you get support such as diesel oil and fertilizer support for the areas you cultivate?
>
> Serhat: We receive support. That is to say, I can get support for the amount of land registered in my name in the agricultural chambers. Let's say we are six brothers. If we have 80 decares of land, if I have 30 decares out of these six,

> they get the support for the others. If it is shared, if it is registered in the title deed, they receive the support. (Interview 25)

The system is based on the declarations given by the farmers over which there is no check and control in practice.

> You go and get your FRS signed by the headman. We get a farmer certificate from the agricultural chamber. We have fields that appear in the ÇKS. I write what I will plant there, and the mukhtar signs and approves it. How does the mukhtar know which field I cultivate? How will he know the 70-80 pieces I have planted? (Yunus, Interview 29)

Although the system relies on farmer's statements and supervision of the official authorities, interviewees imply that some beneficiaries do receive the payments even without farming the land, due to the lack of control:

> Interviewer: Do you receive diesel-fertilizer support from the land you are cultivating?
>
> Yusuf: In tenancy, the support goes to the owner of the field. He already receives it even if his field stands empty.
>
> Interviewer: He can't get it if it is empty, does it look cultivated?
>
> Yusuf: I mean, it's not like showing it...
>
> [At that moment, other farmers from the surrounding area entered the conversation, there was a murmur]
>
> Naim: That's what it looks like, yes!
>
> Nebati: The man writes wheat and chickpeas there, but in reality, there is nothing, and no one looks at it.
>
> Yusuf: I mean, the state doesn't come and inspect it anyway. (Interview 30)

A land owner speaks of an 'invoice market' where it is possible to get an invoice from a merchant by paying the VAT, which allows you to get support payment without any real production:

> I have 500 decares of land of my own, I rent it out. The rent is 15 çiniks, [120 kg] but I receive the fertilizer support and diesel oil support given to my field. Look, here is where the rant comes out. My field may give 5 or 20. Let's say I will get support. If necessary, I will go to the trader, pay the VAT, have an extra invoice made, to get support. There is no obstacle to this. There is also a trade in invoicing. (Arda, Interview 33)

The downside of the unregistered tenancy is that tenant does not receive the support payments. However, there is a tradeoff here which partly compensates this loss. Since

the farming activity is not registered, the sale of the produce is also unregistered, which saves farmer from paying tax. Under normal circumstances, the buyer as the deductor is responsible to deduct the 20% income tax. However, in this case, the buyer does not provide a producer receipt which makes the transaction untraceable.

> Interviewer: How much land do you have registered in the ÇKS?
>
> Umut: I have 70-80 decares of land in the ÇKS. The title deeds of all of it are not in my name. With a lease agreement. But we cultivate 500-600 decares of land in total. We cannot get the support of the product we have planted. Since our ÇKS is low, we cannot get the support for the crops we cultivate. We cannot benefit from the opportunities provided by the state.
>
> Interviewer: But I guess you don't cut the producers either, so it's like the support you don't receive is balanced with that?
>
> Umut: Of course, I mean... We don't cut the producers. We have no expenses from there, 20 percent. (Interview 21)

If a tenancy agreement is recorded in the system, it becomes harder for the farmer to avoid to pay the income tax for the crops sold. In this case farmer pays the income tax when he/she sells the crops even if he/she does not benefit from the support payments. So overall the costs outweigh the benefits.

> Interviewer: Are you registered with the FRS?
>
> Şeyhmus: I am not registered in the FRS. I'm not receiving any support either. Even if I did, what difference would it make? What are the people who receive it doing anyway? Now, if I wanted to register, there are only 9 decares in my father's name, and that's all I can register under FRS. The other lands are with relatives, under my siblings' names. You would need to get power of attorney from them, or you'd have to make rental agreements. Each of them is in a different place—how would that work? And now, even if I went and registered, they'd cut money from the producer. It ends up costing me more. (Interview 5)

In practice, subsidies become a matter of negotiation between the land owner and the tenant, or between the heirs. Negotiating parties may be relatives, or a land owner and a prospective tenant.

Negotiations among greater family members is a common dynamic behind the support payments. When one of the heirs wants to get subsidies for other heirs' farm lands, he needs to get their consent and register these lands in his name at the farmer registry system by documenting that he is the contractual beneficiary. This depends on the farmers family relations.

However, due to high number of heirs, making written tenancy agreements with each of the heirs and registering them is too costly and time consuming, or in some cases even impossible. Thus, some farmers find to make contract with all heirs impractical:

> For example, we have land that we inherited from our father, it's a separate land. I get their support. But for example, the ones left by my grandfather have twenty, thirty or even fifty heirs. Where are you going to find them? You just plant them. Oh, you can also get support where you get a certificate of inheritance, there is no problem there. (Yusuf, Interview 30)

Interviewees state that a predominant amount of land is subjected to inheritance disputes:

> Interviewer: What is the rate of benefiting from supports in the village?
>
> Murat: I am talking about the village as a whole, if 5 or 10 people out of 100 people benefit from the support, 90 people, let's say 80 people do not benefit. Our lands are inherited throughout the village, including the surrounding villages. Mostly due to lack of agreement. (Interview 18)

Even in the case that the farmer manages to get the consent of relatives, receiving subsidies still at relatives' mercy:

> Ramazan: There is a total of 12,000-13,000 decares of land in our village. Maybe two-three households have clear title deeds, they own their own land. Apart from that, the title deeds of the remaining 90 percent of the households are shared.
>
> Interviewer: What exactly is the situation in your family?
>
> Ramazan: I transferred it. Six of my siblings gave their consent. There are seven of us in total. My brothers sign a letter of consent saying that we are not planting, we are transferring it to our brother, and the District Agriculture approves it. That's when you get the support. I get support.
>
> Interviewer: Then do you need to continue to agree with your brothers to continue receiving support?
>
> Ramazan: If you don't agree, your brother will go and get the consent letter revoked with a petition and you won't be able to plant anymore. There are many who don't get support like this. (Interview 23)

The effectiveness and efficiency of the subsidy policies are somehow related to the problem-solving capacity of certain family relations at the local level.

When big farmers attempt to expand the lands they farm, the social dynamic in place is different than family relations. Interviews show that big farmers have more

difficulties getting the support payment. Big farmers renting out other lands, usually complain that the land owner gets subsidies.

> Interviewer: What are your most important problems as a farmer?
>
> Yunus: Our problem is this: I'm farming 1,200 decares, 600 of which is mine, and the other 600 is rented. I benefit from the support for my own land, but I can't benefit from either the support or compensation for hail damage on the rented land. The landowner takes all of that. (Interview 29)

Not only tenancy but also sharecropping holds the same problem. When they farm other's lands as a sharecropper, big farmers still struggle to receive subsidies:

> Interviewer: Is the support from the ÇKS also divided [in partnership]?
>
> Ömer: No, no, that goes to the landowner. For example, the state pays burn money, that goes directly to the landowner, it is not compatible with you. Ha, if he is conscientious, he will give it to you, otherwise he won't share it, it's over. (Interview 22)

Although small farmers mention that there are problems with receiving subsidies and inheritance disputes; the problem with support payments is emphasized more frequently by big farmers than others. It is because the land owners tend to keep the support when the other party is not a relative.

> Generally, the tenars are made with a verbal contract. If they are relatives of each other, the planter gets the support, there is no problem between relatives and relatives. But if they are not relatives, the original owner gets the support. (Fatih, Interview 8)

Big farmers usually mention the problem something that reduces the revenues, profitability and affects their businesses. Therefore, many of the big farmers, specifically touch upon it as a systemic problem that government should address.

> Interviewer: Do you get [fertilizer and diesel support]?
>
> Yusuf: No, we can't get fuel and fertilizer support either. Since some of our land is inherited from our grandfather, no legal process has been done yet; we would need to go to court to divide it, or the shares need to be determined. But even the shares are not clear for us. Another issue is that there are 20 people listed on the title deed, and you would need to get power of attorney from each of them, but they won't give it. If I had a 5 decares share out of my 100 decares, I would at least take that. But no one is dealing with these things. If you dealt with it, you could actually get it, for example, if it's inherited from the grandfather. (Interview 30)

The result is that the support payments are not received by the producers, but by the land owners. In some cases, the land owners who live in the urban areas receive the support payments:

> The most important issue, as we said before, is that a man gets support in Ankara or Izmir without putting in any effort. This is the biggest problem. (Ahmet, Interview 3)

We see that the agricultural policies that aim to prevent fragmentation, and record transactions are unable to encompass the practical rules and ways of doing agricultural business. The rules of the game concerning the property relations seem to transcend the rules put and envisaged by the law. Farmers in the agricultural field utilize their family relations, make use of unwritten social rules of agreement, bypass the legal and procedural framework put by the government and (re)produce a structural disposition in which they make consistent and reliable agricultural transactions.

### 3.3. Local Agricultural Market: Formal and Informal Rules of the Game

In this chapter we will cover the market structure, the formal and informal institutions and patterns in which farmers engage in social relations and economic transactions, and the rules of the game. Discovering how these structures operate and individuals interact will show us how farmers and other actors of the agricultural field, in practice, cope with the challenges caused by the conditions summarized above. It also allows us to explore the interrelation between the rules of the agricultural field and the agricultural policies imposed by the government; in other words, how agricultural policies articulate into the rules of the game.

#### 3.3.1. Informal Financial Structures and Agricultural Policies

Market structure is built upon the seasonal cycle of the agricultural production. The need for inputs, the quantity of the agricultural product available in the market and the prices are all dependent on the stages of the production of the plant in question. Speaking of the relevant plants in particular, wheat and barley are sown at the end of October, and the harvest starts in the third week of July. Sugar beet is sown between the end of March and the mid-April, and the harvest starts around the end of September and the beginning of October. Between the sowing and harvesting there lies various stages of production. Farmers need funds to grow the plants during the season, and

they wait for the harvest season for the commodity. There are numerous risks and uncertainties emerging from the environment, weather and market which could possibly affect the quality and the quantity of the harvest, as well as the price. While the financial needs both for the agricultural business activities and for the family extend throughout the year, harvest and the sale of the production concentrate within a relatively narrow period of time. This uneven distribution of the supply and demand characterizes the nature of agricultural production and paves the way for the precariousness of farmers. As Stirling summarizes it clearly in his examination of two Turkish villages in Kayseri which was conducted in the beginning of 1950s, "Urgent cash needs constantly run ahead of income, and people borrow to meet the immediate situation" (Stirling, 1965, p. 91). It appears that over the past 70 years, little has changed in the relationship between farmers in the region and indebtedness.

Every farmer in the agricultural field, apply to formal institutions, participate in informal structures, and follow structured dispositions to stabilize these fluctuations and mitigate risks. Small farmers, part-time farmers and big farmers differ in tools and methods of dealing with problems. However, small farmers are the most vulnerable group of producers that have limited options.

Farmers have two options to get access to resources. They either get access to credit in the monetary form from financial institutions, and use that money to purchase inputs from various sources, or they can directly buy inputs on credit. In the second senario, farmers can pay their debt either in cash, or in kind (with their harvest). It depends on whether the lender is a crop buyer or not. As we have seen before, there are three main actors in Çiğdemli that a farmer can both purchase inputs, sell procuct and get loans: The Agriculture Credit Cooperatives, gas stations and other merchants. Here, it would be appropriate to quote the very next sentence that follows the one I cited from Stirling above: "Debts are of four main kinds – loans from the Agricultural Bank or Credit Co-operative, loans from money-lenders at illegal and exorbitant rates of interest, casual borrowings among neighbors and kin, and outstanding credit for purchases" (Stirling, p.91). As we will see in detail below, in Çiğdemli, located approximately 160 kilometers away from the villages where Stirling conducted his research, the general structure of the institutions to which debt is owed has not changed much after 70 years.

However, private banks have been added to this picture, and monetization and financialization have become widespread and deepened significantly.

Despite many difficulties, small farmers seek ways to overcome financial obstacles. Different tactics and survival strategies have been documented in many village monographies, and case studies. For example, in his village observations Makal describes how farmers overstate their assets in order to get more credit from the agricultural credit cooperative (Makal, 2019, p. 40).

In the following section we will see how small farmers interact with the market players to navigate through these risks. There are different informal structures that play important role in small farmers choice. Not only the economic capital but also their social and cultural capital are in play.

**The current conditions:** The small farmers' distinctive economic feature is that their production is mostly dependent on loans and purchases on credit. They borrow all inputs including diesel, seeds and fertilizers from agricultural credit cooperatives or merchants (mostly gas stations) and take loans from banks and other lenders (merchants) for the next season. The payments are always due on the harvest season. More specifically, due date is the day debtor farmer harvests the crops. This is usually called "due in harvest" or "harvest term".

Due to the harvest term debts, harvest season is the time when farmers need the cash the most. However, commodity prices fall as a result of simultaneous post-harvest supply to the market. Thus, small farmers need to sell their products at low prices to pay off their debts and re-pay and re-loan the inputs they need for the next season. Due date is the time when they are disadvantaged the most.

The lack of additional financial resources and sufficient equity, small farmers find themselves in an endless cycle of debt renewal, and financially dependent on lenders. The level of dependency does not only affect the financial renewal conditions but also the whole production. The everlasting debt burden on small farmers' back is well documented. For example, Bahattin Akşit writes that smallholder peasants in Ermenek meet their expenses throughout the year by borrowing money at 60% interest, and that in order to pay the interest on the debts, family members go to the cities for 9 months

of the year to work in various jobs and are crushed under the cycle of debt (Akşit, 1966, pp. 66-67). We will call this relationship “the debt cycle” in order to emphasize the persistence of debt and its lasting impact on the socio-economic position of the farmer.

This debt cycle has important consequences for the small farmers; it limits the possibilities of when and to whom farmers sell their crop. Since most of the private lenders and input providers (a.k.a. merchants) are also buyers and wholesalers, many farmers sell their crops to the merchants they owe.

Even if the other agricultural organizations offer seasonal advantages, competitive prices and other policies to support the small farmers, small farmers do not engage in long term relations with those organizations because of the structural relations with merchants that are already exist. So, the financial conditions of small farmers affect their decision-making in a way that agricultural policies applied through the agricultural organizations do not affect as they are designed to.

During the field study, I had the chance to observe how these options were considered by the farmers. Now we will look at how farmers interact with local institutions and create informal patterns of agricultural relations.

Firstly, the debts owned to banks take a remarkable part of the financial burden on farmers’ back. They regularly apply banks for consumer loans, tractors and equipment loans and also for other social and economic needs. During the field study, Ziraat Bank and Denizbank have been the most mentioned banks among farmers. İş Bankası and TEB are also mentioned once.

Farmers that I spoke to find the interest rates too high. These loans are need to be regularly rolled over, and pile up the total debt a farmer has. In the last years, banks started to use a collective agricultural credit solution service called TARDIS, which can obtain information from the Farmer Registration System (ÇKS) database of the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, and Livestock and evaluate multiple producers (families) simultaneously. This system allows them to quickly calculate the financial credibility of any farmer who apply for credit by retrieving data from various sources.

That’s why farmers complain that if they own to Agricultural Credit Cooperatives, they cannot take loans from any bank:

> If you don't pay your debt, you cannot withdraw money from the state bank. They also see on the screen whether you are in debt or not, the system is connected. If you are in debt, you cannot buy diesel or fertilizer from the cooperative. Neither can the guarantors of the debtor, they lock them all up. (Emrah, Interview 6)

It is necessary to consider and discuss the existence of a credit evaluation network, which includes public and private banks, and agricultural credit cooperatives, as Emrah has mourned, and its increasingly expanding influence on farmers' access to financial resources and its impact on the agricultural field. We previously observed how farmers utilize the facilitative nature of their social relationships with traders, contrasting the “cold” face of bureaucratic and social relations based on TGB's quality standards and analytical methods. A similar dichotomy exists in accessing financial resources and incurring debt. From a Weberian perspective (Weber, 1978), the algorithmic operations of financial institutions' credit scoring methods, devoid of local, social, and human relations, starkly contrast with the ways usurers/traders engage with indebted farmers. This bureaucratic nature excludes farmers' local reputations, reliability, and social and symbolic capital. As national and global institutions expand their influence, we see the diminishing role of farmers' local reputations in accessing economic resources. We previously noted that technological and neoliberal trends increase the value and importance of economic capital within agricultural capital through financialization and monetization. Here, we see that the same structural change in local agricultural capital is facilitated by the general momentum and institutional framework of neoliberal markets, as well as the surveillance and operational capacity brought about by technological advancements in bureaucratic structures, ultimately reducing the relative importance of social capital.

Tractor purchases constitute a significant debt item. The observations during the field study indicates that, not only wealthier farmers, but also small farmers purchase new tractors and expensive equipment by getting huge loans. When farmers go under financial distress, they apply to bank to restructure/consolidate the loan. However, sometimes tractor is replaced with a new one in order to restructure the loan. In other words, farmers apply to the bank for a new loan for the new tractor and restructure it

together with the installments remaining from the previous debt. In this way, tractor gets renewed periodically before the initial debt is paid off. A big farmer, refers to this payment method as “getting the loan rolled-over” (borca takla attırmak). Adem (59), a small farmer, tells us how he did manage to roll-over his debts by constantly renewing his tractor:

> Interviewer: Do you have a tractor?
>
> Adem: Yes. It is a 2017 model. I bought it with a loan, with a 5-year maturity. I took the loan from Ziraat in 2017. We have paid two years of the loan, there are three years left. Before that we had a New Holland, it was a 2006 model. The father's tractor is long gone. We did three tractor things in total, we couldn't pay the debt, we sold it, we renewed it, we sold it, we renewed it... We have come this far.
>
> Interviewer: Were you selling it when you couldn't pay the debt? Could you explain a bit more?
>
> Adem: After my father's tractor, the first tractor was a Ferguson, it was 2004 when we bought it. In 2006 or 2008 or something, we couldn't pay it back, we got stuck. This time we sold it, we bought New Holland. You sell it and pay off that loan, then you apply for a loan again. We got stuck there too, we sold New Holland, paid off that loan, and now we are back to this one. I don't know if we will get stuck on this.
>
> Interviewer: You used each of them for a couple of years while paying off their debts, right?
>
> Adem: I couldn't make out the history of the New Holland, but I think we had the Ferguson for four years or something in between. We got stuck in the fifth year of Ferguson, we sold it and bought New Holland. We used it for 5 years, then we had a postponement, again there was no crop for a year. Then we sold that one and bought the current one.
>
> Interviewer: Are there any other people who renewed their tractor debt in a similar way?
>
> Adem: Many... There were many who could not pay and sold it. There were also those who sold it before buying a new one. For example, the man couldn't get out, he couldn't pay off his debt, he sold the tractor or went into something else. (Interview 2)

What if a farmer fails to keep up with paying installments? Since tractor loans are secured by the purchased tractor as collateral, it might end up with the bank repossessing the tractor. Interviewees give examples of people who lost their tractors in such way:

> Baran: On the other hand, there are many people buying tractors... Everyone is buying tractors.

> A Farmer: When you can't pay your debt, the bailiff comes and takes the engine back. Now it's half and half, my nephew, half of them have had their tractors repossessed. If you buy the old engine, you buy it for 20 liras. Otherwise, you will be in debt. If you go and buy a tractor for 150, it will pay for itself in 10 years. (Interview 15)

Zafer, a retired blue-collar, proudly says that he is not one of those who *work for the bank* due to unnecessary loans:

> There's a saying that goes something like this. You know what we just talked about... If I go and buy a 100 thousand tractor, we can't pay that debt anyway. How can I pay for that tractor? What are we going to do, where are we going to get the change? Not everyone has this logic, but my nephew, look, I do what I can handle. I have never done business with debt. Some people are not afraid of debt. They don't like the engine they have, so they upgrade the tractor. That boy you were talking to has a tractor with two blades. If he wanted to, he could borrow money. But he doesn't take the risk. Why, when you take that loan, you work for that man, the ban. (Zafer, Interview 31)

It is also known that farmers try to cope with their excessive debts by constantly applying for new loans from other banks. As Kerem puts it majority of the farmers rely on bank loans to 'keep the ball rolling':

> Kerem: Nowadays, a farmer carries 20 different cards in his pocket. He borrows from one to pay the other. The farmer is completely exhausted. Debts keep piling up, and eventually, either your land gets sold or your tractor does. They even sell your tractor. All the money you've paid up until that point goes to waste. Some people have 50-100 decares of land, and they go to the bank to take out a loan. They say, "The bank is the best option. They don't ask for repayment for a year or two." But they still can't pay it back. And they won't be able to pay it back, brother. If you can't pay 10 liras, it becomes 20, and if you can't pay 20, it becomes 30. People with cash work upfront—like Hüseyin and me.
>
> Interviewer: How many people in Çiğdemli work upfront like you?
>
> Kerem: If you count them, maybe 9-10 people. If you include the *Almancılar* [those who worked in Germany], there might be 20-30 people who work upfront. They exchange their euros, go buy whatever they need. Those without money have no choice but to go to the bank or buy on credit from the gas station. (Interview 14)

There are instances where tractor loans are used to generate cash flow or are taken out for use in different areas. In such cases, the purchase and sale price of the tractor is inflated to secure additional credit, which can then be used for various household needs

or to pay off other debts. In general, farming families tend to use all available credit sources to manage their total debt, employing every possible means such as legal loopholes, the facilities provided by banks, and collusive transactions. This can be interpreted as an agricultural-economic *habitus* developed by small farmers in particular to counteract their economic fragility and vulnerability in the agricultural field.

Lastly, tractor is a cultural capital, as well as an economic one. Owning the latest model tractor and equipment has a symbolic value (Burton, 2004), marking the owner as a respectable farmer. So, the decision to buy a new tractor has to do with increasing one's symbolic capital and economic capital. We come across those who spend a considerable amount of resources on a new tractor that he does not need. The competition for having the latest model tractor, or at least a decent one, puts a heavy financial burden on small farmers.

To summarize, it is observed that bank credits take an important role in finance of the agriculture in Çiğdemli. However financial debts constitute a bigger risk to small farmers than the rest, in terms of going default. Relying more on financial debts than using their own resources makes small farmers more vulnerable.

Banks are not the only option when it comes to lenders. It is also said that there are a few usurers in the town as an alternative source of borrowing but it is generally gas stations who lend out money to farmers.

> Interviewer: Are there any loan sharks or lenders around here that people in debt turn to?
>
> Emre: There are some small brokers, one or two. There is one here, people who are stuck in debt go and take money secretly. In the summer, he takes the wheat and piles it in front of his house. Let's say you are stuck in the winter, you go and get money from him, and in the summer, you ask him to give you wheat at threshing time. When it comes out of the mower, you take your harvest and give it to him. There are one or two such people, but other than that, gas stations usually do this job. There are 3 gas stations here. The rest are in Sorgun. They [Gas station A] also have 2-3 places in Sorgun. They buy and sell oil, chickpeas, lentils, wheat. (Interview 7)

When it comes to having access to the inputs on credit, I have observed that the Agricultural Credit Cooperatives (ACCs), relevant cooperatives and the producer unions are the main options that farmers apply to.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, The Agricultural Credit Cooperatives (ACCs) provide all kinds of inputs, including gas, fertilizers and seeds to its members. For the debts to ACCs, due date is the end of August, which is relatively late compared to the private lenders. Most of the farmers I have interviewed with stated that they purchase fertilizers and some other inputs from the ACCs on credit.

However, the ACCs ask for multiple (four) guarantors and mortgage to become a member. Guarantors are jointly liable with the principal debtor. Most of the farmers who talk about the ACCs, complain about the requirements to have access to the inputs.

> Interviewer: Don't you have the possibility to buy from Agricultural Credit instead of buying from the trader?
>
> Ömer: You can get it from Agricultural Credit, but first of all your farming conditions must be suitable for Agricultural Credit. And what is this, first of all, you have to have land with a title deed, you have to mortgage that land with a title deed to Agricultural Credit. You also have to find two witnesses so that you can get your work done from Agricultural Credit, and when I say witnesses, I mean guarantors. They want both a guarantor and a mortgage. And on top of that, your field must have a title deed. For example, since my land belongs to a heir of mine, I cannot benefit from state support because there is no field in my name.
>
> Interviewer: Who are the fields registered to?
>
> Ömer: The fields are in my father's name. We are murejil, but you are not considered a farmer until you get the title deeds in your name, until you do that step. And that costs a lot of money. You will have at least ten billion in your pocket to register a field. (Interview 22)

As we mentioned before, widespread unregistered farming sets an obstacle before doing business with the ACCs and other cooperatives. Since most of the farmers do not have the lands registered in the Farmers Register System, they cannot apply for the services to full extent. As a public organization, relations with the ACCs and the benefits depends on how much of the transactions and assets are recorded. The more a farmer is a part of the informal economy the less he is likely to get inputs from the ACCs.

The transaction costs, interest rates, mortgage and guarantor terms also deter some farmers from the ACCs. I have encountered with farmers who had mortgaged their house, tractor, or farmland. Farmers also complain about the high default rates that the ACCs charge on their receivables. When I conduct interviews, the interest market was experiencing a sharp increase and most of the farmers were reacting to that the ACCs' interest and default rates have followed the market. They think that the ACCs act by not seeking the public interest, but its own interest like a regular market actor. Adem, for instance describes this as *"The state has become a loan shark"*[10]. Some farmers complain that the ACCs, just like a bank, track its receivables without showing any leniency to the farmers.

> If you buy inputs on credit from agricultural credit, agricultural credit sells them more expensive than the market. They also give you a grace period until the ninth month, and if you exceed the thirty-oneth of the eighth month by one day, they add the interest to the principal. (Ahmet, Interview 3)

It is also mentioned that if one fails to pay his debt to the ACCs, he gets no more service until he pays it off. So, what farmers really touch upon is how the cooperative, just as any private financial corporation, acts in accordance with its own interests, rather than the interests of the farmers.

Producers' cooperatives also support their members by providing them agricultural inputs. The sugar beet producers' union Pankobirlik is one of them. The complaints concerning the lending terms apply to Pankobirlik too. Farmers find the guarantor and mortgage terms unfavorable.

> There is also the beet cooperative, Pankobirlik. They rob us the most. Below 750 TL, they don't sell to their members. They ask for a guarantor from their members. One guarantor up to 2,000 liras, two guarantors up to 4,000 liras, and so on. When you buy something, they ask for a guarantor like this. (Ali, Interview 4)

The complains about Pankobirlik also reveals a similar pattern with complains about other institutions. Farmers seem to be disappointed about the private-like character of the cooperative operations, the competitive prices and the debt collection methods it applies.

[10] Turkish: "Devlet tefeci olmuş"

> For example, there is a beet cooperative, Pankobirlik. Last time I went to buy supplies, I needed a sprinkler. The man said, “We don't have it.” I said, “Well, then have them brought in, aren't you a farmers' union, what's your job?” “We,” he says, “can't take orders like that.” You have to go to private tradesmen. They are more affordable. That cooperative both charges me membership fees and sells the goods at a higher price than the shopkeepers. I don't buy my materials from Pankobirlik because they charge a lot of additional money. It is also closed to bargaining. Both expensive and no bargaining. Pankobirlik actually sells seeds, fertilizers, irrigation pipes, agricultural materials, everything, but it sells expensive. (Emrah, Interview 6)

As we see here, the uniform, official, predetermined and non-personalized applications and regulations are not welcomed by many farmers. These rules do not take into account the everyday problems and concerns of individual businesses. A formal structure based on unbiased and blind rules and regulations provides equal opportunities but it comes with a cost. There are severe consequences if a farmer fails to pay his debts to any of these organizations. Many farmers say that, in this case, banks and farmers’ unions confiscate farmers’ assets including tractors, lands and other properties. They say that in recent years, cooperatives apply to confiscation more often.

> There are more non-payers in Pankobirlik, the rate of non-payers is 50-60%. And that is for the following reason. In the past, there was no foreclosure practice in Panko. That's why everyone used to borrow from Pankobirlik. But now they have started foreclosing too. (Adem, Interview 2)

This results with transfer of assets from farmers to financial and agricultural institutions. Secondly, a farmer with an overdue debt is excluded from all of the institutional financial channels. If debtor does not pay his/her debt on time, he/she cannot purchase or borrow inputs. If it is a bank, farmer’s credit score also gets affected. Thirdly, because all of these institutional lenders demand multiple joint guarantors, any overdue debt puts all of the guarantors into default. This also affects the guarantors and causes payment problems along the chain of liability.

To summarize, farmers relations with banks, credit cooperatives and producers cooperatives have a number of obstacles in common that make farmers look for long term established relations with merchants. The lack of significant advantages, guarantee and warranty requirements, the strict due dates, the lack of flexibility in rule based policy implementations, and the inability to benefit from supports for

unregistered planting stand as obstacles between farmers and these formal institutions. In the next section we will see that the long-term relations between small farmers and merchants have alternative business methods that provides farmers to move around these obstacles.

### 3.3.2. Gas Stations and Public Procurement Policies

Public procurements play an important role in public intervention to the agricultural markets. Government makes procurements directly through Turkish Grain Board or indirectly, through cooperatives. As previously mentioned, the Turkish Grain Board (TGB) purchases grains at a minimum price set by the government, preventing prices from falling below this level. The difference between the set minimum price and the market price at the time of the public purchase constitutes the amount transferred from public resources to the actors selling their products to TGB. This intervention by the public institution directly impacts distribution relationships through its market purchases. If TGB incurs a loss as a result of this intervention, it is covered as a duty loss by the Treasury. Consequently, this intervention ultimately redistributes taxes collected from society in favor of the actors selling their products to TGB.

Except in exceptional cases, TGB purchases products directly from farmers, with the quantity purchased limited by the farmer's registered cultivation amount in the Farmer Registration System. This condition indicates that TGB, at least de jure, restricts access to those bringing products from others, such as traders, thereby prioritizing support for certain social classes within the agricultural field. On the other hand, TGB also buys from big farmers, suggesting, as reflected in the slogan “The Office is the Farmer's Friend,” that its purchasing policies do not differentiate between large and small farmers.

It is also a means for giving incentives towards a certain type of production by imposing standards. With that being said, these policies effectiveness and consequences are widely affected by the other factors in the agricultural field.

In the previous section it is seen that small farmers’ debt cycle and the harvest due agreements are key factors in determining where farmers buy their inputs from. In this section we will explore the output side of the agricultural field and the factors

determining where farmers can sell their produce. The informal socio-economic relations between farmers and merchants, notably the gas stations in Çiğdemli, creates a permanent business structure that disables other options. The gas stations do not only provides inputs but also purchases the crops.

Before moving to the merchants we first look at the local relations with Turkish Grain Board. As we have already seen, there is a TGB branch located in the Sorgun and the government purchases via Turkish Grain Board offers is an alternative to the market. However, it is not viable for many farmers because of the mismatch between the timing of repayment of loans and the timing of intervention.

### 3.3.3. Turkish Grain Board and Public Procurement Policies

Turkish Grain Board is the main public actor that make public procurements from farmers.

The government intervenes in the market prices through imports and direct purchases (via Turkish Grain Board). The chart below shows the yearly price cycle of wheat, government purchases, and the due date for the farmers:





Figure 43: Price Movements of Hard Red Wheat and Market Interventions, Çiğdemli

Source: Prepared by the author by using data from Polatlı Commodity Exchange (Polatlı Ticaret Borsası, 2020) and Turkish Grain Board (2020).

The Figure 43 clearly shows that in 2017 and 2018, by the time the procurement price is announced by the Turkish Grain Board wheat prices bottom out. The government price assure that the prices do not go any lower but it does not change the fact that the post-harvest prices are the lowest level due to seasonality. Post-harvest season keeps being the period that small farmers are the most vulnerable and disadvantaged. Although it effects the price movements in general, the volume of direct purchases is not high in Sorgun and Çiğdemli.





Figure 44: Turkish Grain Board Purchases of Selected Products, Turkey, 2005-2021
Source: Turkish Grain Board (2022a).

The Figure 44 demonstrates government nationwide purchases of wheat, barley lentil and chickpea. The purchases made through the Turkish Grain Board exceeded 5 million metric tons in 2005 and 2009, while no purchases or only minimal purchases were made in 2007, 2008, 2014, and 2021. Based on the Figure, we observe that the general trend has been declining specifically since 2015. Another noteworthy point in the Figure 44 is the significant increase in the share of lentil and chickpea purchases within the total procurement in recent years.





Figure 45: Turkish Grain Board Purchases of Selected Products, Sorgun, 2005-2021
Source: Turkish Grain Board (2022b).

The Figure 45, on the other hand, presents the purchases made by the TGB in Sorgun region for the same four products. The general trends observed in national government procurement over the years are similarly reflected at the local level in Sorgun. Additionally, the emphasis on chickpea procurement in 2018 and 2019, particularly the exclusive focus on this product in 2019 suggests a notable shift in agricultural production toward chickpea cultivation in the region. This pattern indicates the potential impact of government purchasing policies on the local agricultural production choices.

Evaluating the government purchases made in Sorgun relative to overall national procurement is crucial for understanding the unique circumstances of Sorgun and Çiğdemli. In this regard, Figure 46 illustrates the changes in the ratio of purchases in Sorgun to total purchases over the years. The figure reveals that this ratio has fluctuated significantly, exhibiting a zigzag pattern of increases and decreases. However, when the data is adjusted for short term fluctuations by adding a five-year moving average (the orange trendline), it becomes clear that the proportion of government purchases in Sorgun relative to overall procurement has been in a noticeable downward trend. It suggests that, over time, the Turkish Grain Board has

been purchasing a decreasing proportion of products from Sorgun farmers relative to the national average. In other words, the government intervention to the local agricultural market in Sorgun through direct purchases is weakening over the last decade. Now, let's examine how small farmers navigate the market to sell their products in the face of this trend.





Figure 46: The Ratio of TGB Purchases in Sorgun to Total
Source: Turkish Grain Board (2022a, 2022b).

During the field study in Çiğdemli, I have not encountered anyone who sold his crop to TGB in recent years. There are several reasons for that. First, the TGB requires farmers to be registered to the Farmers' Registery System. Those who are not registered cannot bring their crops to the TGB. Especially the farmers who farms based on verbal and unregistered rental contracts cannot sell their produce to the TGB.

Secondly, the schedule of the debt cycle prevents small farmers to consider Turkish Grain Board as an alternative purchaser. Since TGB makes payments in 15 days and lenders wait for farmers to pay off their debts right after the harvest, farmers usually take their crops to the merchants they work with.

> Serhat: Brother, why don't we take it to the TGB now. Our time is the 30th of the eighth month. The TGB opens late for us. We can't make it to the TGB. Because of our debt, we sell it as soon as possible to pay our debt.

> Interviewer: So, if farmers cannot bring products to the TGB because of the urgency of their debts, who are the ones who fill the TGB warehouses?
>
> Serhat: The trader. He buys from us and sells to the TGB. The trader bought chickpeas from us at 18. He took it to the TGB. Now wheat is high, the price has reached around 10,000 - 11,000 liras [referring to 8 tons]. We are trying to pay that date so that it doesn't exceed the 30th, so that there is no interest. The situation is the same with wheat and chickpeas. We sold wheat for 9,500 or 9,000. If I didn't have debts, I wouldn't have sold this wheat until the third month. (Interview 25)

Here, we observe that due to the temporal structure of Serhat's commercial and debt relationship with the trader, he does not have the opportunity to sell his products to TGB. The debt relationship established with the trader clearly constitutes a structural/informal relationship that limits Serhat's market options, thus placing him in a disadvantaged position. This disadvantaged position, in a sense, is the non-interest cost of entering into a debt relationship with the trader. However, considering this cost solely as a missed economic opportunity would obscure many aspects of the issue, even in a context that appears to be purely about economic relationships. Borrowing against the harvest term integrates Serhat into a long-term social relationship with the trader. As we will discuss later, this social bond, in Serhat's case, imbues the economic dependency and exploitation relationship of the small farmer with the trader with a human and social character. This sociality, functioning as a form of Bourdieuian capital, enables the small farmer to remain within this enduring exploitation relationship. This human character can take the form of a favor or friendship relationship.

The quality standards imposed by TGB is not seen as an incentive but an obstacle by the most farmers. Some farmers complain that their crops do not meet certain purchase criteria or the price they get is not satisfactory since they get price reductions due to poor quality.

> I took wheat to the Turkish Grain Board this year, and they did not buy it because it did not meet the criteria. So, I took it to a merchant. Şahbazlar gave me 9,200 liras. (Adem, Interview 2)
>
> § § §
>
> I recently took chickpeas to the TGB, there was a young boy there. He sat down and took some, looked at it, looked at it, took this and that, this and that... My brother, grapes have garbage too. Then I got angry, I didn't give it to him, I gave it to the trader. Let the TGB support and buy the farmer's product. You

> owe money to the oilman, you owe money to the harvester, you owe money for your wedding. You have to take it to the oilman. The man takes it to the TGB, they treat him in such a way that he gets sick of it. He almost gives it to the trader for free. (Altan, Interview 3)
>
> § § §
>
> Interviewer: Why don't you give it to the Turkish Grain Board?
>
> Abdullah: We don't give it to the them. Some do, but not all of them. The last time I took it to the TGB, the man looked at it and said this wheat was scorched. Did I scorch it? It didn't rain, that's what happened. What should I do? (Interview 1)

As previously mentioned, despite TGB incorporating quality-based market regulation examples from the EU harmonization acquis into its policy, it is not surprising that the farmers in this Central Anatolian town, already disadvantaged in terms of soil structure and climate conditions, fail to meet the product criteria. This is especially true when considering that, in response to high inflation and rising costs, they cut back on fertilizers and pesticides. We observe that the farmer turns to their only remaining alternative with a sense of compelled voluntarism in the face of the relentless, exceptionless, and cold visage of bureaucratic mechanisms. However, at this point, it is noteworthy that traders appear as actors who offer suitable solutions to small farmers, understand their situation, and position themselves in stark contrast to the bureaucratic coldness represented by TGB. Merchants in general, offer a purchase price based primarily on the quantity. Indeed, farmers are grateful that traders do not adhere to TGB's quality policy, which reinforces the notion of traders fulfilling their role in the favor-based relationships we discussed earlier.

However, as we will see in later sections, traders manage to sell the products they buy from farmers to TGB through various mechanisms. At this stage of the agricultural game, what remains for the small farmer is the sense of assurance provided by the warm and informal trust relationship developed with the trader. This social capital, in one sense, is the farmer's ticket to maintaining a foothold in the agricultural field, despite the economic exploitation they face.

There are also economic advantages to dealing with traders compared to TGB. Most notably, while sales to TGB are subject to income tax deductions, transactions with traders, due to their informal nature, do not incur such tax deductions. This makes up for the price difference if there is any:

> Now the TGB does not buy from the producers, they pay 9 liras for their tiles. The trader buys from the producer and gives 9.25 liras. The state is strangling us with the traders. (Adem, Interview 2)

The agricultural policies that the TGB and ACCs apply are not effective enough to be an alternative to local gas stations. Therefore, in Çiğdemli, merchants, specifically the gas station owners have become the most preferred buyers and lenders for the small farmers. Because gas stations are key to understand the economic environment in which small farmers struggle to survive, we need to analyze them in detail.

As observed, the multifaceted social and economic dimensions of the structural relationships between traders and small farmers, along with the dependencies created by these informal structural characteristics, significantly undermine the potential for TGB to serve as an alternative in the market. The timing and manner of TGB's market interventions and its purchasing policies further diminish its ability to act as a viable market alternative. From a Bourdieuian perspective, we can see how the multidimensional nature of trader and small farmer relationships undermines public redistribution interventions. However, the class relations between traders and small farmers are not confined to the economic sphere alone. The struggles and tensions that occur in the social and symbolic domains between these two classes also warrant further examination.

### 3.3.4. Gas Stations as Dominant Merchants of Çiğdemli

When we look at the relationship between gas stations and farmers, we inevitably think of Akşit's analysis of the relationship dynamics between grocers and peasants. Akşit argues that the relationship between the peasant and the grocer is not a competitive one, and that the grocer is in an oligopolistic or even monopolistic position vis-à-vis the peasant, enriching himself with the surplus value he obtains from the farmer (Akşit, 1966, pp. 94-95).

When examining the relationships between the merchants operating gas stations and the farmers in Çiğdemli, it becomes evident that an asymmetric relationship exists, stemming from their respective positions within the production relations. As an extension of the conditions created by this asymmetric relationship, these merchants, positioned at the top of the power hierarchy in the agricultural field, are able to convert

their class advantages into economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital. Now, let us delve more deeply into how this class is situated within the agricultural field in Çiğdemli, and investigate the origins of their dominant position. Merchants running gas stations have three features that make this possible:

1. Since gas stations provide loans, sell inputs on credit, and make seasonal contracts with farmers, they are one of the key actors in small farmers' debt cycle. Most of the small farmers I met were financially dependent on one of the gas stations.
2. There are strong indicators that in terms of cereals prices, gas stations act together, and form oligopolistic structures by setting the price at a certain level and through the market information they have. This helps them hindering competition, maximizing the price levels and profit margins.
3. Since there are no traditional coffee houses left in the town, men gather at gas stations to meet and chat. Gas stations therefore, are places where social networks are visible. As we see below, this grants the owners of gas stations a great social credit, information about the agricultural field and supervision over the social relationships. This social environment creates an understanding of 'us', a perception of interdependence, rather than reliance, an ideology disguised as 'friendship' or 'mutual benefits' which is spoken loudly by everyone but very fragile at the same time.

The primary source of the agricultural economic capital of gas stations is the financial control they have on farmers. The means of this financial control are

1. Selling inputs on credit including gas, fertilizers, and seeds
2. Granting loans,
3. Purchasing the product from debtors, or more commonly, keeping it as bailee, and buying it later, at a future date.

I had the chance to directly observe how the they work during the interviews I had in the gas stations. The manager keeps a book which keeps all the transactions with the farmers. He records all the relevant information of debtors in that book. A conversation between the Osman, the manager of the Gas Station and two farmers:

Osman: [writing on the paper] (...) and (...), right? [He said wheat varieties, I couldn't catch what he said].

Serdar: Yes. I'm telling you, one red and one white.

Osman: What was it...

Serdar: Two thousand tiles for two wagons, Mustafa?

Selçuk: He... I think you should save your chickpeas.

Sefa: Osman brother, I owed you money again. How much did I owe you? And you gave me 2,000 Liras last time...

Osman: [To Serdar] [He calculates by looking at the table on the computer screen] Now 7,900 here. You had 6,700 receivables and 1,200 debts.

Serdar: Okay, give me another 2,000 Liras.

Osman: If I give you 2,000, your debt will be 3,200... 3,220 liras.

Serdar: I'll get it in advance, right?

[Osman took out the cash, counted it and gave it to Serdar.] (Interview 20)

Gas stations also purchase farmers' produce, most specifically, the cereals. As we have touched upon before, many farmers sell their wheat to the seller in exchange for the products they buy on credit. However, if seller has no outstanding debt, they may agree on bailment, which is a very common form of contractual relation. According to the bailment agreements, the gas station stores the grain without having an ownership interest in it, until the parties come to a sale deal in a future date. However, as we will see in the next chapters, only those farmers who can afford waiting for the prices to go up can go for this kind of transaction. Small farmers on the other hand, sell their crops immediately, or in some cases they make the sale agreement in advance to secure additional loans from the gas station.

Interviewer: When are you going to cut the bill?

Muhammet: Whenever you want, on that day.

Sertaç: If I owe him money, when I take the wheat to the man, then he will settle the account. But if I don't owe him, if I keep the goods waiting, then it's in my favor. Then it will be deducted on the day I say "let's deduct the account". (Interview 17)

There is an important nuance here that when small farmers purchase gasoline and diesel on credit, it is not debited in cash, but in kind. When the harvest season arrives, the total price of the diesel is deduced from the total price of the crop farmer brings.

Ibrahim: Look, you know what we do. The fallow starts, we go to the gas station, we say, “Fill it up”. The man fills the diesel into the engine. When the crop comes out, we load the goods, we go to the oil station and wash the goods. He deducts the diesel oil and fertilizer from it, and if we are left with 1-2 thousand liras, that's fine.

Interviewer: So, do you pay for the diesel and fertilizer you use at the price of the day you buy it or at the price on the day of payment?

Enes: Whatever the fertilizer costs today, at today's price. The man writes the liters of diesel fuel in the notebook, he doesn't write the price.

İbrahim: He deducts whatever the wheat is worth that day from the price of that day.

Enes: They are always hitting on the back. (Interview 12)

Considering that the debt is set-off when the price of the harvest is the lowest, this kind of agreement usually works against small farmers by reducing their net profit. A big farmer, Kerem points this out:

Interviewer: Is there usury here?

Kerem: I don't know about usury in that way, but there is this: For example, you go and buy chickpeas on credit from an agricultural supplier. The man says, “You will bring your chickpeas to me.” But the price is not discussed. The man who buys the seed that way has a total loss of 6-7 billion liras when he sells his chickpeas. This is why people are selling their engines. They are forced to sell their goods to them. When the man gives you the seed, he gives it to you at a high price, but when he buys the product, he buys it cheaply. He doesn't give you seed for chickpea for less than 30 or 40 dollars. Would he give you something for free without paying you for 6-7 months? No, brother. If you want, go and ask them, ask for seed prices. And when you don't pay, he puts interest on it. If you spread it over 5-6 months, they charge you interest. (Interview 14)

Notice that for Kerem, the word ‘usurer’ connotes merchants who, he thinks, abuse the terms of the sale on their behalf.

If farmers have no additional income or financial flexibility, it is more likely that they become financially dependent on a gas station or merchant simply because they have to pay off their debts from previous year. Ömer summarizes this cycle as following:

Ömer: Now you buy fertilizer on credit, the man gives you a promissory note around the 15th of the seventh month. Our harvest is already around the 20th of the 7th month, and since there is no rainfall, the harvest comes early. Therefore, in order to pay the fertilizer debt as soon as possible, you take the goods to the trader.

> Interviewer: So, you pay the previous year's debt at harvest?
>
> Ömer: Yes, exactly like that. Now I'm going to plant a crop, I'm going to buy the fertilizer, I'm looking for the diesel, I'm buying the seed. I make the debt for this in 2019, and then in 2020, whatever comes up, I take it and pay my debt. The farmer actually works for the trader. [He paused, thought about what he said for a moment, then smiled and continued. I have no chance to wait. I left 3 tins of seed, I sold the rest, I have to pay my debt. (Interview 22)

So, for most of the indebted small farmers have no chance but selling the crop to the payee (merchant) against their debt.

> Interviewer: Well, how do those who produce by borrowing money sell their products, do they have the possibility to wait like you?
>
> Hüseyin: Those who are in a bad situation sell their goods directly out of necessity. They sell it to whoever they borrowed from. He gives the diesel and fertilizer to whoever he bought it from, that's how it usually happens. (Interview 11)

This ongoing debt cycle with merchants is one of the most important reasons that farmers cannot work with TGB.

> Nowadays I have no business with the TGB, I don't give my goods to the TGB. How can I give it elsewhere, farmers like us have debts. Since you are in debt, you have no chance to bargain, you are forced to bring it here. (Şeyhmus, Interview 5)

“Farmer works for the merchant” is an expression, which is put into words by multiple small farmers in different forms. It is a simple expression of the fact that, merchants define the framework of the deal with farmers, and impose conditions favoring themselves.

> We all work for the traders. The citizen cries for 11 months. He gives everything to the traders. Farmers take all their goods and give them to the traders. Our farmers are the porters of the traders. (Serkan, Interview 12)
>
> §
>
> We give the product here, to gas stations. We bring the goods here because we owe money here. So, we are pregnant. We buy diesel, we buy fertilizer if necessary. Then we have to bring the product here and give it to them. And these keep your goods at a lower price. They lower the price when you owe money. I wish we were in a better situation so that we could bring our goods home. In the 11th, 12th month, it would be worth 13, 14, maybe 15 liras [a tile]. But we can't wait, we have debts, we have to pay them off. (Hasan, Interview 10)

Serkan's and Hasan's accounts clearly illustrate that these farmers perceive their positions within production relationships with traders as forms of dependency and exploitation. Phrases like “being at the mercy of the trader” and “working for the trader” reflect the same class habitus that distinguishes small farmers from traders and big farmers, as they articulate the exploitative nature of these relationships. These expressions, which convey the shared worldview of small farmers, act as verbal actions refer to the class differences and antagonism. Indeed, these statements are often made to a researcher attempting to understand agricultural relationships in Çiğdemli, and sometimes even while sitting in the trader's shop.

Not only the seasonal price movements and the debt cycle, but also the local market structure itself creates unfavorable conditions for small farmers. There are indicators of a network and **tacit collusion** among gas stations. Both big and small farmers state that the gas stations of Çiğdemli and merchants of Sorgun act together to fix the prices at a certain level to prevent competition:

> Interviewer: So, you say there are so many traders. Shouldn't the price go up because of the competition?
>
> Abdullah: They all agree among themselves. They agree and lower the price in unison. (Small farmer, Interview 1)
>
> §
>
> Interviewer: If there are many buyers, won't they give you a better price for your product because of competition?
>
> Furkan: Normally it should be like that, right? But what happens, now the men gather and say, “We are shopkeepers, we are walking on the same road. You buy at the same price and I will buy at the same price.” They don't break the price. They all pay the same price. (Retired civil servant and small farmer, Interview 9)
>
> §
>
> Interviewer: Don't traders normally compete with each other? Doesn't that help you to get a better price?
>
> Ramazan: We don't have competition. 15 days before the last harvest, the big merchants of Sorgun, 10-15 people were seen in a restaurant. “Let's buy the product for this price, the lowest price is this price and the highest price is that price. Don't go above this price.” I took wheat to Osman, he quoted me 1,000 liras. I said, “Şahbazlar is offering 1,500 liras.” He said, “No way.” He called Şahbazlar right next to me and said, “Did you buy wheat for 1,500 liras?” They are all in contact with each other, they are aware of each other. They are not

few in number, there are many merchants. There are many merchants in Sorgun. (Mukhtar, farmer, Interview 23)

§ § §

Interviewer: If there are many traders, won't the competition between them be bad for you, won't you get a better price?

Adem: Even if there's a price difference, it's no more than 10 or 20 kuruş. They've made an agreement among themselves. It wasn't like this before—back in the day, when you brought in a trailer, 10 people would gather around to get their hands on it. Now, they've all agreed not to let the price go above 9,000. It's been like this for 4-5 years. Wheat used to make good money, but now it's not worth much. If it weren't for sugar beets, farming wouldn't even be possible in the village. And with beets, we do all the labor ourselves, like hoeing and everything. Otherwise, even beets wouldn't be profitable. (Big farmer, Interview 2)

§ § §

Umut (big farmer): We sold the chickpeas to Sorgun. There are plenty of buyers in Sorgun, but it's like they're a bit reluctant, you know, acting like they're in no rush to buy. I can't quite figure out if there's any competition between them. They're trying to bring down the price of the farmer's goods, and we're practically begging to sell our goods to the merchants. It feels like we have to plead with them. (Umut, big farmer, Interview 21)

§ § §

Interviewer: Isn't there competition between traders? Doesn't this raise the prices they pay for your product?

Süleyman: Our neighborhood is a narrow circle. When a trader comes to a commodity, the others don't come until he leaves. There is such an agreement between them that the other does not approach. The farmer accepts the price so that I don't go back from here, so that I don't have to go this way for nothing. (Retired farmer, Interview 26)

From the farmers' narratives, we can discern one of the most significant market strategies employed by the trader class to maintain their exploitative relationships through their dominant position in the agricultural field in Çiğdemli. Traders, essentially organized around an economic interest commonality that can be described as a "class in itself," tend to construct and maintain an oligopolistic structure in the local market. This organized tendency exemplifies the trader's *class habitus* in the Bourdieuian sense.

Another small farmer, Muhammet says that merchants in Sorgun not only act together, but they also prevent outsiders to enter the market in Sorgun:

Muhammet: We can only take the goods to Sorgun. We cannot take it anywhere else.

Sertaç: The shopkeepers of Sorgun are cruel, cruel...

Interviewer: What does that mean?

Sertaç: I mean the trader here won't harbor foreigners or other traders here.

Muhammet: No other buyers can come. They collect the goods from you and me, and they say to outsiders, "If you are a buyer, come and buy from me." (Interview 17)

Here, similar to the competition among small farmers, we learn that traders also take measures against outside traders to keep their share of the pie large and prevent their peers from increasing demand.

While the inner circle of merchants consists of gas stations of Çiğdemli, there is an alternative outer circle of merchants located in the Sorgun district center. Some farmers sell their crop to them. However, it seems that the lower transaction costs such as the short distance and close relations with the gas stations make them *preferrable*. According to Rıza (72), the previous mayor of Çiğdemli, this was not the case in the past:

> They [Gas stations] sell not only fertilizer and diesel fuel, but also coal and wood. In the past, these buyers did not exist. Citizens used to load their produce on horse carts, they used to take it with horse carts, there were no tractors. They used to take it and sell it on Wednesday at the wheat market in Sorgun. There was still the TGB... The citizen would immediately take the money to the harvester, the scythe man, and sell it to the merchants so that the money would be in my hand immediately. Because the TGB made the citizen wait for 10-15 days to give the money. Or buyers would come here. For example, there is a business in Sorgun, buying wheat. He would come with a truck and 2 workers, the buyers would go door to door, square to square. The gas stations here are 10-15 years old. Why do they do this now, the man takes his product out of the field and takes it to them so that "I don't have to suffer a second ordeal". I did this job for seven years, my place was just ahead of Osman. The weighbridge and warehouse are still there. Before these gas stations, citizens used to take it to Sorgun or people who were merchants in Sorgun used to come with their workers and cars. Now the man [Osman] left the gas station and started to deal in wheat, coal and fertilizer. Citizens buy fertilizer, diesel fuel, medicine, winter coal from the gas station, then they buy wheat at the price he says. (Rıza, Interview 16)

Let's revisit the significance of the institutionalized informal relationship between traders and small farmers from the perspective of the small farmers. Although doing business with merchants comes with many disadvantages particularly for small farmers, there are some social and economic benefits that cause farmers *prefer* merchants to official institutions. First, the low transaction costs cannot be underestimated explaining the merchants' dominant position in the local market. The unwritten rules, repetition and continuous semi-structural features produce and reproduce trust between parties. Some farmers state that they feel grateful because merchants give them whatever they need during the whole year without asking for money. The repetition is key to strong and long-lasting trade patterns; thus, it is understandable that farmers tend to prefer selling their crops to the same merchants to strengthen the relations. Afterall, there is no guarantee that the official institutions will keep purchasing their crops, and there is no obvious social and economic return on regular trade with them.

Another advantage of working with merchants is the "flexibility" of the due dates. As we will see below, delays may *be tolerated* based on personal relations. Big farmers and small farmers with strong social relations may use their network to their advantage by using them to increase their bargaining power. Although this flexibility may come at an invisible cost, it provides some a range of motion unlike the banks and other institutions that are strictly bound by regulations.

Taking that there is no any significant price advantage a farmer gets from TGB, it becomes more important for most farmers to keep structured and ongoing relations with merchants. Although flexibility provided by the merchants work against small farmers in terms of low prices, an all-inclusive deal including lending money, inputs and selling the produce provides a social and economic stability and predictability to small farmers which formal institutions do not. These semi-structured relations with merchants turn into a habitus that constantly produces mutual social capital for both sides. Therefore, keeping constant economic relations with merchants is not just appear as out of necessity, but at the same time for abovementioned reasons, disguised under the vein of preference.

The exploitation relationship between small traders and farmers, mediated through these social aspects, leaves small farmers acutely aware of their helpless and unalterable position within this dynamic. While they recognize and reveal this reality, they also continue to preserve and utilize their social capital to survive in the agricultural field.

We have examined the unique survival strategies of small farmers and the class antagonism they exhibit while relying on traders. Now, we will better distinguish this class-based attitude by analyzing the relationships between big farmers and traders. Unlike the antagonistic and exploitative dynamics revealed when small farmers discuss traders, such antagonism and disclosure of exploitation are not observed in the case of big farmers.

While small farmers tend to put stress on the obligations and necessities, big farmers point out the mutual benefits. They establish their economic and social relations with merchants under completely different circumstances.

I have observed that big farmers were usually making cash purchases or using short-term loans. Having access to cash allows them to control their costs and manage their debts.

> Interviewer: How do you buy gasoline? Do you pay in advance?
>
> Kerem: I buy gasoline weekly. During the week, let's say I owe 1,000 liras, I go and pay it immediately.
>
> Interviewer: What if there is a hike in the meantime?
>
> Kerem: If there is a hike in gasoline, he puts it on top of the debt. If there is no hike, you pay it at the price you bought it. But it's the same with fertilizer, if you have a debt and they raise the price, they take the money for fertilizer with the increase. It's the same with medicine. (Interview 14)

Getting discounts is another advance of paying in cash. Big farmers who have cash have more bargaining power. Yusuf (40) explains why he prefers paying up front:

> I buy [inputs] in advance. Those who buy on credit have adjusted themselves according to the credit. Since I don't have any debt, I work in cash, because once I buy in cash, I get a discount. With credit, you pay a commission. If you make a deal with the harvest, for example, the man writes 7-8 liras for the diesel you bought for 5 liras at the time of threshing. If you write to the harvest on credit, won't he write 2 liras of fertilizer for, say, 2.5 liras? When you buy in

> cash, your purchasing power is good. Also, when it is in cash, the man gives you a little discount. Because you pay in advance, he doesn't want you to go to someone else. You ask, “How much do you sell it for in advance?” For example, let's say he said “2 liras”. When you say, “Good brother, thank you” and turn around, he says, “Wait, don't leave right now, let's talk,” he gives you a discount so as not to lose you. (Yusuf, Interview 30)

Most of the big farmers sell their produce to gas stations and other merchants. However, unlike the small farmers, they do not mention necessities or previous contractual obligations to explain their reasoning. Big farmers have financial tools to stay out of a debt cycle, their trade with gas stations and other merchants are based on cooperation, social and economic benefits.

Unlike the small farmers, big farmers can wait for the market prices to go up. Since they do not urgently need proceeds from the sale, they tend to take advantage of timing. Bailment is a common transaction that big farmers prefer. They deliver the harvest, without selling it and wait for the favorable market conditions:

> Interviewer: How much wheat did you get? How much did you sell it for?
>
> Emre: I got 1,250 *çinik* [10 tons] of wheat. I left it on consignment, though; I haven’t sold it yet. I can take care of my needs with cash in hand. That’s why I hold onto it and sell it whenever I need to, in November, December, or whenever it’s needed.
>
> Interviewer: When do you set the price for the wheat you consign? Based on what date’s price?
>
> Emre: Whatever the price is when I sell it. For example, if the buyers take it from me in the twelfth month, they’ll pay whatever the price is at that time.
>
> Interviewer: But by that time, they’ve already put the wheat into the market, haven’t they?
>
> Emre: Of course. This place [Özbulutlar Trading] doesn’t wait around—they sell the wheat to the industry or factories right away. But my account waits. I’ll sell in December or January, and I’ll get the price at that time. (Interview 7)

The reason that big farmers do not prefer to sell their crops to the Turkish Grain Board is that the price the TGB offers is not advantageous considering the fact that there are tax cuts and price reductions based on quality.

> Interviewer: Who do you give your goods to?
>
> Hüseyin: I don't give to the TGB. I give it to the trader. Now you calculate the price given by the Office and the price given by the trader. Withholding tax and deductions, it comes to the same account. (Interview 11)

The most important consequence of the transformation and dissolution of the social networks is that the local relations with merchants and big farmers becomes crucial for small farmers to survive in agricultural field. Regular economic and social relations with merchants and big farmers ease the access to machinery, loans and other economic advantages.

In the example below, former mayor Halil accurately depicts the one-sided dependency relationship that gradually develops over time between the small and big farmer. He illustrates this under the social fabric of the big farmer's benevolence and the friendship and close relationship that evolves between the two.

> Halil: Since small farmers are struggling, the larger farmers lend them cash or provide tools and equipment. Then the big farmer tells the small one, "Look, İsmail, if you take your goods to this guy, I'll take better care of you." Traders usually deal with the big farmers, and the big farmers influence the smaller ones. For example, the big farmer might lend you his tractor and say, "Just put fuel in it and take it," but in the end, you're in debt to him. He pulls you under his influence.
>
> Interviewer: So, there's a kind of obligation created by whoever you're borrowing from or getting help from...
>
> Halil: Of course. Something like this happened recently. A guy I know was buying things from one trader but took his goods to a different trader because the other one offered more money. The trader he was buying from caught him with the other trader and started insulting him, saying, "Why aren't you bringing your goods to me?" (Interview 33)

In the example described, we see that when the small farmer, who is indebted in this social relationship, attempts to back out of giving his product to the big farmer he owes, he is subjected to the most overt form of symbolic violence. This example suggests that the social capital the small farmer gains from his relationships with the higher classes, due to the exploitative nature of these relationships, tends to generate both *opportunities* and a *lack of alternatives*. The fundamentally unequal economic relationship, manifesting as an asymmetric social bond, allows the small farmer to capitalize on the prestige and financial resources that come from his friendship with the big farmer. However, this friendship precludes him from forming a similar relationship with another big farmer.

On the other hand, the big farmer has fully commodified both the small farmer and many others like him, viewing them as social connections and labor whose surplus

production he can appropriate. From the perspective of the big farmer and the merchant, the protective/patronage and friendship relationships they establish with small farmers are not *personal*, as they might appear to the small farmer. Rather, the big farmer creates a network of such relationships with multiple small farmers, thus building *cumulative social capital* that allows him to seize their products at the most critical times.

The former farmer, now working as a security guard, Tacettin, succinctly explains the nature of social and economic relationships between large and small farmers:

> Tacettin: Let's say Oğuz is a big farmer, and I'm the small farmer. I can't afford to buy a harvesting machine. So what do I do? I go to him and say, "Brother Oğuz, can we harvest mine as well?" He'll harvest my beets for 200 lira. He earns from his own fields and makes money from me, too. The small farmer says, "How can I buy a machine for just 10 decares?" So what do you do? You go to him, bow your head, and ask, "Brother Oğuz, can you do my field as well?" (Tacettin, Interview 32)

So doing business with a merchant on regular basis is not an obligation, but a structured informal relation that work as a safety net. Small farmers secure good relations with certain merchants, -gas station owners in particular- to be able to have access to loans, credit purchases, flexible maturity and so on. This is the most significant form of *agricultural social capital* that is needed in agricultural field. We will see the dynamics of this informal social structures and how they work in a following section.

### 3.3.5. Class Struggle Embedded in Social Relations: Gas Stations

We have seen in the chapter 2.5. that the public institutions and non-farm economic life in Çiğdemli has been gradually dissolved over the last three decades. During the process places such as coffee shops has been closed down and there has been no place left other than gas stations and mosques where farmers gather and socialize.

During the field study, I observed that specifically the service buildings of gas stations were always busy, and utilized as gathering points of farmers. Whenever I enter these gas stations, I witness a continuous flow of people, including many farmers and merchants who come to purchase supplies, ask for a loan, repay or negotiate their debts. There are also people who come just to chat, gossip, or pass the time, forming a crowd that is constantly engaging heated discussions, laughing, shouting, and joking.

At any given moment, there were three, five or sometimes even more people, animatedly interacting with one another. Crow was usually staying in the main hall of the station, and some would go to the small kitchen at the back to sit down, refresh their tea, or even grab a bite to eat if there was something available. Some people just stop by, while others specifically come to meet up with the others.

It was as if the gas station had taken the place of the village's closed coffeehouses. I first realized this social hot spot when an interviewee invited me to one of the gas stations (gas station A) at the evening to find more interviewees, adding that gas station is always full of people in the evenings (Interviewee no:10). Later on, I kept visiting those gas stations and participated in conversations. I conducted 10 interviews in three gas stations. While some of those took place inside other people, in some other cases, we managed to conduct the interview in a place within the shop where we could have a one-on-one conversation. In some situations, during the semi-structured interview, the participation of others led me to turn the interview into a focus group. Later, as I gained the trust of the gas station owners, I began to visit more frequently for conversations and participate in the ongoing discussions. The dialogues and interaction dynamics I observed during these participant observations allowed me to gain insights into the social relationships among the men in the town, as well as the class dynamics and areas of conflict.

At this point, it is imperative to analyze what this environment, both as a physical space, and a structured set of social interactions signifies for the agricultural field before proceeding to our evaluations based on case-by-case events. In Çiğdemli, most men who are participated in the agricultural field whether to a greater or lesser extent, interact with one or more of these gas stations, and form social relationships with each other. These places are locations of social interaction where lenders and borrowers, large and small landowners, reapers and traders come and go, constantly encountering one another. They stop by gas stations for a cup of tea, they gather information from the comings and goings about the agricultural market and the town. Beyond realm of bare economic transactions, it is a realm of social, cultural, political and symbolic exchange. This social interaction, by its nature, represents a symbolic realm where class differences and encounters are exhibited.

These encounters between social classes are never among equals. First and foremost, it is crucial to remember that gas stations are typically places where poor farmers come to delay their debts, get fuel on credit, and ask for loans for various needs throughout the year. From the perspective of the owners of these businesses, it ensures that the indebted and subordinate farmers remain in plain sight. Through observing those who come and go, the station owner can track debt relationships, learn what each farmer is planting, what they will approximately harvest, and to which merchant they will likely to sell their goods. He also oversees his clients' agricultural information, financials and needs. Being at the crossroads of this information flow is significant for the gas station owner in terms of social capital. As the owner of the place, he has the full knowledge of the information circulated through as opposed to guests having only a fraction of it. This situation, which can be seen as a result of the spatial characteristics of the town impacting social relations, highlights how, in a small settlement, the dominance of face-to-face interactions within a commercial establishment that also serves as a platform for social encounters and interactions provides the owner with significant social capital and information. It can be said that in the encounter between the merchant and the farmer, the central position of the merchant in this commercial relationship generally results in information asymmetry. However, in our example, the fact that the merchant's establishment is not just a place where one-on-one negotiations and bare economic transactions occur but also a space where social encounters and daily conversations frequently take place exacerbates the gap in social capital provided by this asymmetry to the parties involved.

Moreover, the moral superiority gained from maintaining good relationships with debtors provides these merchants the opportunity to impose a second layer of shame on indebted farmers, beyond their financial obligations, by positioning themselves as benevolent and understanding figures. This symbolic power derived from personal relationships grants a substantial advantage in social and economic interactions as symbolic capital for the gas station owning merchant. The symbolic power granted to the merchant by the small farmers is actually a price paid by these farmers to secure a persistent financial backing through humane relationships, as opposed to the financial leviathan created by the merging of banks and financial institutions that reduces everyone to a credit score, stripping them of their human qualities.

Spending time together along with a glass of tea help building *mutual understanding* and empathy. This social network, provides all participants a common language to use, which has a potential to disguise the unequal relations of power underneath. In other words, it covers the exploitative character of the exchange relation. Furthermore, through the language of friendship established with the debtor, the merchant finds an opportunity to impose their perspective on the farmers. At the same time, the inherently exploitative relationship, which is essentially based on the farmer's entrapment, is concealed under the everyday cheerfulness of this coffeehouse-like environment. The mechanism of the rural town, which binds everyone through physical proximity and denies class differences under the equalizing principle of rurality, operates as an ideological illusion that equalizes the townspeople against the city.

Especially in the beginning, the gas station owners, who approached me quite positively, nevertheless preferred not to leave the interview environment to learn what was being discussed. In some interviews; manager, appearing to be working, stayed with us in the same place during the entire interview without participating in. Under such circumstances I felt that his presence was distorting the conditions under which our conversation needs to take place. Undoubtedly, the presence of the manager during the interview would hinder the interviewee from expressing their thoughts freely. Given the farmers' indebtedness and dependence on the gas station, I did not expect that under these circumstances, they would even dare to complain about the low prices they received for their harvests during the interviews. However, over time, as the manager became convinced that I was asking the same questions and was not “stirring things up,” his interest waned, and the number of one-on-one interviews I conducted increased.

As I proceeded with such encounters, it turned out that the relationship they have was far more complicated than I expected. During participatory observations, the first thing I noticed was the peculiarities of the relationship between manager of the gas station and the others. At first glance the relationship between them was quite warm. I was witnessing typical everyday conversations conducted exclusively among men, revolving around themes such as work and politics. They do make jokes to each other, talk about the market, politics and other daily things.

When I maneuver the conversation to the topics such as the prices farmers get or the debts they own, participants seemed to speak frankly. In most of the cases, farmers seemed to not mind the presence of the manager, even if they complain about their very economic conditions that the manager is partly or fully responsible for. In those situations, managers generally did not interrupt or intervened to what they say. Moreover, I witnessed twice that the interviewee made insinuations about manager or he teased the manager about how they got constantly 'ripped off' by him. The response they receive was nothing more than a silence, an impish smile or a laugh. Farmers quips not because of the waggish characters they have, but obviously because it is an effective way to keep up the hard bargain between them. It was precisely these moments of encounter, which manifested the positions of the social classes involved, where contradictions and oppositions within a field of power relations found expression on a linguistic and symbolic realm, in playful, naive, humorous and subtle forms.

Interactions and dialogues between 'the bald manager' (a nickname given by others) and his customers/farmers during some of these interviews conducted in the Gas Station A are worth to be read in detail.

One day, while conversing with various people in the large seating area inside the gas station, I met a small farmer named Hasan, who was talking about quitting farming.

> We don't own any land. If my brother or my uncle decides to say, 'That's enough,' or 'Stop,' I'll quit. Those fields are on loan. When they say, 'It's over,' I'll stop. (Hasan, Interview 10)

At that moment, the manager of the establishment appeared to be busy, with his head buried in the ledger where he kept the accounts of the debtors. It was rainy outside. Hasan stared out the window and continued:

> Look at that, rain. The crops will get wet [referring to chickpeas]. Right now, the price is 18 lira. The bald manager will buy the wet crops for 10 lira [Both laugh]. (Hasan, Interview 10)

Adorned with a fine example of the art of exaggeration, the most naked expression of the exploitative relationship between the merchant and the farmer echoes in the manager's ear the very first moment it finds the opportunity to be voiced. Not

surprisingly, this would not be the last dialogue where I witnessed a farmer taking a jab in jest at the manager. Jokes, teasing, quips, and mockery emerge quite often as the most refined and sophisticated among the linguistic weapons -with reference to Scott (1985a)- used by the weak against the strong. At this point, Plato comes to mind, as he seeks the origins of comedy in the dynamics between friends and foes, the powerful and the weak—in short, in unequal power relations[11]. In a place where the saying *'There is a grain of truth in every joke'* is known by everyone, and it is known that it is known, this witty teasing holds a particular significance. It is expected that such encounters would occur within the communication framework provided by the friendship that farmers maintain with merchants. Normally, it is reasonable to assume that the manager, who knew that I was questioning the prices farmers receive during my interviews, would already know that the farmers would complain about him. However, the fact that the notion, which is widely known among the farmers -that the manager is exploiting the farmers- was expressed to the researcher in the very presence of the manager. This means bringing a public secret which is limited to the townspeople, out into the open under the manager's gaze. Such a gesture can be seen as a subtle challenge, adding a secondary layer of meaning to the communication.

In another instance I met Muhammet, a 75-year-old small farmer, in front of the Gas Station C, where I went to conduct a focus group interview, and he agreed to participate. I started the interview with Muhammet at the gas station, joined by a large group of farmers. The manager of the gas station, Nazım, was also present during our discussion. When I asked Muhammet "Who did you sell your wheat to?" he responded,

> [Pointing to the manager, Nazım] I sold the wheat to him, this lazy guy right here. [Laughing] He's always fooling us, you know that? [At that moment, Nazım sat up, turned on the TV, and started watching without paying any attention to the conversation]. (Muhammet, Interview 17)

In some other cases however, there were moments when the manager left the room for some reason and the interviewee immediately changed the subject and complained about gas stations or managers by lowering his voice.

[11] For dialogues between Socrates and Protarchus concerning comedy, see. (Plato, 1975)

Previously, we discussed that the relationship between the small farmer and the merchant can be understood as a dorm of social capital in the Bourdieusian sense. The small farmer derives various economic securities and benefits from this enduring and relatively stable relationship, providing a kind of economic value against the unpredictability of the harvest, market, and state. However, this relationship inherently carries an element of exploitation, and ultimately, it signifies the farmer's financial dependency on the local merchant. For the farmer, being close to the trader – an agent positioned higher in the agricultural field – gaining his friendship and conversation, and getting close to him holds symbolic value beyond these benefits. Yet, on the other hand, the merchant, who never gives the product its deserved value in the eyes of the farmer, and seize every opportunity to cut prices, stands in direct opposition to the farmer's objective interests in a manner that almost establishes the small farmer as a "class in itself".

These humorous taunts should be understood as a comedy born from the tension between the conflict arising from the opposing interests in the relations of production and the developed friendship between the two. In both examples, what makes the farmer's teasing of the merchant over his greed humorous is the mischievous revelation of this contradiction.

The small farmers are not the only class that, despite having conflicting objective interests with the merchants, positions themselves within the same social network and attempts to gain their share of the common social capital. As we will see below, big farmers, although they possess high bargaining power due to their positions in the agricultural field, are essentially in a class opposition against merchants who appropriate a portion of the surplus value they produce. To illustrate, let us continue with an example from my interview with Ali, a 42-year-old big farmer who cultivates approximately 700 to 800 decares, conducted at Gas Station-A. In the presence of the *bald manager*, Ali answered the standard questions regarding what he planted and to whom he sold his produce. However, once the manager left the scene, Ali began to articulate his thoughts concerning the merchants and the trade system:

Interviewer: Who did you sell your crops to this year?

> Ali: I harvested 7-8 thousand ciniks of wheat and sold it to [Gas Station-A] here. As for chickpeas, I got 3-4 thousand ciniks. Those chickpeas are bought by various independent traders. We are indebted to this place, you know.
>
> [At this point, no one else was in the room, and the manager had also left. Seyit continued in a lower voice.]
>
> Ali: This man [the manager] buys my wheat at the price he sets, and I have no luxury to object. These are the people who exploit us. We work for them with our fields, our children, our tractors. This man only has fuel, but because he manages us, we work for them. They are trillionaires. Everyone in the surrounding villages is dependent on this place. If diesel is 6 liras, they add an extra 50 kuruş because you are in debt, take it or leave it [laughs]. You get caught up; you get indebted. Some pay, some can't. It's the same in Sorgun, in fact, it's even worse there. In the free market, because the farmer is poor and the state does not protect him, they put everyone in debt during the harvest. Whether your goods fetch a good price or not, you are forced to sell at harvest time. There is the Agricultural Credit Cooperative, but it also tries to fleece you. (Interview 4)

Ali speaks against the merchants not as a big farmer, but on behalf of all farmers, emphasizing a common plight. The frequently heard complaint from small farmers about the "state abandoning the farmer" is also voiced by Ali in describing the relationship between the merchant and the farmer. As we examined the effects of neoliberal policies on the agricultural field, this "abandonment" points to the state's withdrawal both in its institutional presence and its role in distribution relations, to the detriment of the farmer. The fact that Ali as a farmer, left at the mercy of market forces due to the state's non-intervention, makes this complaint at a merchant-owned gas station is a phenomenon that corroborates our observations on the ground.

With that said, big farmers are not as critical towards merchants as small farmers do. When they sell their product to merchants, they are usually in a better position than small farmers. They have better relations with merchants due to "the high volume of business". Emrah, expresses this as following:

> Interviewer: Do you always give your product here, is there no competition, no market environment?
>
> Emrah: No, of course we do research. We come here, we ask, we take samples of our product, we visit the wheat market, we ask, I have this much product, what is the price? But now, since we work with each other here [Gas Station A] all the time, whatever the price is in the market, thanks to them, I give it here for 100 kurus 200 kurus higher. Otherwise, there is no such thing that you have to give it here. There is a friendship, there is mutual exchange, that's why

> I prefer this place. After all, it is in their interest as well, there is an atmosphere of trust, they always take their customers into consideration.
>
> Interviewer: Well, can the small producer give a higher price when he becomes a regular customer?
>
> Emrah: [Laughs] No, the small producer is not like us, of course he cannot get the same price. Those who bring 100 tons of goods and those who bring 2-3 tons of goods are not in the same conditions. (Interview 6)

It is noteworthy that the big farmers also aware of the difference between small farmers and themselves in regards to the merchants. Emrah refers to his distinct class position in the relations of production which gives him the bargaining power, which does not apply to elderly small farmers.

Not only in their interviews with me but also in the arguments among the farmers themselves, we see significant examples of class encounters. In these encounters, especially when the topic of the small farmers' "abandonment" and the economic difficulties they face arises, the intensity of the debate increases. This is because the issue of abandonment directly criticizes government policies, making it a point of contention. This contention perhaps emerges more intensely due to my presence as an observer, manifesting as heated objections, interruptions, and sometimes attempts to correct what is being explained to me.

Take as an example the following dialogue taken place in Gas Station-A between the Mukhtar who also works for the gas station and a 42-year-old big farmer, Kerem, who farms between 700 to 800 decare lands. During a focus group, while Kerem was telling me about how he was struggling to keep doing farming under harsh conditions of living and how expensive the inputs were, mukhtar interrupted:

> Mukhtar: Brother, if you're not making money, why are you farming?
>
> Kerem: Do you know what they'll say if you don't farm? Just don't farm for once. See what happens. [The manager laughs while fiddling with the ledger.]
>
> Kerem: Diesel is now 6 liras.
>
> Mukhtar: You lying son of a b****. How much did you buy the diesel for?
>
> Kerem: 6 liras.
>
> Mukhtar: Stop lying. You bought it for 3 liras. Didn't you get diesel support?
>
> Kerem: I did, but it wasn't enough… I got 1,000 liras in total. What will 1,000 liras cover…

Mukhtar: If you farm off the books, you'll get less support. So, don't farm illegally. My goodness…

Kerem: Get lost… [To me] Look, these people, they devoured everything. The municipality has 11 trillion in debt. How did you accumulate this debt? Rıza was good, the one who came after him ruined everything. They're all the same, not just this one but the one in Sorgun too. He also left 80 trillion in debt. The previous Rıza had handed over the municipality with 200 million in cash.

Interviewer: But they say we built a cultural center, we built a treatment plant…

Young man there: That treatment plant hasn't worked for 5 years. It's been lying idle. There are rats inside it, I can show you if you want.

Kerem: I've never liked Tayyib. I didn't like him from the beginning.

Mukhtar: Now, I'm not an AKP supporter, but to be fair, they've done some good things too [smirking] …

Kerem: Stop praising AKP, or I'll smack you right in the mouth!

Mukhtar [trying to provoke]: I mean, we need to speak the truth and be fair [laughing]… So, are you an *ülkücü*[12] now?

Kerem: Of course, I'm an ülkücü.

Mukhtar: You are neither an ülkücü nor anything else. Are you even a member of the organization? You're not even a member.

Kerem: And what good does it do you to be a member? You've attached yourselves to Tayyip's tail… You people are like weathercocks.

Mukhtar: I listen to my leader. I do whatever my leader says.

Kerem: Get lost… AKP supporter.

Mukhtar: Look, I said I'm not an AKP supporter [laughing]. (Interview Notes)

This discussion is a rich text that showcases the different dynamics and contradictions inherent in a multi-layered network of oppositions and alliances within the agricultural field. Kerem, a big farmer, speaks on behalf of *all* farmers regarding agricultural issues, as is often observed among other big farmers. This perspective, which ignores significant differences among farmers in terms of capital, reflects a general class opposition derived from production relations with merchants and the state. Kerem's adoption of the problem of lack of state support, which primarily affects small farmers, provides important insights into the ideology that emerges from the unique class condition of big farmers.

[12] "Ülkücü," also known as "*Grey Wolfes*," is the name given to the members and supporters of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)

Of course, it is not surprising that the mukhtar working at the gas station owner, a merchant, accuses Kerem of distorting the truth by exposing the class advantages Kerem holds, as we have noted in previous sections of the thesis. The situation that arises from the Mukhtar's question, “Why are you farming?” also points to this condition. The manager's smirk at Kerem's response, citing tradition as the reason for farming leased land nearly three times the size of his own, indicates that, in this encounter, the merchant, like the mukhtar, also finds the discrepancy between Kerem's words and his class position striking.

The mukhtar’s suggestion to Kerem, “so, don’t farm illegally,” in response to Kerem's complaint about not receiving government support, points to a habitus known and practiced throughout the agricultural field—farming off the books in exchange for not paying taxes. This comment subtly mocks Kerem's practice of farming predominantly through informal tenancy agreements.

Furthermore, the argument that “if their situation was really bad, they wouldn't farm,” generalized by the merchant and the mukhtar to all farmers, is used as an opposing ideological weapon. This is similar to Kerem's self-identification with small farmers' struggles while criticizing merchants and government policies. Both parties use these narratives to position themselves ideologically, creating patterns akin to two sides of the same coin.

It is not the only case that a person who works at the gas station seemed to be annoyed of the complains that farmers made. When I was chatting with another worker of Gas Station A one-to-one, who had listened to some of the interviews before, felt obliged to inform on those who are ‘bending the truth’ as he regarded:

> They're exaggerating, really exaggerating. They’re inflating their costs when they talk to you. That diesel calculation isn’t like that. The tractor doesn’t burn as much fuel as they say. They always go on about how they’re in such a loss, how things are bad for them. Then you see these guys planting 400-500 decares of chickpeas. If they’re losing money, why are they planting? Don’t plant, then. They’re not losing money. It’s also partly the fault of the villagers. They don’t do their work properly. They don’t apply fertilizer or pesticides. Then they say, ‘We’re not making any money.’ The guy gets grants, takes loans, and then spends it on other things. Well, why did you spend it? If you had used it for its purpose, you wouldn’t have lost money. (Anonymous Worker, Interview Notes)

Here, we also encounter the image of the “farmer who does not engage in conscious agriculture and lacks financial acumen.” This image functions as a form of symbolic violence frequently articulated by part-time farmers and upper classes against the small farmer class within the class struggle over symbolic capital. We will explore this topic further in Section 3.6. However, the critical point to emphasize here is the following: the differences between discussions held publicly in focus groups and those held privately, the corrections made to the researcher after an interview to accurately convey the objective situation, and the efforts to explain the real circumstances reveal a significant ideological struggle rooted in class antagonisms beneath the common language, apparent values, and unifying assumptions of cultural capital.

Similarly, the sense of solidarity conveyed by the warm and close social relationships in this small town, when stripped of the neoliberal jargon of mutual understanding and friendship among ‘stakeholders in the agricultural sector’, exposes the underlying conflicting and asymmetric relationships that characterize the class and power struggle structure of the agricultural field. These encounters observed at gas stations underscores the dynamics of the unequal distribution of social, cultural, and symbolic capital.

Such dynamics are illustrative of Bourdieu's concept of symbolic power, where the dominant classes impose their worldview, rendering the dominated classes complicit in their subordination through cultural and social practices. The distinction between the public discourse and private admissions by farmers underscores the complexity of habitus, which shapes and is shaped by these power relations (Bourdieu, 1996a) These gas station encounters serve as microcosms of these broader structural inequities, which demonstrate how social capital is leveraged to maintain class dominance while at the same time, the lower classes, as part of the network of relationships that constitutes this social capital, strive to gain an economic, social, cultural, and symbolic share from this relational power, albeit unequally.

### 3.4. Non-Market Cost Reduction Strategies

In this section we will see how farmers cope with the difficulties occurring from the external conditions, primarily the drought and economic conditions and how does it affect the implementation and the effectiveness of agricultural policies. During the

field study I have witnessed that both small and big farmers take some extraordinary measures in order to keep farming. Farmers tend to avoid certain expenditures, cut the costs by simply avoiding the market, using non-monetary alternatives of inputs if possible, or do not use at all. For this purpose, we examine the two most important plant production, sugar beet and wheat.

### 3.4.1. Sugar Beet Production and Return to Domestic Labor

Sugar beet has been a traditional crop especially for the Burunören Village. All sugar beet farmers I talk to agree on that sugar beet farming is more profitable than other products. In their dialog, former farmers Oğuz (39) and Tacettin talk about how valuable sugar beet is:

> Oğuz: But teacher, I mean, the best money a farmer makes comes from beets. The President came out and announced it, the price per ton is 300 lira now. And if the sugar content is high, what we call the polar ratio, the price changes accordingly. If the polar is high, the price can go up to around 350 lira. Plus, there's the pulp. For example, a friend who produces 100 tons of beets has the right to up to 25 tons of pulp. It sells for 100 lira per ton.
>
> Tacettin: Actually, the state provides great support, but... when there's no water... This water issue needs to be solved.
>
> Oğuz: It's not over yet. There's also molasses that comes from the beets. Do you know what that is? It's from the top part of the beet. It's used in yeast factories and chocolate factories. There's a storage facility here where it's kept.
>
> Tacettin: Everything from these beets actually brings in money. (Interview 32)

Ironically, although both Oğuz and Tacettin come from sugar beet farming families, they left agriculture and started working as security guards at the Sugar Factory, where this dialogue took place. which brings us to the difficulties in sugar beet production.

Although most of the sugar beet producers were relatively big farmers, they still take measures to deal with the uncertainties and the economic difficulties. There are two challenges for the sugar beet producers to cope with. The first one, as Tacettin mentions, is water. As the drought gets worse, it gets harder and more expansive to have sustainable water resources for the sugar beet production.

Larger the scale, lower the cost of irrigation. Since the average size of irrigated farms are too narrow, the unit cost of irrigation is high. Ramazan, explains why his irrigation costs are high, and gives an opposite example from someone he knows:

Interviewer: What are your irrigation costs for beets? How many times do you irrigate the beets?

Ramazan: 5 to 10 times. On average, I irrigate 7 to 8 times. I have 35 decares. Every time, I burn 150 liters of fuel. Let's say 7 lira per liter for diesel because that's what it costs me to pay for the fuel, around 6.5 to 7 lira. If we buy it from the cooperative, it's even more expensive. The reason it's 150 liters is because I'm irrigating the beets with 15 sprinklers. If I had 20 sprinklers, my costs would be lower. If I had electricity and drilled down 20-25 meters, I could get water for 50 sprinklers. Someone did that and got water for 40-45 sprinklers. The guy bought land, for example, Haluk Hodja sold 65 decares, and he bought some more from both sides and made it 100 decares. This guy is from Mirahur village, but he's an electrician in Sorgun. He's always buying land. He had a well drilled and pulled in electricity. If he irrigated 7 times, let's say, he could irrigate 80-90 decares. He'd burn at most 5,000-6,000 lira worth of fuel. With the money I spend irrigating 35 decares, he irrigates 80-90 decares. That guy is making money, in other words.

Interviewer: Who is this man?

Ramazan: The man's name is Turgut. He's an electrician on the Sivas road, you know the Shell gas station at the entrance of Sorgun? His place is across from there. The issue is the small size of the land… That guy pulled electricity for 80-90 decares. If I were in his shoes, I'd do the same, and I wouldn't even blink at the 50-60 thousand lira cost. Or if there were a river or a pond, I'd install 30-40 sprinklers. If there were a river or a pond...

Interviewer: Are there people like Turgut who are buying up unused land in villages?

Ramazan: Certain people are. Let me give you an example from our village. Retirees, for instance, one's wife dies, and the other moves to Ankara or Istanbul. That's how our village's population is down to 25-30 households. There's no new generation willing to farm because it's no longer profitable. The land isn't consolidated. Right now, people like [Turgut] are the ones making money here. For example, someone is in a pinch and sells their field. The land happens to be next to [Turgut's] property, so it works out for him, and he buys it and expands his land. The fact that people are coming back from abroad didn't help either; now someone asks for 10,000 lira for a piece of land next to their property. That's how land prices went from 2,500 to 10,000 lira. Then others see this and also start asking for 10,000 lira for their land. [Turgut] is already a businessman, he has an income behind him. He's a big businessman, handling 50% of Sorgun's coil winding business. This guy can't lose. He slowly increased his land to 100 decares. Even if he doesn't farm it himself and leases it out, it's worth 30,000 lira. This guy profits no matter what. He doesn't even farm himself; he doesn't lift a finger. He partnered with someone, dumped all the labor and everything else onto that guy. If 600-700 tons of beets come out and half is his, that's 300-350 tons. That's 90,000 lira in just one year. (Interview 23)

Here, it is worth mentioning that Turgut who is an electrician, uses his non-agricultural economic capital to scale up in farming and expand in agricultural field. As he

purchases more lands and invests more in drilling wells and running electrical wires, he increases the profitability. This example stands as a success story in the eyes of Osman, who is not able to do the same thing because of being stuck in a high cost – low revenue cycle.

The second problem is the increasing cost of inputs. All sugar beet farmers with no exception complain about the increasing input costs. The profitability diminishes over the last years due to the sky rocketing prices. In order to deal with this problem, farmers try to cut the costs by undertaking some of the work themselves, instead of hiring workers. There are some farmers who hoe the sugar beet themselves, instead of hiring immigrant workers as they used to do. For example, Adem, who has a total of 400-500 decares of cultivated land and grows beets, wheat, chickpeas, and lentils, follows this path. He also owns a tractor and all the necessary equipment for beet farming.

> Adem: (...) Beetroot is irrigated agriculture. There is no cold, this and that. Even if you make a loss, you make a profit. The risk is low. But that's if you do the labor yourself. Otherwise, beets won't save you either.
>
> Interviewer: What is the purchase price for beets?
>
> Adem: Beet is currently 235 liras, plus the price increases according to the sugar content.
>
> Interviewer: How much is the cost of hoe labor?
>
> Adem: For hoeing, the labor cost is 140 liras per decare. For harvesting, workers charged 180 liras, and the machines were 150 liras. We made money because we didn't have to pay for these; we did it ourselves, so we earned money. (Interview 2)

Emrah (40) uses sugar beet harvest machine he owns, which is a cost reducing advantage. But he still hires workers for hoeing:

> Only for beets, we pay for hoeing and labor. I do the uprooting myself because I have a machine, I only pay the laborer for the hoeing. (Emrah, Interview 8)

Farmers tend to rely on their own resources and avoid buying from the market as much as possible. It is specifically true for labor because relying completely on seasonal farm workers takes away the profit margin that is already narrow. For instance, Serhat (57), a small farmer who plants beets on a 15-decare plot he rents in addition to his own 60-65 decares of land, does all the fieldwork himself:

> Interviewer: Do you hire workers for the beets?
>
> Serhat: We do the work ourselves for the beets. Otherwise, it would be too expensive, and we wouldn't keep up. If we handed over the harvesting and hoeing to them, we'd be planting beets for nothing. (Interview 25)

Not only the sugar beet-producers but also the crop producers apply similar methods to overcome the economic obstacles before production.

### 3.4.2. Cutting Fertilizer and Certified Seed Costs

Some farmers say that they cannot afford fertilizers because of the high inflation. It is widely spoken by the locals that the farmers use little or no fertilizer because of the skyrocketing prices. This, inevitably and eventually, has a negative impact on the quality and productivity.

> How are you going to buy fuel and fertilizer? Today, you buy fertilizer for 1,000 liras, but when you buy it on credit, it goes up to 1,500-1,600 liras. How is that going to work? This year, yields have dropped by half. What is the farmer going to earn, and what is he going to eat? Yields are dropping because fertilizer isn't being used. You're supposed to spread 3-3.5 sacks of fertilizer on 10 decares; but when you can't afford it, you'll either use only 1.5 sacks or skip the spring and summer fertilizers altogether. (Ahmet, Interview 3)
>
> § § §
>
> There is also this, I am the farmer with the highest yield here. When there are so many expenses, we steal from ourselves. What do we do, for example, we buy the cheapest fertilizer or we steal from the kilograms. This year, fertilizer cost 125 liras and seed cost 3 liras. That's why people leave agriculture (...). (Hüseyin, Interview 11)

Some farmers also complain about the high prices of the certified seeds. It is specifically emphasized that the certified seed prices are considerably higher than the actual harvest itself.

> You buy seed at the gas station and they say 15 liras. You go and buy wheat for 9 liras and seed for 15 liras. (Kağan, Interview 15)
>
> § § §
>
> We usually get the seed from the chickpeas we sow ourselves. Of course, what the state gives [certified seed] is different. But we cannot buy it because it is expensive. Now you buy it for 40-50 liras and sell it for 20 liras. This is the difference. (Adem, Interview 2)

The price gap between the certified seeds and the seeds at hand leads to the questioning if the quality difference justifies this price. Some farmers say that they do not trust in the effectiveness and quality of the certified seeds. This concern feeds the perception that using certified seeds does not worth it. Seeds that farmers produce for their own use has become widespread.

> Certified today costs at least 17,000 liras [8 tons], about 2 thousand liras per ton. We don't have the chance to use it all the time. If you have a FRS registration, you can go and buy it from Agricultural Credit, but without FRS, you can't buy it easily. And when you buy it from the market, you don't know whether it is certified or not, you can't trust it. That's why we usually buy seeds for the second and third planting. We can buy from clean farmers. For example, we look at someone who has a good field with high yields, we go and buy from those fields. But the last point is from shopkeepers... Yes, it has been sifted and sprayed, but how reliable is it? It's not like what the state does, you don't know. Places outside the state are not safe. There are actually troubled places in the state too. Everyone gives support to their own people, this and that... Not every person who gets their documents can get the support they want. But the one who has a man does his job. (Murat, Interview 18)
>
> § § §
>
> I don't believe in certificates for chickpeas. I look, whichever field is good, that's what I use. So do I believe in certified seed in wheat... I wonder if I should say that I do... Certified seeds have deteriorated a lot. The men spray the seed and camouflage the rye in it. The cost of seed is 16 kilos, so let's say 50 liras for 2 tiles, it's more expensive than that for sifting and so on. (Hüseyin, Interview 11)
>
> § § §
>
> Diesel, fertilizer, seed prices are high. They are all high. If you buy something from the state, the price is high, if you sell it, it is worthless. This year they are saying 9-9.5 liras for wheat. However, if we were to buy seed, it would be 16 liras. They take the wheat they buy from us, sift it and sell it to us again as seed. The man brings it, puts a stamp on it and sells it as certified seed. (Emre, Interview 7)

Not only fertilizers and seeds, but also the amount of pesticides used at farm is affected by the inflation. Ali says that the pesticide use drops down due to high prices:

> The rain came late this year, and that had an effect too. Without rain, the crops didn’t grow tall; they stayed short. Now you look around, and no one is using pesticides either. Pesticides are expensive. There’s no alternative to the German-made product—they came out with something called Merlin. You have to buy it, no choice. They’ve figured it out. If you use too much of that pesticide, there are side effects. And to fix that, Bayer sells another product. Think about it—they made a product to counteract the effects of their own

> product, and they're selling both. And when you look at it, it doesn't even work. The main enemy of chickpeas is fungal disease. You see someone uses the pesticide, but then leaves it, doesn't apply anything else. They get the same yield as I do. So why should I bother applying it for nothing? (Ali, Interview 4)

The quotes above clearly show that in this case, the 'bad' farming practice is not related to being less educated or incompetent; but a conscious choices made to address the economic problems, notably the increasing costs. Both commercial scale/big farmers and small farmers make similar points about the price increases and they present the underuse of inputs as a solution to the problem. We also witness that some farmers doubt the quality and effectiveness of some of the inputs, as they base their arguments on a price-performance analysis.

The logic, or rules of the agricultural game, as we see here, is not always compatible with economization. "Neoliberal remaking of agriculture" in Atasoy's terms (2017, p. 5), seem to collapse under its own weight. When the promoted ways of market solutions such as credit is unachievable, farmers seem to move away from commodified inputs and take a different path: They use their own labor - *self-exploitation* in Chayanov's terms, use their own seed, or use no input whatsoever, leaving the fate of harvest in the hands of nature. It seems that here is a divergence from neoliberal mode of behavior. Taking the seed as an example, although, as Kloppenburg (2010) puts it, a general tendency exists that the seed industry is taking over the "seed sovereignty" from the farmers' hands, farmers are still able to reverse this trend under certain conditions, by producing their own seeds and keeping their hands off the seed market for several years. Needless to say, using a farmer's own produce seed is not a political blow to the global seed industry, or reversal of dispossession in general, but it shows that the rules of the agricultural game cannot be reduced to the market rules. Market rules are rules of one kind in agricultural game, neoliberal commodification is a single trend among others, affecting the agricultural game. They cannot be explanatory unless they are understood within the context of agricultural field. No matter how reasonable, profitable, or healthy buying certificated seeds is marketed to seem, a disposition of using seeds obtained from previous harvest have been created and prevailed in agricultural field under certain conditions. The market value of certified seed has been undervalued by the local seed knowledge

brought by local agricultural culture, non-marketable domestic labor and a strategy of withdrawing from monetary relations in exchange for a yield increase - whose existence is questionable.

### 3.4.3. Consequences of Input Cuts

Underuse of inputs has important consequences on the effectiveness of the quality and procurement policies implemented by Turkish Grain Board. As we have seen before, government directly intervenes in agricultural prices through procurements at a base price. As a part of those policies, Turkish Grain Board imposes a set of quality standards, and has a pricing policy accordingly. The government announces a price for the standard quality, and depending on the quality of the product, the price is increased or decreased at certain rates. Physical and chemical properties of the crop such as high protein, low broken grain and husk ratios lead to price bonuses while the opposite results in reductions. The policy is expected to promote good practices as well as certified high quality cereal use.

However, these quality standards become a barrier before sales to TGB. The underuse of proper inputs apparently lead to that farmers in the region get reduced price offers from the TGB experts. The quality standards have no significant impact on the farmers, not because of the belief in the traditional sowing, but because the farmers cannot keep up with the "good farming practices". I have observed that farmers adopt a negative attitude against this policy. A conversation between two elderly farmers, İbrahim (69) and Enes is a good example to that:

> İbrahim: [Shrugging] Nobody around here sells to the TGB. The guy there, the expert, just keeps sifting and sorting, over and over...
>
> Enes: They classify it as feed wheat all the time. And then he says, "This doesn't even qualify as feed, but let's just say it is," and marks it down as feed wheat. (Interview 12)

Adem says that the TGB does not offer more than a merchant, taking these price cuts into account:

> I don't sell to the TGB because they don't pay. When you account for all the deductions and fees, they end up giving the same amount as the trader. (Adem, Interview 2)

In the worst-case scenario, if crop does not meet the minimum procurement criteria that TGB asks for, it will be denied and the farmer has to take his crop back, which adds an additional transportation cost. Considering that the location of the closest TGB silo is 50 kilometers compared to the cost of delivering the crop inside the town, the risk of turning back is a significant risk.

For those farmers who do not want to take the risk of being denied because of their crop does not meet the standards, merchants stand out as a viable option. In most cases, merchants do not differentiate their prices based on the quality.

> For example, the state does not buy wheat. I took wheat to the TGB this year, and they didn't buy it because it didn't meet the criteria. So, I took it to the trader, Şahbazlar gave 9.200 liras. (Adem, Interview 2)

Considering that the crop will likely be accepted by the merchant, no matter what quality specification, TGB becomes an unlikely option to choose. The structured social relations with the merchants and local agricultural dispositions seem to make TGB a less reliable alternative. This apparently immensely reduces the effectiveness of the TGB's quality policy.

Our observations also overmatch recent studies in results. A study in Ankara – Gölbaşı done by Dellal (2021) finds that despite the policy change most of the farmers did not change their farming techniques. Although most farmers want TGB to set the market price through procurement, most of them state that they still sell their product to traders. They prefer to sell to traders at a lower price to avoid high transportation costs, simply because they usually deliver the product at the farm.

Lastly, small farmers either cannot wait for TGB, or they have already made a deal with the merchant to bring their commodity to them due to their debts. The debt cycle small farmers struggling with prevents them from benefitting from the base price policy:

> I used to give it to them. It used to be very difficult to give wheat to the TGB. I remember waiting 2 days in the queue. Nowadays I have nothing to do with the TGB, I don't give my wheat to the TGB. How can I give it elsewhere, farmers like us have debts. Since you are in debt, you have no chance to bargain, you are obliged to give it here. (Şeyhmus, Interview 5)

### 3.5. Informal Trade Activities and Formal Economic Structures

We have seen in chapter 3.3.2. that the support payments attached to the land ownership is in many instances kept by the owner even if he/she is not involved in farming. Such support payments are negotiated between the farmer and the landowner. In such cases we witness that a subsidy specifically targeting a group of farmers or a product, is detached and become an element of a bargain which is unintended and unforeseen by the policy designers. It is especially true in transactions between the small farmers are in urgent need of funding and the lenders who look for trade opportunities. In this chapter we will explore the other ways that the targeted subsidies are channeled from debt owners -mostly small farmers- through lenders -merchants- in different forms.

Up to this point we have seen that small farmers work and live on borrowed money throughout the year and pay off their debts after the harvest. The nature of the agricultural market constantly creates a cash-flow shortage and most of the time small farmers do not have enough tools to deal with it. If a farmer is entitled to sell something at subsidized price, one way to get access to cash is to sell this right-to-sell-at-a-subsidized-price or support-payment-receivable to a merchant. As a consequence of urgent need of money in harvest season, small farmers usually sell them in return of time value of money to pay off their debts in due time and reloan. Merchants and big farmer-merchants on the other hand, make use of the cash in hand and buy these receivables in advance. This trade is usually made by mediating between the farmers and the public institutions which makes procurements to intervene in agricultural markets.

There are two basic examples of this mediation to be discussed here. (i) The merchants buy farmers' cereals at a discounted price in collusion with those farmers who are in need of cash to pay off their debts in the harvest season. Merchants then sell it to the Turkish Grain Board at the price declared by the government at the subsidized price (ii) Those who have high amount of sugar beet quota, buy sugar beet from farmers without any quota or have a surplus product exceeding their quota, and sell those sugar beets to the Sugar Factory, at the base price for the quota-A declared by the government. In this section, by referring to the Bourdieausian concepts, we will see

how these relations work in practice as structural relations, how the parties are affected, and what do they mean for agricultural policies.

### 3.5.1 Merchants and Turkish Grain Board Procurements

As explained in the previous section, measures taken by small farmers to cut the costs of production lead to quality losses. Consequently, small farmers encounter price cuts or get rejected by TGB because their products do not meet the quality standards. At this point merchants find a way to take advantage of this situation. According to the statements, merchants are able to calibrate the crops they purchase from small farmers, by mixing poor quality crop into high to meet the quality requirements. In this way, merchants maximize the quantity of products that meet the quality standards imposed by the government and ensure that they benefit the subsidized prices as much as possible.

> If I take my wheat to the TGB today, they say there's weed seeds or debris and won't take it. But if I take it to the trader, they don't say a word about debris or anything—just take it, and then they sell it to the TGB. The wheat traders here collect, clean it up, and take it to the TGB. The TGB tells the farmer to go clean their lentils or chickpeas before bringing them in. How am I supposed to clean it? They charge 100 lira per ton in Sorgun to clean it, and only a few places do it. That's expensive too. (Abdullah, Interview 1)

This way, merchants mediate between TGB and small farmers by collecting the crops from small farmers and selling them to TGB in small farmers' name. However, there is another legal obstacle before such trade. The existing regulations prohibit merchants to sell products to TGB with some exceptions. Producers are also not allowed to sell more crops than they produce that particular season. In order to assure this, TGB asks producers for Farmer's Register Certificate and the farmer to be present at the point of delivery. Thus, merchants need farmers to cooperate to sell the crops to TGB that they bought from those farmers.

> Interviewer: Going back to what you were saying earlier… You're saying the state should buy wheat directly from you, instead of leaving you to deal with traders. Doesn't the TGB buy wheat? Why don't you sell it to them?
>
> Samet: The TGB pays late. Sometimes 15, 20 days, even up to a month late. And sometimes they buy at a low price, like we mentioned earlier when the headman was here. Right now, I need cash up front because of my debt to the Agricultural Credit Cooperative. If I delay for a month, I'll have to pay a month's interest. So, I take my wheat to the trader, sell it to him, and get the

> cash immediately. I then pay off the Agricultural Credit so I don't get hit with interest. But since the trader pays up front, do you think he'll give you the full value for your goods? No, I have to sell the wheat for less than it's worth. Like the headman said, it's like they form a commission among themselves and decide, "No one will pay more than this price." Then they take the wheat they bought from me and sell it to the TGB for a higher price, or they sell it to the factory. If TGB bought wheat up front, I'd take it there. At least then I wouldn't be at the mercy of the traders.
>
> Interviewer: Does the TGB buy from traders?
>
> Samet: In the past, there were a lot of people around here doing shady business with fake invoices. Some even ended up in jail. Now, somehow, traders find a way to sell the goods to the TGB. A guy who's never planted chickpeas buys my chickpeas and takes them to the TGB. The state puts a quota on me—I can't go over 3 tons—but this guy takes 50, 100 tons to the TGB.
>
> Interviewer: So, in the end, farmers are letting them use their registration [FRS] for this, right?
>
> Samet: If farmers were told how these guys manage to sell to the TGB, why would I let them profit when I could earn the money myself? If you're going to protect farmers, then explain the system to them so they understand how it works. Teach the farmers, not just those guys, so they know what's going on. (Interview 24)

In order to overcome this problem, merchants work together with the small farmers. From the field observations and the statements of some farmers who did not want to be recorded in any form, small farmers allow merchants to sell their crops to TGB in their names, by bringing them necessary documents and even helping them physically by going to the office to handle the procedures. This has become a known way of doing cereal trade, an informal business structure that farmers apply for.

Since TGB's subsidized purchase policy exclusively targets farmers signed up to FRS, this type of economic transaction can be interpreted as small farmers informally selling their right to sell the crops to the TGB in exchange for payment in advance. In other words, the price support that is envisaged to be transferred to the small farmers is being sold by those very small farmers at a lower price to satisfy their urgent cash needs. *Price supports in practice, are circulating in the agricultural market through* ***verbal derivative contracts****, even before the harvest took place and the underlying asset (product) come out.* Even if never been predicted by the policy makers, this informal market structure came into being under a complex and multidimensional circumstances.

Merchants' social capital, in other saying, social relations between civil servants and merchants might also play a role in this structure. Some farmers imply that merchants are able to mobilize their power to influence officials' decisions:

> I usually sell my goods here [gas station]. Last year, I took them to the [TMO] Office, and the guy took the goods, sifted, sorted, and shook them around. He lowered the price even further than it would've been here. But if you've got connections at the Office, they look out for you. If you have someone on the inside, they sort things out for you and get your truck in for collection. A trader brought his goods in at the same time as me. I took a look at his load—it was a mess, a mix of everything. Your goods are clean, but they give him a price, and not you. The guy's political—well, not exactly political, but powerful, you know, connected. One phone call and he gets his goods into the Office. But the fault lies with the guy working there. He's inclined to cut deals, moves things along for a carton of cigarettes. It's because the guy at the Office is open to this. Last year, I took my harvest there, but after seeing this situation, I didn't take it there this year. (Emrah, Interview 6)

"Political power" is not a misused word for the phenomena Emrah chooses to describe. When Emrah characterize the merchant as "powerful," he quickly explains that he does not mean the merchant is a "politician" but that he has strong relations to those who are "a call away". This is a relational position, or network refers to a social capital in Bourdieusian terms, through which merchants exercise a political/economic power to gain advantage in the agricultural field.

> Interviewer: Why don't you sell to the government?
>
> Ali: Well, now the state has opened the [TMO] Office. They're classifying seed wheat as feed wheat and feed wheat as feed as well. I took mine in, and they priced it at 1,200 lira per kilo. My cousin also brought in wheat, and his wheat isn't even good enough for chicken feed, but they gave him 1,200 lira as well. I went and said, "These two aren't the same," and the guy there said, "Take it or leave it." (Interview 4)

Referring to this relational power is much more than to say that merchants and public officials are in cahoots with. These relations could be easily explained with "misconduct" or "corruption" from a legal perspective; however, taking these conducts as singular and exceptional examples that are caused by lack of control would be misleading. Field study indicates that these sorts of relationships occur regularly and constitute informal channels and even structures. From a socio-economic stand point, this kind of relationships empowers the parties, grants them long term benefits, well-established ties and low transaction costs. Specifically, actors at the top of the power

hierarchy in the agricultural field tend to utilize their power by creating short-cuts and back-doors in the field by using their social capital.

Consequently, although the TGB makes indirect procurements from the region, neither the policies addressing crop quality nor the procurement policies do not lead to the intended results. It is simply because the policy structure neglects the external economic and social conditions, the social relations, social and cultural capital of the players, informal institutions, and the rules of the agricultural field upon which all of these factors play role in making them. The official policies affect the outcomes in a way that they do not benefit the actors that envisaged to. Also, the price intervention does benefit the merchants more than small farmers, because of the fact that, structured conditions and the informal economic institutions make TGB a less reliable and desirable option for the small farmers. The political field on the other hand, plays as a crucial source of power, making the significant players in the agricultural field equipped with an uneven tool for draining public funds for themselves.

### 3.5.2. Sugar Beet Policies and Sugar Factory Procurements

A similar merchant activity is being practiced in regard to the sugar beet production. Sugar factories use Quota A for the internal market where C – sugar refers to the excess production outside the quota A that cannot be processed for the internal markets. Farmers who produce without quota A or B, do not benefit from subsidies and do not get the government-set subsidized price.

Factories allot quota-A to the farmers in their hinterlands. However, quotas are not evenly distributed. According to the interviewees, some farmers hold thousands of tons of quotas to work with. However, instead of farming, they use their quota to purchase sugar beets from farmers who do not possess any quota, and sell it to the factory. Sugar beet producers make an in-depth description of this trade:

> Let’s say a guy has an A quota for beets. Around here, we don’t have transport fees. Now, let’s say the farmer is from Şefaatli or Sarıkaya. He doesn’t bring his goods here. Let’s say I have goods without a quota—I’ve harvested and laid them out. He has a quota. He sits at a table right at the factory entrance, just like where you’re sitting now, with his money laid out on the table. He negotiates with you. If the factory buys at 250 lira, he offers 200 lira. Around here, a lot of people grow beets without a quota. There’s no one monitoring it.

> He buys your goods, brings them over, and deposits them under his quota. He makes 100 lira per ton without even lifting a finger. If he has a 1,000-ton quota, that's 100,000 lira. He doesn't even transport the goods himself—you take them to the factory. All he does is sit there in front of the factory, negotiate the price, and sell his quota. (Emrah, Interview 6)

These traders do not only drive profit from the price gap between price for quota-A and C, but also from other payments such as support payments for transportation:

> The quota system works like this: You have a quota, and you need to meet it. If your beet yield is below the quota, they fine you. If you exceed the quota, they buy the extra portion at half price. In fact, if it's beyond the quota, they take it for a third or a quarter of the price. If you produce 10% less than what's stated in your quota, you get fined. Now, how does the quota trading work? There are central farmers. The central farmers don't get transport subsidies. Farmers outside the central area get 40 lira per ton for transport support. Someone 39 kilometers away gets no support, but someone 40 kilometers away gets the subsidy. That's why central farmers don't plant beets. For example, someone has a 1,000-ton quota but doesn't plant beets, so they go and buy 1,000 tons of beets. If their quota isn't in the central area, they get 40 lira in transport money and another 10-15 lira for pulp without lifting a finger. (Hüseyin, Interview 11)

How did some farmers manage to get such high quotas? Some farmers emphasize the political affiliations between big merchant farmers and political/bureaucratic agents. Kerem for instance, points his finger directly at the ruling party:

> Here's how it goes: AK Party members came in and secured quotas of 1,000 tons back in the day. They give you their quota, but they don't farm themselves. All the quotas are concentrated in the hands of four people. These guys grabbed them back then. They don't give quotas to the farmers who own land; they hand them over to these folks instead. They're siphoners… If this place were privatized, all of this would come to light. These types of people have ruined farming in Turkey. The guy even has four henchmen. He comes to the factory, sits there, and spreads the word. They're all party members. But the MHP folks were saying, "We won't let them get away with it" and such. Let's see what happens... Pankobirlik buys the pulp from the factory now. They haul it with trucks. And there's also the sugar loading tenders, for instance. AK Party members always give these tenders to their own people. (Kerem, Interview 14)

Murat, on the other hand puts emphasis on the close relations between powerful farmers and the factory bureaucracy:

> People with political background have quotas. In the 1950s, when irrigated agriculture was practiced, the floor for beets was around 50 tons. When the

> quota system was introduced, those who were well off, those who were on good terms with the factory manager, got the quota for themselves, and the small farmer was completely wiped out. Some of those who retired from that cultivation also retired from the quota system given by the beet factory. (Murat, Interview 18)

There are some clues showing that the quota trade has been a 'business model' from the very beginning of the implementation of the quota system. The statements of the minister of industry and commerce indicates that the quota trade was a risk from the first years of the policy (Anadolu Ajansı, 2000). In 2005 the opposition leader Deniz Baykal made a claim that there are people in quota trade who has nothing to do with the sugar beet production (Mynet, 2005; İnternet Haber, 2005). Mehmet Sanal, a columnist from the local newspaper Yozgat, expresses this as following "Instead of beet producers, it was the intermediaries who started to make high profits from the quota system. By obtaining the quota, they bought a ton from the intermediary producer for 35-40 YTL and sold it to the factory for 120 YTL, making a lot of money through effortless quota trading." (Sanal, 2005). These evidences show that the quota trade goes back to the beginning of the quota policy.

Just as it is in the cereals, a large social capital encompassing political ties, seem to ease the access to economic resources which are being redistributed through the policies. In other words, power relations are an integrated part of the agricultural field, where powerful players utilize to maximize their economic revenue. Agricultural and political social relations extending to the bureaucratic field is key to maximize one's agricultural economic capital.

The quota system as it is performed in its *informal structure*, should have impacted the agricultural field in two ways. In the short term, it is a means of transfer as we have already mentioned. And in the long term, it should have accelerated the concentration of sugar beet quotas within few hands, and steady elimination of small farmers from the production, at least as *official producers* even if they keep farming.

Can we verify this information provided by the farmers through production data? As far as the Türkşeker is concerned, yes. The annual reports submitted by the Türkşeker provides us with the quota, producer and production information on a per plant basis, between 2001 and 2020. The Figure 47 shows the number of villages in Yozgat where

farmers go under commitment to produce beet for the Yozgat Sugar Factory, while the Figure 48 shows the total number of farmers that have a written 'undertaking' to produce sugar beet in those villages.





Figure 47: Number of Villages with Sugar Beet Production, Yozgat, 2002-2020

Source: Prepared by the author by using the data obtained from the Turkish Sugar Refineries Corporation (2002 - 2020).





Figure 48: Number of Sugar Beet Producers, 2002-2020

Source: Prepared by the author by using the data obtained from the Turkish Sugar Refineries Corporation (2002 - 2020).

While there are 263 villages where farmers undertake sugar beet production for Türkşeker, this number has dropped to 116 in 2020. In other words, there is a steady decline in the number of villages where quota A sugar beet production has taken place.

Parallel to the Figure 47, we see a sharp decrease from 13,814 in 2002, to 2,784 in 2020 in the number of farmers who has an undertaking to produce quota A sugar beet for the Türkşeker. However, the total size allocated to and used for quota A production has not significantly changed according to the Figure 49.

Parallel to the Figure 47, we see a sharp decrease from 13,814 in 2002, to 2,784 in 2020 in the number of farmers who has an undertaking to produce quota A sugar beet for the Türkşeker. However, the total size allocated to and used for quota A production has not significantly changed according to the Figure 49.





Figure 49: Size of Quota-A Production Area, 2002-2020

Source: Prepared by the author by using the raw data obtained from the Turkish Sugar Refineries Corporation (2002 - 2020).

The Figure 49 clearly shows that the change in the area allocated for sugar beet production is independent of the steady decline in the number of *official* sugar beet farmers. The Figure 50 displays how the quota size per farmer changes over 19 years from 2002 to 2020:





Figure 50: Quota-A Per Farmer, 2002-2020

Source: Prepared by the author by using the raw data obtained from the Turkish Sugar Refineries Corporation (2002 - 2020).

Quota A per farmer has increased from 37.57 hectare in 2002 to 179.60 hectare in 2020. The Figure 50 indicates that sugar beet quotas are accumulated and concentrated in the hands of a small number of people over time. At the same time the number of farmers who undergo production contracts has fallen at extreme levels. At this point we should strongly emphasize that, the fall in the number of contracts does not necessarily mean that the number of active sugar beet producers will fall at the same rate. Although being excluded from subsidy payments is expected to discourage farmers from sugar beet production to some extent, the field study also shows that some farmers have become de facto producers on behalf of quota holders.

As in the case of TGB, we see that merchants and merchant-farmers utilize their social and economic capital to reap profits from the transfer payments. In other words, big farmers-merchants appropriate the subsidies which are legally for actual producers by using their close relations with politicians/bureaucrats.

While unregistered small farmers who cannot sell their beet to the factory find a chance to sell it through others; some other farmers with quotas are able to rent it to producers. On the other hand, players with enough economic and social capital are able to sell their production right to the farmers without quota, in exchange for the support

payments. In practice, it allows quota owners to seize the subsidies that is normally devoted to the producers.

The implementation of sugar beet policies seems to be ‘distorted’ in a way that it benefits the powerful players in the field. Behind the policies being poorly designed comes from the fact that the policies do not take the complexities and peculiarities of the local agricultural field. The gap between the complexity of the agricultural field and the one-dimensional regulations is filled by informal structures that are fed from asymmetrical power relations. These structures are produced and reproduced by the dispositions of farmers who tend to follow the best available option for themselves. At this point the current policy framework becomes articulated with the rules of the game in an authentic way.

### 3.5.3. Sugar Beet Pulp Trade

Sugar beet pulp is also subjected to trade. Like most of the sugar beet residues, pulps are valuable side products that is used as animal feed. Sugar beet producers are entitled to the sugar beet pulp that is extracted at the end of the production process. Sugar Factories gives producers a card which issues the date when they can get the beet residue in proportion to their sugar beet production. If a farmer needs cash, or does not have animals to feed with residue, then he or she sells the card to merchants. Sugar beet traders buy these cards at low prices and make profits by trading the sugar beet residues they receive from the factory.

> The situation with pulp cards is the same. Normally, the factory should sell the pulp directly; they should give the farmer the amount of pulp they need and pay for any excess. But what does the factory do? They give you the whole thing in pulp cards. Since you’re short on cash, you can’t wait, so you take the card and sell it on the black market for 40 lira, even though it's worth 50. Then the black market dealers manipulate the market, and when the demand for pulp rises, they sell the card they bought from you for 40 lira at 70 or 80. Those who need the pulp can’t get it from the factory because the factory has already given the cards away. Whoever holds the card, you have to buy it from them.
>
> The situation at the [Sugar Factory] is the same as it is at the Office. They turn a blind eye to everything, even for a pack of cigarettes. That’s how our foremen are—especially the beet region foremen. They’ve built a system based on corruption, and it just keeps going like that. (Emrah, Interview 6)

In some cases, traders do not receive the pulp, they sell it to the animal breeders and make profit from the card trading itself.

> It's like this, the factory gives the farmer a right. For example, you invested 100 tons of beet, they give you 10 tons of pulp, with a card. There are also those who sell that card. If a man buys a ton from you for 50 liras, he sells it to another buyer for 100 liras. (İbrahim, Interview 12)

Most of the cards represent small amounts of receivables, that is not enough for trucking. Traders collect enough card to fill a truck trailer and sell them to the driver. This is also a source of commercial income with minimum effort.

> The trade in pulp works like this: the state gives farmers pulp cards in proportion to the amount of beets they produce. There are people trading these cards at the sugar factory, buying them from farmers for, say, 40 lira and then selling them to truckers for 60 lira. I have a card, but I don't have any animals and don't need it, so I take it and sell it. Most people don't bother with the pulp because they don't have their own animals. (Umut, Interview 21)

Sugar Beet Factories appoint officials in charge of organizing the sugar beet production often called as *sergeants*. Süleyman (61) tells us that the sergeants also play an important role in card trade.

> Interviewer: How does the buying and selling of pulp cards work? Can you explain how that system operates?
>
> Süleyman: Actually, farmers do get a return in the form of pulp, but the group leader goes and says, "We don't want the pulp." They don't take the pulp and instead go sell the cards to traders. You're entitled to 50% of the pulp. You don't take it, and they give you a card worth five lira, and that's what you spend. [We both laugh] You spend it on tea and bread. It's like pocket money…
>
> Interviewer: How many people are in your group?
>
> Süleyman: The group I'm talking about is 10-12 people, beet farmers. Whatever pulp comes out, it's supposed to go to the group. The beet supervisors have set up a system with cards, each worth 5 tons. But they sell the cards for cheap. A guy gets a pulp card but doesn't say, "This is my pulp entitlement," and doesn't fight for his share. He just says, "Give me my pulp card," they give it to him, and he doesn't even know what's written on it. He goes and sells that card for 100 lira. Then he eats a meal and drinks some tea. Everything's been taken over by mafias. (Interview 26)

To summarize, there are many informal structural relationships and institutions constituted by merchants and farmers. These structures are governed by its own rules that are not written, and not imposed by any authorities. Any policy set integrates into

this sui generis socioeconomic structure in a way that brings about outcomes that are not predicted by the policy-makers. Written regulations are not implemented as they are, but they become a part of the complex environment of the agricultural field.

We have explored that the relationship between merchants and farmers are key to understand the longstanding informal market rules and business practices. It also explains why certain policies that seemingly benefit small and vulnerable farmers are not being implemented or applied. In the next section we will take a closer look at (i) how the merchants construct their social network and utilize this social capital for their own benefit and (ii) what is small farmers' take on this relationship.

### 3.6. Transformation of Cultural Capital

In this section of the dissertation, we will examine the characteristics and transformation of cultural capital in the agricultural field, as well as the qualitative and quantitative unequal distribution of this capital and how it leads to differentiation among social classes.

In chapter 1.2. we have touched upon the impact that globalization has made on the agricultural field. With the globalization ideas, images etc. flow into our home from all over the world, and constantly interact with our every day practices. This flow of information, images and ideas change and challenge our habitus (Webb, Schirato, & Danaher, 2002, p. 43) The cultural capital in the agricultural field we examined in Çiğdemli is no exception to this transformation. We see those technological advancements, increasing level of education, migration and immigration, urban experience, and increasing integration between villages and urban areas has resulted in a profound cultural transformation. As a result, we observe that there is a big difference between elderly small farmers on the one side and big and part-time urban-experienced farmers on the other in terms of their approach to the problems of agriculture.

To briefly recap the concept of capital that we previously examined in detail, according to Bourdieu, cultural capital manifests in three forms: institutionalized, objectified, and embodied (Bourdieu, 1986). Institutionalized cultural capital includes formal educational qualifications that certify cultural competence. As examples of

institutionalized capital in the agricultural field, we can cite training certificates issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and diplomas obtained from agricultural faculties. Objectified cultural capital is evident in material objects, valued for their purposeful use in farming, such as modern machinery, specifically tractors and opulent houses our case. Embodied cultural capital, involves the assimilated labor by the individual, forming the 'habitus'—a socialized and structured body that internalizes the structures of a particular field, influencing perception and action within that field (Bourdieu 1998a, p. 81).

In my interviews in Çiğdemli, it is evident that cultural capital, in its three forms, is unequally distributed both qualitatively and quantitatively among social classes. We addressed these differentiations in Section 3.1, where we examined the classes. In this section, we will explore how farmers from different social classes draw distinctions between themselves and others through the display of their cultural capital, often by means of negation, and how they assert their uniqueness. Among both large and part-time farmers, as well as small farmers, there is a cultural struggle over what values should represent ideal farmer and good agricultural practices. These differences, circulated through methods such as innuendo, complaints about other farmers, and gossip, illustrate the dynamics of inter-class struggle and the ongoing battle and transformation over what values should be considered valid and more valuable in the agricultural field, in the Bourdieusian sense.

The differentiation brought about by this cultural transformation is most evident between generations. The older generation, which is larger in number and predominantly composed of small farmers, relies on a value system that encompasses many characteristics such as their embodied agricultural experience, which heavily depends on older technologies and traditional techniques, and the language they use. In contrast, the younger generation shows a tendency towards new values and new forms of institutionalized and objectified cultural capital. Considering that the being elderly is a component of small farmers, this qualitative differentiation in cultural capital manifests itself primarily in the daily practices and habitus of different social classes. As we will see below, while small farmers and other social classes tend to adopt different agricultural practices and habitus, speaking to elderly small farmers

and others unfolds a difference between their understanding of the agricultural game, or in Bourdieu's words, a differentiation in "the feel for the game" (Bourdieu, 1998a).

### 3.6.1. Tractor Purchases: Symbols of Class Distinction

We previously discussed the economic and financial aspects of tractor purchases. Here, we will focus on the role of the tractor as "objectified cultural capital" in the symbolic struggle among different farmer classes and how it manifests class distinctions.

The desire of small farmers to own the newest, best tractors, even when not needed, and the competition said to exist among farmers in this regard, undoubtedly emerged as one of the most frequently cited issues in my field research. We see that this topic holds symbolic significance, as well as importance within the narrower realm of economic capital accumulation. Let us begin examining this issue with a dialogue that took place in front of the mosque in the Camiikebir neighborhood, during an interview with three elderly small farmers:

> Interviewer: It seems like everyone who has land here owns a tractor…
>
> İbrahim: Not everyone. Some don't have one.
>
> Enes: [Laughing] Even those without land have tractors. [Pointing to Serkan] Like him.
>
> Serkan: I do have a tractor. Haven't used it in years.
>
> Interviewer: [Laughing] Do you drive it around the village?
>
> Serkan: [Laughing] No, why would I drive a tractor around? I drive my car. My tractor just sits in front of the house. (Interview 12)

Serkan's response to Enes's humorous teasing demonstrates that showing off with tractors is a subject of symbolic contention among farmers. This contention has multiple aspects. Firstly, the purchase of high-capacity tractors or the renewal of existing ones by small farmers, despite not needing them in production, seems to open the door to endless bickering between those who engage in this practice and those who do not. As previously discussed, there is a clear economic rationale behind this practice, whether as a tool for credit renewal or as a means of protecting assets from inflation. However, from a Bourdieusian (1986) perspective, considering that these tractors are a form of objectified cultural capital and signal status, it can be said that

the issue encompasses meanings beyond the narrow economic rationality of a purchase transaction.

Let us continue with another dialogue that corroborates our approach. Serhat, born in 1962, is a retired small farmer who cultivates 60-65 decares of land, all of which he co-owns with his siblings. He has two daughters and one son, all of whom are adults and married. His son helps him with farming. He lives with his wife, son, and daughter-in-law. Between 2000 and 2010, he worked abroad intermittently. He primarily grows sugar beets, chickpeas, wheat, barley, and a small amount of lentils. The land where he grows sugar beets, about 15 decares, is leased. He produces with debt and has a 1-decare orchard where he grows fruit. The debt on his 2011 model tractor was recently paid off. During our interview, where he frequently emphasized his financial struggles, I asked him, as I often heard in the village, whether he sees everyone having a new tractor as proof that things are going well. He responded as follows:

> These claims are baseless, brother. My tractor is one of the smaller ones. Today, people are abandoning their 70, 80, and 90 horsepower tractors to buy 110 horsepower ones. I don't know what they're relying on to make such purchases. How will they pay for it? Of course, there are unnecessary tractor purchases. Unnecessary. They take out loans from the bank, but I don't know how they plan to repay them. You know the saying, “If my uncle has one, why shouldn't I?” In our village, we have little land. Four tractors would be more than enough for the village. These tractors would plant, harvest, and do everything needed. This village used to have 50 households; now there are only about 30-35 households left. And 20 of these households have tractors. These tractors were bought after 2000. Why? What would have happened if we bought a 50-horsepower tractor instead of a 100 horsepower one? It’s because they couldn’t manage their finances that they ended up in this situation. Why did I buy a small tractor? If I bought a large one today, how would I pay 17,000 to 20,000 lira a year? (Serhat, Interview 25)

Serhat, a small farmer, exhibits a critical attitude towards the practice of purchasing tractors based on the mentality of “If my uncle has one, why shouldn't I?” His stance reflects an objection to the value placed on “objectified cultural capital” generated by conspicuous consumption within intra-class competition. It is evident that the symbolic and cultural values emerging from a purchasing habitus, driven by the economic dynamics previously mentioned, are also disparaged and targeted with the weapon of rationality by those who do not participate in this habitus within the agricultural game.

Here, we observe that the argument frequently voiced by big farmers—that ordinary small farmers do not act rationally—is also utilized by small farmers against each other when necessary. This indicates that the perspective (or more accurately, the ideology) of farmers positioned at higher levels within the agricultural game, due to their cultural and economic capital, is also adopted by small farmers. This transition signifies a shift to a game where market rationality is accepted as the norm, showing that the value judgments regarding what is considered valuable and commendable in the agricultural game are evolving.

Let us examine the second aspect of the symbolic oppositions signaled by tractor purchases. The symbolic meaning carried by a new tractor, along with the contradictory position between the productivity it represents and the objective conditions of the farmer who owns it, is met with great disdain and criticism by wealthier, high-production capacity big farmers and part-time farmers, especially in response to this behavior by small farmers. Indeed, it is observed that even small farmers who do not renew their tractors join in the condemnation sessions against those who "live beyond their means." When voiced by big farmers, these criticisms take on the character of a general critique of small farmer-dominated agriculture, whereas for semi-urban, white-collar farmers, they function as a marker indicating the lack of education, experience, and cultural capital among small farmers. These discussions surrounding this issue can be considered as a symbolic battlefield within the agricultural field.

Umut (35) a young farmer, and straw bale trader, who also runs a combine harvester business, underlines the impact of bad personal choices and farmers buying tractor and equipment that they do not need:

> Interviewer: So, are there people around you who cannot pay their debts and are on the verge of bankruptcy?
>
> Umut: There are many.
>
> Interviewer: And what is the reason?
>
> Umut: Let's say it's for personal reasons. I don't know exactly why 3-5 of our friends went bankrupt, but I think it's because they didn't manage their finances properly. If you have an income of 10 lira but take on 50 lira of debt, what's going to happen? That's what happened to some people. A farmer's annual income might be 20 lira—let's say you use 15 lira for your own expenses,

> right? You do whatever you want with the rest. But then someone goes and takes on 50 lira of debt. For example, a guy has 200 decares of land, and a 25,000-lira tractor would be enough for his needs, but he goes and buys a 300,000-lira tractor. What do you need a 300,000-lira tractor for? And, of course, he buys it with a bank loan because no one has cash. Then, when he can't pay it off, the debt multiplies—what was 1 becomes 5. That's how 3-5 of our friends lost their tractors.
>
> There is also this, people use the opportunities provided by our state unconsciously. God bless our state, of course, it tried to help, but because people used it unconsciously, they made themselves miserable. People buy commercial equipment outside of their needs, outside of their scope of work, high, commercial equipment, and this time they have difficulty in paying because the work they have done does not save them. It is equipment that is bought unconsciously, without accounting. I am buying this, but it is something that is bought without thinking about what my work is and whether it will save me. (Interview 21)

Umut emphasizes the importance of living within one's means and acting according to economic rationality, as we will frequently observe later, in contrast to the ostentatious tractor purchases as a form of objectified cultural capital. The key point here is that the argument against the cultural capital signaled by ostentatious behavior itself serves as an indicator of the positional difference of the person advancing this argument, functioning as a form of cultural capital. This principle of rational behavior refers to a habitus based on an ideal homo-economicus understanding, embodying a set of character traits. According to this, the ideal farmer is one who is prudent and does not spend money on ostentatious displays.

We have previously discussed the cultural conflicts experienced by those returning to their hometowns after working abroad. Research has shown that returnees often complain about inefficiencies in local operations, a lack of diligence and punctuality, and pervasive bureaucratic corruption. Overall, they express dissatisfaction with how things are managed compared to their expectations (Gmelch, 1980, p. 143). It is possible to evaluate Yaşar's comments on Tractor, who returned to his homeland from abroad after his retirement, from this perspective. Yaşar, a retired and wealthy ex-migrant worker who farms for joy, also thinks that tractor purchases are irrational and a reason for high rates of indebtedness:

> Interviewer: Farmers complain about debt. They say that they have to sell their produce below its value because of their debts. Some say that farmers are doing

well, otherwise there would be tractors at every door. What is your view on this issue?

Yaşar: Here's the thing. Let’s say you have 50 decares of land, and you plant wheat. Then you go and buy a tractor for 300,000 lira. How are you going to pay for it? They sell it cheaply, but if you set the payment deadline for the sixth month, that’s what happens. Why don’t you push the due date to the tenth or eleventh month instead of the sixth? Set it for the eleventh month, negotiate, and say, “I’ll pay my debt in full in the eleventh month.” Make the most of your harvest. Why don’t I buy a tractor? I have the money, but I don’t buy one because it’s not useful for me. You buy the tractor for 300,000, but when you can’t pay off your debt, you sell it for 150,000, and even then, no one buys it because they say, “That tractor’s second-hand now.” When you buy it on installment, the price of the 150,000-lira tractor jumps to 300,000. Then when you try to sell it, it’s not even worth 150,000. As soon as you buy it, its value drops by 20-30%. Life is a calculation. If you can’t do the math, it will ruin you. (Interview 28)

In accusing indebted farmers of not knowing mathematics, Yaşar uses the life philosophy that he believes has saved him from such a predicament as a *distinguishing marker* between himself and others. Similar to Umut's case, the lengthy discourse on economic rationality actually points to a set of principles that govern economic practices and must be adhered to throughout life. This set of principles is, in essence, a form of embodied cultural capital. Furthermore, as noted above, it serves as a symbolic marker that distinguishes between those who possess this habitus and those who do not. Yaşar presents the work habitus he brought from abroad to Çiğdemli as an ideal agricultural habitus, emphasizing his class position in contrast to that of the *ordinary* farmer. This behavior, noted by Gmelch (1980) and others as a general dissatisfaction among returnees with their hometown, can be interpreted as a performance aimed at demonstrating the class position they occupy in the agricultural field they return to. When viewed as a strategy by which those who have been away for years attempt to introduce the values they brought back as the dominant culture in the agricultural sphere, thereby asserting their superiority to the local agents, this behavior's universality becomes more evident, as it can manifest in any context where similar class contrasts are observed.

This *distinction*, which we will see illustrated many times below, serves both as an indicator of the change in the nature of cultural capital and as a tool used by different social classes to mark their class differences against each other. In this inter and intra-class struggle in agricultural field, especially big farmers and part-time farmers tend

to emphasize that ordinary farmers are responsible for the agricultural problems in Çiğdemli, due to; (1) The lack of the technical skills and expertise, (2) making inaccurate financial decisions, and (3) being lazy, preferring not to work; while at the same time they themselves differentiate by adopting the ideal farmer habitus.

These attitudes are not peculiar to the big farmers; we have also seen similar arguments made by former mayors of Çiğdemli, part-time farmers, farmers retired from abroad, and ex-farmers who are currently engaged in wage jobs. These interconnected ideas form a worldview shared by those who are not traditional small farmers.

### 3.6.2. Mayors and Cultural Capital: Intersecting Perspectives

Before moving on to the other big farmers, it would be beneficial to hear these ideas in a more sophisticated form from local mayors who have been both farmers and local politicians and administrators in Çiğdemli. Both of the previous mayors of Çiğdemli, Rıza and Halil, have strong remarks about the role of farmers in the problems of agriculture. When I asked Rıza about the reason behind the high levels of household indebtedness in Çiğdemli, he responded with an example that is a heated debate topic in the town: unnecessary tractor purchases. Along with high input costs, Rıza points out small farmers purchasing tractors out of need and "citizens not wanting to work" as problems. According to him, although there are undeniable problems with the high inflation and input costs, the main issue with the ordinary citizens remains as bad debt management and being reluctant to work:

> I think this issue [indebtedness] stems from our own people. You already have a tractor with 2 or 3 plows, but you went and bought one with 6, even 7 plows. You ended up 400-500 thousand lira in debt. Then that year, your harvest didn't yield much. Or when you bought it, did you ask yourself, "Do I really need such a big tractor?" A man has 10 decares of land and a tractor sitting in his yard, or he has 50 decares and a tractor. What do you need a tractor for with just 10 decares? I think it's driven by greed, by the desire to get rich quickly.
>
> Let's say you bought the tractor. Now, there's the cost of the plow, harrow, thresher, and chisel, and before you know it, the expenses hit a million. Then they come and seize your assets, taking them away one by one. Back in the day, people farmed with horse-drawn carts, they'd cover 50-100 decares, harvest it, and get by just fine. Of course, it's true that now diesel, fertilizer, and pesticide prices are high. This puts them at a disadvantage as well. The farmer's input costs are extremely high. But there's also a lack of willingness to work. In the past, every household had at least 30 sheep, calves, horses, donkeys—everything. We used to raise cows here [pointing to the yard]. We'd

> raise our sacrificial animals at home. Now, people don't want to work. The second reason is the cost of inputs. (Rıza, Interview 16)

Rıza, although not possessing extensive farmland, is involved in wheat trading and has held the mayoral office in Çiğdemli four times, thereby, it is accurate to assert that he is establishing a significant position in the local political field and wields considerable influence within it. Moreover, during our extensive interview, he spoke not as a mere farmer, but as a witness to Çiğdemli's history and as a political figure who has actively engaged in and shaped the town's issues. Given his distinctive position, it is more appropriate to interpret his remarks as those of an actor wielding symbolic power derived from his political engagements within the agricultural field.

Rıza's perspective on *rational expenditure* and his evaluations can be construed as those of a modernizing bureaucrat who embodies institutionalized cultural capital through technocratic, and bureaucratic agricultural knowledge, and who has worked towards the hegemony of these values in the field. However, his use of expressions such as "the ambition to get rich immediately" when discussing small farmers, and the underlying implications in "citizens don't want to work," exemplify a typical perception held by wealthier farmers towards small farmers. This reflects a shared negative attitude among figures, who occupy the upper echelons of agricultural and political hierarchies, towards small farmers.

However, the judgment that small farmers are unwilling to work is not a mere baseless mental construct. It aligns with our previous observations, demonstrating that the strategy of small farmers to gradually remain involved in agriculture without channeling their existing resources into the field for various reasons is understood by all actors. Such judgments indicate an accurate reading of the current positioning of small farmers within agricultural relationships. However, the evaluation of this position often carries a negative value judgment, which depends on the current positioning of the speaker within the agricultural field.

Now, let us proceed with another former mayor, Halil. Before addressing the topic, let us first consider his biography as briefly narrated by himself:

> Halil: I started working in Sorgun Municipality in 1987-88. I worked in the municipality until 1999. Then I had a two-year adventure in Europe, I left the civil service and went to the Netherlands. I both worked and traveled.
>
> Interviewer: How long were you a civil servant?
>
> Halil: I have 32 years of civil service. I have done both research, work and travel. I worked in greenhouses there [in the Netherlands] in tomatoes, peppers, eggplants, cucumbers, etc. That's why my view of the world is different. (Interview 33)

In our interview with Halil, the first notable point was his self-positioning not primarily as a mayor or politician, but as a well-traveled, enlightened citizen, as locally termed. He grounded his views in the knowledge and experiences he acquired during his extensive time abroad, emphasizing an external, global perspective on local issues in Çiğdemli. This emphasis on viewing local problems from a global standpoint is prominently reflected in the following lengthy passage. In his analysis of Çiğdemli's agricultural issues, İsmail emphasized the indifference, and even resistance, towards professional farming practices:

> [Laughs] Look, we follow Europe well, but it is difficult to do business with people in Turkey at the implementation stage. Let me give you an example. When I was mayor, we started strawberry farming in Çiğdemli. We made the name of Çiğdemli famous with strawberry farming, but now no one is doing strawberry farming. Our citizens are a bit lazy. We do agriculture primitively. The only difference in farming in Çiğdemli in 20 years is the development of machinery. But for example, there is still no soil analysis and planting accordingly. 40 years ago, we were planting wheat, now we plant wheat. We do not plant alternative crops. I define Çiğdemli as the Çukurova of Anatolia. But I couldn't get Çiğdemli to plant alternative crops. I started pastoralism in Çiğdemli, Rıza [the previous mayor] complained against me. We could not convince the citizens to start alternative crops.
>
> In my opinion, our farmers are not planting consciously. Maybe they may not think like me, but I worked in the Netherlands for two years, I saw a lot. There were people from China and Japan who saw the production there and came to implement it in their country. Even if we wanted to take people to agricultural fairs for free, no one would go. With all due respect, District Agriculture was also lacking here. I also see mistakes here because we actually give a lot of support, but the citizens are fooled by this. They get money whether they plant or not. There is comfort. Serious and definite decisions must be taken on this issue. For example, the state will stipulate alternative crops and force the citizens to use them. Wheat will not be wheat every year. There are people who try to make a living just by planting crops. But we cannot get the desired level of yield from this wheat every year. However, in the process of soil analysis, the state should decide which product should be in that soil. At the moment, the state says plant whatever you want. (Halil, Interview 33)

Following Halil's explanation, the most striking point is undoubtedly the issues surrounding the implementation of Western/modern agricultural practices in Turkey. The formulation of the issue in this manner provides significant insights into the speaker's cultural background. Similar to what we heard from Rıza, the underlying understanding of this discussion is the introduction and dissemination of agricultural modernization and Western practices—in Bourdieu's terms, an agricultural habitus not commonly seen in Çiğdemli.

Unlike Rıza, however, Halil speaks not as a politician and public official from within the political arena but rather from the perspective of someone who has experienced life abroad and possesses cultural capital and a habitus that transcends Çiğdemli. Nevertheless, the views of both speakers reflect their shared class position, although we can also spot the intra-class political rivalry which is evident in Halil's statements, where he criticizes Rıza for opposing his projects and obstructing his efforts.

In his terms, there should be a shift from primitive farming to "conscious" farming, where soil analysis is conducted, and crops are selected based on the analysis results, embracing innovation and change. Halil's emphasis on the persistent and somewhat blind cultivation of wheat for years underscores the presence of a strong agricultural habitus in Çiğdemli. We have examined the reasons behind this habitus and the dynamics underlying the agricultural practices of small farmers to some extent.

The critical point here is that the habitus, as indicated by Halil, functions as a distinguishing factor among social classes for other actors at higher levels of the social hierarchy. Let us proceed with Halil's remarks on the perceived laziness of farmers and his views on traders:

> Support programs... For example, here we have fuel subsidies. In the Netherlands, the government gives farmers fuel directly, and if they use it in their private cars, there are heavy penalties. But here, people take the fuel subsidy and go on vacation with that money. Or they receive field support and use it for something else. I wanted to do many things in agriculture, including a feed factory, but we couldn't make an impact. In Çiğdemli, people plant whatever brings the most money just to keep the fields from lying fallow. They don't get good yields. There need to be decisive actions on this. I'm 55 years old. For 37 years, it's been the same system. Nothing has changed. The only difference in what we've been planting for 37 years is that there are more varieties of wheat. I believe something needs to be done about this. There's no

> flour factory or feed factory in Çiğdemli. We all work for the trader. People cry for 11 months. They give everything they have to the trader. Farmers take all their goods and give them to the traders. Our farmers are doing the hard labor for the trader. The government does provide support for tractors, grants, and such. People take that money, but... (Halil, Interview 33)

Similar to Rıza's perspective, Halil emphasizes the issue of farmers' perceived laziness while also addressing other mechanisms that contribute to underdevelopment. Notably, Halil, who comes from a bureaucratic background and is not engaged in grain trade like Rıza, underscores the notion that small farmers are subservient to traders. He points out the exploitation by the trader class and, reflecting his state-centric bureaucratic stance, laments the absence of an industrial class to counterbalance the traders.

A critical insight derived from a comparative analysis of Rıza and Halil's narratives is the presence of ideological positions shaped by their relational networks within the agricultural and political spheres. These positions are embodied in their roles as farmers, public officials, traders, or expatriates, which often intersect or conflict. Although both individuals share substantial social, cultural, and symbolic capital, reflecting their elevated positions within the social hierarchy, the nuances in their respective roles reveal subtle differences in their viewpoints and ideological stances.

### 3.6.3. Laziness, and Conscious Farming as Markers of Class Distinction

You might notice that 'laziness' ('*tembellik*' or '*hayınlık*' in the local dialect) is an expression that used by many interviewees. Referring to Burton (2004) we have pointed out the importance of productivism as a social symbol defining the 'good farmer'. Burton suggests that there is a paradigm change in agriculture is from 'productivism' towards 'post-productivism' where alternative roles and a new understanding of a multi-functional landscape are eroding the traditional role of "intensive agricultural producers" (Burton, 2004, p. 211).

In Çiğdemli, as we have previously noted, the image of a good and hardworking farmer functions as a form of symbolic capital that is part of the farmers' asset inventory. This can be observed in the responses we receive when asking farmers why they continue farming under adverse conditions. For instance, Now, let's look at how Altan, who

works as a civil servant in the municipality and continues to cultivate his 77 decares of land, explains why he continues to farm:

> Interviewer: If the situation is so bad, why do you continue farming?
>
> Altan: I keep going... If people say, “Look, he abandoned his father's property and sold it,” that would be too hard to bear. (Interview 3)

Altan's statement reflects a moral obligation commonly found in Central Anatolia. Leaving one's ancestral land untilled or abandoning it is seen as a great disrespect to one's forefathers. Neglecting ancestral land and not working it is traditionally condemned by the community. As Serhat expressed:

> Let's say I have 50 decares of land. If I leave it empty, what would I do? If I don't plant it, the community will say, ‘Look at this, why don't you plant it?’ (Serhat, Interview 25)

Although not precisely in the context described by Burton (2004), the transformation of land into a mere commodity, disconnected from its traditional ties, occurs in Çiğdemli as well. This transformation is driven by the dissolution of traditional social structures and the deepening of market relations. As we have seen in the survival strategies of small farmers, there is a tendency to operate with minimal resources in agriculture, a habitus that develops in parallel with the diversion of agricultural resources to non-agricultural fields. This tendency is particularly criticized by those engaged in more competitive farming.

In this context, the traditional image of the hardworking peasant is used in contrast with today's farmers, especially elderly small farmers, who are accused of laziness (“*hayınlık*”). In the previous section, we discussed how this opposition is employed by mayors, particularly Rıza. This rhetoric is frequently used by big farmers, who attribute the decline in agriculture to the laziness (“*hayınlık*”) of others.

Examples of perceived laziness vary. For instance, as Adem noted, a common act of laziness is frequently seen in renting out land instead of cultivating it:

> Interviewer: Are those who stop sowing [the field] increasing?
>
> Adem: In Çiğdemli, the man is lazy, he gives the land for rent and then takes it back ready plowed. Our people don't want to work.

Murat, a part-time farmer who works at the municipality as a civil servant puts stress on social aids behind the laziness:

> Interviewer: Do you have hope for the future?
>
> Murat: Let's say it's fifty-fifty. The government needs to keep things more controlled, and people need to work harder. This isn't something that can be done just by the government alone. Actually, this laziness comes partly from that aid fund. You know the Turkish aid fund... People started relying on it. The fund gives food, coal, and even money for sacrificial animals. Because of this, people stop working. Farmers can't find workers anymore. Without Afghans and others like them, what would we do? The government is making people too dependent, encouraging laziness. (Interview 18)

Umut (35) say that farmers overproduce the same crops because it is easier. He also complains that farmers do not put enough effort into agriculture:

> There is a lot of unconscious farming in our community. I'm a high school graduate, so I know a bit about this, and when I think about it, I see that there is unconscious farming. Our farmers all plant the same crops. When there's an oversupply, the value will drop—that's just the law of nature. But people plant these crops because it seems easy. Nowadays, people are gravitating toward work that can be done with simple technology. They avoid putting in the effort. (Umut, Interview 21)

As evidenced by Umut's words, the habitus of elderly small farmers to plant the same crop is recognized from various angles and dimensions by other players, like Umut, who occupy different class positions. Similar to the observations made by former mayors, we see here that Umut accurately understands and/or perceives the very habitus elderly small farmer have. In Bourdieu's terms, Umut's "practical sense" or "sense of the game" (Bourdieu, 1991) allow him to grasp small farmers' game plan. Small farmers clearly choose the easier path, gravitating towards effortless cultivation where technological means can be mobilized. However, the way Umut identifies and portrays this tendency of small farmers is influenced by his class position. It is evident that Umut, who accurately identifies this habitus as a survival strategy within the general conditions and trajectory of the game, views this tendency as the fundamental cause of the overall decline in agriculture, labeling it as laziness and indolence. Laziness functions as a symbolic marker employed and circulated by new social classes against small peasants.

Ayşe, who has an animal farm which contains the biggest number of flocks in Çiğdemli, has a similar approach to the matter. She has a compelling story, a part of which was covered previously in regards to her husband Bünyamin, in section 2.6.1. She was born into an Alevi family but converted to Christianity. According to her, after her conversion, the town's people subjected her family to various forms of harassment, eventually driving them out of the town. Now, as one of the few Christian families in Sorgun, she lives a secluded life on a farm she established in a mountainous area outside the town. Despite all this, Ayşe has amassed significant wealth, owning a large herd, a modern barn, and numerous properties. Below, see how she makes her argument, starting from farmers' lack of technique and motivation for stock farming, to the laziness and to tractors and cars purchases:

> Ayşe: They gave us 25 sheep, and we were left with 13, so we carried on with those 13. Do you know the secret to doing this work? You have to know how to do it—when to feed them, when to give them food. The second thing is love. Actually, the first thing is love. (...) Sheep farming is a great business. Now, I have 100 breeding ewes and 90 lambs. If I sold them, they'd bring in 80,000 lira. I have 40-50 decares of land that I inherited from my father. We plant barley and wheat. But I made the most of what I inherited from my father and added to it. The people who started sheep farming with us are now unemployed; they have no work. Our guy can't take good care of the animals—he takes them out at 6 in the morning, and again at 10.
>
> People should not blame the collapse of livestock farming on the state, people are lazy. People go and get help from the fund. They get help but they don't want to work.
>
> (...)
>
> But let me tell you something, you know how some people say they're unemployed? This year, I spent 450 lira and bought a 100-egg incubator. If I started in January and the hens laid eggs six times a month, imagine getting a total of 600 chicks. If you sell each chick for 30-40 lira, let's say at 30 lira each, that's 18,000 lira. If you buy feed in large sacks, it's cheaper. Plus, once they grow, they can graze on the land. You'll spend about 3,000 lira on feed, leaving you with 15,000. At the very least, you can buy a year's worth of food for your household. Three sacks of flour cost 330 lira, two bags of sugar—100 kilos—500 lira, and two tins of oil will cost 200-300 lira. Buy 100 lira worth of tomato paste for the year, 10 kilos of cooking oil, 500 lira worth of bulgur, 200 lira worth of soup ingredients, and 1,000 lira worth of tea. There you go—spend that 15,000 on all your groceries, and you'll have plenty. And you'd be doing it all while sitting at home.
>
> In the village, everyone has land, and they own tractors worth at least 200,000 lira; even the cheapest tractor is around 80,000. We have two tractors in total, and if you took them to the dealership now, they'd be worth 40,000. Everyone

has a car at home. Each household has at least two incomes. Look at those vineyards over there [pointing out the window]. They're all ruined because of their laziness.

Interviewer: They say there's no water...

Ayşe: Did it used to grow with water before? They were too lazy to open their eyes and look. No one bothered to pay attention. But come grape season, everyone rushed to grab their baskets. By neglecting it, everything fell apart. The people in our village are so lazy, no one wants to do any work.

(...)

I don't believe those who say they are unemployed and desperate. Laziness... (Interview 27)

In Ayşe's narrative, we observe the hallmarks of an entrepreneurial farmer habitus, where entrepreneurialism is intertwined with frugality and diligence, forming a certain work ethic. The absence of this habitus renders the challenges faced by small farmers meaningless, turning them into mere excuses for "laziness". Ayşe's portrayal of small farmers reveals them as a social class deprived of this entrepreneurial spirit, which can be regarded, in Bourdieu's terms, as a form of *embodied cultural capital* manifest in her own life story. The agricultural problems in Çiğdemli are thus symbolized by the class disposition of the majority, characterized by "laziness".

It almost seems like Ayşe's marginalization from the social life of Çiğdemli allows her to assert the agricultural superiority of her social class through a discourse that Bourdieu would characterize as *symbolic violence* crystalized in the word "laziness". This rhetorical strategy puts stress on the perceived deficiency of entrepreneurial spirit among small farmers and frames it as a fundamental cause of their economic struggles.

Those who possess this relatively new habitus, characterized by entrepreneurship, economic rationality, freedom from the traditional burdens of the past, and making agricultural decisions through thoughtful consideration rather than repetition, are often referred to as 'conscious farmers.' Conscious farming often refers to farming practices carried out with sufficient technical knowledge, combined with an awareness of the soil and the market. It largely emphasizes the technical aspect of agricultural cultural capital on one hand, and on the other, it signals an awareness focused on the market, involving producing the right product at the right time. In this sense, the opposite of a conscious farmer is one who operates based on traditional, memorized practices, rather than market awareness—someone resistant to innovation, following others instead of

thinking critically, and continuing production with outdated methods. This type of farming is often referred to as ‘uninformed’ or more commonly ‘unconscious’ farming. The term can take on different nuances depending on the user's class and social position. This term can be seen in example expressions used in the accounts of Rıza and Umut, which we mentioned earlier in sections 3.1.5.3. and 3.6.1., respectively. In this context, as a final example, we will examine Emrah's perspectives. Emrah, an ex-banker who farms in a very large scale, tells that unprofessional, traditional ways of farming is the root of the agricultural problems.

> First of all, this work needs to be professionalized. It is done unconsciously; pesticides are always thrown unconsciously. No one has a soil analysis. For example, I did it last year, I liked it, I got results. Most of them don't do it at all, they say “our grandfathers did it like this” and continue. I am saying that this work should be done by university graduates who have finished school. (Emrah, Interview 6)

The argument is followed by the idea that farming should be done by corporations in large scales:

> I think this business needs to be professionalized. Personally, I don’t want my kids to do this work. It should be done by big companies and educated people. The land needs to be consolidated. Let the companies handle it, and everyone can earn based on their shares. Right now, we have 2-decare, even 1-decare plots of land. They’ve been divided. If you look at the deed, it says 20 decares, but in reality, it’s down to 1-2 decares. There are disagreements between siblings, conflicts over land. Brothers have become enemies because of it. This work should be done by people who know what they’re doing. In its current state, there’s no profit here. What’s the point of chasing after it, struggling with it? It’s always a hassle, always debt. You’re just paying off debt. But if people did this work with knowledge, without debt, and worked in advance, maybe something would be left at the end. (Emrah, Interview 6)

In the case of Emrah, there is another point to stress out. Emrah spent most of his life pursuing a banking career in the city, and after his resignment he decided to start a farming business without no previous experience. In his case, his putting stress on the new ideas, contemporary concepts and a spirit of entrepreneurship reminds us of the distinction made by Monllor (2012) between the newcomers who have not farmed before, and continuers, who have taken over the family farm. As a newcomer, his interview draws a different picture than the others, in terms of the terminology and

point of view. This is also a good indicator of how different cultural capacities can be utilized in the agricultural field.

Emrah's identity as a banker, combined with the finance and market-oriented cultural capital he has acquired in the financial field and transferred to the agricultural field, presents a solution package centered around the complete removal of small-scale farming in favor of transferring control to large capital enterprises. Emrah's views place him at the extreme end of the spectrum in the cultural capital battles.

### 3.6.4. Part-Time Farmers and Two Sides of Cultural Capital

In our evaluation of the agricultural cultural capital of part-time farmers, we find that their views on the problems of agriculture provide significant insights. During interviews focused on questions such as 'Who is considered a good farmer?' and 'What are the current issues in agriculture?' we observe that part-time farmers also reflect a symbolic struggle over the requirements of being a good farmer and good farming practices—essentially, a cultural war in agriculture.

In terms of cultural capital, part-time farmers occupy a distinct position compared to other social classes. This group includes many individuals with urban or expatriate work experience, which influences their tendency to distance themselves from traditional agricultural practices with emphasis on institutionalized forms of modern agricultural practices. During the interviews, it was evident that these farmers often adopt an outsider's perspective on agricultural matters. They emphasize the importance of scientific approaches, education, innovation, and economies of scale. When discussing agricultural problems, they frequently attribute issues to ignorance, poor debt management, and the outdated mindset they associate with traditional/small farmers. In this context, their views on agricultural production methods and problems are more closely aligned with those of large-scale farmers. As an example, Furkan (57), a retired civil servant who is currently farming, talks about the problems of agriculture:

> I believe farming is being done without proper knowledge. Things are being done, but it's all hearsay. For example, they don't do soil testing. A guy looks at it and says, "What's soil testing for?" Around here, people follow what others are doing. They watch what others plant, how they plant, and what they

> put in the soil. I see the problem with the farmers. We have a saying, "Plant early, plant late, plant in the right moisture." Timing is very important. For instance, this year we planted chickpeas. I planted on the 10th of March, but those who planted on the 20th of April got better yields. Those who planted between the 20th and 30th of April had better results. These are the problems—fields not being properly worked, fallow land not being handled correctly, and farming without the right knowledge. And then there's the issue of not using the support correctly. If you take the support and spend it elsewhere, it won't work. We need to be honest about this. (Furkan, Interview 9)

The *distinction* (in Bourdieusian sense) that Furkan seeks to establish between himself and the average farmer signifies a form of class differentiation realized through embodied cultural capital. In particular, we observe an inverse reaction among semi-urban, professional, part-time farmers such as Furkan, compared to the resistance small-scale farmers exhibit towards institutional and theoretical agricultural knowledge, often targeting agricultural professionals. These part-time farmers emphasize the general indifference of small-scale farmers towards the most modern technical agricultural knowledge produced by universities and government technocrats. In doing so, they manifest their own awareness and self-perception of what it means to be a "good farmer."

Murat, who works both in the public sector and in agriculture draws a similar picture:

> In the past, this area was all about irrigated farming, but now it's dry farming. It used to produce great yields of beans, vegetables, and beets. Unfortunately, due to global warming, the area has shifted to a single system: barley and wheat. Sure, people also plant chickpeas and lentils, but they don't produce much either, in terms of yield, it's practically zero. The cause is poor farming practices, unregulated pesticide use, fertilizing without proper soil testing, and the use of chemical fertilizers. Now, soil testing is essential, and land reform is necessary. The small size of plots also leads to losses. (Murat, Interview 18)

In this brief, yet intense commentary on agricultural issues, Murat addresses a range of current topics such as global warming, fertilizer use without soil analysis, conscious farming, and land reform. His use of terminology typical of an agricultural expert, especially when considering his awareness of being interviewed by a researcher, should be understood as an indication of his position in the agricultural field, what he represents, and what he opposes. Again, just as Furkan, Murat draws a line here, between good farmers, who embrace the new set of values and knowledges that is key

to save agriculture, and elderly farmers, who cling tightly to outdated and ineffective agricultural practices.

The positioning observed in Murat and Furkan cannot be considered independently of what elderly small farmers say about the newly arrived professional farmers in agriculture. As we have seen before, small-scale farmers emphasize the value of their cultural capital, which stems from the embodiment of years of practical experience in farming. They manifest this value by contrasting it with the lack of everyday agricultural knowledge in agricultural engineers and the ignorance of urban dwellers who enter farming as a temporary opportunity.

As we have seen, the thought structure is more or less built around the following themes: Professionalism, farmer awareness, good financial choices, and not being lazy. We can draw a number of conclusions from this this disposition:

1. We see that a new set of market-oriented values and approaches has been introduced to the agricultural field by certain segments of people. They contribute to the transformation of the meaning and content of the *ideal farmer*, and the proper way of conducting farming practices. It promotes a specific market rationale and technical/scientific knowledge of farming that requires information flow through institutional and formal channels instead of traditional ways. It is clear evidence that content of the cultural capital required to be successful in agricultural field has changed.
2. However, this transition has not evenly distributed in the local population. We have observed that this discourse has embraced by big farmers, return migrants, mukhtar who work as a wage labor, those who have an urban experience, runs business, or served as mayors. This thought process is never shown up among elderly small farmers. It is a reminder of the importance of the class dispositions. As we mentioned before, even if the class differences are not great, farmers who are in a better position in the agricultural field due to their agricultural capital, tend to justify their positions in agricultural field relative to the small farmers by pursuing symbols of a higher culture, sharing a distinct

> cultural capital that often associated with a sophi. Although they also mention the high costs of living, rising input costs and bad government decisions as the reason behind the general problems of the agriculture, they tend to adopt a discourse that puts forward the personal choices and responsibilities.

The emphasis they put on professionalism implies that agriculture should be done in large scales, based on modern principles and a capitalist mind-set. What they implicitly or explicitly target here, is the old way of farming: a farming consisting of smallholdings, combined with old-fashioned agricultural practices and a never-ending debt-cycle. This is both a call for and a prediction of extinction of small farmers.

# CHAPTER 4

## FUTURE OF ÇİĞDEMLİ: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the final chapter of this dissertation, I will discuss the conclusions derived from our findings. First, drawing from the application demonstrated in the dissertation, I will draw attention to the advantages that Bourdieu's theoretical framework offers for analyzing local agricultural relations. Secondly, I will explore what Çiğdemli teaches us about the dynamics of local agricultural relations and farmer strategies, particularly those of small farmers, and consider to what extent these insights can be generalized. Finally, based on the case of Çiğdemli, I will examine the future of agricultural relations and small farmers in a semi-arid, agriculturally disadvantaged Anatolian town. Drawing from the findings of the thesis, I will attempt to make predictions based on the possibilities and insights offered by the research.

The theoretical framework offered by Bourdieu provides significant tools for understanding the complex and multifaceted nature of contemporary agricultural power relations in several ways. Firstly, Bourdieu's approach enables us to view agriculture in a relational context, as a *field*, allowing for a holistic understanding of agricultural relations within their multifaceted yet holistic structure. This perspective is particularly valuable given the increasingly blurred and intertwined nature of rural and urban areas. As agriculture becomes fully market-oriented and highly financialized, the rural landscape is also urbanizing, integrating more non-agricultural components. Bourdieu’s framework allows us to identify the unique rules, values, and internal dynamics of agricultural relations while demonstrating how the *agricultural field* connects with other fields, underlining the transitions and intersections that occur.

Another advantage that Bourdieu's approach offers in examining contemporary agricultural relations is its ability to integrate knowledge and perspectives from various disciplines, such as rural sociology, anthropology, and development economics. This

integration allows for a comprehensive presentation of the social, political, and economic dynamics of rural communities as interconnected parts of a whole. Consequently, it enables the examination of class struggles, power relations, and economic distribution relationships within the agricultural field as a domain dominated by the economy of values - in the broadest sense of the term, emphasizing their interconnections. This perspective has allowed us to bring the deep insights of the rich literature on village and peasantry back into the analysis of contemporary agricultural relations.

Furthermore, by employing Bourdieu's concept of *capital* and emphasizing the relative value of *social* and *cultural capital* specific to the agricultural field, we put emphasis on the challenges faced when agricultural capital is transferred outside the agricultural field. This approach allowed us to illustrate the difficulties and capital losses that agricultural actors encounter when trying to convert their agricultural capital into other forms of capital that can be utilized beyond the agricultural field. This partially accounts for the tendency of elderly small farmers to remain within the agricultural game in the short term, despite their disadvantaged position. We demonstrated that certain types of agricultural capital, which hold value and significance solely within the agricultural context and are not conducive to generating economic resources elsewhere, help keep small farmers afloat in the agricultural game while also confining them to agriculture. Additionally, our examination of cultural and social capital within the agricultural field provided insight into the challenges faced by actors from non-agricultural field who seek to transfer resources into agriculture and participate in the agricultural game.

Bourdieu's concept of habitus has equipped us to interpret class differentiation within the agricultural field as specific dispositions shared among class members. While examining how agricultural practices and survival strategies reveal class differences, the concept of *habitus* provides a model that transcends the structure-agency dichotomy. We identified patterns, unwritten rules, and informal structures that farmers inherit and benefit from, functioning as prescriptive manuals drawn from collective or class-based experiences. Moreover, we observed a constant transformation in these habitus, driven by farmers' responses to concrete challenges they face. Thus, when we recognize that the interaction between structure and agency

is mediated and stratified through habitus, identifying and analyzing the habitus of farmer classes becomes an effective tool for understanding changes in agricultural relations, not only in Çiğdemli but also in broader contexts.

However, while applying Bourdieu's concepts to agricultural relations, the limitations of this dissertation impeded a more detailed conceptual analysis. I believe that a more nuanced examination of these concepts, grounded in in-depth observation and analysis of local agricultural relations, would significantly enhance this field in future research.

Our fieldwork in Çiğdemli, conducted within this theoretical framework, has allowed us to draw a series of conclusions applicable at various levels and abstractions, particularly concerning Çiğdemli, rural villages and towns in Central Anatolia dominated by elderly small farmers, and agriculture as a whole.

At the most general level, we observed that the factors influencing agricultural relations cannot be reduced to economic aspects alone. The opportunities and limitations of farming within the agricultural field arise from the combined effects of various factors operating at different scales and timeframes. We demonstrated that it is impossible to draw an adequate social analysis of the agricultural field without considering the interplay of long-term environmental factors such as climate, geography, and soil structure; medium- and long-term structural changes in production methods, production relations, and demographics; relatively short-term changes in political, social, and economic organizations; and shifts stemming from the internal dynamics of the studied settlement.

More importantly, while considering these broader external trends in the analysis of the agricultural game, the dissertation successfully avoids a top-down, deterministic approach. Instead, it demonstrates the behavioral tendencies of farmers, farming families, and social classes by transcending the subjective-objective dichotomy, particularly by illustrating how agricultural habitus operates.

I believe that making relatively broad generalizations is possible, depending on the level of abstraction, scale, and timeframe. For instance, given Çiğdemli's semi-arid climate, its elevation within Central Anatolia, its fragmented land structure, and its status as an out-migration area amid internal and external migration dynamics, as well

as its aging demographic and prevailing regulations, it can be said that a similar *agricultural game* is being played in many other Central Anatolian towns with comparable environmental, climatic, demographic, economic, and social characteristics. As we shift from the regional to national levels, the boundaries of the agricultural field will expand, increasing the diversity and number of players, while the rules of the game become more generalized due to a decreasing number of common factors and trajectories. In an agricultural field with broader spatial and temporal boundaries, social class dynamics can be examined at a proportional level of abstraction. Therefore, I believe that exploring the agricultural game at different scales is crucial for understanding the underlying dynamics of agricultural relations, and this gap can and will be addressed by future researchers interested in this topic.

Another conclusion we drew about Çiğdemli is the dynamic and variable nature of its class structure. Our study aimed to illustrate social classes not as timeless abstract entities, but as historical and relational positions that transform alongside changing social structures influenced by various factors. We emphasized the different aspects of the struggle between these classes, shaped by their respective capital structures and distributions. By considering secondary attributes, such as age in identifying small farmers, we were able to provide a more accurate depiction of the town's class structure. We demonstrated that the strategies of elderly farmers and their farming habitus are profoundly influenced by their age and their position within the farmer family cycle. Our findings regarding social classes in Çiğdemli suggest that conducting class analysis through the examination of capital structure, agricultural habitus, and secondary attributes is an effective method not only in Çiğdemli, but also in a broader context.

In the case of Çiğdemli, the dissertation illustrates that a specific farmer class is concluding its lifecycle in the agricultural field through an intergenerational capital transfer process. The final representatives of these families—elderly small farmers—utilize their resources to sustain themselves in agriculture while directing the remainder of their capital to support family members who have migrated to pursue new opportunities. A common class strategy involves maintaining minimal agricultural resources and reallocating capital in various forms to help younger generations acquire new skills and establish lives outside of agriculture. Therefore, the

rationale behind the elderly small farmers' approach to agriculture cannot be fully understood without considering the broader family strategy.

In this context, I believe that the social class we define as *elderly* small farmers—not merely smallholders—constitutes a widespread social class in Turkey. A critical characteristic of this class is that age significantly influences the formation of its class habitus. Evaluating this class within its specific historical and social conditions, independent of small farming, is essential for a robust analysis of the social and class dynamics in rural Anatolia today. Further research on this subject is necessary to deepen our understanding.

Çiğdemli also demonstrates that elderly small farmers are not the sole narrative; new actors are continually emerging. These include immigrant shepherds, retired bankers launching businesses, harvesting enterprises, middle-aged workers, and blue-collar individuals who are entering farming. Despite the rapid changes in the rules of the game, those who possess a keen *sense of the game* are successfully adapting and developing new habitus. Thus, despite the prevailing trends of aging and depopulation in the town, the dynamic relationships within the agricultural field and the influx of potential new residents present the possibility of a vibrant future for Çiğdemli.

The dissertation also emphasizes the importance of long-term survival strategies adopted by small farmer families in the transformation of the agricultural field. This study, like many others, confirms that small farmer families have served as the backbone of agriculture, and their exit from agriculture is behind the rural depopulation. While the aforementioned ‘entry strategies’ are particularly evident among middle-class/part-time individuals, it is premature to claim that such participation in agriculture will be sustained. Beyond the new entrants seeking additional income or short-term opportunities, reversing the depopulation of rural areas like Çiğdemli necessitates long-term family decisions rooted in optimistic expectations for the future of agriculture.

We observed how the laws and regulations governing the agricultural field, along with the general rules of the game and the functioning of formal bureaucratic structures, are uniquely linked to informal local agricultural practices. In our observations in

Çiğdemli, we identified numerous instances where different social classes engage in significant struggles over the redistribution of public resources. These struggles often manifest as class-based habitus, with groups competing for resource allocation. In this context, we noted the exploitation of neutral gaps, such as legal loopholes, varying interpretations, and lack of oversight, as well as the use of social capital and political influence to access resources. This dynamic has led to corruption, tacit collusion, and the establishment of oligopolistic structures.

In this context, elderly small farmers, who are the least organized and possess the weakest social and political capital, represent the most exploited group, receiving the smallest share of redistributed resources. In contrast, big farmers and traders, by leveraging all forms of extra-economic capital and their positions within the political field, gain access to the most resources. While official institutions, laws, and regulations theoretically uphold the ideals of equal citizenship and impartiality, they often serve as a political and public domain that mediates unequal class power relations through informal and unofficial redistribution mechanisms. This finding of the dissertation confirms Bourdieu's approach that reads the state as a field of power struggle. The ideological illusion of equality and impartiality is frequently propagated as discourse within class struggles, yet it is particularly rejected by the lower classes.

Similarly, class antagonisms among merchants, big farmers, and small farmers—who maintain close relationships in the daily life of the countryside—are expressed through gossip, jokes, and symbolic violence. Beneath the surface of the countryside, which may appear from an urban perspective as a stagnant community of similar individuals, the realities of exploitation and class struggle emerge in both symbolic and discursive forms, alongside exploitative economic dependencies.

At this point, based on the data gathered in the dissertation, we can explore potential possibilities and projections for the future of Çiğdemli. Firstly, the eventual withdrawal of the elderly small farmer class from the agricultural landscape does not imply that agriculture or small-scale farming will come to an end. Observations in the field indicate that this dynamic agricultural game persists, with constant changes and circulation among players. This phenomenon is evident not only at the level of

individual farmers or farming families but also, and perhaps more crucially, within the broader context of farmer classes.

With its unique rules, capital structure, economic opportunities, and operations, the agricultural game presents avenues for advancement to newcomers. While it is currently more advantageous for struggling farming families to transfer resources to different urban fields as a strategy for intergenerational class mobility, there is potential for this trend to reverse. The opportunities available in the agricultural field for outsiders are growing.

To date, the challenges of transferring cultural and social capital into the agricultural field have complicated entry into the field, leading to significant losses. However, the transformations discussed in this dissertation suggest that the prevailing cultural capital in agriculture is shifting towards more institutional forms, while traditional cultural influences are disappearing due to increased urban migration. In other words, new generations of young farmers are beginning to adopt a shared language. I believe that the intergenerational transition following the withdrawal of elderly small farmers could facilitate and accelerate returns to rural areas.

The departure of elderly small farmers may create vacancies that can be filled by emerging social classes. In places like Çiğdemli, where productivity remains low due to structural conditions, these same factors that prevent large players from expanding could also serve as barriers to their entry into the agricultural field. However, such conditions may also foster an environment conducive to the emergence of young and small farmers. It is reasonable to anticipate that these young farmers, willing to invest resources into the agricultural field, could replace the elderly small farmers who rely on minimalist strategies by transferring their assets to the urbanized new generation.

Nevertheless, expecting this transition to occur without conflict or friction would be unrealistic. The dissertation demonstrates how social classes engage in struggles against one another, even in a town that may appear uniformly impoverished from a distance. The ongoing trend of land commodification and the erosion of traditional ties suggest that big farmers and capital owners will persist in their efforts to accumulate assets. The dominance of commercial capital in the town will continue to present

significant financial challenges for small farmers. The role of government and local public authorities in regulating distribution policies will undoubtedly become clearer amidst these social struggles. Even if an organized social movement does not emerge during this process, we will continue to witness the survival strategies and their derivatives, which have been frequently emphasized throughout the dissertation.

However, developments such as the increasing refugee flows, environmental factors, and security concerns, along with the acceleration of migration from cities to rural areas due to push factors, emerge as potential factors that could fundamentally change the current situation, including the rules of the game and the social landscape in Çiğdemli. Conversely, the continuing increase in aridity that we observe in Çiğdemli points to a possibility that could negatively impact the future of the area.

Finally, the younger population in Çiğdemli demonstrates both the desire and the sophisticated linguistic tools to analyze and articulate the political-economic relationships underlying agricultural dynamics. The keen ‘sense of the game’ among the emerging generation of farmers may also be a potential *game changer* leading to efforts to uncover hidden exploitation and domination within economic relationships, engage in active politics, and participate in various social organizations. Whether this rural/political habitus will materialize remains to be seen.

## REFERENCES


Abrar-ul-Hassan, S. (2021, April-June). Linguistic Capital in the University andthe Hegemony of English: Medieval Origins and Future Directions. *SAGE Open*, 1-11. doi:10.1177/21582440211021842

Adam, K. (2006). *Community Supported Agriculture.* National Sustainable Agriculture Information Service (ATTRA).

Adams, R., Hurd, B., Lenhart, S., & Leary, N. (1998, December 17). Effects of global climate change on agriculture: an interpretative review. *Climate Research, 11*(1), 19-30. Retrieved from ttps://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/24865973

Akkaraca Köse, M. (2012). Agricultural Policy Reforms and Their Implications on Rural Development: Turkey and the EU. *Ankara Avrupa Çalışmaları Dergisi, 11*(2), 75-98.

Akşit, B. (1966). *Türkiye'de "Az Gelişmiş Kapitalizm" ve Köylere Girişi.* Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi Öğrenci Birliği Yayınları.

Alavi, H., & Shanin, T. (1988). Introduction to the English Edition: Peasantry and Capitalism. In K. Kautsky, *The Agrarian Question* (P. Burgess, Trans.). Winchester: Zwan Publications.

Albayrak, M., Güneş, E., & Gülçubuk, B. (2010, February 4). The effects of irrigation methods on input use andproductivities of sugarbeet in Central Anatolia, Turkey. *African Journal of Agricultural Research, 5*(3), 188-195.

Alexander, C. (2002). *Personal States: Making Connections between People and Bureaucracy in Turkey.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Alonso-Fradejas, A., Borras Jr., S., Holmes, T., Holt-Giménez, E., & Robbins, M. (2015). Food Sovereignty: Convergence and Contradictions, Conditions and Challenges. *Third World Quarterly, 36*(3 Special Issue: Food Sovereignty (2015)), 431-448. Retrieved December 12, 2023, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/24523057

Althusser, L. (1969). *For Marx.* (A. Lane, Trans.) The Penguin Press. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/ebooks/althusser/For_Marx_-_Louis_Althusser.pdf

Althusser, L. (1971). Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation). In *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (pp. 142–7, 166–76). New York and London: Monthly Review Press.

Amin, S. (2009). Dünya Yoksulluğu, Yoksullaşma ve Sermaye Birikimi. *Mülkiye, XXXIII*(262), 89-97.

Amin, S. (2022). The Agrarian Question a Century after October 1917: Capitalist Agriculture and Agricultures in Capitalism. In S. Amin, *The Agrarian Question Beyond Neoliberalism: Essays on the Peasantry, Sovereignty and Socialism* (pp. 43-74). Harare, New Delhi and São Paulo: Agrarian South Network in collaboration with Sam Moyo African Institute for Agrarian Studies, Centre for Agrarian Research and Education for South, and Coletivo Novo Bandung.

Anadolu Ajansı. (2000, December 13). *Şeker Pancarında Kota Uygulaması*. Retrieved 01 04, 2023, from Hürriyet Bigpara: https://bigpara.hurriyet.com.tr/haberler/genel-haberler/seker-pancarinda-kota-uygulamasi_ID345899/

Anadolu Ajansı. (2023, April 26). *"Yüksek Hızlı Tren hattı bugün açılıyor: Ankara-Sivas arası 2 saate inecek"*. Retrieved from NTV: https://www.ntv.com.tr/galeri/turkiye/yuksek-hizli-tren-hatti-bugun-aciliyor-ankara-sivas-arasi-2-saate-inecek,DU25a6Mp8EiLMUaf_Zm7lQ/XAy-Q7DFzkCZXvhsbKf6UA

Andersen, P., & Hansen, M. (2012). Class and Cultural Capital - The Case of Class Inequality in Educational Performance. *European Sociological Review, 28*(5), 607-621. doi:10.1093/esr/jcr029

Anderson, K. (Dü.). (2010). *The Political Economy of Agricultural Price Distortions.* USA: Cambridge University Press.

Andrée, P. (2014). Citizen-Farmers: The Possibilities and the Limits of Australia's Emerging Alternative Food Networks. In P. Andrée, J. Ayres, M. Bosia, & M. Massicotte (Eds.), *Globalization and Food Sovereignty* (pp. 141-172). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. doi:https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442696860-005

Andrée, P., Ayres, J., Bosia, M., & Massicotte, M.-J. (Eds.). (2014). *Globalization and Food Sovereignty: Global and Local Change in the New Politics of Food.* Canada: Univertsity of Toronto Press.

Andrew, E. (1983, September). Class in Itself and Class against Capital: Karl Marx and His Classifiers. *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, 16*(3), 577-584. Retrieved December 12, 2023, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3227396

Andrew, G. (2008). *The Slow Food Story: Politics and Pleasure.* Montreal & Kingstone, Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Araghi, F. (2009). The invisible hand and the visible foot: Peasants, dispossession and globalization. In A. Akram-Lodhi, & C. Kay (Eds.), *Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian Question* (pp. 111-147). London and New York: Routledge.

Aragon, C. (n.d.). *https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/united-nations-must-manage-global-food-reserve*. Retrieved from https://www.un.org: https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/united-nations-must-manage-global-food-reserve

Arrighi, G. (1970). Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective: A Study of The Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia. *Journal of Development Studies, 6*(3), 197-234. Retrieved November 6, 2023, from https://krieger.jhu.edu/arrighi/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2012/08/1970_Arrighi_Labor_Supplies_in_Historical_Perspective.pdf

Arrighi, G. (1994). *The Long Twentieth Century: Monet, Power, and the Origins of Our Times.* London and New York: Verso.

Arrighi, G., Aschoff, N., & Scully, B. (2010, November 9). Accumulation by Dispossession and Its Limits: The Southern Africa Paradigm Revisited. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 410-438. doi:DOI 10.1007/s12116-010-9075-7

Arslanbey, S. (2011). *Bankacılık Sektörü ve Tarım Kredileri: Türkiye'de Tarımın Finansmanı ve Ziraat Bankası A.Ş.'nin Rolü (Yüksek Lisans Tezi).* Balıkesir: Balıkesir Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü İktisat Anabilim Dalı. Retrieved March 28, 2023, from https://dspace.balikesir.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.12462/2118/Sel%c3%a7uk_Arslanbey.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Atasoy, Y. (2017). *Commodification of Global Agrifood Systems and Agro Ecology.* (D. Drache, Ed.) London and New York: Routledge.

Avcıoğlu, D. (1969). *Türkiye'nin Düzeni (Dün-Bugün-Yarın).* Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları.

Ay, A., & Yapar, S. (2005). Dünya Ticaret Örgütü Tarım Anlaşması ve Türkiye. *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 13*, 57-80.

Aydın, Z. (2002, December). The New Right, Structural Adjustment and Turkish Agriculture: Rural Responses and Survival Strategies. *The European Journal of Development Research, 14*(2), 183-208.

Aydın, Z. (2010, April). Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish Agriculture. *Journal of Agrarian Change, 10*(2), 149-187.

Aydın, Z. (2016). Çağdaş Tarım Sorunu ve Yeni Köylülük. *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi - METU Studies in Development, 43*(1), 43-61.

Aydın, Z. (2018). *Çağdaş Tarım Sorunu: Ekonomik, Politik ve Sosyolojik Kuramlar, Yaklaşımlar, Politikalar.* Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları.

Bacaksız, M., & Uysal, S. (2019). Tarımsal Kalkınmada Devletçi Politikaların Önemi: Türkiye'de 1930-1939 Dönemi için bir Değerlendirme. *Uluslararası Ekonomi, İşletme ve Politika Dergisi, 3*(1), 19-36. Retrieved from http://dergipark.gov.tr/ueip

Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler. (2007). *IMF Gözetiminde On Uzun Yıl, 1998-2008: Farklı Hükümetler, Tek Siyaset.* İstanbul: Yordam Kitap.

Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency. (2019, September). *FinTurk Coğrafi Dağılımı*. Retrieved April 1, 2023, from Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu: https://www.bddk.org.tr/BultenFinTurk

Barkan, Ö. (1980). *Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi.* İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları.

Barnes, A., Hansson, H., Manevska-Tasevska, G., Shrestha, S., & Thomson, S. (2015, August 18). The influence of diversification on long-term viability of the agricultural sector. *Land Use Policy, 49*, 404-412. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.08.023

Barrett, C., Reardon, T., & Webb, P. (2001). Nonfarm income diversification and household livelihood strategies in rural Africa: concepts, dynamics, and policy implications. *Food Policy, 26,* 315-331.

Baykurt, F. (2017). *Yılanların Öcü.* İstanbul: Literatür Yayınları.

Bayrak, M. (2000). *Köy Enstitüleri ve Köy Edebiyatı.* Ankara: Öz-ge Yayınları.

Bazı Alacakların Yeniden Yapılandırılması İle Sosyal Sigortalar Ve Genel Sağlık Sigortası Kanunu Ve Diğer Bazı Kanun Ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasi Hakkında Kanun. (2011, February 13). *Official Gazette, Date: 2/25/2011 No: 27857*. Retrieved from https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=6111&MevzuatTur=1&MevzuatTertip=5

Bello, W. (2009). *The Food Wars.* London: Verso.

Berberoğlu, C. (1978). *Sanayi Öncelikli Ekonomik Gelişmede Türkiye'de Tarımın Finansmanı ve Tarımsal Kredi Uygulaması.* Eskişehir İktisadi ve İdari İlimler Akademisi. Retrieved March 21, 2023, from file:///C:/Users/Aykut%20Ozan%20Alan/Downloads/99634.pdf

Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1991). *The Social Construction of Reality.* Great Britain: The Penguin Press.

Berkes, N. (1942). *Bazı Ankara Köyleri Üzerinde Bir Araştırma.* Ankara: Dil ve Tarih - Coğrafya Fakültesi Felsefe Enstitüsü Neşriyatı. Retrieved from https://acikerisim.tbmm.gov.tr/server/api/core/bitstreams/90a34903-d1cc-4900-a83a-5be704ddb656/content

Berkes, N. (2013). *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi.* İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.

Bernstein, H. (2015). Food Regimes and Food Regime Analysis: A Selective Survey. *Land grabbing, conflict and agrarian-environmental transformations: perspectives from East and Southeast Asia, An international academic conference.* BRICS Initiatives for Critical Agrarian Studies (BICAS).

Bernstein, H. (2018). The‘peasant problem’in the Russian revolution(s), 1905–1929. *The Journal of Peasant Studies, 45*, 1127-1150. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2018.1428189

Bernstein, H., & Terence, J. (2001, January). From Peasant Studies to Agrarian Change. *Journal of Agrarian Change, 1*(1), 1-56. Retrieved from https://www.blackwellpublishing.co.uk/pdf/joac002.pdf

Bir 23 Nisan Bayrami Yil 1986 CIGDEMLI Kasabasi Yozgat Sorgun 2. Bölüm. (1986). Yozgat1968 via Youtube. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PQZsUHf3goQ&t=20s

Birtek, F., & Keyder, Ç. (1976, December). Türkiye'de Devlet - Tarım İlişkileri 1923-1950. *Birikim, 22,* 31-40.

Bloch, M. (1966). *French Rural History: An Essay on its Basic Characteristics.* (J. Sondheimer, Trans.) Berkeley, Great Briton: University of California Press. Retrieved December 2, 2023, from https://archive.org/details/frenchruralhisto0000unse/page/n7/mode/2up?view=theater

Bloom, D., & Williamson, J. (n.d.). Demographic Transition and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia. *The World Bank Economic Review, 12*(3), 419-455. Retrieved from https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/934291468206034843/pdf/772740JRN0WBER0Box0377301B00PUBLIC0.pdf

Boeke, J. (1954, April). Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies as Exemplified by Indonesia. *International Affairs, 30*(2), 259-260. Retrieved October 22, 2023

Boran, B. (1940a, June). Köy Davası 'Şehirleşmek' Davasıdır I. *Siyasi İlimler Mecmuası, 111*, 172-174. Retrieved from https://behiceboran.net/_aa/yazilar_pdf/0172.pdf

Boran, B. (1940b, July). Köy Davası 'Şehirleşmek' Davasıdır II. *Siyasi İlimler Mecmuası*, 112. Retrieved from https://behiceboran.net/_aa/yazilar_pdf/0175.pdf

Boran, B. (1992). *Toplumsal Yapı Araştırmaları: İki Köy Çeşidinin Mukayeseli Tetkiki.* İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi.

Boratav, K. (2004). *Tarımsal Yapılar ve Kapitalizm.* Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları.

Boratav, K. (2005). *1980'li Yıllarda Türkiye'de Sosyal Sınıflar ve Bölüşüm.* Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları.

Boratav, K. (2012). *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2009.* Ankara: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları.

Boratav, K. (2015). *Dünyadan Türkiye'ye, İktisattan Siyasete.* İstanbul: Yordam Kitap.

Boratav, K., Şenses, F., Türel, O., & Voyvoda, E. (Eds.). (2015). *AKP'li Yıllarda Emeğin Durumu.* İstanbul: Yordam Kitap.

Bottomore, T. (2018). *Modern Toplumlarda Sosyal Sınıflar.* (Ö. Balkız, B. Balkız, & Ü. Tatlıcan, Trans.) Bursa: Sentez Yayıncılık.

Bourdieu, P. (1962). *The Algerians.* (A. Ross, Trans.) Boston: Beacon Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice.* (R. Nice, Trans.) Cambridge University Press. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812507

Bourdieu, P. (1986). The Forms of Capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (pp. 241-258). New York: Greenwood Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1987, July). The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field. *Hastings Law Journal, 38*(5), 814-853.

Bourdieu, P. (1987). What Makes a Social Class? On the Theoretical and Practical Existence of Groups. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 32 (1987)*, 1-17. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/41035356

Bourdieu, P. (1991). *The Logic of Practice.* (R. Nice, Ed.) Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1991b). *Language and Symbolic Power.* (J. Thompson, G. Raymond, & M. Adamson, Trans.) Oxford, UK: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1993). *The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature.* (R. Johnson, Ed.) Great Britain: Columbia University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1994, March). Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field. *Sociological Theory, 12*(4), 1-18. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/202032

Bourdieu, P. (1996a). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste.* (R. Nice, Trans.) Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1996b). *On Television.* (P. F. Priscilla, Trans.) New York: The New Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1996c). *The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power.* (L. Clough, Trans.) Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1998a). *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Bourdieu, P. (1998b). The Cult of Unity and Cultivated Differences. In P. Bourdieu, L. Boltanski, R. Castel, J.-C. Chamboredon, & D. Schnapper, *Art, Photography - A Middle-brow* (S. Whiteside, Trans., pp. 13-72). Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. (2000). *Acts of Resistance: Against the New Myths of Our Time.* (R. Nice, Trans.) Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. (2000). *Pascalian Meditations.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P. (2004). The Peasant and His Body. *Ethnography, 5*(4), 579-599. doi:10.1177/1466138104048

Bourdieu, P. (2008). *The Bachelor's Ball: the crisis of peasant society in Bearn.* (R. Nice, Trans.) Cambridge: Polity.

Bourdieu, P. (2014). *On the State: Lectures at the College de France, 1989-1992.* (P. Champagne, R. Lenoir, F. Poupeau, & M.-C. Riviere, Eds.) Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J.-C. (1977). *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture.* (R. Nice, Trans.) Great Britain: Sage Publications.

Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J.-C. (1990). *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture.* (R. Nice, Trans.) London: Sage Publications.

Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. (1992). *An Invitation to Reflective Sociology.* Oxford, UK: Polity Press.

Bourdieu, P., Boltanski, L., Castel, R., Chamboredon, J.-C., & Schnapper, D. (1998). *Photography, A Middle-brow Art.* (S. Whiteside, Trans.) Oxford: Polity Press.

Boz, İ. (1992). Tarımda Yeniliklerin Yayılması ve Benimsenmesi. In *Yurtdışından Dönen Akademik Personel Konferansları* (Vol. 86, pp. 24-34). Kahramanmaraş: Kahramanmaraş Sütçü İmam Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü.

Braudel, F. (2009). History and the Social Sciences: The Longue Durée. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 32*(2), 171-203. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/40647704

Breen, R. (2005). Foundations of a neo-Weberian Class Analysis. In E. Wright (Ed.), *Approaches to Class Analysis* (pp. 31-50). Cambridge University Press.

Brewer, J., & Hunter, A. (1989). *Multimethod Research: A Synthesis of Styles.* Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications.

Brueckner, J., Mills, E., & Kremer, M. (2001). Urban Sprawl: Lessons from Urban Economics [with Comments]. *Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs*, 65-97. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/25058783

Bryman, A. (2007). Barriers to Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Research. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1*(8). doi:10.1177/2345678906290531

Bulut, E. (2023). Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde Tarımın Dönüşüm Serüveni: Dün, Bugün ve Yarın. *Akademik Hassasiyetler, 10*(Cumhuriyet Özel), 616-641.

Bulut, İ. (1998). *Şehir Coğrafyası Açısından Sorgun.* Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Burawoy, M. (2018). The Poverty of Philosophy: Marx Meets Bourdieu. In T. Medvetz, & J. Sallaz (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Pierre Bourdieu* (pp. 1-28). Oxford University Press (Printed Online). doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199357192.013.16

Burch, D., & Lawrence, G. (2009). Towards a Third Food Regime: Behind the Transformation. *Agriculture and Human Values, 26*(4), 267-279.

Burgess, R. (2006). *In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research.* London and New York: Routledge.

Burkay, K. (2000). Köy Enstitüleri Deneyi ve Getirdikleri. M. Bayrak içinde, *Köy Enstitüleri ve Köy Edebiyatı* (s. 13-33). Ankara: Öz-Ge Yayınları.

Burton, R. (2004, March 195-215). Seeing Through the 'Good Farmer's' Eyes: Towards Developing an Understanding of the Social Symbolic Value of 'Productivist' Behaviour. *Sociologia Ruralis*. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9523.2004.00270.x

Burton, R., & Paragahawewa, U. (2011). Creating culturally sustainable agri-environmental schemes. *Journal of Rural Studies, 27*, 95-104. doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2010.11.001

Burton, R., Kuczera, C., & Schwarz, G. (2008, January). Exploring Farmers' Cultural Resistance to Voluntary Agri-environmental Schemes. *Sociologia Ruralis, 48*(1), 16-37. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9523.2008.00452.xopen_in_new

Büke, A., & Çetinkaya, Ö. (2009, Temmuz - Ağustos). Emek Yoğun Tarımsal Üretimin Mecburlar Ordusu: Türkiye'de Gezici Mevsimlik Tarım İşçileri. *Doğudan, 2*(12), 54-67.

Byres, T. (1986, Nov. - Dec.). The Agrarian Question, Forms of Capitalist Agrarian Transition and the State: An Essay with Reference to Asia. *Social Scientist, 14*(11/12), 3-67. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3517162

Carolan, M. (2005). Barriers to the Adoption of Sustainable Agriculture on Rented Land: An Examination of Contesting Social Fields. *Rural Sociology, 70*(3), 387-413.

Castles, S., & Miller, M. (2003). *The Age of Migration: International Population Movements in the Modern World.* New York: The Guilford Press.

Central Anatolia Development Agency. (2016). *Yozagat İli Sosyal Profil Araştırması.* Kayseri: ORAN. Retrieved from https://www.oran.org.tr/materyaller/Editor/document/PlanlamaBirimi/Dokmerkezi/ORAN_YOZGAT_SOSYAL_PROFIL_ARASTIRMASI_PRESS.pdf

Central Anatolia Development Agency. (n.d.). *Yozgat Sosyal Durum Analizi.* 2016. Retrieved from https://www.oran.org.tr/images/dosyalar/20190918155744_2.pdf

Cerase, F. (1974, Summer). Expectations and Reality: A Case Study of Return Migration from the United States to Southern Italy. *The International Migration Review, 8*(2). Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3002783

Chadwick, A. (2019). *Law and the Political Economy of Hunger.* Oxford University Press.

Chayanov, A. (1925). *Peasant Farm Organization.* Moscow: The Co-operative Publishing House.

Chayanov, A. (1966). *The Theory of Peasant Economy* (1 b.). (D. Thorner, B. Kerblay, & R. Smith, Dü) Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

Clapp, J. (2006). WTO Agriculture Negotiations: Implications for the Global South. *Third World Quarterly, 27*(4), 563-577. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/4017724

Clawson, M. (1962, May). Urban Sprawl and Speculation in Suburban Land. *Land Economics, 38*(2), 99-111. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3144612

Cloke, P., & Thrift, N. (1987). Intra-Class Conflict in Rural Areas. *Journal of Rural Studies, 3*(4), 321-333.

Cohen, R. (1949). *The Economics of Agriculture.* London: Cambridge University Press.

Coleman, J. (1988). Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. *The American Journal of Sociology, 94*, 95-120. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2780243

Coleman, W., Grant, W., & Josling, T. (2004). *Agriculture in the New Global Economy.* USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc.

Contreras, L. (2011). *Agricultural Policies: New Developments.* New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Crang, M., & Cook, I. (2007). *Doing Ethnographies.* London: Sage Publications.

Crossley, N. (2001, February). The Phenomenological Habitus and Its Construction. *Theory and Society, 30*(1), 81-120. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/658063

Cumhuriyet. (2018, December 26). 3 şeker fabrikasının satışı iptal. *Cumhuriyet*. Retrieved from https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/3-seker-fabrikasinin-satisi-iptal-1182689

Curran, S. (Ed.). (2009). *The Global Governance of Food.* New york: Routledge.

Çankaya, E. (2013, Spring). Köy Edebiyatı ve Türk Edebiyatında Köye "İçeriden" Bakış Doğuşu, Etkileri, Sonuçları. *Turkish Studies - International Periodical For The Languages, Literature and History of Turkish or Turkic, 8*(4), 473-488.

Çelik Ateş, H., Yılmaz, H., Demircan, V., Gül, M., Öztürk, E., & Ormeci Kart, M. (2017). How did post-2000 agricultural policy changes in Turkey affect farmers? – A focus group evaluation. *Land Use Policy, 69*, 298-306.

Çelik, A. (2019). *Tarımın Finansmanı, Özel Banka Uygulamaları ve Denizbank Örneği (Yüksek Lisans Tezi).* Tekirdağ: Tekirdağ Namık Kemal Üniversitesi Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü Tarım Ekonomisi Anabilim Dalı. Retrieved March 28, 2023, from http://acikerisim.nku.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.11776/3437/0065895.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Çetin, S. (2010). Direct Income Payments: Turkish Experience. *Middle East Technical University*. Ankara.

Çiçek, Ö., & Acar, O. (2019). Türkiye'de Üretici Kooperatiflerinin Yakın Geleceğini Tartışırken Şeker Fabrikası Özelleştirmeleri: Pancar Ekicileri Kooperatifleri Birliği (Pankobirlik) Örneği. *Fiscaoeconomia, 3*(2), 99-127. doi:10.25295/fsecon.2019.02.005

Çiğdemli Aile Sağlığı Merkezi. (n.d.). *Çiğdemli Aile Sağlığı Merkezi*. Retrieved from http://cigdemliasm.com/aile-hekimlerimiz.html

Dalton, G., Bernhard, H., Chiṽas, B., Chiňas, B., Franklin, S., Kaplan, D., & Wolf, E. (1972). Peasantries in Anthropology and History [and Comments and Replies]. *Current Anthropology, 13*(3/4), 385-415. Retrieved November 26, 2023, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2740820

Das, R. (2002). The green revolution and poverty: a theoretical and empirical examination of the relation between technology and society. *Geoforum, 33 (2002)*, 55-72.

de Haas, H. (2008). *Migration and development: A Theoretical Perspective.* James Martin 21st Century School, University of Oxford, International Migration Institute. University of Oxford.

de Hoyos, R., & Medvedev, D. (2011). Poverty Effects of Higher Food Prices: A Global Perspective. *Review of Development Economics, 15*, 387-402. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2011.00615

Delaney, C. (2012). *Tohum ve Toprak: Türk Köy Toplumunda Cinsiyet ve Kozmoloji.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Della Porta, D., & Keating, M. (2008). How many approaches in the social sciences? An epistemological introduction. In D. Della Porta, & M. Keating (Eds.), *Approaches and Methodologies in Social Sciences* (1 ed., p. 365). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Dellal, İ. (2021). Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi Alım Politikalarının Üreticilerin Buğday Üretim Uygulamaları Üzerine Etkisi: Ankara İli Gölbaşı İlçesi Örneği. *Ziraat Mühendisliği, 373*, 19-28. doi:10.33724/zm.891801

DenizBank. (2019). *Annual Report 2019.* Financial Services Group. Retrieved March 31, 2023, from https://www.denizbank.com/medium/document-file-6091.vsf

DenizBank. (2022). *Annual Report.* Retrieved March 30, 2023, from https://www.denizbank.com/medium/document-file-7631.vsf

Denzin, N., & Lincoln, Y. (2003). Introduction: The Discipline and Practice of Qualitative Research. In N. Denzin, & Y. Lincoln (Eds.), *The Landscape of Qualitative Research: Theories and Issues* (pp. 1-46). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Devlet Memurları Kanunu. (1965, July 14). *Official Gazette, Date: 7/23/1956, No: 12056*. Retrieved from https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=657&MevzuatTur=1&MevzuatTertip=5

Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı. (1989, June 22). *Altıncı Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1990-1994)*. Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı. Ankara: DPT Yayınları. Retrieved from

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı Strateji ve Bütçe Başkanlığı: https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Altinci_Bes_Yillik_Kalkinma_Plani-1990-1994.pdf

Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı. (2001-2005). *Uzun Vadeli Strateji ve Sekizinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı.* RG: 07.07.2000, S:24100-mükerrer. Retrieved February 3, 2023, from sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Uzun_Vadeli_Strateji_ve_Sekizinci_Bes_Yillik_Kalkinma_Plani-2001-2005.pdf

Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı. (n.d.). *Yedinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı (1996-2000).* Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı. Kalkınma Bakanlığı. Retrieved from http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr /Lists/Kalknma%20Planlar/Attachments/3/plan7.pdf

Directorate for EU Affairs. (2022, June 1). *Chapter 11: Agriculture and Rural Development*. Retrieved from Directorate for EU Affairs: https://www.ab.gov.tr/76_en.html

Directorate for EU Affairs. (2022, November 15). *Current Situation*. Retrieved from Directorate for EU Affairs: https://www.ab.gov.tr/current-situation_65_en.html#:~:text=T%C3%BCrkiye's%20EU%20accession%20process%20is,last%20stage%20of%20the%20negotiations.

DİSK-Genel İş. (2018, April 27). *Şeker Fabrikaları Değerinin Çok Altında Üç Kuruşa Satıldı*. Retrieved from DİSK - Genel İş Türkiye Genel Hizmetler İşçileri Sendikası: https://www.genel-is.org.tr/seker-fabrikalari-degerinin-cok-altinda-uc-kurusa-satildi,2,16639#.ZaRKRXZBy5d

Divitçioğlu, S. (2003). *Asya Tipi Üretim Tarzı ve Osmanlı Toplumu (1967) Marksist Üretim Tarzı Kavramı (1970).* İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.

Doğa Gözcüleri Derneği. (2005, Februrary 28). *Kırsal Kalkınma Projeleri: Destekler ve Uygulamalara Genel Bir Bakış.* (A. İlgen, M. Sarı, & Ş. Ertan, Eds.) Doğa Gözcüleri Derneği.

Doğan, D. (1990). *Bütün Yönleriyle Sorgun.* Ankara: Sorgun Belediyesi.

Doğan, D. (2011). *Sorgun Güldestesi.* Sorgun: Sılam Yayınları.

Doğanay, H., & Orhan, F. (2014). Artvin İlinde Nüfusun Başlıca Özellikleri. *Eastern Geographical Review, 31*, 1-22.

(2007-2013). *Dokuzuncu Kalkınma Planı.* RG: 01.07.2006, S:26215-mükerrer. Retrieved from https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Dokuzuncu_Kalkinma_Plani-2007-2013.pdf

Douglas, S. (2015). Migration, Theory of. *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 15*, 466-471. doi:10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.31119-9

Dönmez, İ. (2021, May 10). Çok hisseli tarım arazilerinde yaşanan sorunlar: Adana-Seyhan örneği. *Mediterranian Agricultural Sciences, 34*(2), 181-188. doi:10.29136/mediterranean.641655

Duby, G. (1968). *Rural Economy and Country Life in Medieval West.* (C. Postan, Trans.) Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press. Retrieved December 3, 2023, from https://archive.org/details/ruraleconomycoun0000geor/page/n5/mode/2up?view=theater

Durkheim, E. (1960). *The Division of Labor in Society.* (G. Simpson, Trans.) Illinois, The United States of America: The Free Press of Glencoe. Retrieved October 9, 2023, from http://fs2.american.edu/dfagel/www/Class%20Readings/Durkheim/Division%20Of%20Labor%20Final%20Version.pdf

Durna, M. (2013, Eylül). Yozgat Yer Adları Üzerine Bir İnceleme. Niğde: Niğde Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı A.B.D.

Duru, B., & Uzgel, İ. (Eds.). (2013). *AKP Kitabı: Bir Dönüşümün Bilançosu.* Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi.

Dworkin, D. (2014). *Class Struggles.* London and New York: Routledge.

Ecevit, M. (1999). *Kırsal Türkiye'nin Değişim Dinamikleri: Gökçeağaç Köyü Monografisi.* Ankara: T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları.

Edelman, M. (2005, September). Bringing the Moral Economy back in... to the Study of 21st-Century Transnational Peasant Movements. *American Anthropologist, 107*(3), 331-345. doi:https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.2005.107.3.331

Edelman, M. (2013). *What is a peasant? What are peasantries? A briefing paper on issues of definition.* The City University of New York, Geneva. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGPleasants/MarcEdelman.pdf

Edelman, M., Weis, T., Baviskar, A., Borras Jr., S., Holt-Giménez, E., Kandiyoti, D., & Wendy, W. (2014). Introduction: critical perspectives on food sovereignty. *The Journal of Peasant Studies, 41*(6), 911-931. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2014.963568

Edwards, D., & McKee, T. (1997). *Characteristics Of 20th Century Drought in The United States at Multiple Timescales.* Climatology Report No. 97-2, Paper No. 634, Colorado State University, Department of Atmospheric Science, CO.

Ekinci, K., & Sayılı, M. (2010). Tarım Arazilerinin Parçalanmasını Önlemeye Yönelik Mevzuat Üzerine Bir İnceleme. *Gaziosmanpaşa Üniversitesi Ziraat Fakültesi Dergisi, 27*(2), 121-129. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/82222

Elias, N. (2001). *The Society of Individuals.* New York and London: Continuum.

Ellis, F., & Biggs, S. (2001). Evolving Themes in Rural Development 1950s-2000s. *Development Policy Review, 19*(4), 437-448. Retrieved from https://www.staff.ncl.ac.uk/david.harvey/AEF806/Ellis&Biggs2001.pdf

Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2024, Jun 25). *technology*. Retrieved from Britannica: britannica.com/technology/technology

Enke, S. (1962, June). Economic Development with Unlimited and Limited Supplies of Labour. *Oxford Economic Papers, 14*(2), 158-172. Retrieved 10 23, 2023, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2661958

Epstein, G. (2005). Introduction: Financialization and the World Economy. In G. Epstein (Ed.), *Financialization and the World Economy* (pp. 3-16). Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.

Erdem, Ç. (2008). Cumhuriyet Yönetiminin 1930'lu Yıllarda Köyde ve Köylülükte 'Dönüşümü' Gerçekleştirme İsteğinin Bir Aracı Olarak 'Köy Eğitmen Kursları'. *Gazi Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 10*(3), 187-200.

Erdentuğ, N. (1956). *Hal Köyünün Etnolojik Tetkiki.* Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.

Erdentuğ, N. (1959). *Sün Köyü'nün Etnolojik Tetkiki.* Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi.

Erdentuğ, N. (1978). Türk Köyünde Modernleşme. *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih - Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi, 29*(1-4), 211-222.

Erdost, M. (2005). *Asya Üretim Tarzı ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Mülkiyet İlişkileri.* Ankara: Onur Yayınları.

Erikson, R., & Goldthrope, J. (1992). *The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies.* Ney York: Clarendon Press.

Erikson, R., Goldthrope, J., & Portocarero, L. (1979). Intergenerational class mobility in three Western European Societies: England, France and Sweden. *The British Journal of Sociology, 30*(4), 415-441. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/589632

Ertan, M. (2019). The latent politicization of Alevism: the affiliation between Alevis and leftist politics (1960–1980). *Middle Eastern Studies*. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2019.1591276

Escobar, A. (1992). Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought, Development and Social Movements. *Social Text, 31/32*, 20-56. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/466217 .

Esenkar, D. (2019). *Türk Bankacılık Sektöründe Tarımsal Finansman Uygulamaları.* Bilecik: Bilecik Şeyh Edebali Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü İktisat Anabilim Dalı. Retrieved March 21, 2023, from http://acikkaynak.bilecik.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11552/1394/10126529.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

European Bank for Construction and Development. (2016). *Agribusiness Support Measures in Turkey – Project Report Public Summary.* Istanbul: EBRD. Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/Aykut%20Ozan%20Alan/Downloads/Mapping%20Agribusiness%20Support%20Measures%20in%20Turkey_public%20summary%20(2).pdf

European Commission. (2005, October 21). Concil Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005 of 20 September 2005 on support for rural development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). *Official Journal of the European Union, L 277*, 1-40. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32005R1698

Fair Trade International. (n.d.). *How Fairtrade Works*. Retrieved November 11, 2023, from Fair Trade International: https://www.fairtrade.net/about/how-fairtrade-works

Fairbairn, M. (2014, January). ‘Like gold with yield’: evolving intersections between farmland and finance. *The Journal of Peasant Studies, 41*(5), 777-795. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2013.873977

FAO. (2017, May 25). *AQUASTAT - FAO's Global Information System on Water and Agriculture*. Retrieved from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: https://www.fao.org/aquastat/en/

FAO. (2023). *FAOSTAT*. Retrieved November 15, 2023, from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#home

Fassin, D. (2019, February 2). Moral Economies Revisited. *Cairn International*. Retrieved from https://www.cairn-int.info/article_p.php?ID_ARTICLE=E_ANNA_646_1237

Firth, R. (1963). *Elements of Social Organization.* London: Watts & Co Ltd.

FitzGerald, E. (1990, June). Kalecki on financing development: An Approach to the Macroeconomics of the Semiindustrialised Economy. *Cambridge Journal of Economics, 14*(2), 183-203. Retrieved October 8, 2023, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/23598236

Flannery, K. (1973). The Origins of Agriculture. *Annual Reviews, 2*, 271-310. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2949273

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (n.d.). *FAOLEX Database*. Retrieved March 12, 2023, from Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: https://www.fao.org/faolex/results/details/en/c/LEX-FAOC023801/

Foster, G. (1965, April). Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good. *American Anthropologist, 67*(2), 293-315. Retrieved October 10, 2023, from https://web.mnstate.edu/robertsb/380/Peasant%20Society%20&%20Image%20of%20Limited%20Good.pdf

Frank, A. (1984, May 12). World Economic Crisis and Third World in Mid-1980s. *Economic and Political Weekly, 19*(19), 799-804. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/4373249

Friedland, W. (1984). Commodity System Analysis: An Approach to the Sociology of Agriculture. In H. Schwartzweller (Ed.), *Research in Rural Sociology and Development* (pp. 221-235). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Friedland, W. (2021). Reprise on Commodity Systems Methodology. *The International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 9*, 82-103. doi:10.48416/ijsaf.v9i.346

Friedmann, H., & McNair, A. (2008, April and July). Whose Rules Rule? Contested Projects to Certify 'Local Production for Distant Consumers'. *Journal of Agrarian Change, 8*(2 and 3), 408-434.

Fukuyama, F. (2000). *Social Capital and Civil Society.* IMF Institute. International Money Fund. Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2000/wp0074.pdf

Galeski, B., Stevens, H., Shanin, T., Worsley, P., & Allen, A. (1975). *Basic Concepts of Rural Sociology.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Gallagher, P. (2001, Spring). The Environmental, Social, and Cultural Impacts of Sprawl. *Natural Resources & Environment, 15*(4), 219-223. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/40924406

Galpin, C. (1915). *Social Anatomy of an Agricultural Community.* Madison, Winconsin: Agricultural Experiment Station of the University of Winconsin.

Gardner, B., & Rausser, G. (Eds.). (2002). *Handbook of Agricultural Economics* (Vols. 2A - Agriculture and Its External Linkages). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.

Geertz, C. (1961). Studies in Peasant Life: Community and Society. *Biennial Review of Anthropology, 2*, 1-41. Retrieved November 27, 2023, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2949217

Geertz, C. (1963). *Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change in Indonesia.* Berkeley and Los Angeles:: University of California Press.

Gelir İdaresi Başkanlığı. (2022). *Bütçe Vergi Gelirlerinden Mahalli İdarelere Verilen Pay Oranları (1985-2022).* Retrieved from Gelir İdaresi Başkanlığı: https://www.gib.gov.tr/sites/default/files/fileadmin/user_upload/VI/GBG/Tablo_10.xls.htm

Geray, C. (2011). *Dünden Bugüne Kırsal Gelişme Politikaları.* (B. Duru, Ed.) Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi.

Geray, C. (2014). *Kooperatifçilik.* Ankara: Nika Yayınevi.

Gereffi, G., & Korzeniewicz, M. (Eds.). (1994). *Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism.* Praeger, USA: Greenwood Publishing.

Giddens, A. (1984). *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration.* Berkley: University of California Press.

Gillies, V. (2006, May). Working class mothers and school life: exploring the role of emotional capital. *Gender and Education, 18*(3), 281-293.

Giménez, E., & Shattuck, A. (2011, January). Food Crises, Food Regimes and Food Movements: Rumblings of Reform or Tides of Transformation? *The Journal of Peasant Studies, 38*(1), 109-144. doi:DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2010.538578

Glenna, L. (1996). Rationality, habitus, and agricultural landscapes: Ethnographic case studies in landscape sociology. *Agriculture and Human Values, 13*(4), 21-38. doi:10.1007/bf01530521

Glover, J. (2008). *Why do Daily Farmers Continue to Farm? Can Bourdieu's Theory Aid Our Understandings and Suggest How Farmers Could Regain Some Control in Their Industry?* Phd Thesis, Loughborough University.

Gmelch, G. (1980). Return Migration. *Annual Review of Anthropology ,, 9 (1980),* 135-159. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2155732

Goodman, D. (1999, Jan). Agro-Food Studies in the 'Age ofEcology': Nature, Corporeality,Bio-Politics. *Sociologia Ruralis, 39*(1), 17-38. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9523.00091

Goodman, L. (1961, March). Snowball Sampling. *The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 32*(1), 148-170. Retrieved from : https://www.jstor.org/stable/2237615

Google. (n.d.). *Google Maps*. Retrieved April 2020, from https://www.google.com/maps/@39.8458245,35.3002237,14471m/data=!3m1!1e3?entry=ttu&g_ep=EgoyMDI0MDkxNS4wIKXMDSoASAFQAw%3D%3D

Göknil, N. (1943). Garbi Anadolu Köy Monografileri. (H. Ülken, Ed.) *İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi, 2*(2), 312-357. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/4402

Gramsci, A. (1992). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks.* (G. Smith, Q. Hoare, Eds., Q. Hoare, & G. Smith, Trans.) New York: International Publishers.

Grethe, H. (2004). *Effects of Including Agricultural Products in the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU: A Partial Equilibrium Analysis for Turkey* . Frankfurt: Peter Lang AG. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv9hj7sw.1

Griffin, K. (1979). *The Political Economy of Agrarian Change: An Essay on the Green Revolution.* London: Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16176-8

Gunder Frank, A. (1966, September). The Development of Underdevelopment. *The Monthly Review, 18*(4), 17-31.

Gülçubuk, B. (2002). Küreselleşme ve Küreselleşmenin Türkiye'nin Tarım Politikasına Yansımaları. *Mülkiye, 26*(236), 97-112.

Gülçubuk, B. (2013). Türkiye'de Tarımın Ekonomi-Politik ve Sosyolojik Nitelikleri Açısından Arazi Toplulaştırması. *TÜRKTARIM, 1*(210), 16-21.

Gümüş, N., İlhan, A., & Gülersoy, A. (2013, Spring). Bir Tersine Göç Örneği: Köprücük Köyü (Varto-Muş). *Turkish Studies, 8*(6), 233-261. Retrieved from https://openaccess.artvin.edu.tr/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11494/3985/ali_ilhan.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Günaydın, G. (2001). Türkiye'de Kırsal Yerleşme Düzenşne Yönelik Planlama Yaklaşımları. *TMMOB Ziraat Mühendisleri Odası*, Ankara.

Gürel, B. (2014). Türkiye'de Kırda Sınıf Mücadelelerinin Tarihsel Gelişimi. In S. Savran (Ed.), *Marksizm ve Sınıflar: Dünyada ve Türkiye'de Sınıflar ve Mücadeleleri* (pp. 303-385). İstanbul: Yordam.

Gürel, B., Küçük, B., & Taş, S. (2022). Land occupation as a form of peasant struggle in Turkey, 1965-1980. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 1-28. doi:10.1017/npt.2022.3

Güven, H. (1982). Kırsal Yapıda Bir Değişim Aracı Olarak Köy Kalkınma Kooperatifleri. *Amme İdaresi Dergisi, 15*(2), 21-62.

Haberler.com. (2013, May 24). *Çiğdemli Belde Belediyesi Kanalizasyon Şebekesini Yeniliyor*. Retrieved from Haberler.com: https://www.haberler.com/cigdemli-belde-belediyesi-kanalizasyon-sebekesini-4665369-haberi/

Habermas, J. (1989). *The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume Two. Lifeworld and System:A Critique of Functionalist Reason.* Boston: Beacon Press.

HaberTürk. (2018, December 26). 3 şeker fabrikasının satış ihalesi iptal edildi. *HaberTürk*. Retrieved from https://www.haberturk.com/3-seker-fabrikasinin-satis-ihalesi-iptal-edildi-2273536-ekonomi

HaberTürk. (2019, May 2). *2019 Emekli maaş zammı ne kadar? SGK ve Bağkur emekli maaşları hesaplama!* Retrieved from HaberTürk: https://www.haberturk.com/2019-emekli-maas-zammi-ne-kadar-sgk-ve-bagkur-emekli-maaslari-hesaplama-2284141-ekonomi

Haldun, İ. (1977). *Mukaddime.* (T. Dursun, Trans.) Ankara: Onur Yayınları.

Halpern, J., & Brode, J. (1967). Peasant Society: Economic Changes and Revolutionary Transformation. *Biennial Review of Anthropology, 5*, 46-139. Retrieved December 12, 2023, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2949209

Hammen, O. (1972, June). Marx and the Agrarian Question. *The American Historical Review, Vol. 77, No. 3 (Jun., 1972), pp. 679-704 (26 pages), 77*(3), 679-704. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/1870346

Hançerlioğlu, O. (1999). *Karanlık Dünya / Ekilmemiş Topraklar.* İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.

Hann, I., & Hann, C. (2017). *İki Buçuk Yaprak Çay: Doğu Karadeniz'de Devlet, Piyasa, Kimlik.* (P. Öztamur, Trans.) Ankara: İletişim Yayınları.

Harvey, R., & Clark, W. (1965, February). The Nature and Economics of Urban Sprawl. *Land Economics, 41*(1), 1-9. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/3144884

Hayran, S. (2012, January - June). Zirai Kazançların Vergilendirilmesi ve Tarım İşletmeciliği Açısından Bir Değerlendirme. *Ziraat Mühendisliği*(358), 10-13. Retrieved February 23, 2023, from

file:///C:/Users/Aykut%20Ozan%20Alan/OneDrive/Masa%C3%BCst%C3%BC/Zirai%20Kazan__lar__n%20Vergilendirilmesi%20ve%20Tar__m%20%20____letmecili__i%20A____s__ndan%20Bir%20De__erlendirme[%23680904]-946584.PDF

Hazell, P. (2009). *The Asian Green Revolution.* International Food Policy Research Institute. International Food Policy Research Institute. Retrieved from https://books.google.com.tr/books?id=frNfVx-KZOcC&pg=PA1&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false

Hebinck, P. (2018). De-/re-agrarianisation: Global perspectives. *Journal of Rural Studies, 61*, 227-235. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2018.04.010

Hickel, J. (2014, November 27). The Death of International Development. *The Africa at LSE (blog)*. Retrieved from https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2014/11/27/the-death-of-international-development/

Higgins, B. (1956, January). The "Dualistic Theory" of Underdeveloped Areas. *Economic Development and Cultural Change, 4*(2), 99-115. Retrieved October 22, 2023, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1151896

Hilav, S. (1966, Februrary 18). Asya-Tipi Üretim Nedir? *Yön*.

Hillyard, S. (2007). *The Sociology of Rural Life.* Oxford, UK.: Berg.

Hobsbawm, E. (2013). *The Age of Extremes 1914-1991*. London, Great Britain: Abacus.

Hodges, D. (1961, Spring). The 'Intermediate Classes' in Marxian Theory. *Social Research, 28*(1), 23-36. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/40969314

Hopkins, T., & Wallerstein, I. (1986). Commodity Chains in the World-Economy Prior to 1800. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 10*(1), 157-170. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/40241052

Höllinger, F., Rutten, L., & Kiriakov, K. (2009). The use of warehouse receipt finance in agriculture in transition countries. *working paper presented at the Word Grain Forum.* St. Petersburg: FAO. Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/3/i3339e/i3339e.pdf

Huang, Y., & Tsz Fung Ng, K. (2021). Overcoming ‘small peasant mentality’: semiproletarian struggles and working-class formation in China. *Globalizations, 18*(8), 1436-1452.

İnalcık, H. (2021). *İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete.* İstanbul: Kronik Kitap.

International Development Committee. (2004). *DFID's Agriculture Policy*. London: The Stationery Office Limited. Retrieved from https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmintdev/602/602.pdf

International Monetary Fund. (2019). *Macroeconomics of Aging and Policy Implications.* Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/2019/060519a.pdf

İnternet Haber. (2005, 08 11). *İnternet Haber*. Retrieved from "Baykal: Sen kim oluyorsun": https://www.internethaber.com/baykal-sen-kim-oluyorsun-1153690h.htm

IPPC. (2014). Climate Change 2014 - Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability - Part A Global and Sectoral Aspects. In C. Field, & V. Barros (Ed.), *Climate Change 2014.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

İskan Kanunu. (1934, June 14). *Official Gazette, Date: 6/21/1934, No: 2733*. Retrieved from https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc013/kanuntbmmc013/kanuntbmmc01302510.pdf

Jason, H. (2015, March 18). The Death of International Development. *Global Policy Jourrnal*. Retrieved November 2, 2023, from https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/18/03/2015/death-international-development

Jha, R. (2010, April 24-30). The Analytics of the Agriculture-Industry Relationship in a Closed Economy: A Case Study of India. *Economic and Political Weekly, 47*(17), 94-98. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/25664390

Kaçmazoğlu, H. (2012). Türkiye'de Sosyoloji Çalışmaları: 1950-1960 Dönemi. *İstanbul University Journal of Sociology, 3*(4), 131-190. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iusosyoloji/issue/530/4845#article_cite

Kaldor, N. (1975, August). What is Wrong with Economic Theory. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 89*(3), 347-357. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/1885256

Kara, M. (2019). *Yozagat Ekonomik Görünüm Raporu - 2019.* Yozgat: Yozgat Ticaret Borsası. Retrieved April 14, 2024, from https://www.yozgattb.org.tr/dosyalar/MTVkZjRmMWFkN2Y1ZDU.pdf

Karadağ, S., & Sert, D. (2023). (Non-)deport to Discipline: The Daily Life of Afghans in Turkey. *Journal of Refugee Studies, 36*(3), 449-466. doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fead029

Kautsky, K. (1988). *The Agrarian Question.* (P. Burgess, Trans.) Winchester: Zwan Publications.

Kaya, M. (2017). *Tarımda Lisanslı Depoculuk Sistemi: Hububat Piyasası Örneği.* Yıllık Programlar ve Konjonktür Değerlendirme Genel Müdürlüğü. Kalkınma Bakanlığı.

Kaya, M. (2018, June). ABD Lisanslı Depoculuk Sistemi ve Fiyat Desteği Uygulaması Işığında Hububatta Yeni Bir Destekleme Fiyat Sistemi Önerisi. *Tarım Ekonomisi Dergisi*, 53-62. doi:10.24181/tarekoder.449998

Kelsen, H. (2005). *Pure Theory of Law.* Clark, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange.

Kemal, O. (2010). *Bereketli Topraklar Üzerinde.* İstanbul: Everest Yayınları.

Kemal, Y. (2012). *İnce Memed.* İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.

Kemal, Y. (2018). *Teneke.* İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.

Kerblay, B. (1966). A. V. Chayanov: Life, Career, Works. In A. Chayanov, D. Thorner, B. Kerblay, & R. Smith (Eds.), *The Theory of Peasant Economy* (1 ed., p. 317). Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

Keyder, Ç. (1993). *Ulusal Kalkınmacığın İflası.* İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.

Keyder, Ç. (2017). *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Keyder, Ç., & Yenal, Z. (2013). *Bildiğimiz Tarımın Sonu.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Kim, E. (1998). Globalization of Capital Markets and the Asian Financial Crisis. *Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 11*(3), 30-39.

King, R. (1978). Return Migration: A Neglected Aspect of Population Geography. *Area, 10*(3 (1978)), 175-182. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/20001343

Kırsal Kalkınma Projeleri Kapsamında Genç Çiftçi Projelerinin Desteklenmesine İlişkin Karar. (2016, February 16). *Official Gazette,*. Retrieved February 28, 2023, from https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2016/02/20160226-10.pdf

Kızılaslan, N., & Almus, S. (2001). Arazi Toplulaştırmasında Çiftçi Eğilimleri (Tokat - Zile Güzelbeyli Örneği). *Gaziosmanpaşa Üniversitesi Ziraat Fakültesi Dergisi, 18*(1), 51-60.

Kızıldere, G. (1983). *Türkiye Toplumunun Değişim ve Gelişimi.*

Kloppenburg, J. (2010). Seed Sovereignty: The Promise of Open Source Biology. In H. Wittman, A. Desmarais, & N. Wiebe (Eds.), *Food Sovereignty: Reconnecting Food, Nature and Community* (pp. 152-167). Fernwood Publishing: Halifax & Winnipeg.

Knezevic, I. (2014). Free markets for all: Transition economies and the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy. In P. Andree, J. Ayres, M. Bosia, & M. Massicotte (Eds.), *Globalization and food sovereignty: Global and local change in the new politics of food* (pp. 228-252). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Koç, A. (2005). Türkiye'de Tarımsal Ürün ve Girdi Piyasaları. In F. Yavuz (Ed.), *Türkiye'de Tarım* (pp. 130-159). Ankara: Tarım ve Köyişleri Bakanlığı.

Koç, B., & Gül, A. (2006). *Türkiye'de Bir Kırsal Kalkınma Modeli Olarak Köykentler ve Köykentlerde Tarımsal İşletmelerin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Analizi.* Tarımsal Ekonomic Araştırma Enstitüsü. Ankara: T.C. Tarım ve Köyişleri Bakanlığı.

Komuscu, A. (1999, February). Using the SPI to Analyze Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Drought in Turkey. *Network News*, 7-13.

Kooperatifler Kanunu. (1969, April 24). *Offical Gazette, Date: 5/10/1969, No: 13195*. Retrieved from https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/1.5.1163.pdf

Köse, A., & Bahçe, S. (2011). “Yoksulluk” Yazınının Yoksulluğu: Toplumsal Sınıflarla Düşünmek. *Praksis, 19*, 385-419.

Köse, A., & Bahçe, S. (2017). Social Classes and the Neo-Liberal Poverty Regime in Turkey, 2002–2011. *Journal of Contemporary Asia, 47*(4), 575-595. doi:10.1080/00472336.2017.1325919

Köy Kanunu. (1924). *Official Gazette, Date: 7/4/1924, No: 68*. Retrieved from https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.3.442.pdf

Köymen, O. (2009). Kapitalizm ve Köylülük: Ağalar - Üretenler - Patronlar. *Mülkiye, XXXIII*(262).

Kredi Kayıt Bürosu. (2019). *Türkiye Tarımsal Görünüm Saha Araştırması.* Retrieved May 6, 2023, from https://www.kkb.com.tr/Resources/ContentFile/2019_KKB_TURKIYE_TARIMSAL_GORUNUM_SAHA_ARA%C5%9ETIRMASI.pdf

Kredi Kayıt Bürosu. (2022). *Türkiye Tarımsal Görünüm Saha Araştırması.* Kredi Kayıt Bürosu. Retrieved from https://www.kkb.com.tr/Resources/ContentFile/KKB_2022_TARIMSAL_GORUNUM_SAHA_ARASTIRMA_KASIM_2022.pdf

Kroeber, A. (1948). *Anthropology* (2nd ed.). New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.

Krogstad, E. (2007, March-April). The Post-Washington Consensus: Brand New Agenda or Old Wine in a New Bottle? *50*(2), 67-85. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/40722440

Krueger, A. (1990, Summer). Government Failures in Development. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4*(3). Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1942926

Kundu, A., Pradhan, B., & Subramanian, A. (2002, December 14-20). Dichotomy or Continuum: Analysis of Impact of Urban Centers on Their Periphery. *Economic and Political Weekly, 37*(50), 5039-5046.

Kurhan, Y. (1955). Eskitaşlı Köyü Monografisi. *İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi, 2*(10-11), 44-59. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iusosyoloji/issue/552/5398

Kurhan, Y. (1955). Yenibedir Köyü Monografisi. *İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi, 2*(10-11), 60-71. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iusosyoloji/issue/552/5399

Laferté , G., & Renahy, N. (2006). Tradition, modernization and domination: Three perspectives of French rural studies crystallized around a single survey (RCP Châtillonnais, 1966–1975). *SSHA's 31st Annual Meeting.* Minneapolis, Minnesota: Centre d'Economie et Sociologie (CESAER).

Lamaison, P., & Bourdieu, P. (1986). From Rules to Strategies: An Interview with Pierre Bourdieu. *Cultural Anthropology, 1*(1), 110-120. Retrieved May 14, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/656327

Lamont, M., & Lareau, A. (1988, Autumn). Cultural Capital: Allusions, Gaps and Glissandos in Recent Theoretical Developments. *Sociological Theory, 6*(2), 153-168.

Law No. 5779. (n.d.). *İl Özel İdarelerine ve Belediyelere Genel Bütçe Vergi Gelirlerinden Pay Verilmesi Hakkinda Kanun*. Retrieved from https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=5779&MevzuatTur=1&MevzuatTertip=5

Lee, E. (1966). A Theory of Migration. *Demography, 3*(1), 47-57. Retrieved from http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0070-3370%281966%293%3A1%3C47%3AATOM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B

Lee, R., & Mason, A. (2011, June). The Price of Maturity. *Finance and Development*.

Lees, S. (1986, September). Coping with Bureaucracy: Survival Strategies in Irrigated Agriculture. *American Anthropologist, 88*(3), 610-622. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/679480

Lenin, V. (1977). *Collected Works, Volume 3, The Development of Capitalism in Russia.* Moscow: Progress Publishers.

Lenin, V. (2008). *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.* Marxist Internet Archive. Retrieved November 5, 2023, from https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1899/devel/index.htm#Chapter3

Lerner, D. (1958). *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East.* New York: The Free Press.

Lesay, I. (2012, Fall). How 'Post' Is the Post-Washington Consensus? *Journal of Third World Studies, 29*(2), 183-198. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/45194943

Letenyei, L. (2000). A Network Interpretation of the Chayanov's Model. *Society and Economy in Central and Eastern Europe, 22*(3), 117-131. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/41468483

Lever, W. (1991, December). Deindustrialisation and the Reality of the Post-Industrial City. *Urban Studies, 28*(6), 893-999. doi:https://www.jstor.org/stable/43195853

Lewis, W. (1954, May). Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour. *The Manchester School*. Retrieved October 08, 2023, from https://la.utexas.edu/users/hcleaver/368/368lewistable.pdf

Long, N. (1982). *An Introduction to the Sociology of Rural Development.* Bungay: English Language Book Society and Tavistock Publications.

Loyal, S., & Quilley, S. (2017). The particularity of the universal: critical reflectionson Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power and the state. *Theory and Society, 46*, 429-462. doi:10.1007/s11186-017-9298-y

Lukacs, G. (1967). *Class Consciousness.* (R. Livingstone, Trans.) Merlin Press. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/history/lukacs3.htm

Maddock, N. (2020). *What Works in Rural Development and How? Exogenous and Endogenous Growth Factors in Rural Development.* UNDP. The European Union for Georgia ENPARD. Retrieved from https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/ge/undp_ge_povred_growth-factors-in-rural-development-2020_eng.pdf

Makal, A. (2019). *Bizim Köy.* İstanbul: Literatür Yayıncılık.

Mandal, R. (1989). *Systems of Rural Settlements in Developing Countries.* New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company.

Marshall, J. (1947, July). Aristotle and Agrarians. *The Review of Politics, 9*(3), 350-361. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1404020

Martin, S., & Clapp, J. (2015, October). Finance for Agriculture or Agriculture for Finance? *Journal of Agrarian Change, 15*(4), 549-559. doi:10.1111/joac.12110

Marx, K. (1853, June 25). The British Rule in India. *New-York Daily Tribune*. Retrieved November 4, 2023, from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1853/06/25.htm

Marx, K. (1959a). *Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844.* (M. Milligan, Trans.) Moscow: Progress Publishers. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-Manuscripts-1844.pdf

Marx, K. (1959b). *Capital - A Critique of Political Economy* (Vol. 3). NY: International Publishers. Retrieved October 22, 2023, from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-III.pdf

Marx, K. (1973). *Grundrisse.* (M. Nicolaus, Trans.) Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books in association with New Left Review.

Marx, K. (1999a). *Capital* (Vols. III - The Process of Capitalist Production as a Whole). (F. Engels, Ed.) marxist.org. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Capital-Volume-III.pdf

Marx, K. (1999b). *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (Online Version ed.). (S. Padover, & Progress Publishers, Trans.) Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org). Retrieved December 27, 2023, from https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1993). *The Communist Manifesto.* (F. Engels, Ed.) The Project Gutenberg eBook of The Communist Manifesto. Retrieved from https://www.gutenberg.org/files/61/61-h/61-h.htm

Masser, F., & Stroud, D. (1965, July). The Metropolitan Village. *The Town Planning Review, 36*(2), 111-124. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/40102463

Maton, K. (2010). Habitus. In M. Grenfell (Ed.), *Pierre Bourdieu Key Concepts* (pp. 49-66). Durham: Acumen.

Matthews, S. (2004). Post-development theory and the question of alternatives: a view from Africa. *Third World Quarterly, 25*(2), 373-384. doi:10.1080/0143659042000174860

Mazzanti, M. (2002, March). Cultural heritage as multi-dimensional, multi-value and multi-attribute economic good: toward a new framework for economic analysis and valuation. *Journal of Socio-Economics, 31*, 529-558.

McCullough, E., Pingali, P., & Stamoulis, K. (Eds.). (2008). *The Transformation of Agri-Food Systems: Globalization, Supply Chains and Smallholder Farmers.* London: Earthscan.

McKee, T., Doesken, N., & Kleist, J. (1993). The Relationship of Drought Frequency and Duration to Time Scales. *Proceedings of the 8th Conference on Applied Climatology* (pp. 17-22). Anaheim, CA. Boston, MA.: American Meteorological Society.

McMahon, M. (2014). Local food: Food sovereignty or myth of alternative consumer sovereignty? In P. Andrée, J. Ayres, M. Bosia, & M. Massicotte (Eds.), *Globalizationand Food Sovereignty: Global and Local Change in the New Politics of Food* (pp. 111-138). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

McMichael, P. (2008, April 25). Peasants Make Their Own History, But Not Just as They Please... *Journal of Agrarian Change, 8*(2-3), 205-228. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0366.2008.00168.x

McMichael, P. (2009, January). A Food Regime Genealogy. *The Journal of Peasant Studies, 36*(1), 139-169. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150902820354

McMichael, P. (2009, April). Banking on Agriculture: A Review of the World Development Report 2008. *Journal of Agrarian Change, 9*(2), 235-246.

McMichael, P. (2013). Value-chain Agriculture and Debt Relations: contradictory outcomes. *Third World Quarterly, 34*(4), 671-690. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/42002149

McMichael, P., & Buttel, F. (1990). New Directions in the Political Economy of Agriculture. *Critical Theory, 33*(1), 89-109. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1388979

McMichael, P., & Schneider, M. (2011). Food Security Politics and the Millennium Development Goals. *Third World Quarterly, 32*(1), 119-139.

Mendras, H. (1970). *The Vanishing Peasant: Innovation and Change in French Agriculture.* (J. Lerner, Trans.) Massachussets: The MIT Press. Retrieved December 4, 2023, from https://archive.org/details/vanishingpeasant0000mend/page/n6/mode/1up?view=theater

Mendras, H. (2002). The Invention of the Peasantry: A Moment in the History of Post-World War II French Sociology. *Revue française de sociologie, 43, Supplement: An Annual English Selection*, 157-171. doi:https://doi.org/10.2307/3322761

Mengi, A., Çınar, T., & Keleş, R. (2017). Transformation of Rural Lands into Urban Uses: Impact Upon Environmental Assets in Turkey. In E. Hepperle, R. Dixon-Gough, R. Mansberger, J. Paulsson, J. Hernik, & T. Kalbro (Eds.), *Land Ownership and Land Use Development: The Integration of Past, Present, and Future in Spatial Planning and Land Management Policies* (pp. 221-228).

Midgal, J. (1977). *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution.* Priceton: Priceton University Press.

Millett, P. (1984). Hesiod and His World. *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, 30 (210)*, 84-115. Retrieved November 29, 2023, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/44698806

Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı. (n.d.). *T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yozgat/Sorgun - Çiğdemli Yunus Emre İlkokulu*. Retrieved from Tarihçe: https://cyeio.meb.k12.tr/tema/dosyadetay.php?KATEGORINO=1837895&CHK=327e839c1c1442f70e0fddf4718b10a7

Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı. (n.d.). *T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yozgat/Sorgun Çiğdemli Çok Programlı Anadolu Lisesi*. Retrieved from Teşkilat Şeması: http://cigdemlicpl.meb.k12.tr/66/07/321853/teskilat_semasi.html

Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı. (n.d.). *Tarihçemiz*. Retrieved from Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yozgat/Sorgun - Sorgun Çiğdemli İmam Hatip Ortaokulu: https://cigdemliortaokulu.meb.k12.tr/tema/icerikdetay.php?KATEGORINO=9650453

Ministry of Interior, Precidency of Migration Management. (2024, April 4). *Temporary Protection*. Retrieved from Precidency of Migration Management: https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27

Mishel, L. (1989). The Late Great Debate on Deindustrialization. *Challenge*, *32*(1), 35-43. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/40720408

Misra, M. (2017, July). Is Peasantry Dead? Neoliberal Reforms, the Stateand Agrarian Change in Bangladesh. *Journal of Agrarian Change, 17*(3), 594-611. doi:10.1111/joac.12172

Monllor, N. (2012). *Farm Entry: A Comparative Analysis of Young Farmers, Their Pathways, Attitudes and Practices in Ontario (Canada) and Catalunya (Spain).* accesstoland.eu. Retrieved December 10, 2023, from https://www.accesstoland.eu/IMG/pdf/monllor_farm_entry_report_2012.pdf

Montesquieu, C. (2001). *The Spirit of Laws.* (T. Nugent, Trans.) London: Batoche Books.

Moore, B. (1966). *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.* Boston: Beacon Press.

Moore, R. (2010). Capital. In M. Grenfell (Ed.), *Pierre Bourdieu Key Concepts* (Vol. 6, pp. 101-118). Durham: Acumen.

Moore, W. (1963). *Social Change.* New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Morgan, L. (2007). *Ancient Society: or, Researches in the lines of human progress from savagery through barbarism to civilization.* USA: Kessinger Pub.

Municipality Law No. 5393. (n.d.). *Official Gazette Date 13/7/2005 Issue 25874*. Retrieved from https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=5393&MevzuatTur=1&MevzuatTertip=5

Murdoch, J. (2000, October). Networks — a new paradigm of rural development? *Journal of Rural Studies, 16*(4), 407-419. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/S0743-0167(00)00022-X

Mynet. (2005, August 8). *Mynet*. Retrieved April 01, 2023, from "Sen kimsin ki Sezer'e saldırıyorsun": https://www.mynet.com/sen-kimsin-ki-sezere-saldiriyorsun-110100154840

Nagy, E. (1998). Growth and urban differentiation on the urban periphery: A case study from Szeged, Hungary. *GeoJournal, 46*(3), 221-230. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/41147292

Nechyba, T., & Walsh, R. (2004, Autumn). Urban Sprawl. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18*(4), 177-200. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3216798

Nelson, L. (1980). *Rural Sociology: Its Origin and Growth in the United States.* USA: Greenwood Press, Publishers.

Nişanyan, S. (n.d.). Retrieved December 21, 2021, from Nişanyan Yeradları: Türkiye ve Çevre Ülkeler Yerleşim Birimleri Envanteri: https://nisanyanyeradlari.com/?yer=40339&haritasi=%C3%A7i%C4%9Fdemli

O'Brein, K., & Leichenko, R. (2000, October). Double Exposure: Assessing the Impacts of Climate Change within the Context of Economic Globalization. *Global Environmental Change, 10*(3), 221-232.

O'Brien, D., Hassinger, E., & Dershem, L. (1996, February). Size of Place, Residential Stability and Personal Social Networks. *Sociological Focus, 29*(1), 61-72. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/20831768

Oda TV. (2019, April 29). *AKP'den alınan belde belediyesinin borcu "pes" dedirtti*. Retrieved from Oda TV: https://www.odatv4.com/siyaset/akpden-alinan-belde-belediyesinin-borcu-pes-dedirtti-160379

OECD. (2016). *Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation 2016.* Paris: OECD Publishing. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/agr_pol-2016-en

OECD. (2017). *Agricultural Support*. doi:10.1787/6ea85c58-en

Oks, D., & Williams, H. (2022, Winter). The Long, Slow Death of Global Development. *The American Affairs Journal, VI*(4). Retrieved November 4, 2023, from https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2022/11/the-long-slow-death-of-global-development/

Olağanüstü Hal Kapsamında Bazi Düzenlemeler Yapılması Hakkında Kanun Hükmünde Kararname. (2017, November 11). *Official Gazette, Date: 12/24/2017, No: 30280*. Retrieved from https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2017/12/20171224-22.htm

Ollman, B. (1968, March). Marx's Use of "Class". *American Journal of Sociology, 73*(5), 573-580. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.com/stable/2775559

Oral, N. (Ed.). (2015). *Türkiye'de Tarımın Ekonomi-Politiği (1923-2013).* İstanbul: Nota Bene Yayınları.

Oyan, O. (2000). Tarımda Doğrudan Gelir Desteğine Hazır mıyız? *Tarım Ekonomisi Dergisi, 5*(1-2). Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/tarekoder/issue/25834/272383#article_cite

Oyan, O. (2015). Tarımda IMF-DB Gözetiminde 2000'li Yıllar. In N. Oral (Ed.), *Türkiye'de Tarımın Ekonomi-Politiği 1923-2013* (pp. 111-130). Ankara: TMMOB Ziraat Mühendisleri Odası Bursa Şubesi & NotaBene Yayınları.

Ozankaya, Ö. (1971). *Köyde Toplumsal Yapı ve Siyasal Kültür - İki Grup Köyde Yapılan Karşılaştırmalı Bir Araştırma.* Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası.

Öğütle, V., & Çeğin, G. (2010). *Toplumsal Sınıfların İlişkisel Gerçekliği.* Ankara: Tan Kitabevi Yayınları.

Önder, İ. (2019). Âşarın Kaldırılması. *Mülkiye Dergisi, 43*(2), 491-510.

Öngen, T. (2002, Güz). Marx ve Sınıf. *Praksis, 8*, 9-28.

Özdemir, N. (2013). Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye'de Yol Vergisi. *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi, 32*(53), 213-248. doi:https://doi.org/10.1501/Tarar_0000000541

Özensel, E. (2018). *Kır Sosyolojisi.* Konya: Çizgi Kitabevi Yayınları.

Öztaş, N. (2015). *Türkiye'de Şeker Sektörü Üretim Süreci ve Çalışma İlişkileri - Yönetsel, Hukuki, Sosyolojik ve Ekonomik Boyutlarıyla Şeker Sanayii Araştırma Projesi.* Türkiye Gıda ve Şeker Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası. Ankara: Türkiye Gıda ve Şeker Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası.

Özuğurlu, M. (2014). *Küçük Köylülüğe Sermaye Kapanı.* İstanbul: Nota Bene Yayınları.

Pahl, R. (1964). *Urbs in Rure: The Metropolitan Fringe in Hertfordshire.* London: London School of Economics and Political Science Geographical Papers No. 2.

Pamuk, Ş. (2016). *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi.* İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.

Pancar Ekicileri Kooperatifleri Birliği. (n.d.). *Genel Bilgi ve Tarihçe*. Retrieved April 3, 2023, from Pankobirlik: https://www.pankobirlik.com.tr/AnaSayfa/Genel_Bilgi_ve_Tarihce#

Pandey, V. (2003, March). Re-presenting Rural: From Definition to Discourse. *Sociological Bulletin, 52*(1), 32-52. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/23620300

Peterson, W. (1997, January). Are Large Farms More Efficient? *AgEcon Search*(Staff Paper P97-02), 15. doi:10.22004/ag.econ.13411

Petrini, C. (2001). *Slow Food: The Case for Taste.* (W. McCuaig, Trans.) New York: Columbia University Press.

Pierce, J. (2003). *Bir Türk Köyünde Yaşam.* (Z. Sarıhacıoğlu, Trans.) İstanbul: Epsilon.

Pieris, R. (1969). *Studies in the Sociology of Development.* Rotterdam University Press.

Pinkerton, T., & Hopkins, R. (2009). *Local Food: How to Make It Happen in Your Community.* Cambridge: Green Books.

Plato. (1975). *Philebus.* (J. Gosling, Trans.) Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Ploeg, J. (2008). *The New Peasantries : Struggles for Autonomy and Sustainability in an Era of Empire and Globalization.* London: Earthscan.

Ploeg, J., Renting, H., Brunori, G., Knickel, K., Mannion, J., Marsden, T., . . . Ventura, F. (2000, October). Rural Development: From Practices and Policies Towards Theory. *Sociologia Ruralis, 40*(4), 391-408. Retrieved from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-9523.00156

Polanyi, K. (2001). *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time.* Boston: Beacon Press. Retrieved from https://inctpped.ie.ufrj.br/spiderweb/pdf_4/Great_Transformation.pdf

Polatlı Ticaret Borsası. (2020). *Kırmızı Sert Buğdayın Yıllar İtibariyle Aylık Ortalama Fiyatları.* Retrieved Ocak 25, 2020, from Polatlı Ticaret Borsası: https://www.polatliborsa.org.tr/fiyat-endeksleri/bugday/bugday-fiyat-endeksi/

Popkin, S. (1979). *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Poulantzas, N. (1976a). *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism.* (D. Fernbach, Trans.) London: NLB.

Poulantzas, N. (1976b). *Political Power and Social Classes.* (T. O'Hagan, Trans.) London: NLB.

Pressman, S., & Holt, R. (2008, June). Nicholas Kaldor and Cumulative Causation: Public Policy Implications. *Journal of Economic Issues, 42*(2), 367-373. Retrieved October 9, 2023, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/25511321

Prial, D. (2019, November). *Community Supported Agriculture*. Retrieved November 12, 2023, from ATTRA Sustainable Agriculture: https://attra.ncat.org/publication/community-supported-agriculture/

Putnam, R. (1993). *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Qi, H. (2019). Semi-Proletarianization in a Dual Economy: The Case of China. *Review oof Radical Political Economics, 51*(4), 553-561.

Raedeke, A., Green, J., Hodge, S., & Valdivia, C. (2003). Farmers, the Practice of Farming and the Future of Agroforestry: An Application of Bourdieu's Concepts of Field and Habitus. *Rural Sociology, 68*(1), 64-86.

Ragin, C. (2009). Introduction: Cases of "What is a case?". In C. Ragin, & H. Becker (Eds.), *What is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry* (pp. 1-18). New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.

Rahmato, D. (1991). *Famine and Survival Strategies: A Case Study form Northeast Ethiopia.* Uppsala: The Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA).

Ravenstein, E. (1885, June). The Laws of Migration. *Journal of the Statistical Society of London, 48*(2), 167-235. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2979181

Ravenstein, E. (1889, June). The Laws of Migration. *Journal of Royal Statistical Society, 52*(2), 241-305. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2979333

Rawdanowicz, Ł. (2010). *The 2008-09 Crisis in Turkey: Performance, Policy Responses and Challenges for Sustaining the Recovery.* OECD Economics Department Working Papers, OECD.

Reay, D. (2000, November). A useful extension of Bourdieu's conceptual framework?: emotional capital as a way of understanding mother's involvement in their children's education. *The Sociological Review, 48*(4), 568-585. doi:https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-954X.0023

Redfield, R. (1956). *Peasant Society and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Civilization.* Chicago, Illinois, USA: The University of Chicago Press. Retrieved November 28, 2023, from https://ia801605.us.archive.org/35/items/peasentsocietyan030677mbp/peasentsocietyan030677mbp.pdf

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. (2022). *Türkiye Şeker Sektörü.* Presentation, Şeker Dairesi Başkanlığı. Retrieved April 16, 2023, from https://www.tarimorman.gov.tr/SDB/Belgeler/sektorel%20veriler/Tu%CC%88rkiye%20S%CC%A7eker%20Sekto%CC%88ru%CC%88%20Web%20I%CC%87c%CC%A7in-ocak%202023.pdf

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. (2023, February 20). *Amounts of Use of Plant Protection Products at Provincial Level (in Agricultural Control Practices), 2016*. Retrieved from T.C. Tarım ve Orman Bakanlığı Gıda ve Kontrol Genel Müdürlüğü: https://www.tarimorman.gov.tr/GKGM/Belgeler/DB_Bitki_Koruma_Urunleri/Istatistik/Il_Duzeyinde_BKU_Kullanim_Miktar_2016.pdf

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture And Forestry. (2023, February 5). *The Usage Amount of Plant Protection Products (By Grouping) By Years, 2006-2020*. Retrieved from T.C. Tarım ve Orman Bakanlığı Gıda ve Kontrol Genel Müdürlüğü: https://www.tarimorman.gov.tr/GKGM/Belgeler/DB_Bitki_Koruma_Urunleri/Istatistik/Yillar_Itibariyla_BKU_Kullanim_Miktar_2006-2020.pdf

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry General Directorate of Agricultural Reform. (2022, March 1). Grant amounts paid to young farmers under the rural development young farmer projects support program. Unpublished raw data.

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry General Directorate of Agricultural Reform. (2022, March 1). Grant supports provided to natural and legal persons within the scope of the Rural Development Investments Support Program (KKYDP). Unpublished raw data.

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry General Directorate of Agricultural Reform. (2022, May 23). Number of Registered Farmers, Average Farm Size, and Number of Rental Contracts in Turkey, Sorgun, and Çiğdemli, 2015-2021. Unpublished raw data.

Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry General Directorate of Agricultural Reform. (2022, March 1). Rent, transportation, and analysis fee supports paid to producers storing their products in licensed warehouses. Unpublished raw data.

Republic of Türkiye Supreme Election Council. (2023). *Mahalli İdareler Genel Seçimleri Arşivi.* Retrieved from T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu: https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/mahalli-idareler-genel-secimleri-arsivi/2650

Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change. (2023). *13.2 Kimyevi Gübre Kullanımı*. Retrieved from Çevresel Göstergeler: https://cevreselgostergeler.csb.gov.tr/kimyevi-gubre-kullanimi-i-85833

Richmond, M. (2002). Population Pyramids. In D. Husle, S. Gregory, & J. Baker, *Willamette River Basin Atlas* (pp. 64-65). PNW Ecosystem Research Consortium.

Riley, M., Sangster, H., Smith, H., Chiverrell, R., & Boyle, J. (2018). Will farmers work together for conservation? The potential limits of farmers' cooperation in agri-environment measures. *Land Use Policy, 70*, 635-646. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.10.049

Rodrik, D. (2015, November 21). Premature Deindustrialization. *Journal of Economic Growth, 21*, 1-33. doi:10.1007/s10887-015-9122-3

Rosling, T., Roberts, D., & Orden, D. (2004). *Food Regulation and Trade: Towards a Safe and Open Global System.* Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.

Rostow, R. (1960). *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.* New York: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved November 4, 2023, from https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-03062A001100030001-6.pdf

Sağlam, S. (2016). Türkiye'de Köyle İlgili Uygulama ve Çalışmalar ile Türk Sosyolojisindeki Yansımaları. *Sosyoloji Konferansları, 53*(2016-1), 221-255. doi:10.18368/IU/sk.17721

Saldanha, D. (1988, Jan 30). Antonio Gramsci and the Analysis of Class Consciousness: Some Methodological Considerations. *Economic and Political Weekly, 23*(5). Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/4378043

Salvioni, C., Henke, R., & Vanni, F. (2020, January 8). The Impact of Non-Agricultural Diversification on Financial Performance: Evidence from Family Farms in Italy. *Sustainability, 12*(486), 1-14. doi:doi:10.3390/su12020486

Samberg, L., Gerber, J., Ramankutty, N., Herrero, M., & West, P. (2016, November 30). Subnational distribution of average farm size and smallholder contributions to global food production. *Environmental Research Letters, 11*. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/11/12/124010

Sanal, M. (2005, June 06). *Gaspedilen Alınteri*. Retrieved April 01, 2023, from Yozgat: https://www.yozgatgazetesi.com/mehmet-sanal/gasbedilen-alinteri-80743.html

Sapiro, G. (2015). Habitus: History of a Concept. (2nd, Ed.) *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 10*, 484-489. doi:10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.03085-3

Savage, M. (2011). The Lost Urban Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. In G. Bridge, & S. Watson (Eds.), *The New Blackwell Companion to the City* (pp. 511-520). Blackwell Publishing.

Savran, S. (2011). Sermaye Birikimi, Sınıf Mücadeleleri, Devlet. In M. Süalp, A. Güneş, & Z. Akbal Süalp (Eds.), *Sınıf İlişkileri* (pp. 73-96). Ankara: Bağlam Yayıncılık.

Sayın, C. (1997, October, November, December). Türkiye'de Tarımsal Destekleme Politikaları. *Kooperatifçilik, 118*, 31-40.

Sayın, C., Altunkaya, M., Taşçıoğlu, Y., Sav, O., & Kavasoğlu, İ. (2017). Türkiye'de toprak parçalanması ve miras hukuku. *Mediterranian Agricultural Sciences, 30*(3), 213-218. doi:10.29136/mediterranean.359827

Schaffer, S. (1995). Hegemony and the Habitus: Gramsci, Bourdieu, and James Scott on the Problem of Resistance. *Research and Society, 8*, 29-53.

Schick, I., & Tonak, E. (Eds.). (2006). *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye.* İstanbul: Belge Yayınları.

Schultz, T. (1964). *Transforming Traditional Agriculture.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Scott, J. (1985a). *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Scott, J. (1985b). *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance.* USA: Yale University Press.

Scoville, O., & Smith, K. (1953). *Part-Time Farming.* Washington, D.C. Retrieved February 5, 2023, from https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc1722/m1/3/

Sezen, F. (Producer), & Sezen, F. (Director). (2021). *Çiğdemli Kasabası Belgeseli* [Motion Picture]. Retrieved February 1, 2022, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_I3J-KDHICw

Sezen, T. (2017). *Osmanlı Yer Adları.* Ankara: Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü. Retrieved from https://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/varliklar/dosyalar/eskisiteden/yayinlar/genel-mudurluk-yayinlar/osmanli_yer_adlari.pdf

Shanin, T. (1971). Peasantry: Delineation of a sociological concept and a field of study. *European Journal of Sociology, 12*(2), 289-300. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/23998674

Shanin, T. (1972). *The Awkward Class: Political Sociology of Peasantry in a Developing Society: Russia 1910-1925.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Shanin, T. (Ed.). (1973). *Peasants and Peasant Societies.* Great Britain: Penguin Education.

Shanin, T. (1986). *Russia 1905-7 Revolution as a Moment of Truth* (Vols. 2 - The roots of otherness: Russia's turn of century). London: Macmillan.

Shilling, C. (2004, September). Physical capital and situated action: a new direction for corporeal sociology. *British Journal of Sociology of Education, 25*(4), 473-487. doi:10.1080/0142569042000236961

SinghaRoy, D. (2005, December 24-30). Peasant Movements in Contemporary India: Emerging Forms of Domination and Resistance. *Economic and Political Weekly, 40*(52), 5505-5513. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/4417584

Slow Food Foundation. (n.d.). *About Us*. Retrieved from Slow Food: https://www.slowfood.com/about-us/

Solarist. (2018, June 28). *Çiğdemli Belediyesinden Güneş Enerjisi yatırımı*. Retrieved from Solarist: https://www.solar.ist/cigdemli-belediyesinden-gunes-enerjisi-yatirimi/

Sonnenfeld, D., & Oosterveer, P. (2012). *Food, Globalization and Sustainability*. UK: Earthscan.

Sorgun Agriculture District Directorate. (2020, June 29). Planting and harvest data for Çiğdemli Town, 2014 - 2020. Unpublished raw data.

Sorgun District Governorship. (n.d.). *http://www.sorgun.gov.tr/idari-yapi-ve-nufus*. Retrieved March 7, 2023, from http://www.sorgun.gov.tr: http://www.sorgun.gov.tr/idari-yapi-ve-nufus

Sorgun District Governorship. (n.d.). *http://www.sorgun.gov.tr/mahalli-idareler*. Retrieved March 7, 2023, from http://www.sorgun.gov.tr: http://www.sorgun.gov.tr/mahalli-idareler

*Sorgun İlçesi Su Sıkıntısı Çekmeyecek*. (2012, August 10). Retrieved May 28, 2020, from Memurlar.net: https://www.memurlar.net/haber/269577/sorgun-ilcesi-su-sikintisi-cekmeyecek.html

Sorgun Kaymakamlığı. (n.d.). *Tarihçe*. Retrieved from Sorgun Kaymakamlığı: http://www.sorgun.gov.tr/tarihce

Sorgun Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası. (2020). *2019 Yılı İlçe Raporu.*

Sorgun'da 2015 Yıl Sonu İtibariyle Su Abone Sayısı 21 Bini Geçti. (2016, January 8). *Hürriyet*. Retrieved May 28, 2020, from https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yerel-haberler/yozgat/sorgun-da-2015-yil-sonu-itibariyle-su-abone-sayisi-21-bini-gecti-37224683

Sorgun'da Su Sorunu Çözüldü. (2021, 08 19). *HaberTürk*. Retrieved December 8, 2021, from https://www.haberturk.com/yozgat-haberleri/89919754-sorgunda-su-sorunu-cozuldu

*Sorgun'da Şehir Suyuna Takviye*. (2018, July 30). Retrieved May 28, 2020, from Sorgun Belediyesi: https://www.sorgun.bel.tr/haberler/sorgunda-sehir-sebeke-suyuna-takviye

Sorokin, P., & Zimmerman, C. (1929). *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology.* New York: Henry Holt and Company.

Sorokin, P., Zimmerman, C., & Galpin, C. (Eds.). (1930). *A Systematic Sourcebook in Rural Sociology.* Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.

Soyşekerci, S. (2021). Türkiye'de Köy Sosyolojisi Üzerine Bir Tahlil. *Smart Journal, 7*(52), 3119-3130. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.31576/smryj.1200

Sönmez, A. (1993). *Peasant household survival strategies: Rural Transformation in the Heartland of Turkey's Hazelnut Production Belt.* Durham University. Retrieved from http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/5616/

Sözcü. (2019, May 2). *Nüfus 2050 borç 11 milyon*. Retrieved from Sözcü: https://www.sozcu.com.tr/nufus-2050-borc-11-milyon-wp4650156

Spencer, H. (1867). *First Principles* (2nd ed.). London: Williams and Norgate. Retrieved October 22, 2023, from https://oll-resources.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/oll3/store/titles/1390/0624_Bk.pdf

Spradley, J. (1980). *Participant Observation.* USA: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Stalin, J. (1954). The Agrarian Question. In J. Stalin, *Works* (Vols. 1 November 1901 - April 1907). Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House - Marxists Internet Archive. Retrieved October 2023, 25, from https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1906/03/x01.htm

Standing, G. (2014). *The Precariat: The new dangerous class.* London: Bloomsbury.

Standing, G. (2018, October). The Precariat: Today's Transformative Class? *Great Transition Initiative*. Retrieved from https://greattransition.org/publication/precariat-transformative-class

Sterne, J. (2003). Bourdieu, Technique and Technology. *Cultural Studies, 17*(3/4), 367-389.

Stirling, P. (1965). *Turkish Village.* London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Stoltzfus, V. (1973, Summer). Amish Agriculture: Adoptive Strategies for Economic Survival of Community Life. *Rural Sociology, 38*(2), 196-206.

Su Sıkıntısı Giderildi. (2011, August 16). *İleri Gazetesi*. Retrieved May 28, 2020, from https://www.ilerigazetesi.com.tr/su-sikintisi-giderildi

Sucu, İ. (2016, January-December). Mehmet Ali Şevki Bey: Türkiye'de 'Sosyal Bilim' Ekolünün Temsili. *Sosyologca, 6*(11-12), 143-159.

Sungur, A. (2021, June 7). Ahmet Sungur - Çiğdemli Belediye Başkanı. (M. Erciyas, Interviewer) Yozgat TV. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y_JpO3FWbDc

Sutherland, L.-A., & Burton, R. (2011, July). Good Farmers, Good Neighbours? The Role of Cultural Capital in Social Capital Development in a Scottish Farming Community. *Sociologia Ruralis, 51*(3), 238-255. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9523.2011.00536.x

Svoboda, M., & Fuchs, B. (2016). *Handbook of Drought Indicators and Indices.* Integrated Drought Management Programme (IDMP), Integrated Drought Management Tools and Guidelines Series 2, World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and Global Water Partnership (GWP), Geneva.

Swartz, D. (1997). *Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu.* Chicago, USA: The University of Chicago Press.

Swartz, D. (n.d.). *Culture & Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Şahin, H. (2022). Kent ve Köyün Sosyo-Ekonomik Avantajlarını Birleştirme Deneyimlerinin OECD Refah Göstergeleri Üzerinden Değerlendirilmesi. *Kültür Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2022*(15), 100-123. doi:10.46250/kulturder.1184677

Şahin, M. (2017). Türk Sosyolojisinin Kısa Tarihi: Dönemler, Şahıslar ve Ana Yönelimler. *İslami İlimler Dergisi, 12*(1), 7-41. Retrieved from https://isamveri.org/pdfdrg/D02917/2017_1/2017_1_SAHINMC.pdf

Şeker Kanunu. (2001, April 4). *Official Gazette, Date: 4/19/2001, No: 24378*. Retrieved from https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.4634.pdf

Şeker ve Hammaddeleri Yönetmeliği. (n.d.). *Official Gazette, Date: 6/5/2021, No: 31502*. Retrieved from https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2021/06/20210605-14.htm

Şenol, P., & Altuntek, N. (2017, April). Yapılaşmış Kırsal Habitusun Değişimi: Üç Köy Okuması. *Sosyoloji Araştırmaları Dergisi, 20*(1), 201-236.

T.C. Sorgun Kaymakamlığı. (2023, April 2). *T.C. Sorgun Kaymakamlığı*. Retrieved from İklim ve Bitki Örtüsü: http://www.sorgun.gov.tr/iklim-ve-bitki-ortusu

Tahir, K. (1997). *Rahmet Yolları Kesti.* İstanbul: Adam Yayınları.

Tahir, K. (2007). *Körduman.* İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları.

Tanilli, S. (2010). Köy Enstitüleri ve Mirası: Gerçekler ve Gelecek. *Köy Enstitüleri Sempozyumu* (pp. 12-27). İstanbul: Kastamonu Gölköy Enstitülüler Vakfı, Yeşil Kuşak Köy Enstitülüler Derneği, Köy Enstitüleri ve Çağdaş Eğitim Vakfı.

Tanrıvermiş, H. (2005). Tarımda Sosyal Politikalar. In F. Yavuz (Ed.), *Türkiye'de Tarım* (pp. 94-119). Ankara: Tarım ve Köyişleri Bakanlığı. Retrieved from https://www.tarimorman.gov.tr/SGB/Belgeler/yayinlar/turkiyede_tarim.pdf

Tanyol, C. (2014a). Elifoğlu Köyü. *İstanbul University Journal of Sociology, 2*(17-18), 171-222. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iusosyoloji/issue/557/5474

Tanyol, C. (2014b). Peşke Binamlısı Köyü. *İstanbul University Journal of Sociology, 2*(16), 17-59. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iusosyoloji/issue/556/5458

Tanyol, C. (2014c). Eylen Köyü. *İstanbul University Journal of Sociology, 2*(19-20), 38-98. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iusosyoloji/issue/558/5480

Taraklı, D. (1976). *Çiftçiye Topraklandırma Kanunu ve Uygulama Sonuçları.* Ankara: Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi.

Tarhan, S., & Dellal, İ. (n.d.). Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi Alım Politikalarının Üreticilerin Buğday Üretim Uygulamaları Üzerine Etkisi: Ankara İli Gölbaşı İlçesi Örneği. *Ziraat Mühendisliği, 373*, 19-28. doi:10.33724/zm.891801

Tarım Kanunu. (2006, April 18). *Official Gazette, Date: 25/4/2006, No: 26149*. Retrieved February 28, 2023, from https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuatmetin/1.5.5488.pdf

Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri ve Birlikleri Kanunu. (1972, April 18). *Official Gazette, Date: 4/28/1972, No: 14172*. Retrieved March 14, 2023, from https://mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=1581&MevzuatTur=1&MevzuatTertip=5

Tarım Özel İhtisas Komisyonu. (2014). *Tarım Arazilerinin Sürdürülebilir Kullanımı Çalışma Grubu Raporu.* T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı. Ankara: T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı. Retrieved February 4, 2023, from https://www.sbb.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/Onuncu-Kalkinma-Plani-Tarim-Arazilerinin-Surdurulebilir-Kullanimi-Calisma-Grubu-Raporu.pdf

Tarım Ürünleri Lisanslı Depoculuk Kanunu. (2005, February 10). *Official Gazette, Date: 2/17/2005, No: 25730*. Retrieved from https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=5300&MevzuatTur=1&MevzuatTertip=5

Tarım Ürünleri Lisanslı Depoculuk Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ. (n.d.). *ULİDAŞ*. Retrieved from https://ulidas.com.tr/?page_id=77

Taşçıoğlu, R. (1955a). Manisa İli Mütevelli Köyü Monografisi. *İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi, 2*(10-11), 28-31. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iusosyoloji/issue/552/5395

Taşçıoğlu, R. (1955b). Manisa Kayalıoğlu Köyü Monografisi. *İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi, 2*(10-11), 32-35. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iusosyoloji/issue/552/5396

Taylor, C. (1923). The Field of Rural Sociology. *The Journal of Social Forces, 1*(5), 592-595. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/3005148

TBMM Tarım, Orman ve Köyişleri ile Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonları. (2007). *Adana Milletvekili Vahit Kirişçi ve Tokat Milletvekili Zeyid Aslan'ın; T.C. Ziraat Bankası A.Ş. ve Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri Tarafından Kullandırılan Grup Kredilerinden Doğan Kefaletin Sona Erdirilmesi Hakkı.* Retrieved March 19, 2023, from https://cdn.tbmm.gov.tr/KKBSPublicFile/D22/Y5/T2/DosyaKomisyonRaporunuVerdi/6bc7baf2-e028-4c14-a4a6-e3d81800531b.htm

Teddlie, C., & Tashakkori, A. (2003). Major Issues and Controversies in the Use of Mixed Methods in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. In C. Teddlie, & A. Tashakkori (Eds.), *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research* (pp. 3-50). Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications.

Tekeli, İ. (2016). *Dünya'da ve Türkiye'de Kent-Kır Karşıtlığı Yok Olurken Yerleşmeler İçin Temsil Sorunları ve Strateji Önerileri.* Ankara: İdealkent Yayınları.

Tezcan, M. (1989). Köyden Kente Göç. *Ankara Üniversitesi Eğitim Bilimleri Fakültesi Dergisi, 22*(1), 37-42.

The Turkish State Meteorological Service. (2021, December). Sorgun 17712 numbered station monthly total precipitation data 1985-2021. Unpublished raw data.

The World Bank. (n.d.). *Commodities Market Development Project*. Retrieved from The World Bank: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P048851

The World Bank. (n.d.). *The World Bank*. Retrieved June 03, 2020, from Indicators: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND

Thomas, E., Riley, M., & Spees, J. (2020). Knowledge flows: Farmers' social relations and knowledge sharing practices in 'Catchment Sensitive Farming'. *Land Use Policy, 90*. doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.104254

Thompson, E. (1971, February). The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century. *Past & Present*(50), 76-136. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/650244

Thompson, J. (1991). Editor's Introduction. In P. Bourdieu, & J. Thompson (Ed.), *Language and Symbolic Power* (G. Raymond, & M. Adamson, Trans., pp. 1-31). Oxford: Polity Press.

Thompson, P. (2010). Field. In M. Grenfell (Ed.), *Pierre Bourdieu Key Concepts* (pp. 67-84). Durham: Acumen.

Thorner, D. (1966). Chayanov's Concept of Peasant Economy. In A. Chayanov, D. Thorner, B. Kerblay, & R. Smith (Eds.), *The Theory of Peasant Economy* (1 ed.). Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.

Thorton, S. (2005). The Social Logic of Subcultural Capital [1995]. In K. Gelder (Ed.), *The Subcultures Reader* (pp. 184-192). London and New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Tisenkopfs, T., Lace, I., & Mierina, I. (2008). Social Capital. In J. van der Ploeg, & T. Marsden (Eds.), *Development, Unfolding Webs: The Dynamics of Regional Rural* (pp. 87-110). Assen: Royal Van Gorcum.

Todaro, M. (1969, March). A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries. *American Economic Review, 59*(1), 138-148.

Toprak Koruma ve Arazi Kullanımı Kanunu. (2005, July 3). *Official Gazette, Date: 7/19/2005, No: 25880*. Retrieved from https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.5403.pdf

Toprak Koruma Ve Arazi Kullanimi Kanununda Değişiklik Yapilmasi Hakkinda Kanun. (2014, April 30). *Official Gazette, Date: 5/15/2014, No: 29001*. Retrieved from https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/05/20140515-1.htm

Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi Genel Müdürlüğü. (2020). *82. Hesap Dönemi Faaliyet Raporu 2019.* Mali İşler Dairesi Başkanlığı. Retrieved March 26, 2023, from https://www.tmo.gov.tr/Upload/Document/maliisler/2019faaliyetraporu.pdf

Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi Genel Müdürlüğü Ana Statüsü. (n.d.). Official Gazette dated 11/12/1984 and numbered 18602. Retrieved from http://www.tmo.gov.tr/Upload/Document/amacveg%C3%B6reving.pdf

Toprak, Z. (1988). Türkiye Tarımı Ve Yapısal Gelişmeler 1900–1950. In Ş. Pamuk, & Z. Toprak (Eds.), *Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapılar.* Ankara: Yurt Yayınları.

Toprak, Z., & Pamuk, Ş. (Dü). (1988). *Türkiye'de Tarımsal Yapılar.* Ankara: Yurt Yayınevi.

Tosun, F., & Arslan, S. (2016). 4634 Sayılı Şeker Kanunu Sonrasında Türkiye Şeker Sanayinde Meydana Gelen Gelişmeler. *Tarla Bitkileri Merkez Araştırma Enstitüsü Dergisi*(25), 328-333. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/264769

Tökin, İ. (1990). *Türkiye Köy İktisadiyadı.* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Tönnies, F. (2001). *Community and Civil Society.* (J. Harris, Dü., J. Harris, & M. Hollis, Çev.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Trotsky, L. (1967). *The History of the Russian Revolution.* London: Sphere Books.

TUİK. (2017). *İşgücü İstatistikleri Veri Tabanı (1988-2013)*. Retrieved May 25, 2017, from Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu: https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/isgucuapp/isgucu.zul

Turan, E. (2018). Türkiye'nin İklim Değişikliğine Bağlı Kuraklık Durumu. *Doğal Afetler ve Çevre Dergisi, 4*(1), 63-69. doi:10.213247/dacd.357384

Turhan, E., Kallis, G., & Zografos, C. (2019). Power Asymmetries, Migrant Agricultural Labour and Adaptation Governance in Turkey: A Political Ecology of Douple Exposures. In I. La Jeunesse, & C. Larrue (Eds.), *Facing Hydrometeorological Extremes: A Governance Issue* (pp. 261-282). Wiley: John Wiley & Sons.

Turhan, M. (1957). Köy Tetkiklerinde Kullanılacak Metodlar Hakkında Bazı Düşünceler. *Istanbul University Journal of Sociology, 2*(12), 98-103. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iusosyoloji/issue/553/5424#article_cite

Turhan, M. (2015). *Kültür Değişmeleri: Sosyal Psikoloji Bakımından Bir Tetkik.* Ankara: Altınordu Yayınları.

Turhan, M. (2019). *Mümtaz Turhan Bütün Eserleri.* Ankara: Altınordu Yayınları.

Turkish Grain Board. (2020). Turkish Grain Board intervention purchase dates and prices. *Unpublished data*.

Turkish Grain Board. (2022a, March 15). Turkish Grain Board purchases by products betwen 2005 and 2021. Unpublished raw data.

Turkish Grain Board. (2022b, March 15). Turkish Grain Board purchases in Sorgun by products betwen 2005 and 2021. Unpublished raw data.

Turkish Statistical Institute. (2016). *Distribution of agricultural holdings and land operated by holdings by holding size and land tenure, 2016.* Retrieved from Agricultural Holding Structure Statistics: https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Kategori/GetKategori?p=tarim-111&dil=2

Turkish Statistical Institute. (2020a). *Address Based Population Registration System Results*. Retrieved May 21, 2020, from Data Portal for Statistics: https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=95&locale=tr

Turkish Statistical Institute. (2020b). *General Population Census*. Retrieved April 25, 2020, from Data Portal for Statistics: https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/nufusmenuapp/menu.zul

Turkish Statistical Institute. (2021a, April 20). *Data Portal for Statistics.* Retrieved from Turkish Statistical Institute: https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=134&locale=en

Turkish Statistical Institute. (2021b, May 5). *Livestock Statistics.* Retrieved from Data Portal for Statistics: https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=101&locale=en

Turkish Statistical Institute. (2022). *Population and Demography.* Retrieved from Data Portal for Statistics: https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Kategori/GetKategori?p=Population-and-Demography-109

Turkish Statistical Institute. (2024, April 14). *Uluslararası Göç İstatistikleri*. Retrieved from Merkezi Dağıtım Sistemi: https://biruni.tuik.gov.tr/medas/?kn=95&locale=tr

Turkish Statistical Institute. (n.d.). *Tarımsal İşletme Yapı Araştırması, 2016.* Retrieved from TÜİK: https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Tarimsal--Isletme-Yapi-Arastirmasi-2016-24869

TUSİAD. (2008). *Ulusal Tarım Raporu 2008.* TUSİAD.

Türk Dil Kurumu. (n.d.). *Güncel Türkçe Sözlük*. Retrieved from Türk Dil Kurumu Sözlükleri: https://sozluk.gov.tr/

Türk Medeni Kanunu. (2001, November 22). *Official Gazette, Date: 12/08/2001, No: 24607*. Retrieved from https://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/mevzuat?MevzuatNo=4721&MevzuatTur=1&MevzuatTertip=5

Türkdoğan, O. (1969). *Köy Sosyolojisinin Temel Sorunları.* Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları.

Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları A.Ş. (2019). *Hakkımızda*. Retrieved April 16, 2023, from Türkşeker: https://www.turkseker.gov.tr/?ModulID=3&MenuID=2

Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları A.Ş. (2020). *Türkşeker Faaliyet Raporu 2019.* Ankara. Retrieved April 16, 2023, from https://www.turkseker.gov.tr/data/dosyalar/Faaliyet_Raporlari2020_10_30_16_57_43_562.pdf

Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları AŞ. (2002 - 2020). *Faaliyet Raporları.* Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları AŞ. Retrieved March 1, 2023, from https://www.turkseker.gov.tr/?ModulID=8&MenuID=36

Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri. (2019). *2019 Yıl Sonu Faaliyet Raporu.* Muhasebe ve Bütçe Daire Başkanlığı Bütçe ve Raporlama Müdürlüğü. Retrieved March 12, 2023, from https://www.tarimkredi.org.tr/media/oqwdl0ql/2019-yili-faaliyet-raporu.pdf

Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri. (2021). *Faaliyet Raporu 2021*. Muhasebe ve Bütçe Daire Başkanlığı Bütçe ve Raporlama Müdürlüğü. Retrieved 03 19, 2023, from https://www.tarimkredi.org.tr/media/sh3lxoe0/2021_yili_faaliyet_raporu.pdf

Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri. (2023a). *Cooperative Supermarket*. Retrieved April 15, 2023, from Agricultural Credit Cooperatives of Turkey: https://www.tarimkredi.org.tr/en/what-we-do/cooperative-supermarket/

Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri. (2023b). *Credit*. Retrieved from Agricultural Credit Cooperatives of Turkey: https://www.tarimkredi.org.tr/en/what-we-do/credit/#isletmekredileri

Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri. (2023c). *Insurance*. Retrieved April 15, 2023, from Agricultural Credit Cooperatives of Turkey: https://www.tarimkredi.org.tr/en/what-we-do/insurance/

Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri. (2023d). *Marketing and Sales*. Retrieved April 15, 2023, from Agricultural Credit Cooperatives of Turkey: https://www.tarimkredi.org.tr/en/what-we-do/marketing-and-sales/

Türkiye Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri. (2023e). *Product Valuation*. Retrieved April 15, 2023, from Agricultural Credit Cooperatives of Turkey: https://www.tarimkredi.org.tr/en/what-we-do/product-valuation/

Türkşeker. (2021). *Draft Sugar Beet Production Contract.* Unpublished document.

Türkşeker. (2021, February 15). *Haberler*. Retrieved from Türkşeker: https://www.turkseker.gov.tr/?ModulID=1&MenuID=53&ID=53#:~:text=23%20A%C4%9Fustos%201990'da%20temeli,zaman%20i%C3%A7erisinde%20%C3%BCretim%20kapasitesini%20art%C4%B1rd%C4%B1.&text=Yozgat%20%C5%9Eeker%20Fabrikas%C4%B1'n%C4%B1n%202020,%C3%BCretim%20rekoruna

TÜSİAD. (2008). *Türkiye'de Tarım ve Gıda: Gelişmeler, Politikalar ve Öneriler.* Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği. İstanbul: Ersis Reklam Matbaacılık ve Tanıtım Hiz. Tic. Ltd. Şti.

Tütengil, C. (1954). İhsaniye Köyü İncelemesi. *Sosyoloji Dergisi, 2*(9), 37-58. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iusosyoloji/issue/551/5385

Tütengil, C. (1955). Keçiller Köyü İncelemesi. *Sosyoloji Dergisi, 2*(10-11), 36-43. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iusosyoloji/issue/552/5397

Tütengil, C. (1969). *Türkiye'de Köy Sorunu.* İstanbul: Kitaş Yayınları.

Tütengil, C. (1983). *100 Soruda Türkiye'nin Kırsal Yapısı ve Sorunları.* İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi.

Ulidaş. (n.d.). *Şirketimiz Hakkında*. Retrieved from Ulidaş: http://ulidas.com.tr/?page_id=77

United Nations. (1992). *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.* Retrieved from United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/convention_text_with_annexes_english_for_posting.pdf

United States Environmental Protection Agency. (n.d.). *United States Environmental Protection Agency*. Retrieved from Climate Change Impacts on Agriculture and Food Supply: https://www.epa.gov/climateimpacts/climate-change-impacts-agriculture-and-food-supply#:~:text=Climate%20change%20is%20expected%20to,soil%20and%2

0depleting%20soil%20nutrients.&text=Heavy%20rains%20can%20also%20increase,oceans%2C%20lakes%2C%20and%20streams.

USDA. (2024). *USDA Economic Research Service*. Retrieved February 6, 2024, from Farming and Farm Income: https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/ag-and-food-statistics-charting-the-essentials/farming-and-farm-income/

USDA. (n.d.). *Community Supported Agriculture*. Retrieved November 12, 2023, from USDA National Agricultural Library: https://www.nal.usda.gov/farms-and-agricultural-production-systems/community-supported-agriculture

Ülken , H., Kösemihal, N., & Tanyol, C. (1950). Karataş Köyü Monografisi. *Sosyoloji Dergisi, 6*, 82-103.

Ünal, M. (1979). Tarımsal Toprakların Miras Yoluyla Parçalanması ve Bunun Ekonomik Zararları. In F. Eren, *Tarım Hukuku Ders Notları.* Ankara.

Ünsal, Y. (2020). *Türkiye'nin Coğrafi Bölgelere Göre Tarımsal Mekanizasyon Düzeyinin Belirlenmesi.* T.C. Tarım ve Orman Bakanlığı, Tarımsal Ekonomi ve Politika Geliştirme Enstitüsü - TEPGE. TEPGE. Retrieved from https://arastirma.tarimorman.gov.tr/tepge/Belgeler/Di%C4%9Fer%20Yay%C4%B1nlar/Tu%CC%88rkiye%E2%80%99nin%20Cog%CC%86rafik%20Bo%CC%88lgelere%20Go%CC%88re%20Tar%C4%B1msal%20Mekanizasyon%20Du%CC%88zeyinin%20Belirlenmesi.pdf

Ünsal, Y. (2022). *Ürün Raporu Şeker Pancarı.* Tarımsal Ekonomi ve Politika Geliştirme Enstitüsü. Retrieved April 3, 2023, from https://arastirma.tarimorman.gov.tr/tepge/Belgeler/PDF%20%C3%9Cr%C3%BCn%20Raporlar%C4%B1/2022%20%C3%9Cr%C3%BCn%20Raporlar%C4%B1/%C5%9Eeker%20Pancar%C4%B1%20%C3%9Cr%C3%BCn%20Raporu-TEPGE-354.pdf

Vanhaute, E. (2008). The End of Peasantries? Rethinking the Role of Peasantries in a World-Historical View. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 31*(1), 39-59. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/40241704

Varangis, P., & Larson, D. (2015, June). How Warehouse Receipts Help Commodity Trading and Financing. Retrieved from https://www.farm-d.org/app/uploads/2019/05/How-warehouse-receipts-help-commodity-trading-and-finance.pdf

Vilar, P. (1998). Reflections on the Notion of 'Peasant Economy'. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center) , 21*(2), 151-189. Retrieved November 12, 2023, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/40241423

Vogel, R. (2013). Marxist Theories of Migration. *The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration*. doi:10.1002/9781444351071.wbeghm354

Vreeland, J. (2003). *The IMF and Economic Development.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wade, R. (2017). The developmental state: dead or alive? *Development and Change, 49*(2), 518-546. doi:10.1111/dech.12381

Wallerstein, I. (1974). *The Modern World System I, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York: Academic Press.

Wallerstein, I. (1980). *The Modern World System II, Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy 1600-1750.* New York: Academic Press.

Wallerstein, I. (1998). The Rise and Future Demise of World-Systems Analysis. *Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 21*(1), 103-112. Retrieved December 12, 2023, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/40241417

Ware, N. (1931, December). The Physiocrats: A Study in Economic Rationalization. *The American Economic Review, 21*(4), 607-619. doi:https://www.jstor.org/stable/492

Watson II, D. (2017). The political economy of food price policy during the global food price crisis of 2006-2008. *Food Security, 9,* 497-509. doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-017-0685-z

Web Tarım TV. (2019, February 5). *Şeker Kotaları Belirlendi*. Retrieved April 16, 2023, from Web Tarım TV: https://www.tarimtv.gov.tr/tr/video-detay/seker-kotalari-belirlendi-11191#:~:text=Resmi%20Gazete'de%20yay%C4%B1mlanan%20Cumhurba%C5%9Fkan%C4%B1,131%20bin%20625%20ton%20oldu.

Webb, J., Schirato, T., & Danaher, G. (2002). *Understanding Bourdieau.* Sydney, Australia: Allen&Unwin.

Weber, M. (1965). *The Sociology of Religion.* (E. Fischoff, Trans.) London: Methuen Co Ltd.

Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and Society.* (G. Roth, & C. Wittich, Eds.) London: University of California Press.

Weininger, E. (2005). Foundations of Pierre Bourdieu's class analysis. In E. Wright (Ed.), *Approaches to Class Analysis* (pp. 82-118). Cambridge University Press.

Wilhite, D., & Glantz, M. (1985). Understanding the Drought Phenomenon: The Role of Definitions. *Drought Mitigation Center Faculty Publications, 10*(3), 111-120.

Williamson, J. (2004). *The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development.* Peterson Institute for International Economics. Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Retrieved November 12, 2023, from https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/publications/papers/williamson0204.pdf

Winburne, J. (Ed.). (1962). *A Dictionary of Agriculture and Allied Terminology.* USA: Michigan State University Press.

Wirth, L. (1938, July). Urbanism as a Way of Life. *American Journal of Sociology, 44*(1), 1-24. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2768119

Wittfogel, K. (1953). Oriental Despotism. *Sociologus, Neue Folge / New Series, 3*(2), 96-108. Retrieved December 2, 2023, from https://www.jstor.org/stable/43643798

Wolf, E. (1966). *Peasants.* (M. Sahlins, Ed.) New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

World Bank. (2002). *Turkey Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP).* Washington DC.: World Bank. Retrieved from http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/184001468760206258/Turkey-Agricultural-Reform-Implementation-Project-ARIP

World Forum for Food Sovereignty. (2007). *Declaration of Nyéléni.* Retrieved from https://nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/DeclNyeleni-en.pdf

Wright, E. (2016). *Sınıflar.* (S. Toral, & F. Alikoç, Trans.) İstanbul: Nota Bene.

Wright, S. (2014). Food Sovereignty in Practice: A Study of Farmer-Led Sustainable Agriculture in the Philippines. In P. Andree, J. Ayres, M. Bosia, & M. Massicotte (Eds.), *Globalization and Food Sovereignty: Global and Local Change in the New Politics of Food* (pp. 199-227). Toronto: University of Toronto Press. doi:https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442696860

Yalçınkaya, A. (1996). *Alevilikte Toplumsal Kurumlar ve İktidar.* Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yayınları.

Yasa, İ. (1969). *Yirmibeş Yıl Sonra Hasanoğlan Köyü - Karşılaştırmalı Bir Toplumbilimsel Araştırma.* Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi.

Yaşar, M. (2022). *Sorgun İlçesi Tarım Coğrafyası.* Ankara: Iksad Publishing House.

Yenal, Z. (1999). Food TNC's, Intellectual Property Investments and Post-Fordist Food Consumption: The Case of Unilever and Nestle in Turkey. *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 8*, 21-34.

Yeni Ufuk. (2018, September 21). *Çiğdemli Belediyesine Kültür Evi ve Spor Tesisi*. Retrieved from Yeni Ufuk: https://yeniufukgazetesi.com.tr/cigdemli-belediyesine-kultur-evi-ve-spor-tesisi/

Yeniçağ. (2019, April 29). *AKP'den kaybettiği belediyenin borcu dudak uçuklattı*. Retrieved from Yeniçağ: https://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/akpden-kaybettigi-belediyenin-borcu-dudak-ucuklatti-232363h.htm

Yew-Foong, H. (2009, April). The (Un)Changing World of Peasants: Two Perspectives. *Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 24*(1), 18-31. Retrieved November 19, 2023, from https://muse.jhu.edu/article/367736/pdf

Yıldırım, M., & Karakoyun, O. (2023). Mevsimlik Tarım İşçiliği Üzerine Bir Araştırma: Çarşamba (Samsun) İlçesi Örneği. *19 Mayıs Journal of Social Sciences, 4*(2), 61-81. doi:10.52835/19maysbd.1320646

Yıldırır Kocabaş, Ö. (2010). *Türkiye'de Tarımsal Kooperatifçilik Düşüncesinin Gelişimi.* İstanbul: Libra Yayıncılık.

Yörükan, T., & Cebe, T. (1955). Çatak Köyü Araştırması. *İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Dergisi, 2*(10-11), 1-27. Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/iusosyoloji/issue/552/5394

Yücer, A., Topbaş, S., Can, M., Akdağ, K., Bilici, İ., & Ekin, N. (2009). *Türkiye'de Kırsal Kalkınma.* Ankara: Türkiye Teknik Elemanlar Vakfı Yayınları.

Yüksek Seçim Kurulu. (n.d.). *T.C. Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*. Retrieved from Mahalli İdareler Genel Seçimleri Arşivi: https://www.ysk.gov.tr/tr/mahalli-idareler-genel-secimleri-arsivi/2650

Zebre, N. (2014). Exploring the limits of fair trade: The local Food Movement in the context of late capitalism. In P. Andree, J. Ayres, M. Bosia, & M. Massicotte (Eds.), *Globalization and Food Sovereignty: Global and local change in the new politics* (pp. 84-110). Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Zengin, O. (2018, April). The Metropolitan Municipality Reform and Its Impact on Rurral Areas in Turkey. (S. Akar, & D. Şenbel Eser, Eds.) *Current Debates in Public Finance & Public Administration, 27*, 133-151.

Ziai, A. (2016). *Development Discourse and Global History: From Colonialism to the Sustainable Development Goals.* London and New York: Routledge.

Ziraat Bankası. (2023). *Agriculture*. Retrieved March 31, 2023, from Ziraat Bankası: https://www.ziraatbank.com.tr/en/corporate/agriculture

Ziraat Mühendisleri Odası. (2004a). *Doğrudan Gelir Desteği: Tarımsal Destek mi Yoksulluk Yardımı mı?* Retrieved from http://www.zmo.org.tr/genel/bizden_detay.php?kod=147&tipi=5

Ziraat Mühendisleri Odası. (2004b, June 11). *Tarım Ürünleri Lisanslı Depoculuk Kanunu Tasarısı'na İlişkin Ziraat Mühendisleri Odası'nın Görüşleri*. Retrieved from https://www.zmo.org.tr/genel/bizden_detay.php?kod=140&tipi=5&sube=0

Zülküf, A. (2010, April). Neo-Liberal Transformation of Turkish Agriculture. *Journal of Agrarian Change, 10*(2), 149-187.

# APPENDICES

## A. APPROVAL OF THE METU HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE

SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

ORTA DOĞU TEKNİK ÜNİVERSİTESİ
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

DUMLUPINAR BULVARI
06800 ÇANKAYA/ANKARA
T: +90 312 210 20 94
F: +90 312 210 37 03
sbem@metu.edu.tr
www.sbe.metu.edu.tr

Sayı: 28620816 /301

12 Haziran 2019

Konu: Değerlendirme Sonucu

Gönderen: ODTÜ İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu (İAEK)

İlgi: İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu Başvurusu

**Sayın Hüseyin Tarık ŞENGÜL**

Danışmanlığını yaptığınız **Aykut Ozan ALAN'ın "Üçüncü Gıda Rejiminde Türk Kırsal Kesiminde Siyasal İlişkiler"** başlıklı araştırması İnsan Araştırmaları Etik Kurulu tarafından uygun görülmüş ve **282-ODTÜ-2019** protokol numarası ile onaylanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla bilgilerinize sunarız.

[redacted]
Prof. Dr. Tülin GENÇÖZ
Başkan

[redacted]
Prof. Dr. Tolga CAN
Üye

[redacted]
Doç.Dr. Pınar KAYGAN
Üye

[redacted]
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Ali Emre TURGUT
Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Şerife SEVİNÇ
Üye [redacted]

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Müge GÜNDÜZ
Üye

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Süreyya Özcan KABASAKAL
Üye [redacted]

## B. SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONAIRRE

The questions are arranged from general to specific, with the least personal questions asked at the beginning of the interview, while more sensitive and potentially uncomfortable questions (such as those about economic status, debt, "political" matters, etc.) are asked in later stages. The questions are grouped under specific themes in a way that they are interconnected and will not disrupt the flow of the conversation.

**Question Group 1:** Questions about the household's and the village/town's past

**1.1.** Can you describe the town/village you live in? What was it like when you were younger? Has it changed over time?

**1.2.** Where are you originally from? Are you from here? Were your elders/ancestors/grandparents also from here? What's their story, where did they come from?

Information to be obtained:

- The history of the village or town where the person was born and raised, what it was like in the past, how and in what direction it changed,
- The story of the person, their family, and close surroundings, where they came from, what kind of family they grew up in, the memories and experiences passed down from their parents and elders,
- Insight into how the person relates themselves, their family, and the environment they lived/grew up in.

**Question Group 2:** Questions about the general economic and social characteristics of the household

**2.1.** Can you tell me about your family? How many people are there in your household? What is your profession? Are you married? Is your spouse from the same village, are you related? Do you have children? Are they studying? (If yes) Where?

**2.2.** Do you own land? If so, how many decares? How did you acquire it (inheritance, purchase, etc.)? Do you have income sources other than agriculture? Do you own any immovable property like houses or gardens?

**2.3.** Besides agriculture, do you have any other sources of income? Does anyone in your family work for wages? Where do your spouse and children work? How did they find their jobs? Did you assist your children in finding work? (If yes) What methods did you use?

**2.4.** The young population is leaving rural areas for cities. Is this true for you and your village? Recently, finding jobs in cities has become harder; has there been a change in the attitude of the young people toward migration? If you have family members or close relatives who migrated to the city, how is your relationship with them? Do you visit each other, stay with them when you go to the city? What's the level of mutual support?

Information to be obtained:

- Age, education, marital status, and profession of household members,
- The relationship the household has with the city, including regular, temporary, or permanent migration for education, work, treatment, etc.,
- Economic situation of the household, sources of income,
- Information about favoritism, if any, in helping family members find employment.

**Question Group 3:** Questions about the household's trade and debt relations through farming activities and the roles of official institutions, political parties, and others in these relations:

**3.1.** Do you cultivate your land? If so, what do you grow? Can you explain how you plant and harvest it, and what the difficulties and advantages are?

**3.2.** Have you made any changes to the crops you grow over time? If yes, why?

**3.3.** Who works the land? Do your children or relatives help? Do you hire day laborers? Do you also work on other people's land?

**3.4.** Do you have farming equipment like a tractor? What tools do you use for production? Who owns these tools? If they are yours, when did you acquire them?

**3.5.** Where and how do you obtain fertilizers and pesticides?

**3.6.** How, when, and through what channels do you sell your products after the harvest? If the price of your product is too low ("if the product doesn't sell"), what do you do to prevent or minimize your losses?

**3.7.** Does what you produce cover your living expenses? (If not) Why do you continue farming? (If not) Can't you grow something else to make a living?

**3.8.** What are the costs of production, and can you list your expenses and income for the last harvest season?

**3.9.** If you can't cover your expenses, from whom/where do you borrow money, and under what conditions? How do you manage your debts? How long has this been the case? Are there others facing similar difficulties? When you face legal actions due to your debts, what do you do?

**3.10.** Do you receive occasional or regular support/aid from official institutions, private organizations, or political parties? (If yes) How did you obtain this support/aid? Did you follow a formal procedure? Do others in your community benefit from these aids?

**3.11.** When you face insurmountable obstacles in your activities or fall into hardship, can you get help from official or private institutions, or locally influential people? How?

**3.12.** When you look around your village, what percentage of farmers are in your situation? How do those who differ, differ? Are there larger landowners in your village, and is their situation different from yours? What percentage of people in your village are worse off than you, and how would you assess their situation? Can you provide an assessment of borrowing and credit use in your village and surroundings? What's the situation regarding borrowing, guarantorship, and defaults?

Information to be obtained:

- The history and current status of the family's agricultural production, ownership of the tools used, what the family grows, and the inputs (tools, labor, etc.) they use, and the changes over time due to economic, technological, and sociological factors,
- How the product is marketed, the roles of contract farming, local markets, grain exchanges, specific traders, industrial companies, cooperatives, etc. in the marketing process,
- Information about the household's borrowing processes and conditions, whether they borrow from relatives, the roles of banks and moneylenders, the formal and informal aspects of the debt cycle, and the prevalence of such relationships in the community where the research is conducted,

- The influence of public institutions, private organizations (large companies, associations, etc.), and political parties on the processes of production, distribution, and resource transfers through formal and informal relationships.

**Question Group 4:** Questions about the household's level of organization:

**4.1.** Is there a union member in your family? (in cases where there are workers/employees)

**4.2.** Is there a member of a cooperative or producers' union in your family? Why? (If yes) How are your relations with the cooperative? Do you participate in cooperative activities? What benefits do you get from cooperative membership?

**Question Group 5:** General questions that may reflect the person's political attitudes and behavior:

**5.1.** What problems do you face while farming?

**5.2.** What are the main problems in your district/region?

**5.3.** In your opinion, what are the biggest problems facing farmers/those engaged in farming in Turkey?

**5.4.** Are you optimistic about the future? How do you see yourself and your family in ten years? If you have a pessimistic view, how could this situation improve? What should the state and relevant institutions do, and what policy changes are needed?

Information to be obtained:

- Answers to these questions will help clarify inconsistencies in the person's story from the beginning of the interview and will be useful in understanding how the anecdotes they share relate to their worldview and political attitudes.

## C. TABLE OF INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

| Interview No | Pseudonym | Occupation | Place of Residence | Interview Location | Date | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Abdullah | Farmer | Burunören | Residence, Burunören | 3.08.2019 | 1 hour |
| | Hacer | Farmer | Burunören | | | |
| | Yücel | Not Provided | Burunören | | | |
| | Haluk | Not Provided | Sorgun | | | |
| 2 | Adem | Farmer | Burunören | Residence, Burunören | 3.08.2019 | 1 hour |
| 3 | Ahmet | Former farmer, Mukhtar of Karşıyaka | Gülveren | Gas station A | 4.08.2019 | 40 minutes |
| | Altan | Municipal civil servant, farmer | Gülveren | | | |
| | Şeyhmus | Farmer, gas station employee | Karşıyaka | | | |
| | İlbey | Not Provided | Not Provided | | | |
| 4 | Ali | Farmer | Karşıyaka | Gas station A | 4.08.2019 | 1 hour 30 minutes |
| | Caner | Not Provided | Not Provided | Gas station A | | |
| 5 | Şeyhmus | Farmer, gas station employee | Karşıyaka | Gas station A | 4.08.2019 | 1 hour 40 minutes |
| 6 | Emrah | Farmer, driver | İsmailhacılı | Gas station A | 4.08.2019 | 1 hour 30 minutes |
| 7 | Emre | Farmer, supermarket employee | Kale | Gas station A | 4.08.2019 | 1 hour 30 minutes |
| 8 | Fatih | Merchant, gas station owner | Gülveren | Gas station B | 18.08.2019 | 30 minutes |
| 9 | Furkan | Farmer, retired civil servant | Karşıyaka | Gas station B | 18.08.2019 | 1 hour 40 minutes |
| 10 | Hasan | Farmer | Karşıyaka | Gas station A | 18.08.2019 | 50 minutes |
| 11 | Hüseyin | Farmer, market owner | Gülveren | Market | 18.08.2019 | 2 hours |
| 12 | İbrahim | Farmer, retired sugar factory worker | Camiikebir | Camiikebir Square | 24.08.2019 | 1 hour 30 minutes |
| | Serkan | Farmer | Karşıyaka | | | |
| | Enes | Farmer | Karşıyaka | | | |
| | Eren | Farmer | Not Provided | | | |
| | Uğur | Farmer | Not Provided | | | |

| Interview No | Pseudonym | Occupation | Place of Residence | Interview Location | Date | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 13 | Sultan | Housewife, former farmer | Kale | Residence, Kale | 24.08.2019 | 2 hours 40 minutes |
| 14 | Kerem | Farmer | Gülveren | Sorgun Terminal Kafe | 29.08.2019 | 2 hours 30 minutes |
| 15 | Mehmet | Farmer | Camiikebir | Camiikebir Square | 30.08.2019 | 45 minutes |
| | Baran | Farmer | Not Provided | | | |
| | Kağan | Farmer | Not Provided | | | |
| 16 | Rıza | Former mayor, retired civil cervant | Karşıyaka | Residence, Karşıyaka | 30.08.2019 | 2 hours |
| 17 | Muhammet | Farmer | Duralidayılı | Gas station C | 31.08.2019 | 1 hour 30 minutes |
| | Raşit | Mukhtar of Duralidayılı, farmer | Duralidayılı | | | |
| | Sertaç | Farmer | Duralidayılı | | | |
| | Tarık | Cargo employee | Duralidayılı | | | |
| | Günay | Farmer | Duralidayılı | | | |
| | Gürkan | Farmer | Duralidayılı | | | |
| 18 | Murat | Farmer, civil servant | Duralidayılı | Ortaçayır region | 31.08.2019 | 1 hour |
| 19 | Mustafa | Shepherd | Duralidayılı | Ortaçayır, Kayarca region | 31.08.2019 | 30 minutes |
| 20 | Osman | Gas station owner, farmer | Karşıyaka | Gas station B | 31.08.2019 | 1 hour 10 minutes |
| | Selçuk | Farmer | Not Provided | | | |
| | Serdar | Farmer | Not Provided | | | |
| | Sefa | Farmer | Not Provided | | | |
| | Sait | Farmer | Not Provided | | | |
| 21 | Umut | Farmer, harvester owner | Karşıyaka | Residence, Karşıyaka | 1.09.2019 | 4 hours |
| 22 | Ömer | Farmer | Camiikebir | Residence, Camiikebir | 1.09.2019 | 2 hours 30 minutes |
| 23 | Ramazan | Farmer, Mukhtar of Burunören | Burunören | Vineyard house, Burunören | 7.09.2019 | 1 hour 30 minutes |
| | Kemal | Not Provided | Not Provided | | | |
| 24 | Samet | Farmer | Burunören | Vineyard house, Burunören | 7.09.2019 | 1 hour |
| 25 | Serhat | Farmer | Burunören | Vineyard house, Burunören | 7.09.2019 | 1 hour 40 minutes |
| 26 | Süleyman | Farmer | Gülveren | Residence, Gülveren | 7.09.2019 | 2 hours 30 minutes |
| | Cemile | Not Provided | Gülveren | | | |
| | Oktay | Not Provided | Not Provided | | | |
| 27 | Ayşe | Livestock farmer | Gülveren | Residence, Gülveren | 8.09.2019 | 4 hours |

| Interview No | Pseudonym | Occupation | Place of Residence | Interview Location | Date | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Bünyamin | Livestock farmer | Gülveren | | | |
| 28 | Yaşar | Retired migrant worker | Camiikebir | Residence, Camiikebir | 8.09.2019 | 1 hour 40 minutes |
| | Kadir | Not Provided | Camiikebir | Residence, Camiikebir | | |
| | Enver | Co-owner of a café in Sorgun | Camiikebir | Residence, Camiikebir | | |
| | Ersaim | Not Provided | Not Provided | Residence, Camiikebir | | |
| 29 | Yunus | Farmer, former banker | Duralidayılı | Terminal Simit Kafe, Sorgun | 8.09.2019 | 2 hours 20 minutes |
| | Şamil | Not Provided | Not Provided | | | |
| 30 | Yusuf | Farmer, livestock farmer | İsmailhacılı | Mosque courtyard, İsmailhacılı | 22.09.2019 | 1 hour |
| | Naim | Farmer | Not Provided | | | |
| | Nebati | Farmer | Not Provided | | | |
| 31 | Zafer | Farmer, retired worker | İsmailhacılı | Mosque courtyard and residence, İsmailhacılı | 22.09.2019 | 2 hours |
| | Kadriye | Farmer | İsmailhacılı | Residence, İsmailhacılı | | |
| | İsmet | Farmer | İsmailhacılı | Mosque courtyard, İsmailhacılı | | |
| 32 | Oğuz | Farmer, security guard at the sugar factory | Karşıyaka | Sugar Factory, security room | 29.09.2019 | 1 hour 30 minutes |
| | Tacettin | Farmer, security guard at the sugar factory | Camiikebir | Sugar Factory, security room | | |
| | Kerim | Farmer, security guard at the sugar factory | Not Provided | Sugar Factory, security room | | |
| 33 | Halil | Former mayor | Gülveren | Community clubhouse, Sorgun | 29.09.2019 | 2 hours 30 minutes |
| | Arda | Not Provided | Not Provided | Community clubhouse, Sorgun | | |
| **Total Duration** | | | | | | **53 hours 35 minutes** |

## D. CURRICULUM VITAE

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

| | |
|---|---|
| Surname, Name: | Alan, Aykut Ozan |
| Nationality: | [redacted] |
| Date of Birth: | [redacted] |
| Mobile: | [redacted] |
| Email: | [redacted] |

### EDUCATION

| Degree | Institution | Year of Graduation |
|---|---|---|
| PhD | Middle East Technical University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration | 2024 |
| MS | Ankara University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration | 2013 |
| BS | Ankara University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration | 2009 |

### CONFERENCES

13th National Social Science Congress, Ankara. December 14-15, 2013.

### WORK EXPERIENCE

| Work Place | Position | Years of Service |
|---|---|---|
| Limak Group of Companies | Internal Audit Manager | 2023 to the present |
| Turkish Grain Board (TMO) | Head Inspector | 2021 – 2023 |
| Turkish Grain Board (TMO) | Inspector | 2014 – 2021 |
| Turkish Grain Board (TMO) | Deputy Inspector | 2011 – 2014 |

### LANGUAGES

| Language | Level of Proficiency |
|---|---|
| Turkish | Native |
| English | Full working proficiency |
| Russian | Limited working proficiency |

### CERTIFICATION

| Certificate | Institution | Certificate No | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| Certified Internal Auditor (CIA) | The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) | CIA-196360-KFHID | April 2022 |

# E. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu tez, kırsal Anadolu'da tarımsal ilişkileri incelerken ortaya çıkan basit ama önemli bir soruyu ele almaktadır: Orta Anadolu'da küçük, yarı kurak ve tarımsal potansiyeli çevresel nedenlerden dolayı sınırlı, uzun zamandır nüfusu yaşlanan ve azalan, geleneksel özellikleri aşınan, ekonomik ve toplumsal yapıları kapitalist piyasa ilişkilerine tamamen eklemlenmiş bir kasabada, tarımsal ilişkilere dayanan, kendine özgü toplumsal ilişkiler ve sınıf mücadeleleri hâlâ var mıdır? Eğer varsa, bu tarımsal ilişki dinamikleri, yaşlanan nüfusun tamamen sahneden çekilmesiyle yok olacağı beklenen bu tür kırsal yerleşimlerdeki gidişatı tersine çevirme, kırsal tarım hayatının geleceğini etkileme potansiyeline sahip midir? Diğer bir ifadeyle, bu tür Anadolu kasabalarının yavaş ölümünü bir ön kabul olarak veri alan yaklaşımların aksine, toplum bilimleri açısından incelemeye değer bir tarımsal sosyal dinamik bulunmakta mıdır? Bu soruları yanıtlayabilmek için hangi kavramsal araçlar kullanılabilir ve bu ilişkiler hangi teorik düzlemde analiz edilebilir?

Bu sorulara yanıt aramak amacıyla, tez Pierre Bourdieu'nün toplumsal teorisinden yola çıkarak Çiğdemli kasabasındaki tarımsal ilişkileri uzun vadeli dışsal faktörler, yerel tarımsal ilişkiler ve tarım politikaları çerçevesinde sistematik bir şekilde incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Ayrıca, çiftçiler arasındaki sınıf dinamiklerini ve onların tarımsal alanda hayatta kalma stratejilerini analiz ederek Orta Anadolu'daki tarımsal ilişkilerin bugünü ve geleceği hakkında çıkarımlar yapmayı amaçlamaktadır.

Tez, tarımsal ilişkilerin toplumsal, politik ve ekonomik yönlerini bir arada ele alan bütünleşik bakışla okunması gerektiğini öne sürmektedir. Tarım, sadece ekonomik bir faaliyet değil, aynı zamanda toplumsal ve kültürel bağlamda şekillenen bir olgudur. Çiğdemli kasabasındaki yerel tarımsal ilişkiler, küresel ve ulusal yapılarla etkileşim içinde olmakla birlikte özgün özellikler barındırmaktadır. Bu ilişkilerin anlaşılması, kırsal hayatın bugünkü ve gelecekteki dönüşümlerine ışık tutabilecek potansiyele sahiptir.

Tarihsel olarak köylülük, belirgin ve kendine özgü nitelikleri olan bir sosyal kategori olarak siyasetin, ekonominin ve toplumsal düşüncenin önemli bir parçası olagelmiştir. Özellikle modern çağa gelindiğinde, köylülük sosyal bir kategori olarak kentliliğin, tarım ise ekonomik bir kategori olarak sanayinin karşısına konumlandırılmış, köy, köylülük ve tarım, modern sanayi toplumunu anlayabilmek için hareket noktası kabul edilen ve modern sanayi toplumu ile zıtlığı üzerinden tanımlanan kavramlar haline gelmiştir. Köylülüğün kapitalizmle ilişkisi içinde oraya çıkan hem köylülüğü hem de kapitalizmi kökünden etkileyen ve "köylü sorunu" başlığı altında tartışılan bir dizi ekonomik ve siyasi sorunun temayüz etmesi, 20. yüzyılın ikinci yarısına gelindiğinde köylülüğün devrimci bir güç olarak ortaya çıkması, köylülük üzerine olan ilgiyi arttırmıştır. Köy sosyolojisinden kalkınma ekonomisine, Marksist literatürden Weberyen yaklaşımlara, antropolojiden siyaset bilimine kadar birçok okul ve disiplin köylülüğün ekonomik, sosyal, kültürel ve siyasal yapısı üzerine geniş literatürler oluşturmuştur. Bu yüzyıl boyunca oluşturulan literatürler büyük ölçüde kent-kır, sanayi-tarım, geleneksel-modern gibi ikiliklere dayansalar da çok yönlü ve derinlikli araştırmalarla köylülüğün ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel yönlerini bütünlüklü bir biçimde değerlendirebilecek zengin perspektifler oluşturulmasını sağlamışlardır.

Sanayileşme, teknolojik ve demografik dönüşümler, kır ve kent arasındaki sınırları zaman içinde bulanıklaştırmış, geleneksel denilebilecek sosyal ve kültürel koşullarda yaşayan, geçimlik üretim yapan küçük köylülük büyük ölçüde ortadan kalkmış veya dönüşmüştür. Tarımsal ekonominin genel kapitalist ekonomiyle bütünleşme derecesi artmış, çok uluslu şirketlerin tarım-gıda zincirleri üzerindeki kontrolü ve finansal sermayenin tarımdaki etkinliği genişlemiştir. Bu süreçte tarım politikalarının odak noktası gıda güvenliği, çevresel sürdürülebilirlik gibi alanlara kaymış, tarım kendi içerisinde bir inceleme nesnesi olmaktan ziyade dünyanın kentli nüfusunu ilgilendiren ve tüketici merkezli bakış açılarından beslenen sorunların alt başlıklarından biri haline gelmiştir. Köylülük, analitik bir kavram olmaktan çıkmış, kırsal alanların giderek daha çok kentleşmiş, tarım ve sanayi iç içe geçmiştir. Tüm bunların sonucu olarak, tarımsal kavramları ve ilişkileri düalist bir teorik çerçevede inceleme imkânı ortadan kalkmıştır. Literatürde yukarıdan aşağı ve piyasa temelli yaklaşımların etkisi artmış, 20. yüzyılda üretilen ve bütünlüklü bakış açısı içeren perspektifler bir kenara bırakılmıştır. Geleneksel sosyal örüntülerin gerilemesinden yola çıkarak kırsal

toplumsal ilişkileri ekonomik ilişkilere, ekonomik ilişkileri ise formel ve parasal ilişkilere indirgeyen bir bakış açısı hâkim olmuştur.

Tez, kırsal yaşamı şekillendirmede yerel tarımsal ilişkilerin hâlâ hayati bir rol oynadığını, tarımsal ilişkilerin kendine has dinamiklerinin yerel tarımsal ilişkilerin merkeze alındığı bir yaklaşımla ortaya konulabileceğini, böyle bir yaklaşımın tarımsal ilişkilerin kendine has sosyal, kültürel ve ekonomik yönlerini bütünlüklü olarak dikkate alması gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda tez, Pierre Bourdieu'nün sosyal teorisini, özellikle alan, habitus ve sermaye kavramlarından yararlanarak, kırsal toplulukların sosyal dinamiklerini analiz edebilecek bir çerçeve sunmaktadır. Tezde, parasal olmayan ekonomik faaliyetler, enformel yapılar ve yerel ilişkiler göz önünde bulundurulması savunulmaktadır. Bu yolla tarımsal ilişkilere odaklanarak, kırsal alanlardaki sosyal sınıflar, politik yapılar ve ekonomik faaliyetler arasındaki karmaşık etkileşimleri ortaya çıkarılması hedeflemektedir. Böylece bu ilişkilerin tarımın geleceğinin şekillenmesinde etkisinin ne olduğu daha iyi anlaşılabilir.

Bu amaçla Çiğdemli köyü araştırma sahası olarak seçilmiştir. Çiğdemli, Orta Anadolu'da Yozgat iline bağlı, yarı kurak bir iklime sahip, yakın tarihte sulaklığı, sosyal ve ekonomik imkanlarıyla dikkat çeken, ancak son yıllarda yaşlanan ve azalan nüfusu, gerileyen su kaynakları ve yüklü belediye borçlarıyla anılan küçük bir kasabadır. Bölge, sınırlı sulama imkânları ve küçük ölçekli çiftçilikle ayakta kalmaya çalışan bir tarım ekonomisine sahiptir. Bu nedenle, kapitalist yatırımların sınırlı olduğu, yaşlı çiftçilerin tarım yapmaya devam ettiği bölgelerdeki dinamiklerin anlaşılması için uygun bir alan sunmaktadır.

Geleneksel köy yapılarının çözülmesine ve piyasa ilişkilerinin genel hakimiyetine karşın, Çiğdemli gibi yerlerde tüm zorluklara rağmen çiftçilik yaparak hayatta kalmaya çalışan çiftçilerin ve yerel tarımsal ilişkilerin incelenmesi, özellikle büyük tarımsal yatırımların olmadığı, kırsal nüfusun giderek küçüldüğü ve yaşlandığı bu tür yerleşimlerdeki sosyal dinamiklerini anlamak ve geleceğe yönelik öngörü yapabilmek bakımından önem taşımaktadır.

Çiğdemli'de yapılan saha çalışması, ilk bakışta durağan ve çözülmekte gibi görünen sosyal yapının gerçekte dinamik sosyal ilişkiler ve sınıflar arası mücadeleler içerdiğini

göstermektedir. Bu dinamikler, gelecekte bu bölgelerdeki toplumsal dönüşümleri şekillendirebilecek potansiyele sahiptir. Ayrıca, sert iklim ve olumsuz piyasa koşullarına rağmen küçük çiftçilerin neden ve nasıl tarım yapmaya devam ettiğini anlamak, Türkiye'nin diğer kırsal bölgeleri için de gelecekteki öngörülerde bulunmak adına önem taşımaktadır.

Tezde hedeflenen perspektife uygun bir teorik ve kavramsal çerçeveye ihtiyaç duyulmuştur. Bu bağlamda tez, Pierre Bourdieu'nun sosyal teorisinden yararlanmıştır. Bourdieu toplumsal yapılar ile bireylerin gündelik pratikleri arasındaki ilişkiyi incelerken bireyin toplumsal dünyayı algılama biçimini merkeze alan öznelcilik ile, toplumsal yapıların bireylerden bağımsız olarak var olduğunu savunan nesnelciliğe karşı çıkarak bu ikiliği 'habitus' kavramıyla aşmaya çalışmıştır. Habitus, bireyin toplumsal koşullardan edindiği, uzun süreli ve aktarılan eğilimleri ifade eder. Bourdieu, toplumsal gerçekliği anlamak için 'pratik bilgiye' dayalı bir yaklaşım önerir. Bireyler, bilinçli ya da hesaplı kararlar almak yerine, toplumsal yaşama katılımlarıyla edindikleri bu eğilimler doğrultusunda davranır. Habitus, bireylerin ve yapının karşılıklı etkileşimini sağlayan bir araçtır.

Bourdieu'nün sermaye teorisi, toplumsal yapıları anlamak için tarihsel bir perspektif sunar. Ona göre, toplumsal dünya, birikmiş tarihtir ve sermaye bu tarihin somutlaşmış halidir. Sermaye, maddi ya da bedensel bir biçimde birikmiş emektir ve toplumsal ilişkilerde bir değer taşıyan her türlü kaynak sermaye olarak kabul edilebilir. Bu bağlamda, sermaye yalnızca ekonomik anlamda değil, kültürel, sosyal ve sembolik biçimlerde de var olabilir. Bourdieu, sermayeyi bireyler ve gruplar arasında bir güç mücadelesinin aracı olarak ele alır. Ekonomik sermaye, görünür ve genellikle maddi kazanç sağlarken, kültürel ve sosyal sermaye de benzer şekilde toplumsal hiyerarşide yükselme ve güç kazanma stratejilerinin bir parçası olarak işlev görür. Kültürel sermaye, dil becerileri ve davranışsal özellikler gibi sınıfsal kaynaklardan beslenir ve genellikle eğitim sistemi aracılığıyla meşrulaştırılır. Bu meşrulaştırma, toplumsal eşitsizliklerin yeniden üretilmesine neden olur. Sosyal sermaye ise, bireylerin sosyal ağlar aracılığıyla kazandığı kaynaklara dayanır ve bireylerin sosyal dünyada daha yüksek bir statüye ulaşmalarını sağlar. Bu bağlamda, sermaye, toplumsal hayatta stratejik olarak kullanılan bir kaynaktır. Ayrıca, ekonomik sermaye diğer sermaye

türlerine dönüştürülebilir, ancak bu dönüşüm maliyetlidir ve her sermaye türü, ait olduğu alanın kendine özgü kurallarına göre işlev gösterir.

Bourdieu'nün toplumsal teorisinde ‘alan’, bireyler ve kurumlar arasındaki objektif ilişkileri tanımlayan önemli bir kavramdır. Alan, belirli kurallar, değerler ve hiyerarşiler çerçevesinde işleyen ve aktörlerin sermaye türlerini biriktirip üzerinde hakimiyet kurmaya çalıştığı bir yapıdır. Bourdieu, alanı bir oyuna benzetir; oyuncular bu oyunun kurallarını kabul eder ve çeşitli stratejilerle kazanmak için çaba harcarlar. Ancak bu oyunun adil olmadığını, oyuncuların sahip oldukları sermaye miktarlarının ve başlangıç pozisyonlarının eşitsiz olduğunu vurgular. Her alan kendi sermaye türlerine sahiptir; ekonomik, sosyal, kültürel ve sembolik sermaye türleri farklı alanlarda değişen değerlerle değerlendirilir. Bir aktörün alandaki gücü, sahip olduğu sermayenin miktarı ve dağılımına bağlıdır. Alan, aynı zamanda bir mücadele alanıdır; bireyler ve kurumlar bu alanda güç ve pozisyon elde etmek için rekabet eder. Bu mücadele, sermaye türlerini dönüştürerek ve stratejik hamleler yaparak gerçekleşir.

Bourdieu'nün sınıf anlayışı, toplumsal sınıfları hem maddi hem de sembolik unsurlar çerçevesinde analiz etmeye dayanır. Weber’in sınıf ve statü ayrımını yeniden ele alarak, sınıf farklılıklarını yaşam tarzları gibi sembolik gösterimlerle açıklar. Sınıf, yalnızca üretim ilişkilerinden değil, aynı zamanda bu ilişkilerin bireylerin algıları ve davranışları üzerindeki etkilerinden oluşur. Bourdieu'ye göre, sınıf hem objektif göstergelere (sermaye gibi) hem de öznel algılara dayanır. Bu iki kutup, bireylerin toplumsal konumları ve bu konumların alışkanlıklar (habitus) yoluyla oluşması ile birleşir. Bourdieu, toplumsal sınıfları tanımlarken sermayenin miktarına ve bileşimine odaklanır. Bir bireyin sahip olduğu sermaye miktarı sınıflar arası farklılıkları, sermaye bileşimi ise sınıflar içi fraksiyonları oluşturur. Sınıf, yalnızca bir üretim ilişkisine bağlı değildir; yaş, cinsiyet, etnik köken gibi ikincil özellikler de sınıfın tanımlanmasında etkili olabilir. Bourdieu, sınıfı bir dizi ilişkiler ağı olarak görür ve bu ağın bireylerin stratejileri ve sermayeyi nasıl kullandıkları ile şekillendiğini vurgular. Sınıflar arasında sermaye türleri ve sermayenin neyin değerli sayıldığı üzerine bir rekabet bulunur. Bireyler ve aileler, bu sınıf yapısındaki konumlarını sürdürmek veya geliştirmek için farklı sermaye türlerine yatırım yaparlar.

Bourdieu'nün devlet anlayışı, devleti bir alan veya alanlar bütünü olarak görmesine dayanır. Devlet, farklı sermaye türleriyle bağlantılı çıkarlar çerçevesinde yapılandırılmış bir "güç alanı" olarak tanımlanır. Devletin varlığı, halkın bu kavrama inancı ve toplumsal tanınma ile şekillenir. Bourdieu, devleti bir sosyal gerçeklik olarak değil, zihinsel ve teorik bir inşa olarak ele alır ve bu yapının evrensellik ve tarafsızlık gibi bürokratik alanlardan üretilmiş kavramlarla örtüldüğünü eleştirir. Weber'den esinlenerek, Bourdieu devleti, meşru fiziksel ve sembolik şiddet kullanma tekelini elinde bulunduran bir yapı olarak kabul eder. Devletin gücü, farklı sermaye türlerinin (fiziksel güç, ekonomik, sembolik, hukuki sermaye gibi) bir araya gelmesinden oluşur. Bu yüzden, devletin tarafsız olmadığına dikkat çeken Bourdieu, devletin sadece egemen sınıfın aracı olmadığını savunur. Devlet, aynı zamanda toplumsal hareketlerin etkili olup dönüşüm yaratabileceği bir mücadele alanıdır.

Bourdieu'nun teorik çerçevesi tarımsal ilişkilere uygulandığında 'tarımsal alan', içinde ajanların tarımsal sermaye için rekabet ettiği, kurallar, düzenlilikler ve kurumlar ağı olarak tanımlanabilir. Tarımsal alan sadece piyasa ilişkilerini değil, tarımsal ilişkilerden beslenen sosyal yaşamın diğer yönlerini de kapsar. Bu nedenle, tarımsal sermaye yalnızca tarım piyasalarında değişim değeri olan materyallerle sınırlı değildir. Alanın sınırları belirlenirken, tarımsal ekonomik ilişkiler diğer ekonomik alanlardan ayrılmalı ve tarım üretimi merkezde tutulmalıdır. Çiftçiler, tarım işçileri, arazi sahipleri, tüccarlar gibi üretime doğrudan katkı sağlayanlar tarımsal alanın içinde yer alırken, tarım ürünlerinin tüketicileri bu alanın dışında kalır.

Tarımsal sermaye, tarımsal alan içinde değerli sayılan çeşitli sermaye türlerinden oluşur. Bourdieu'nun tanımlarından yola çıkarak 'tarımsal ekonomik sermaye', 'tarımsal sosyal sermaye', 'tarımsal kültürel sermaye' ve 'tarımsal sembolik sermaye' şeklinde alt kategorilere ayrılabilir. Örneğin, tarımsal ekonomik sermaye, tarımsal üretimden elde edilen ve dolaşımda olan maddi kaynakları kapsar. Bu sermaye, tarım döngüsü ile doğrudan bağlantılıdır ve para, kredi, iş gücü, makineler ve tohumlar gibi örneklerle açıklanabilir. Tarımsal sosyal sermaye ise tarımsal topluluk içinde ortaya çıkan ve taraflara sosyal sermaye kazandıran sosyal ağları içerir. Tarımsal kültürel sermaye, çiftçilikle ilgili teknik bilgi ve uygulamaları, aynı zamanda yerel tarımsal kültürü kapsar. Yerel ve geleneksel bilgiler tarımsal kültürel sermayenin parçası olsa da modern tarım teknikleri bu sermayenin giderek daha önemli bir parçası haline

gelmektedir. Tarımsal sembolik sermaye, bir çiftçinin toplumdaki itibarı ile ilgilidir. Çiftçinin sahip olduğu makineler veya ekipmanların sembolik değeri de bu kavram kapsamındadır.

Tarımsal sermaye, tarım alanında geçerliliği olan bir değer taşıdığı sürece önemlidir. Sermaye türleri arasında dönüşüm de mümkündür; örneğin, tarımsal sermaye türleri birbirine dönüşebileceği gibi, tarımsal bir sermaye türü tarımsal olmayan bir sermaye türüne de dönüşebilir. Ancak bu dönüşüm sırasında bir miktar kayıp yaşanabilir. Tarımsal alan ve tarımsal sermaye, sosyal ve ekonomik ilişkilerin karmaşık yapısını anlamada önemli araçlar sunar. Bu ilişkiler, güç mücadelesi, sınıf farkları ve tarihsel değişimlerle şekillenir.

Çalışma çalışmasında, başlangıçta belirlenmiş bir metodolojiye bağlı kalmamış, teorik araştırmalar saha ziyaretleri sırasındaki gözlemler ile birleştirilerek en uygun yöntemin belirlenmesine çalışılmıştır. Yapılan ön araştırma sonucunda Yozgat ilinin Sorgun ilçesine bağlı Çiğdemli kasabası, tarımın ana geçim kaynağı olması ve sosyal yaşamın görece canlı olması dikkate alınarak saha çalışmasının yapılacağı yerleşim yeri olarak belirlenmiştir.

Araştırma yöntemi olarak, nitel ve nicel verilerin birlikte kullanıldığı bir karma yöntem tercih edilmiştir. Bu kapsamda, katılımcılarla yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiş ve bu görüşmelerde kartopu örnekleme yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Kartopu yöntemi ile ilk görüşülen kişilerden yeni katılımcılar önerileri alınmış, ancak bu yaklaşımın homojen bir grup oluşturma riskine karşı, daha geniş bir temsil sağlamak amacıyla araştırma sorununu dikkate alan teorik örnekleme de yapılmıştır. Yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmelerin yanı sıra, kasabadaki sosyal yaşamın bir parçası olabilmek ve katılımcı gözlem yapabilmek amacıyla cami avluları, meydanlar, benzin istasyonları gibi kamusal alanlar ziyaret edilmiştir. Bu yerlerde topluluk içinde yapılan sohbetler gözlemlenmiş ve katılımcı gözlemlerde bulunulmuştur. Saha çalışmasında toplamda 33 ana katılımcı ve 36 kısmi katılımcı ile 53 saati aşan yüz yüze görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmiştir. Saha çalışması sırasında Çiğdemli kasabasının eski ve yeni belediye başkanlarıyla yapılan görüşmeler, kasabanın yönetim yapısı ve tarihine dair önemli bilgiler sunmuştur Araştırma sırasında katılımcılar arasındaki sınıf ilişkileri ve yerel topluluk içindeki güç dinamikleri gözlemlenmiştir.

Tez, saha çalışmasından elde edilen bulguların yanı sıra, Tarım ve Orman Bakanlığı, TUİK, Sorgun İlçe Tarım Müdürlüğü gibi kurumlardan elde edilen resmi verilerle de desteklenmiştir. Ayrıca yerel gazete, video, belgesel ve benzeri kaynaklardan yararlanılmıştır. Saha çalışmasında tutulan notlar nitel araştırma aracı ATLAS.ti yazılımı yardımıyla işlenmiş, yapay zeka araçları ise dil düzeltmelerinde kullanılmıştır.

Tez, Çiğdemli'deki tarımsal alanda yaşanan mücadeleyi Bourdieu'cü bir perspektifle, tarımsal oyun olarak kavramaktadır. Tarımsal oyun, tarımsal üretim etrafında şekillenen ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel ilişkileri kapsar. Tarım sermayesi yalnızca ekonomik sermaye ile sınırlı değildir; aynı zamanda insani ilişkiler aracılığıyla biriken kültürel, sosyal ve sembolik sermayeyi de içerir. Çiğdemli'de bu sermaye, tarım faaliyetlerine katılan aktörler arasında sürekli olarak yeniden tanımlanır ve toplumsal mücadeleler içerisinde değer kazanır.

Çiğdemli'deki tarımsal alan, çiftçi aileler, tarım işçileri, tüccarlar, kooperatifler ve tarımsal ilişkileri düzenleyen kamu otoriteleri gibi çeşitli aktörlerden oluşur. Bu aktörler arasındaki ilişkiler, tarımsal sermayenin birikimi ve dağıtımı yoluyla sosyal sınıfların şekillenmesinde rol oynar. Toprak, bu oyunun temel ekonomik kaynağı olarak, tarımsal oyunun maddi sınırlarını çizer. Tarımsal alanın yapısı, kaynakların nasıl biriktiğini ve dağıtıldığını, dolayısıyla pozisyonlar arasındaki hiyerarşik ve dengesiz ilişkileri gösterir. Bu nedenle, tarımsal sermayenin kaynağı olan toprak, nüfus, kurumlar ve tarihsel bağlam incelenmelidir.

Sorgun, Bozok Platosu'nun merkezinde yer almakta olup, kuzeyde büyük sırtlar ve güneyde engebeli alanlarla çevrilidir. Bölgenin tarımsal faaliyetleri, topografyası, iklimi ve su kaynakları tarafından şekillenir. Çiğdemli'de yükselti 1,123 ila 1,195 metre arasında değişir ve yüksek rakımlarda soğuk hava, uzun kışlar ve erken don olayları nedeniyle tarımsal faaliyetler sınırlanır. Bu bölgelerde genellikle arpa ve buğday yetiştirilir, şeker pancarı tarımı nadirdir. Bölgenin yarı kurak iklimi, sıcak ve kurak yazlar ile sert kışlara yol açar; yıllık ortalama sıcaklık 9,5-10 °C'dir. Yağış genellikle ilkbahar ve sonbaharda yoğundur, yıllık ortalama yağış miktarı 465,2 mm'dir. Çiğdemli'nin toprakları alüvyonlu olup, su gerektiren ürünler için uygundur.

Sorgun'daki bu doğal koşullar, tarımsal verimliliği belirleyen temel etkenlerdir ve tarımsal faaliyetleri şekillendiren ‘tarımsal oyunun’ zeminini oluşturur.

Eski adı “Sorkun” olan kasabanın adı 1972’de Çiğdemli olarak değiştirilmiştir. Kasaba, Alevi ve Sünni nüfusun bir arada yaşadığı yerleşimlerden biridir. Alevi nüfusu zamanla azalsa da bu sosyal yapının politik ve demografik etkileri önemini korur. 1972 yılında belediye statüsüne kavuşan Çiğdemli, 2005’te yakındaki üç köyün mahalle olarak bağlanmasıyla da genişlemiştir. Kasabada tarım dışı faaliyetler bulunsa da tarım, ekonomik ve sosyal yaşamın merkezinde kalmıştır.

Tezde Çiğdemli'deki büyük teknolojik, çevresel, demografik, kurumsal ve politik değişimlerin kasabayı nasıl etkilediği ve tarımsal oyunun kurallarını nasıl etkilediği incelenmiştir. Değişimlerin öznel etkisini anlamak için katılımcılardan geçmişle günümüzü karşılaştırarak deneyimlerini paylaşmaları istenmiş, yanıtlar, kasabada yaşam şartlarının ve tarımsal üretimin geçmişte daha iyi olduğunu, ancak şimdi kötüye gittiğini ve gelecekte de iyileşme ihtimali olmadığı noktalarında yoğunlaşmıştır. Bu ortak görüşe rağmen, farklı sosyal sınıflar bu olumsuz gidişat karşısında hayatta kalmak için farklı stratejilere başvurduğu gözlemlenmiştir.

Dışsal ve uzun vadeli etkenler, teknoloji, su kaynaklarının azalması, demografik değişimler, kurumsal ve siyasi yapıdaki değişiklikler ve tarım politikalarının çerçevesi ve uygulanması başlıkları altında incelenmiştir.

Sorgun'da tarımsal mekanizasyon son 15 yılda önemli bir gelişme göstermiştir. Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu'nun verilerine göre, 2004-2020 yılları arasında traktör sayısı %30 artarken, traktörlerin güç kapasiteleri de önemli ölçüde yükselmiştir. Bunun yanı sıra, biçerdöver ve pancar hasat makinelerinin sayısında da artış olmuştur. Ancak küçük çiftçiler genellikle bu makineleri sahiplenmek yerine kiralama yoluna gitmektedir. Aynı dönemde kimyasal gübre ve bitki koruma ürünlerinin kullanımı da artmıştır. Ayrıca, Ankara-Sivas yüksek hızlı tren hattının tamamlanmasıyla bölgeye olan ulaşımın kolaylaşması, tersine göçün artmasına yol açabilecektir. Bu gelişmeler, tarımsal ekonomik sermayenin hem niceliksel hem de niteliksel olarak genişlediğini göstermektedir.

Traktörün kullanıma girmesiyle büyük çiftçilerden başlayarak çiftçiler tarımın yöntemlerini değiştirmiş, makinelerin kullanımıyla iş gücü ihtiyacı azalmıştır. Bu süreç bir yandan göçü tetiklemiş, diğer yandan tarımsal üretimde finansal ilişkilerin rolünü arttırmıştır.

Artan göç ve yaşlanan nüfus nedeniyle iş gücü yoğun ürünlerin ekiminden kaçınıldığını göstermektedir. Bu durum, iş gücüne olan ihtiyacı azaltan teknolojilerin ürün tercihini etkilediği anlamına gelir. Özellikle biçerdöverlerin yaygın kullanımı, nohut gibi makinelerle hasat edilebilen ürünlere talebi artırmıştır. Son yıllarda, nohut ve mercimek üretiminin artmasıyla birlikte nadasa bırakılan alanlar azalmıştır. Ayrıca, makinelerle hasadı kolaylaştıran yeni nohut türleri de tercih edilmeye başlanmıştır.

Teknoloji sosyal sınıf yapısında ve ilişkilerde önemli değişimlere yol açmıştır. Biçerdöverlerin yaygınlaşması, mevsimlik tarım işçilerine olan ihtiyacı azaltmış ve farklı sosyal sınıflar için yeni fırsatlar yaratmıştır. Bu teknolojik değişiklikler, tarımsal alana yeni oyuncuların girmesine olanak tanırken, bazı eski oyuncuların ise devre dışı kalmasına neden olmuştur.

Teknolojik gelişmeler, Çiğdemli'deki sosyal yapı ve dayanışmayı olumsuz etkilemiştir. Makinaların yaygınlaşması, iş gücüne olan bağımlılığı azaltarak sosyal yardımlaşmayı ortadan kaldırmış, bireylerin tarım süreçlerinde birbirlerine olan ihtiyaçlarını azaltmıştır. Eskiden yaygın olan imece ve ‘yamaç’ gibi kolektif iş birliği yöntemleri, yerini bireysel çözümler ve finansal bağımlılığa bırakmıştır. Tarım daha sermaye yoğun bir hale gelirken, çiftçiler makineler, gübreler ve zirai ilaçlar için pazara bağımlı hale gelmiştir. Bu durum, tarımsal sosyal sermayenin göreli değerini zayıflatmış, geleneksel iş birliği ağları azalmış ve yerini profesyonel ve formel ilişkiler almıştır.

Kol gücünün gerilemesiyle geleneksel aile yapısının sosyal ve ekonomik tarımsal sermaye olarak değeri gerilerken parasal kıymetler ve bunlarla elde edilebilen ekonomik tarımsal sermaye türleri önemini arttırmıştır. Tarımsal üretim ilişkileri ve tarımsal sosyal ilişkiler dönüşmüş, bu da tarımsal oyunun kurallarını değiştirmiştir.

Yeni teknolojiler aynı zamanda kültürel sermayeyi de dönüştürerek geleneksel ve yerel tarımsal bilginin önemini geriletmiş, teknik, kurumlar tarafından üretilen bilgi türleri değer kazanmıştır.

Çiğdemli'deki su kaynaklarının azalması, kasabanın geçmişte su zenginliğiyle anılırken, günümüzde kuraklıkla mücadele etmek zorunda kalmasına yol açmıştır. Büyük Öz adlı çay eskiden yıl boyu akarken, artık sadece kış aylarında akmaktadır. Özellikle son 10 yılda ortalama yağış miktarında düşüş ve kuraklık gözlemlenmiştir. Tarım için gerekli olan suyun büyük kısmı yer altı sularından sağlanmakta ve kuyularla sulama oldukça maliyetlidir. Çiftçiler, Çiğdemli'nin yıllar içinde hem yer altı hem de yüzey sularını kaybettiğini vurgulamakta ve kuraklığın tarımsal faaliyetleri olumsuz etkilediğini belirtmektedir. Eskiden Ortaçayır gibi alanlar suyla kaplı iken, bugün tamamen tarıma açılmış durumdadır. Bu değişimin nedenleri olarak düşen yağış oranları ve yer altı sularının aşırı kullanımı gösterilmektedir. Sorgun'a içme suyu sağlamak amacıyla açılan kuyular, su kaynaklarının azalmasına katkıda bulunmuştur.

Kasabada su kaynaklarının azalması, tarımı ciddi şekilde etkilemiştir. Bölgedeki kuraklık ve azalan yağışlar tarımsal üretimi sınırlandırmış, eskiden çokça görülen camız besiciliğini bitirmiş, birçok ürün çeşidinin ekimi azalmıştır. Yeraltı sularına bağımlılık sulama maliyetlerini artırmıştır.

Çiğdemli'deki su kıtlığı, politik bir gerilim ve yerel rekabetin merkezi bir konusu haline gelmiştir. Çoğu Çiğdemli sakini, su kıtlığının ana nedenini Ortaçayır'dan Sorgun'a yeraltı suyunun taşınmasına bağlamaktadır. Duralidayılı köyü ve Sorgun Belediyesi arasındaki bir anlaşmayla suyun ücretsiz olarak sağlandığı iddia edilmektedir. Bu su transferi, özellikle tarım alanında su kıtlığına neden olmuş, sebze ve meyve üretimi azalmıştır. Ancak Duralidayılı köyü ve çevresindeki bazı köyler bu anlaşmadan ekonomik ve politik fayda sağlarken, Çiğdemli bu politik rekabetin kaybedeni olmuştur. Yerleşim yerleri arasında yaşanan ve bölüşüm ilişkilerinin etkileyen bu tür siyasal mücadeleler, siyasi alandaki ilişkilerin tarımsal alan üzerinde tarımsal kaynakların bölüşümünde ne denli etkili olduğunu göstermektedir.

Türkiye'de kırsal nüfusun hızla azalması ve şehir nüfusunun artması, Yozgat gibi illerde nüfus kaybına yol açmıştır. 2000'den itibaren Yozgat, nüfusunun %22'sini

kaybetmiştir. Bu düşüş, büyük oranda net göç sebebiyle gerçekleşmiştir. Çiğdemli'de de benzer bir göç eğilimi gözlemlenmektedir, özellikle Alevi nüfusun Ankara'ya göç ettiği anlaşılmaktadır. Bu göç dalgası, 1990'larda ekonomik sebeplerle hızlanmıştır. Çiğdemli'nin 2000'deki nüfus artışı, Alevi-Sünni karışık yapısını değiştirmiş, nüfusun 2007'den itibaren hızla azalmasına yol açmıştır. Göç, Çiğdemli'nin sosyal ve politik yapısını önemli ölçüde etkilemiştir.

Düşen doğum oranları ve artan yaşam beklentisiyle demografik geçiş süreci yaşayan Türkiye geneline paralel olarak Çiğdemli'de de genç nüfusun azaldığı ve yaşlı nüfusun arttığı ve kasabanın göç verdiği gözlemlenmiştir. Çiğdemlinin de içinde bulunduğu Sorgun ve çevresinde, kırsal yerleşimlerdeki yaşlı nüfusun nüfusa oranının kent merkezine göre daha fazla arttığı dikkat çekmektedir.

Çiğdemli 1970'ler itibaren köy kalkınma kooperatifleri aracılığıyla yurt dışına göç vermiş, bu göçün ve geri dönüş göçünün kasaba ekonomisi ve tarımsal üretim ilişkileri üzerinde önemli ekonomik sonuçları olmuştur. Araştırmada, çalıştıkları ülkeden Çiğdemli'ye dönenlerin, getirdikleri birikim ile Çiğdemlide tarla, arsa, gayrimenkul, küçük ölçekli işletmeler ya da traktör gibi statü ürünlerine yatırım yaptıkları, sahip oldukları emeklilik gelirlerinin de tarımsal faaliyetlerde finansal bir avantaj oluşturduğu anlaşılmaktadır. Avrupa'ya çalışmaya gitmiş üyelere sahip çiftçi ailelerinde sonraki kuşağın da yurt dışından tarımsal alana getirilen bu ekonomik sermayeden faydalandıkları gözlemlenmiştir.

Son yıllarda Çiğdemli bölgesine Afganistan ve Suriye'den gelen mülteci sayısında artış gözlenmiştir. Bu mülteciler, bölgede tarımsal iş gücü ihtiyacını karşılamak amacıyla istihdam edilmektedir. Saha araştırmasında Çiğdemli'nin yaşlanan ve azalan nüfusun tarımsal üretim üzerindeki olumsuz etkileri nedeniyle hane halklarını iş gücü piyasasına daha bağımlı hale geldikleri gözlemlenmiştir. Yaşlanan nüfus, hayvancılık gibi emek yoğun faaliyetlerden uzaklaşırken, Afgan çobanların, özellikle hayvancılıkta istihdam edildiği ve tarımsal iş gücü açığını kapattığı görülmüştür. Bu durum, demografik değişimlerin tarımsal alandaki alt sosyal sınıfların göreli durumlarını etkilediğini, yaşlı küçük çiftçilerin tarımsal üretimdeki pozisyonları gerilerken tarımsal oyuna mülteci tarım işçilerinin girdiğini ortaya koymaktadır.

Çiğdemli'nin nüfus kaybı, tarımsal alanlarda olduğu kadar siyasi ve idari alanlarda da olumsuz sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. Nüfus azalması, belediyenin gelirlerinin azalmasına, belediye tüzel kişiliğinin tehlikeye girmesine ve genel olarak politik güç kaybına yol açmaktadır. Bu nedenle yerel belediye başkanları, Çiğdemli'nin nüfusunu yüksek tutmayı öncelikli hedef haline getirmiştir. Eski belediye başkanları, nüfusun geçmişte gerçekte olduğundan daha yüksek gösterildiğini ve bu sayede merkezi hükümetten daha fazla gelir elde edildiğini itiraf etmektedir. Bu durum, nüfusun bir araç olarak siyasal alanda kullanıldığını ve yerel politikaların temelinde yer aldığını göstermektedir.

Kasabanın nüfus kaybı, ekonomik ve sosyal yaşamı olumsuz etkilenmiştir. Eskiden Çiğdemli'de birçok kamu kurumu ve ticari işletme bulunurken, günümüzde geriye sadece belediye ve okullar kalmıştır. Kamu kurumlarının kapanması, tarım mühendisleri ve teknik personelin de kasabadan ayrılmasına yol açmış, bu da tarımsal bilgi ve uzmanlık birikiminin azalmasına, yani tarımsal alanda ciddi bir kültürel sermaye kaybına neden olmuştur. Yine bu süreçte kasabadaki tarımsal ekonomik faaliyetler zayıflamış, sosyal hayat gerilemiş, geleneksel sosyal bağlar çözülmüş, buna bağlı olarak kümülatif bir sosyal ve ekonomik sermaye kaybı meydana gelmiştir.

2019 yılında belediyenin 15 yıllık AKP yönetiminin ardından MHP'ye geçmesiyle, yeni yönetim belediyenin gelir-gider durumunu kamuoyuyla paylaşmış, Çiğdemli'nin kişi başına düşen borcunun İstanbul ve Ankara'dan 5 kat fazla olduğu belirtilmiştir. Borçların temeline inildiğinde, belediyeye güneş enerji santrali, kültür merkezi ve henüz tamamlanmamış atıksu arıtma tesisi gibi yatırımların yapılmış olduğu, ancak saha çalışması sırasında katılımcıların bu yatırımlar ile ilgili olumsuz bir tavır içinde olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Çiğdemli'de belediye, kamu kaynaklarının dağıtımında siyasi bağlantılarla önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Belediye, iş yaratmak, ihaleler düzenlemek, iş makinelerini toplumsal işlerde kullandırmak gibi faaliyetlerle tarımsal ve siyasi alanlarda merkezi bir aktör haline gelmiştir. Tarımsal alandaki aktörler de dolaylı ya da doğrudan belediyenin yaptığı kamu harcamalarından etkilenmektedir. Ancak bu etkiler, farklı toplumsal sınıflar ve gruplar arasında eşit dağılmamaktadır. Tarımda küçük çaplı çiftçiler, belediyenin kaynakları yakın çevresine ve destekçilerine aktardığını dile getirmiştir. Ayrıca, belediyede işe alımların, sadece seçmenlere iş imkânı sağlamak amacıyla yapıldığı da ifade edilmiştir. Yapılan görüşmeler,

belediyeden en önemli beklentinin ve mahalli seçimlerde etkili olan politikanın iş yaratma kapasitesi olduğunu göstermiştir. Kamu kaynaklarının yeniden dağıtılması, tarımsal alandaki güç dengelerini ve bu grupların birbirine karşı güçlerini etkilemektedir.

Sonuç olarak, Çiğdemli'de belediye, yalnızca tarımsal alanda değil, aynı zamanda yerel siyasette ve ekonomik ilişkilerde de kritik bir rol oynamakta, bu da yerel güç dengelerini ve sosyal adalet algılarını etkilemektedir. Tarımsal alandaki aktörler, siyasal alanda harekete geçirdikleri sosyal sermayeleri ile belediye üzerinden bölüşüm ilişkilerini etkilemekte ve kendilerine ekonomik kaynak aktarılmasına çalışmaktadır.

Türkiye'nin tarım sektöründe devletin ve özel sektörün çok sayıda kurum ve kuruluşu doğrudan ya da dolaylı olarak müdahalelerde bulunarak sektörü şekillendirmektedir. Bu müdahaleler, teşvikler, sübvansiyonlar, kamu alımları, fiyat destekleri ve kredi imkanları gibi çeşitli yollarla gerçekleşmektedir. Çiğdemli ve çevresinde faaliyet gösteren en önemli kurumlar arasında çiftçilere kısa, orta ve uzun vadeli krediler veren Ziraat Bankası ve Denizbank gibi bankalar, Çiftçilere finansman, girdi temini ve pazarlama hizmetleri sunan Tarım Kredi Kooperatifleri, şeker pancarı üreticilerine kota sistemiyle destek veren Türk Şeker Fabrikaları ve , tahıl ve diğer tarımsal ürünlerin alımını yaparak piyasayı düzenlemekte ve fiyat dalgalanmalarına karşı çiftçiyi korumakla görevli Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi (TMO) sayılabilir. Bunların yanı sıra Çiğdemli'deki benzinlikler, tarımsal girdi ticareti ve zahirecilik yaparak, kasabanın tarım ekonomisinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Bu tüccarlar, çiftçiler ile daha büyük tarım piyasaları arasında aracılık yaparak yakıt, gübre, tohum, zirai ilaçlar ve tarım makineleri gibi temel girdileri sağlamakta, çiftçilerden tarımsal ürünlerini satın almakta, onlara borç vermektedirler. Bu tür işyerleri, çiftçilerin, özellikle de küçük çiftçilerin üzerinde büyük ekonomik etkiye sahiptirler.

Tarımsal destek politikalarının Çiğdemli üzerindeki etkisine bakıldığında, yeni bazı politikaların henüz yeterli uygulama alanı bulmadığı gözlemlenmiştir. Lisanslı depoculuk sistemi ve ürün senedi kullanımı, tarımsal üretimin finansmanı için etkili bir araç olarak görülse de bölgedeki küçük çiftçiler arasında yaygın bir ilgi görmemiştir. 2019 yılında Sorgun'da faaliyete geçen lisanslı depolarla birlikte küçük çiftçiler, yerel tüccarlar ile olan uzun süreli ilişkilerini devam ettirmişlerdir. Bu

sistemin başarılı olamamasının temel nedenleri arasında, küçük çiftçiler için avantajların maliyetlerle dengelenmemesi ve destekleyici alım sistemlerinin eksikliği gösterilmektedir. Aynı zamanda genç çiftçi projeleri de Çiğdemli'de sınırlı bir etkiye sahip olmuştur. Sorgun'daki çiftçilerden yalnızca birkaç kişi bu desteklerden yararlanabilmiştir. Saha araştırmasında özellikle siyasi bağlantıları olan büyük çiftçilerin, devlet desteklerinden daha fazla faydalandıkları, küçük çiftçilerin ise bu kaynaklara erişimde zorluk yaşadıkları tespit edilmiştir.

Bourdieu'nun toplumsal sınıf anlayışına dayanarak, Çiğdemli'deki sosyal sınıfları belirlemek için ekonomik ve sosyal sermaye yapısına dayalı bir yaklaşım benimsenmiştir. Bourdieu, sınıfları sabit özelliklere dayandırmayı reddeder; onun yerine, sosyal ilişkiler ağının oluşturduğu yapıların sosyal sınıfları oluşturduğunu savunur. Çiğdemli'de sosyal sınıfları anlamak için çiftçilerin sahip oldukları sermaye yapıları, meslekleri, gelir düzeyleri gibi faktörler dikkate alınmıştır. Ayrıca, çiftçilerin aile yapısı, yaş ve tarım dışı gelir kaynakları gibi ikincil özellikler de sınıf yapılarını etkileyen önemli faktörler olarak değerlendirilmiştir.

Bu yaklaşımla, Çiğdemli'de üç ana sınıf tespit edilmiştir. Küçük çiftçiler ekonomik tarımsal sermayesi zayıf ve genellikle yaşlı bireylerden oluşmakta olup geçimini ağırlıklı olarak tarımdan sağlamaya çalışmaktadır. Genellikle finansal risklere karşı savunmasızdırlar ve tarımsal gelirleri emeklilik maaşları gibi marjinal gelirlerle desteklenir. Yarı zamanlı çiftçiler Çiğdemli'de gözlemlenen bir diğer sosyal sınıf olup çiftçilikle kısmen uğraşan memur, beyaz ve mavi yakalılardan oluşmaktadır. Hem tarımsal hem de kentsel alanlarda faaliyet göstermektedirler. Kentsel geçmişleri nedeniyle sosyal ve kültürel sermayeleri daha çeşitlidir ve sahip oldukları tarım dışı gelirler ile finansal risklere karşı daha dirençlidirler. Büyük çiftçiler ise geniş tarımsal ekonomik sermayelerinin yanı sıra tarımsal ürün ticareti, işletmecilik gibi başka işlerden elde edilen gelirlerle de sahiptirler. Kurdukları yaygın sosyal ilişkiler, toplumsal ve ekonomik kurum ve kuruluşlarda yer almaları, yerel siyasilerle kurdukları bağlar gibi faktörler büyük çiftçilere önemli bir tarımsal sosyal sermaye vermektedir. Bu nedenle bu sınıf, toplumsal ve siyasal alanda daha fazla etkiye sahiptir.

Tarımsal alanda ayakta kalmaya çalışan tüm çiftçiler, ama özellikle de küçük çiftçiler, kapitalizmin mülksüzleştirici eğilimlerine, devletin ve egemen sınıfların sömürüsüne karşı direnç gösterme yolları ararlar. Bu stratejiler, tarımsal alanda başarılı olma ve hayatta kalma mücadelesini kapsamaktadır. Bourdieu'nun kullandığı anlamıyla strateji kavramı, tarımsal alandaki aktörlerin başarıya ulaşma yollarını ifade eder. Bu stratejiler bilinçli bir planlama değil, tarımsal oyunun bir ürünü olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Stratejiler, sosyal sınıfların sahip olduğu habitus ile bağlantılıdır ve sınıflar farklı stratejiler geliştirir. Üst sınıflar hâkimiyetlerini sürdürmek için stratejiler geliştirirken, alt sınıflar hayatta kalmak için stratejiler benimser. Bu nedenle, tezde 'hayatta kalma stratejileri' yerine daha geniş bir strateji kavramından hareket edilmiştir.

Çiğdemli'deki küçük çiftçiler, tarım yapmalarına rağmen yeterli gelir elde edememektedirler ve bu durum, onları tarımsal borç döngüsüne itmektedir. Bu çiftçilerin çoğu yaşlı olup, başka bir ekonomik faaliyetle uğraşmamaktadır. Küçük çiftçiler, sınırlı toprak varlıkları ve düşük tarımsal üretkenlik nedeniyle, yaşamsal olarak tarıma bağımlıdır. Özellikle yaşlı olmaları ve emekli maaşlarının yetersizliği, tarımsal faaliyetlerini sürdürmelerinin başlıca nedenlerinden biridir. Bourdieu'nun kavramlarıyla ele alındığında, bu çiftçiler, sosyoekonomik pozisyonlarına bağlı olarak, tarım dışı alanlarda kendilerine ve ailelerine daha iyi bir gelecek sağlama stratejisi benimsemektedirler. Çiftçiler, çocuklarını eğitime yönlendirerek, tarım dışı mesleklere geçiş yapmalarını teşvik etmektedirler. Bu strateji, nesiller arası bir çıkış planının bir parçasıdır ve ailelerin tarım alanındaki sermayelerini yavaşça tarım dışı sermayeye dönüştürmelerine yol açmaktadır. Uzun vadede, tarımdan çıkış stratejisi uygulayan küçük çiftçi aileler, tarımsal sermayelerini eğitim yoluyla tarım dışı kültürel sermayeye dönüştürmektedirler. Bu süreçte, çocuklarına eğitim ve farklı meslek fırsatları sunarak, tarımdan uzaklaşmayı hedeflemektedirler.

Yarı zamanlı çiftçilik, Çiğdemli'deki çiftçiler arasında giderek yaygınlaşan bir strateji haline gelmiştir. Tarımsal üretim dışındaki gelir kaynaklarının artması, bu çiftçilerin ekonomik yapılarını ve tarımsal faaliyetlerini önemli ölçüde etkilemektedir. Yarı zamanlı çiftçiler hem tarım hem de maaşlı işler yaparak geçimlerini sağlamaktadırlar. Bu çiftçiler, genellikle beyaz yakalı veya mavi yakalı işlerde çalışan ve tarımsal

üretimi ek gelir kaynağı olarak gören kişilerdir. Çoğu, köyde kalmak yerine, şehirlerde çalışmakta ve emekli olduktan sonra köylerine dönmektedir.

Yarı zamanlı çiftçiler, küçük çiftçilerden farklı olarak daha iyi bir mali duruma sahiplerdir. Tarım dışı gelir kaynakları, tarımsal girdileri finanse etmelerine ve kısa vadeli tarımsal fiyat dalgalanmalarına karşı daha dayanıklı olmalarına olanak tanımaktadır. Ancak, tarımı uzun vadeli bir iş olarak görmemekte, genellikle çocuklarının tarımsal faaliyetlere devam etmesini istememektedirler. Eğitim ve şehirde yaşam gibi uzun vadeli hedefler doğrultusunda, tarımsal faaliyetlerini sınırlı tutmaktadırlar. Bunların yanı sıra, yarı zamanlı çiftçilik, yerel topluluk içinde bazı eleştirilere de yol açmaktadır. Küçük çiftçiler, tarımla ilgisi olmayan kişilerin tarıma girmesinin fiyatları düşürdüğünü ve tarımsal üretimin kalitesini olumsuz etkilediğini belirtmektedirler. Bu durum tarımsal alana giren ve beraberinde farklı, kentli bir kültürel sermaye getiren yarı zamanlı çiftçilere karşı küçük çiftçilerin geliştirdiği sınıfsal bir karşıtlık niteliğindedir.

Büyük çiftçiler, Çiğdemli'deki en fazla ekonomik ve sosyal tarımsal sermayeye sahip gruptur. Ekonomik sermayeleri, büyük ölçekli tarımsal faaliyetler yürütmelerine ve yerel tarımsal piyasada güçlü bir konuma sahip olmalarına olanak tanır. Ancak, bu sermaye yalnızca tarımsal üretimle sınırlı değildir; gayrimenkul, makineler, miras gibi farklı ekonomik sermaye unsurlarına da dayanır. Büyük çiftçileri tarımsal ekonomik sermaye bakımından ‘büyük’ yapan şey sahip oldukları arazi değil, ürettikleri ürün hacmidir. Araştırmada büyük çiftçilerin kiralama ve ortakçılık anlaşmaları yaparak işlettikleri arazi miktarını arttırdıkları görülmüştür. Çiğdemli’de büyük çiftçilerin sulama yapılan arazilerde, özellikle şeker pancarı gibi yüksek katma değerli ürünler yetiştirdiği görülür. Sulama, daha fazla girdi ve iş gücü gerektirse de büyük çiftçiler ölçek ekonomileri sayesinde maliyetleri düşürerek kâr elde edebilmektedirler. Ayrıca, büyük çiftçiler market işletmeciliği, emtia ticareti gibi tarım dışı işler sayesinde tarımsal risklerini yönetebilmekte, ek gelir kaynakları yaratabilmektedirler. Bu da büyük çiftçilerin finansal kararlarında küçük çiftçilere kıyasla daha esnek olmalarına olanak tanımaktadır.

Büyük çiftçilerin geniş bir sosyal sermayesi vardır. Çoğu büyük çiftçi, diğer işlerle uğraşır ve bürokratik ve politik alanlarda da roller üstlenir. Yerel kooperatiflerde ve

tarımsal örgütlerde aktif olarak yer alır, bazıları yönetim pozisyonlarında bulunur. Çoğu büyük çiftçi, Pankobirlik, ziraat odası gibi tarımsal organizasyonlara üyedir ve bu ağlar, onların tarımsal alanda daha fazla enformasyona ve ilişki ağlarına fırsata erişmesini sağlar.

Büyük çiftçilerle yapılan görüşmelerde, önemli bir kısmının tarımsal sermayelerini artırma ve işlerini genişletme stratejileri izlerlerken bir yandan uzun vadede tarımsal alandan çıkmayı amaçladıkları görülmüştür. Çoğu büyük çiftçi, çocuklarının tarım dışı mesleklere yönelmesini ve şehirde bir hayat kurmasını istemektedir. Bu nedenle, tarımdan çıkış stratejisini bir nesil boyunca uygulayarak çocuklarının tarımsal kültürel ve sosyal sermayeyi devralmasını engellemektedirler. Bu çıkış stratejisi, tarımsal alandaki sermayenin başka bir alana aktarılmasına ve dönüştürülemeyen yerel, geleneksel, sosyal ve kültürel tarımsal sermayenin kaybolmasına neden olmaktadır.

Büyük çiftçilerin ekonomik sermayesinde yurt dışına giden göçmenlerin yaptığı ekonomik birikimler önemli rol oynamaktadır. Göçmen işçilerin emeklilikten sonra Çiğdemli'ye dönerek biriktirdikleri sermaye ile arazi ve gayrimenkul satın almaları, yerel tarım üzerinde önemli bir etki yaratmıştır. Bu sermaye, bir sonraki nesle miras kalmış ve bu süreç tarımsal sermayeyi artırarak tarımsal faaliyetlere dolaylı bir katkı sağlamıştır.

Türkiye'de tarım arazilerinin parçalanması ve mülkiyet anlaşmazlıklarının etkileri Çiğdemli'deki tarımsal alanda da gözlemlenmiştir. Çiğdemli'de çiftçilerin, araz paylaşımını resmi yollarla çözüme kavuşturamadıkları için resmi olmayan yöntemlerle icar ve yarıcılık yaptıkları, bunun da destek ödemelerinden yararlanmalarını zorlaştırdığı gözlemlenmiştir. Türkiye'de çiftçilerin mazot ve gübre gibi tarımsal desteklerden yararlanabilmeleri için Çiftçi Kayıt Sistemi'ne (ÇKS) kayıtlı olmaları ve ilgili belgeleri sunmaları gerekmektedir. Ancak birçok çiftçi, arazilerini fiilen kullanmasına rağmen, araziler resmi olarak üzerlerine kayıtlı olmadığından destek ödemelerini alamamaktadır. Bu ödemeler genellikle arazi sahibi olan kişilere yapılmakta, kiracılar veya ortakçılar bu desteklerden yararlanamamaktadır. Çiftçiler, aralarındaki sözlü anlaşmalar ve aile içi ilişkiler yoluyla bu sorunları çözmeye çalışmaktadır. Yarıcılık ve icar, Bourdieucu anlamda, formel ve hukuksal düzlemde tıkanan tarımsal üretim ilişkilerini yürütebilmek izledikleri birer habitus haline

gelmiştir. Bu durumda, toprağa bağlı tarımsal destekler, çiftçilerin bir sosyal sermaye olarak sosyal ve ailevi ilişkilerini kullanabilme imkanlarına bağlı olarak elde edebilecekleri bir ekonomik fayda haline dönüşmüştür. Tarımsal destek politikaları, mevcut sistemin pratikteki işleyişini tam olarak yansıtamadığı için etkisiz kalmakta, destekler genellikle tarımsal üretime katkısı olmayan arazi sahiplerine gitmektedir.

Çiğdemlide tarımsal piyasanın formel ve enformel kurallar çerçevesinde işlediği görülmektedir. Çiftçiler, üretim mevsimine bağlı olarak ihtiyaç duydukları kaynaklara erişmek için borçlanmak zorunda kalmakta ve bu durum, tarımsal faaliyetlerin sürekliliğini sağlamak adına önemli bir risk ve belirsizlik kaynağı oluşturmaktadır. Küçük çiftçiler, çoğunlukla kredi ve borçlanma üzerine kurulu bir üretim yapısı içinde bulunmakta, ihtiyaçlarını tarım kredi kooperatifleri, tüccarlar ve bankalar gibi kurumlardan karşılamaktadırlar. Ancak, bu kurumların yüksek faiz oranları, teminat ve kefil talepleri, küçük çiftçilerin formel finansal sisteme erişimlerini zorlaştırmaktadır. Bu nedenle birçok çiftçi, uzun vadeli ilişkiler kurdukları yerel tüccarlar üzerinden enformel yöntemlerle borçlanmayı tercih etmektedir. Ayrıca, çiftçilerin borç döngüsü içine sıkışması, ürünlerini düşük fiyatlarla satmalarına neden olmakta ve onları sürekli borçlarını yenilemeye mecbur bırakmaktadır. Bu durum, tarımsal destek politikalarının etkisini azaltmakta ve piyasa yapısındaki enformel dinamiklerin önemini artırmaktadır.

Çalışmada, küçük çiftçilerin ürünlerini TMO'ya satmalarının önünde pratikte bazı engeller söz konusu olduğu görülmüştür. TMO'ya satış yapabilmek için Çiftçi Kayıt Sistemi'ne (ÇKS) kayıtlı olma zorunluluğu, kayıtsız çiftçilerin TMO'ya satış yapmasını engellemektedir. İkincisi, küçük çiftçiler, borç döngüsüne bağlı olarak, hasat sonrası hemen ödeme yapmaları gerektiği için ürünlerini tüccarlara satmayı tercih etmektedir. TMO'nun ödeme yapma süresi 15 gün olduğu için, borçlarını derhal kapatmak zorunda kalan çiftçiler için TMO'ya satış yapmak cazip bir seçenek olmaktan çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca, TMO'nun kalite standartları ve denetimleri de çiftçiler tarafından bir engel olarak görülmektedir. Ürün kalitesinin düşük olması veya TMO'nun belirlediği kriterlere uymaması nedeniyle çiftçiler, ürünlerini tüccarlara satmayı tercih etmektedirler. Tüccarlar, TMO'nun aksine, ürünün kalitesiyle ilgilenmemekte ve daha esnek bir şekilde çiftçilerle iş yapmaktadırlar. Büyük çiftçiler ve tüccarlar, küçük çiftçilerden topladıkları düşük kaliteli ürünleri kaliteli ürünlerle

paçal yapmakta, çiftçilerle iş birliği yaparak çiftçilerin normalde tüccar sıfatıyla ürün satamadıkları TMO'ya küçük çiftçilerin ÇKS belgeleriyle satış yapmaktadır. Çiftçiler, nakit ihtiyaçları nedeniyle ürünlerini tüccarlara daha düşük fiyatlarla satarken, tüccarlar bu ürünleri daha yüksek fiyatlardan TMO'ya satmaktadır. Tüccar ve büyük çiftçiler, küçük çiftçiler üzerindeki etkilerinden gelen tarımsal sosyal sermayelerini ve satın alma güçlerini kullanarak tarımsal alanda önemli avantaj elde etmektedirler.

Çiğdemli'de, kahvehanelerin kapanmasıyla birlikte akaryakıt istasyonları, çiftçiler için önemli sosyal ve ekonomik etkileşim merkezleri haline gelmiştir. Tarım dışında ekonomik hayatın da zayıfladığı bu kasabada, istasyonlar, çiftçilerin borçlarını erteledikleri, yakıt ve kredi aldıkları, aynı zamanda sosyalleştikleri yerlerdir. İstasyon sahipleri, bu ilişkiler ağı içinde çiftçilerin tarımsal faaliyetleri hakkında bilgi edinerek önemli bir sosyal sermaye ve güç elde eder. Bu etkileşimler, sınıfsal farkların silikleştiği, çiftçilerin ve tüccarın eşitlendiği sosyal bir ortam yaratırken, tüccarların çiftçilere karşı ekonomik üstünlüğünü pekiştirmektedir. Buna karşılık küçük çiftçilerle yapılan görüşmelerde küçük çiftçiler, tüccarların kendilerini sömürdüğünü ve tüccara muhtaç kaldıklarını ifade etmektedirler. Çiftçilerin, akaryakıt istasyonlarında, işletmecilerin de bulundukları ortamda, alaycı ifadeler ile bu işletmecilerin kendilerini kandırdıklarını, sömürdüklerini alaycı bir dille ifade ettikleri gözlemlenmiştir. Bu tür şakalaşmalar, görünürdeki sıkı sosyal ilişkilerin altında bir hoşnutsuzluk ve direnç yattığını gözler önüne sermektedir.

Gerek büyük gerekse küçük çiftçiler, ekonomik zorluklarla başa çıkmak için piyasanın oyun kurallarını devre dışı bırakan, ancak tarımsal oyunun tam parçası olan çeşitli taktiklere başvurarak maliyetlerini düşürme yoluna gitmektedirler. Çiftçilerin üretim maliyetlerini düşürmek için geleneksel tohumlara başvurmak gibi piyasa dışı kaynaklara kullanarak ya da gübre ve ilaç gibi bazı girdileri hiç kullanmayarak maliyetleri azaltma eğilimindedirler. Yine özellikle şeker pancarı ve buğday üretiminde maliyetleri düşürmek için tarım işçisine başvurmak yerine aile içi emeğe geri dönüş gözlenmiştir. Çiftçilerin gübre ve ilaç kullanmaktan kaçınması verim ve kalite üzerinde olumsuz etkiler yaratmakta, bu tür hayatta kalma stratejileri bu defa özellikle küçük çiftçilerin mahsullerinin TMO'nun kalite standartlarını karşılamasını zorlaştırmakta ve çiftçilerin TMO yerine tüccarları tercih etmesine neden olmaktadır.

Şeker pancarı üretiminde de tüccarlar, tahıl ticaretinde olduğu gibi kâr elde etmek amacıyla kota sistemi üzerinden hareket etmektedir. Kota sahibi olan büyük çiftçiler, kota dışı üretim yapan küçük çiftçilerden pancar satın alıp, kota kapsamında fabrikaya satarak devletin belirlediği sübvansiyonlu fiyatlardan yararlanır. Bu tüccarlar, kota fiyat farkından kazanç sağlarken, nakliye destekleri gibi ödemelerden de yararlanmaktadır. Bazı büyük çiftçilerin kotaya erişimlerinin, siyasi ve bürokratik ilişkiler sayesinde olduğu ifade edilmektedir. Zamanla kota sahibi çiftçi sayısının azaldığı, ancak kotaların bir azınlığın elinde yoğunlaştığı yayınlanan resmi verilerle de doğrulanır niteliktedir. Bu durum, pancar üretim politikalarının güçlü oyuncular lehine işlediğini ve küçük çiftçilerin üretimden uzaklaştırıldığını göstermektedir. Burada da büyük çiftçilerin ve tüccarların, ekonomik ve sosyal sermayeleri ile siyasal alandaki güçlerini kullanarak tarımsal alanda üstünlüklerini pekiştirdikleri görülmektedir.

Şeker pancarı posası da ticaret konusu olmaktadır. Şeker pancarı üreticileri, üretim sürecinin sonunda pancardan elde edilen posayı hayvan yemi olarak kullanmak üzere alabilirler. Ancak, nakde ihtiyaç duyan ya da hayvan beslemeyen çiftçiler, bu posaları almak yerine fabrikadan verilen posa kartlarını tüccarlara satmaktadırlar. Tüccarlar, çiftçilerden düşük fiyatla topladıkları bu kartları daha yüksek fiyata satarak kazanç elde etmektedirler. Bu ticaret sistemi, tüccarların tarımsal alandaki sosyal ve ekonomik sermayelerini kullanarak küçük çiftçilerin sübvansiyon haklarını satın alması ve yeniden dağıtması üzerine kuruludur. Çiftçilerin nakit ihtiyacı ve piyasanın karmaşıklıkları, pancar posası kartlarının ticaretine zemin hazırlamıştır.

Tarımsal alandaki kültürel sermayenin özellikleri ve dönüşümü ile bu sermayenin niteliksel ve niceliksel eşitsiz dağılımı, sosyal sınıflar arasında önemli farklılaşmalara yol açmaktadır. Küreselleşmenin tarımsal ekonomi üzerindeki etkilerinin artması ve bilgiye erişimin hızlanması ile tarımsal kültürel sermayenin içeriği hızla değişmeye başlamıştır. Çiğdemli'de yapılan görüşmeler, kültürel sermayenin üç biçiminin (kurumsal, nesneleşmiş, bedenselleşmiş) sosyal sınıflar arasında eşit dağılmadığını göstermektedir. Yaşlı çiftçiler geleneksel tekniklere dayanırken, genç nesil yeni değerlere ve modern tarım uygulamalarına yönelmektedir. Bu farklılıklar, çiftçiler arasında hangi değerlerin ideal tarım pratiğini temsil edeceği konusunda süregelen bir kültürel mücadeleyi ortaya koymaktadır.

Bu bağlamda Bourdieu'nun 'nesneleşmiş kültürel sermaye' olarak ifade ettiği kültürel sermaye türünün tarımsal alandaki sosyal sınıflar arasında süregelen sembolik mücadelede önemli bir rol oynadığı söylenebilir. Küçük çiftçilerin en yeni traktörleri edinme isteği, ekonomik nedenlerin yanı sıra sembolik bir anlam taşımaktadır. Traktör alımına dair yapılan tartışmalarda, çiftçilerin borçlarını yönetememeleri ve gereksiz yere büyük traktörler satın almaları daha yüksek sosyal sınıflarda yer alan çiftçiler tarafından eleştirilmektedir. Küçük çiftçiler, ata toprağını boş bırakmamak gibi sembolik gerekçeleri de öne sürerek, geleneksel çalışkanlık imajını korumak adına olumsuz koşullara rağmen tarım yapmaya devam etmektedirler. Buna karşılık büyük çiftçiler ve kısmi zamanlı çiftçiler, küçük çiftçileri 'tembellik' ile suçlamakta, bu etiket sosyal hiyerarşi içinde sembolik bir şiddet aracı olarak kullanılmaktadır. Küçük çiftçilerin eski tarımsal yöntemlere bağlı kalmaları, büyük çiftçiler tarafından 'bilinçsiz' tarım olarak damgalanmakta ve bu durum, onların ekonomik zorluklarının nedenleri arasında gösterilmektedir.

Bazı yarı zamanlı ve kentli çiftçiler ise, büyük ölçekli tarımı savunarak, uzmanlık ve piyasa bilgisi temelinde tarımın profesyonelleşmesi gerektiğini vurgulamaktadır. Yarı zamanlı çiftçiler, geleneksel tarım uygulamalarından uzaklaşarak bilimsel yöntemlere, eğitim ve yeniliklere vurgu yapmakta, iklim değişikliği ve tarımda modern tekniklerin eksikliği gibi konuları gündeme almakta, bu yolla kendilerini "iyi çiftçiler" olarak tanımlarken, küçük çiftçileri eski ve etkisiz yöntemlere bağlı kalmakla eleştirmektedirler. Bu tablo, tarımsal sorunların kökenlerini sınıfsal farklılıklar ve kültürel sermaye ile ilişkilendiren bir perspektifimizi desteklemektedir.

Buna karşılık yaşlı küçük çiftçiler geleneksel bilgi ve deneyimin önemini vurgulayarak özellikle tarıma yeni gelen çiftçileri küçümsemekte, onları ek gelir arayan ve tarımda kısa dönemli fırsat gördükleri için gelen dışarıdan kimseler olarak görmektedirler. İkinci bir belirgin eğilim olarak yaşlı küçük çiftçiler yeni tür tarımsal kültürün temsilcisi olan ziraat mühendislerini ve uzmanları, tarımın pratik bilgisine sahip olmamakla, tarımdan anlamamakla suçlamaktadırlar. Sınıfsal ayrışmaların sembolik bir düzlemde belirginleştiği bu söylemsel çatışma alanı bize, tarımsal oyunun dinamik ve dönüşen yapısı karşısında oyuncuların sahip oldukları sermaye kompozisyonuna göre ellerindeki sermayenin göreli değerini korumak ve yükseltmek için nasıl mücadele ettiklerini gözler önüne sermektedir.

Tezinin son bölümünde, elde edilen bulguların sonuçları tartışılmıştır. İlk olarak, Bourdieu'nun teorik çerçevesi yerel tarımsal ilişkilere çok yönlü ve bütüncül bir açıdan bakmaya olanak sağlayacak kavramsal araçları sağladığı düşünülmektedir. Bourdieu'nun sermaye kavramının tarımsal sermayeye uygulanması kullanılarak, tarımsal alan dışında tarımsal sermayenin dönüştürülmesindeki zorluklar vurgulanmakta, bu durumun küçük çiftçilerin tarımda kalma eğilimini açıkladığı görülmektedir. Habitus kavramı ise sınıf farklılaşmalarını anlamada önemli bir araç sunarak, tarım uygulamaları ve hayatta kalma stratejileri arasındaki sınıf farklılıklarını ortaya koymaktadır.

Çiğdemli'deki saha çalışmaları, tarımsal ilişkilerin dinamik ve değişken doğasını ortaya koyarak, yaşlı küçük çiftçilerin sınıf stratejilerini ve aile içindeki yerlerini vurgulamaktadır. Ayrıca, genç çiftçilerin, tarımsal alanda yeni bir aktör olarak ortaya çıkma potansiyeline sahip olduğu, ancak bu geçişin çatışmasız olmayacağı ifade edilmektedir. Tarım alanındaki yasalar ve kurallar, yerel sosyal yapılarla etkileşime girerek, kaynakların yeniden dağıtımında önemli rol oynamaktadır.

Sonuç olarak, yaşlı küçük çiftçilerin tarımdan çekilmesi, Çiğdemli'de tarımın sona ereceği anlamına gelmez; yeni sosyal sınıfların bu alanı doldurabileceği ve tarımsal alanın dinamiklerinin devam edeceği öngörülmektedir. Yeni ve genç çiftçilerin, kaynaklarını tarım alanına yatırarak, geleneksel yöntemlerden uzaklaşmaları, gelecekte Çiğdemli gibi yerlerde tarımsal ilişkilerin yeniden şekillenmesine katkı sağlayabilir.

.

## F. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

*(Please fill out this form on computer. Double click on the boxes to fill them)*

**ENSTİTÜ /** INSTITUTE

**Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences ☐

**Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Social Sciences ☒

**Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics ☐

**Enformatik Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Informatics ☐

**Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü** / Graduate School of Marine Sciences ☐

**YAZARIN /** AUTHOR

**Soyadı** / Surname : ALAN
**Adı** / Name : AYKUT OZAN
**Bölümü** / Department : Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi / Political Science and Public Administration

**TEZİN ADI /** TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce** / English): LOCAL AGRICULTURAL RELATIONS AND FARMER STRATEGIES: THE CASE OF ÇİĞDEMLİ

**TEZİN TÜRÜ /** DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master ☐ **Doktora** / PhD ☒

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır. /** Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide. ☒
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of **two years. *** ☐
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for period of **six months**. ***** ☐

***** *Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir. / A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.*

**Yazarın imzası** / Signature ..... **Tarih** / Date .....
*(Kütüphaneye teslim ettiğiniz tarih. Elle doldurulacaktır.)*
*(Library submission date. Please fill out by hand.)*

*Tezin son sayfasıdır. / This is the last page of the thesis/dissertation.*